



Declassification of Records Relating to Nuclear
Weapons Testing and Cleanup Activities in the
Marshall Islands

Feasibility Study

August 2022

Executive Summary	8
Background	13
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)	13
Summary of Issues and Recommendations	13
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands	16
U.S. and Marshall Islands Relations	17
Compacts of Free Association	17
Current concerns of the Marshallese	18
Methodology for the Feasibility Study	20
Appendices	30
Appendix A	30
National Defense Authorization Act of 2020	30
Appendix B	31
Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000, as amended	31
Appendix C	42
Public Interest Declassification Board Member Biographies	42
Appendix D	47
Potentially Responsive Record Collections	47
NARA Holdings and Accessioned Records	47
Federal Records Relating to Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands	47
Section 1: Possibly Responsive Records by Operation	47
Section 2: Possibly Relevant Records by Record Group(s)	47
Record Group 19: Records of the Bureau of Ships (1946-66)	47
Record Group 24: Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel	48
Record Group 38: Records of the Chief of Naval Operations	48
Record Group 48: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior	48
Record Group 52: Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	49
Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State	49
Record Group 74: Record of the Bureau of Ordnance (1946-59)	49
Record Group 77: Records of the Army Corps of Engineers	49
Record Group 90: Records of the Public Health Service	49
Record Group 181: Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments	49
Record Group 218: Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	50
Record Group 220: Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards	50
Record Group 313: Records of Naval Operating Forces	50
Record Group 326: Records of the Atomic Energy Commission	50
National Archives at Riverside	50

Record Group 338: US Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (World War II and Thereafter), 1917-1999	50
Record Group 344: Records of the Naval Sea Systems Command (1966 -)	50
Record Group 359: Records of the Office of Science and Technology (OST)	51
Presidential scientific advisor records in the appropriate Presidential libraries. Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology 1957-1972 and Science Advisor to the President, 1973-76.	51
Record Group 374: Records of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency	51
Record Group 385: Records of the Naval Facilities and Engineering Command	51
Record Group 402: Records of the Bureau of Weapons (1959-66)	51
Record Group 407: Records of the Adjutant General's Office	51
Record Group 412: Records of the Environmental Protection Agency	51
Record Group 434: Records of the Department of Energy	51
Record Group 443: Records of the National Institutes of Health	52
Record Group 494: Records of US Army Forces in the Middle Pacific	52
Record Group 496: Records of GHQ, SW Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II)	52
Record Group 550: Records US Army, Pacific	52
Record Group 593: Records of Strategic Systems Projects Office (SSPO)	52
San Francisco Federal Records Center	52
Presidential Libraries Records Relating to Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands	53
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library	53
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library	54
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library	54
The Center for Legislative Archives Records Relating to Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands	56
Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy	56
Records of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources	56
Department of Defense	57
U.S. Army	57
US Army Center of Military History, Library at Fort McNair	57
Army Declassification Directorate	58
US Army History and Education Center	58
U.S. Navy	59
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	59
Naval Sea Systems Command	60
Commander Naval Surface Force	60
Dept of the Navy, US Pacific Fleet	60
Naval History and Heritage Command	60

U.S. Fleet Forces	62
DRMD Declassification Program	62
U.S. Air Force	62
Air Force Historical Research Agency	63
Joint Chief of Staff	63
JS/Joint History Office	63
Defense Technical Information Center	63
Defense Threat Reduction Agency	63
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)	63
Undersecretary of Defense Policy	64
OSD Records Office (WHS/ESD/RDD)	64
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness	66
Department of Energy	67
Headquarters Defense Programs	67
Headquarters DOE Records Management Historians Office	67
Headquarters Environmental, Health, Safety, and Security	68
Headquarters Federal Records Center (WNRC)	68
Brookhaven National Laboratory	69
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	69
Los Alamos National Laboratory - Institution Records Management	70
Los Alamos National Laboratory - Weapons Records Services	71
Los Alamos National Laboratory - Weapons Records Services-Project Y Index	72
Nevada National Security Site	73
Office of Scientific Technical Information	73
Sandia National Laboratory	73
Appendix E	75
National Declassification Center Review Process Flowchart	75
Appendix F	77
List of Stakeholders Consulted	77
Bibliography and Resources	79

August 12, 2022

The Honorable Jack Reed
Chairman
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee

The Honorable James Inhofe
Ranking Member
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee

The Honorable Adam Smith
Chairman
U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Ranking Member
U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee

The Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) is pleased to provide you with its feasibility study for reviewing and declassifying information related to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands, including cleanup activities and the storage of waste. This study was conducted pursuant to section 1685 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which the President signed into law on December 27, 2021.

Over the past three decades, the U.S. Government has declassified substantial volumes of information, including significant historical information about the 67 nuclear tests conducted in the Marshall Islands. Declassified and publicly available records date from the earliest test in 1946 to monitoring activities in the 1980s. Although the U.S. government has undertaken a number of declassification projects specifically related to the U.S. nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, department and agency efforts in releasing information about the tests and cleanup activities have been disjointed, singular, and transactional. There has been no strategic or “whole-of-government” approach. As a result, declassified information can be difficult to locate and analyze.

The U.S. Government has also not made all records related to testing in the Marshall Islands available to the public. Some information remains classified or is not publicly available for other reasons. Other records are unclassified, or their classification status is unknown, as they are unprocessed and located in U.S. Government archives or records centers across the nation. These records are almost always contained within larger collections of records that include a variety of topics unrelated to weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. As shown in Appendix D of this study, departments, agencies, and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) identified a multitude of archival collections that may contain potentially relevant information.

We believe there is new information to be discovered within these unprocessed collections. We also believe a special project to search for, identify, review for declassification, and make responsive records available to the public is feasible. However, if undertaken, completing it successfully will be difficult, costly, and lengthy. Such a project will require dedicated resources, highly specialized staff with subject-matter expertise, and significant new funding. Critically, if such a project is to be undertaken, it must be done strategically and in a way that permits interagency collaboration, integrates declassification and public access review standards, and enables easy online public access, ideally including access to previously declassified records.

The United States Congress created the PIDB through the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000, as amended. As authorized by Congress, the PIDB advises the President, other Executive branch officials, and the Congress on the systematic, thorough, coordinated, and comprehensive identification, collection, and review for declassification and potential release of records with archival value and extraordinary public interest. The PIDB is non-partisan and composed of nine members drawn from the public, five of whom are appointed by the President and four by the respective leaders of Congress. The PIDB is an independent government entity, yet it does not have an appropriation and, instead, relies on the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) at NARA for all staff, program, and logistical support. The ISOO staff spent over 600 staff hours supporting the preparation of this study.

This is the first instance of the PIDB conducting a declassification study on a specific topic. Given the NDAA requirement's breadth, the PIDB formed its recommendations based on a high-level plan that included seeking data from the Departments of Defense and Energy and NARA about classified archival holdings as well as records that were previously declassified. The PIDB's plan also included extensive background research, speaking with stakeholders, holding closed-door investigative meetings, and gaining insight into antiquated records management and declassification processes.

At the onset, we requested assistance, including staff augmentation, from the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. They or their predecessor agencies and components were responsible for the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program in the Marshall Islands and related activities. They have subject matter expertise and experienced staff who perform records management and declassification review. They also maintain physical possession of the records in their facilities and in national laboratories across the country. Importantly, they are also the only two departments that have declassification authority over information related to nuclear testing. In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Department of Energy is solely responsible for the classification and declassification of information identified as "Restricted Data" while the Departments of Defense and Energy jointly are responsible for the classification and declassification of information identified as "Formerly Restricted Data."

Between late December 2021 and June 2022, the PIDB and its staff conducted over 40 virtual and in-person meetings with stakeholders. We met with declassifiers and records managers from the Departments of Defense and Energy, agency staff supporting the National Declassification Center, archivists at NARA, and representatives from the Department of State. We held virtual meetings with representatives from the Marshall Islands and its National Nuclear Commission to gain perspective and learn about the interests of the Marshallese. We met with historians to better understand both the history of nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands and learn about their research methodologies.

In addition to the need for dedicated resources, a special declassification project like this one is further complicated by the antiquated condition of current declassification policies and

processes. In many ways, the challenges identified in this feasibility study mirror the challenges the PIDB has previously identified with declassifying and making publicly available historical records. In previous reports to the President, we expressed the urgent need to reform the classification and declassification system and offered recommendations for its modernization to help address these challenges. In our June 2020 report to the President, we offered a road map to enact reform. We believe that many of the challenges detailed in this feasibility study would be alleviated or reduced through this modernization and introduction of automated systems. For instance, investments in and the application of machine learning and artificial intelligence technologies could support this project, including by identifying potentially responsive records and assisting declassification and public access reviews.

The PIDB hopes this declassification feasibility study will serve as a call to action for the government to invest in modernizing the classification and declassification process. The staggering departmental estimates of the resources required to accomplish greater public understanding of specific weapons testing—\$100-200 million—is far more than we currently spend annually on all government declassification efforts combined. Action to fix the classification system is required today. Modernization will not only improve public access to our nation’s national security history and aid transparency, but it will also support our nation’s 21st century national security requirements.

Should your schedule permit, we would welcome the opportunity to discuss this feasibility study in greater detail with you. We look forward to answering your questions and those of the committee members and staff.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'EZRA COHEN', written in a cursive, stylized font.

EZRA COHEN
Chair

Executive Summary

The Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) completed a study on the feasibility of conducting a declassification review of records related to U.S. weapons tests conducted in the Marshall Islands for the United States Senate and House of Representatives Armed Services Committees. This study focused on activities concerning the 67 U.S. nuclear weapons tests conducted between 1946 and 1958. It also included activities related to these tests, including the cleanup and storage of nuclear waste. The study was performed pursuant to section 1685 of P.L. 117-81, the National Defense Authorization Act, which President Joseph R. Biden signed on December 27, 2021.

The PIDB believes it would be feasible to conduct a topical-based declassification project, but would encourage Congress to consider whether such a project merits the resources required. To be successful, such a project will need to address several significant challenges and will require dedicated new resources. Based on data provided by Executive branch agencies, the project will cost between \$100-200 million. It will require approximately 100 new Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff who are fully cleared at the Top Secret and Q levels, and who are trained to identify and review technical nuclear weapons data. Given the large volume of unprocessed records to search—estimated to be over 40-80 million pages scattered in various facilities around the country—and the cumbersome manual processes associated with searching for and then reviewing records on a word-for-word basis, the PIDB estimates that it will take at least four to six years to complete.

Alternatively, the government could scale back the project. Taking this approach would reduce the volume of records to search and review, reduce costs, and require fewer FTE staff. Working with stakeholders, the Government would prioritize the search of archival collections deemed most likely to contain relevant information and information that is historically significant. There would be fewer records to search and to review for public access. However, staff would still require the appropriate security clearances and would also still require extensive technical training. Although the overall time needed to complete a scaled-down project would be reduced, it is our assessment that such a project will still take between three to four years to complete.

A third option would be for the government to focus on digitization of suspected records and the subsequent application of machine learning technologies to support either the search for relevant records or public access review—or both. If combined with the digitization of previously declassified records, that additional data could be used to support technology-assisted review. Digitization costs, according to NARA and the departments, are not insignificant. Estimates we received were based on previous projects and varied in price from just over \$1.00 per page up to over \$3.00 per page, depending on requirements. These costs likely preclude digitization of entire unprocessed collections, although some key unprocessed collections identified in a prioritization plan—for instance, the U.S. Congress' Joint Committee on Atomic Energy—should be digitized in their entirety, given their historical significance and likelihood of containing important relevant information.

Completing a Declassification and Public Access Review Project: What It Would Take

Ultimately the U.S. Congress will make the determination whether to dedicate funds for a special project to search for relevant records and review them for public access. The three main Executive branch entities—the Departments of Defense and Energy and NARA—will need to develop and agree on a comprehensive project plan with an end goal of making relevant

records available and accessible to the public. In addition to dedicated funding and new resources, to be successful, a declassification project of this scope and size will need to address challenges the PIDB identified during the course of its research and in its interviews with stakeholders.

Addressing these challenges form the basis of the PIDB's recommendations:

- *Sustained executive-level leadership, direction, and support.* Senior-level officials from participating agencies must oversee the project and remain actively engaged throughout its duration. This continued engagement serves several purposes, including reinforcing its importance. Senior-level officials also can resolve interagency disputes, provide direction, monitor progress, and hold staff accountable.
- *A senior-level official from the Department of Energy to serve as project leader.* The Department of Energy has experience leading several declassification projects related to nuclear weapons testing, including projects concerning nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. Importantly, it is solely responsible for identifying, classifying, and declassifying technical nuclear weapons information under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and leads the Historical Records Restricted Data Recognition and Historical Records Restricted Data Reviewers certification and training courses. Recently, the Department of Energy has been testing advanced technologies to support the identification of Restricted Data (RD) information in digital data.
- *Interagency agreement on the project plan.* The Departments of Defense and Energy and NARA need to agree on all elements of the project, including its scope, terminology for conducting searches, timelines, declassification review and public access review standards, multi-agency review standards, scanning and redaction standards, and equity review referral policies and practices. Additionally, all participating departments must have access to secure communication systems and software for redacting sensitive information.
- *Include unclassified records in the project.* The NDAA limited the scope of the PIDB's study to classified records, meaning unclassified and previously declassified records fell outside the scope of Congress' request. In fact, as the PIDB gathered information, it learned that many unprocessed records are not classified, including some that may be relevant to the request. These unclassified records are likely very important to the Marshallese people, including information on health, safety, environmental testing, and cleanup activities.
- *Interagency agreement on declassification guidance for Restricted Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD).* Typically, once identified, records containing RD and FRD information are simply excluded from public release. The project leader should convene an interagency group of technical subject matter experts, historians, and declassifiers to develop a comprehensive and detailed declassification guide for all participating agencies to use for the project. At the outset, this group should engage with stakeholders and researchers to learn about their interests. This special RD/FRD declassification guide should seek to declassify and disclose as much information as possible, including evaluating whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the need for restriction. It should receive approval from interagency senior leaders and its contents incorporated into training reviewers. The declassification guide should be

sufficiently specific and detailed that it could support a project to use advanced technology to support automated review.

- *Interagency agreement on declassification guidance for national security restrictions.* Participating agencies should develop a comprehensive and detailed topical declassification guide to review national security information. Like the process used in creating the RD/FRD declassification guide, it should take stakeholder interest into account, evaluate the public interest in disclosure, and be sufficiently detailed to permit its use for automated review. Once approved by interagency senior leaders, reviewers from all participating agencies should receive authorization to use it.
- *Interagency agreement on other non-classification restrictions.* The PIDB learned that there are records and information withheld from the public for reasons other than national security or Atomic Energy Act requirements. Typically, these records are unclassified but contain information that, if publicly released, could violate the privacy of a person. However, each agency has its own definitions which reviewers then apply routinely without conducting research. This project should have common and agreed-upon definitions for privacy and other non-national security restrictions that also include examples to guide reviewers. Working with stakeholders, agencies should seek the narrowest definitions, and consider possible substituted text that informs users of content. The creation and use of these types of declassification guides and standard criteria for non-national security restrictions ensures consistency of declassification and public access reviews across agencies and maximizes the information that can be made available to the public.
- *Agreement on processing non-textual records.* Agencies identified several forms of non-textual records that could potentially contain responsive information. They are listed in Appendix D and include motion picture film, audio recordings, still pictures, and microfilm. There must be agreement on whether to include these formats in the project, and if so, how to search and review them for public access. While some formats do not present difficult challenges, others do. Microfilm is a particularly vexing challenge as each reel might contain thousands of pages from hundreds of documents on a variety of topics. Isolating, reviewing, and redacting individual documents is even more complicated. Regardless, all decisions about the treatment of non-textual records should be carefully documented, described, and be included in the public record.
- *Agreement on overcoming logistical challenges associated with the physical locations of records.* This report highlights challenges related to the physical locations of potentially responsive records. Executive Order 13526 established the National Declassification Center (NDC) at NARA in College Park, Maryland with the express purpose to facilitate the review of records containing multiple-agency equities, including the Department of Energy's authority to review information designated as RD and FRD. At present, it remains the only entity focused on the review of these multi-equity records. Yet, as detailed in Appendix D of this report, many important unprocessed collections are physically located in other facilities that lack any ability to conduct or lead a multiple-agency equity declassification review process. These facilities include the Department of Energy sponsored labs in New Mexico, California, and New York, a Defense Threat Reduction Agency facility in New Mexico, and the Center for Legislative Archives (CLA) and the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHHC) in Washington, D.C. None have processes that permit the declassification review of multi-equity records. Successful

completion of this project must include solutions that permit the review of these important unprocessed collections, including:

- developing and agreeing to a plan that permits a thorough search for responsive records; and
 - deciding how best to conduct a declassification and public access review on these records. One option to consider would be to digitize them—or the entire collection, depending on its historical significance.
- *Access to secure communications networks.* While several facilities have either Secret and/or Top Secret communications networks, not all do. Specifically, the NDC and the NHHHC only have Secret network communications, while the CLA does not have a secure communications capability. The accreditation process for obtaining a Top Secret network and terminal is both costly and, more importantly, time-consuming.
 - *Digitize the records.* Agencies should evaluate the benefits and costs of digitization for this project. While digitizing all records identified in Appendix D is both cost-prohibitive and not desirable, there is great value in digitizing relevant records. Both the NHHHC and the CLA have unprocessed collections that should be considered for digitization. Agencies should also consider the potential benefits to digitizing a few complete series or entire collections that contain relevant information and are also historically significant. Digitization will also improve public access to the records by making them available online instead of only in research rooms or by request. It also enables the possible use of advanced technologies to support declassification and public access review.
 - *Develop and use metadata standards for digitized records.* It is critical that this project develops and uses metadata standards to support any digitization effort. These standards will support online access, increase discoverability, and provide users with important contextual information, including archival description and arrangement information. Researchers can track these records back to their original locations and learn more about the contents and value of those series and collections.
 - *Consider the use of advanced technologies.* This project offers an opportunity to test machine learning and artificial intelligence technologies and learn how they can support more effective and efficient declassification and public access review. The Department of Energy is currently testing the use of this technology for identifying nuclear weapons design information classified as RD. It should consider expanding this test to include evaluating records for this project. The declassification guide created for this project should be sufficiently detailed and precise to support advanced technology use. The Department of Energy should also incorporate previously declassified records to improve accuracy.
 - *An integrated public access plan that facilitates use.* One challenge identified by researchers is the confusion of where to research and find relevant declassified records. Currently, there is no integrated point to access declassified and publicly available records. They are scattered or grouped on multiple government websites, including several different sites operated by the Department of Energy, its affiliated national laboratories, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Nuclear Testing Archive, and NARA. Other websites contain broken links that are no longer active. Still others note that online documentation is incomplete, and accessing specific records requires a written request. Responsive records are provided at a later date. To be successful, this

project must include a strategic plan that enables easy public access. This plan must include all participating agencies, and, ideally, should include previously declassified records.

Considering a Cost/Benefit Analysis and Timeliness for Completion

In evaluating our recommendations, agencies must naturally weigh the costs to fund this project and consider the additional resources required. As currently written in the FY 2022 NDAA, Congress asked the PIDB to study the feasibility for declassifying information “relating to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, or ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands.”

The Department of Energy conducted several declassification projects over the past 30 years to search for and review records relating to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands¹. These projects have resulted in the declassification of millions of pages of government records. Department of Energy declassifiers informed the PIDB that almost all information has been declassified—with only specific information detailing nuclear weapons design information still classified as RD. Still, fully documenting the 67 nuclear weapons tests conducted in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958 has proven elusive as each project identifies some new information.

While the Departments of Defense and Energy have informed the PIDB that the U.S. did not conduct any tests of chemical or biological weapons in the Marshall Islands, the Department of Defense and its components have a long history of using the Marshall Islands for rocket launches and testing missiles, including ballistic missiles. This testing began in 1946 and continues today at the 750,000-square-mile Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Site. Including information about all the missile tests conducted over the past 75 years would significantly increase the scope of a declassification project. The Department of Defense informed the PIDB that searching for potentially responsive records would include between 100 and 200 million records and would take a decade or longer to complete. Most of the information in the historical records, even if unprocessed or not yet accessioned to NARA, has been automatically declassified.

The government must be realistic about what it can accomplish. Accordingly, designing the project with a proper and realistic scope is important. It should be transparent about how it develops and designs the project. This must include search policies and terms, metadata requirements, scanning and digitization processes, and public access and declassification review guides. The explanation should also include specific information about what information remains unavailable or restricted. Once the project is complete and records are posted online, an agency must be designated to maintain and update the website, adding newly available records once restrictions lapse.

¹ Between 1993 and 1997, the Department of Energy searched over 3.2 million cubic feet of records to identify records related to nuclear weapons testing, and related activities as part of Secretary Hazel O’Leary’s Openness Initiative. By the end of 1997, it had declassified over 10 million pages, including records related to human radiation experiments and records related to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. Later, in the early to mid-2000s it identified additional records for declassification. Beginning in 2012, the Department of Energy began a new round of searches, declassifying records later that year and in subsequent years through 2015. Many of these records were provided to the Marshallese at different points in time—on paper, disks and CDs. Other declassified records were posted on several different websites, including the Department’s Office of Scientific and Technical Information website, OpenNet; Lawrence Livermore National Lab’s website; and the Nuclear Testing Archive, to name a few.

Background

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

The FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), signed by President Joseph R. Biden on December 27, 2021, included a section that mandated the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) conduct a feasibility study on the declassification of information “relating to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, or ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands, including with respect to cleanup activities and the storage of waste relating to such tests,” (section 1685).

Summary of Issues and Recommendations

The PIDB identified many challenges that must be addressed as part of a declassification project related to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. The records that may be responsive are in the legal custody of the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

NARA holds records that may be responsive to the study. Archivists identified series that are restricted for national security or privacy. Included in this study are unrestricted records that may be responsive. These records may be either unprocessed or not fully described. An additional challenge affecting the search is that the records are located in various locations throughout the country. Records are held at the Washington, D.C. and College Park, Maryland facilities, the regional archival facilities of Seattle and San Francisco, and the Hoover, Eisenhower, and Carter Presidential Libraries. The National Declassification Center (NDC), established in accordance with Executive Order 13536 section 3.7, coordinates the review of classified documents in the custody of the National Archives. The process to conduct the review is detailed in Appendix E.

Although section 3.7 (e) of the executive order provided the authority for agency heads to establish centralized facilities to conduct internal declassification reviews, agencies never implemented internal declassification centers. Currently, there is no established process for agencies to conduct internal reviews for records in their holdings, nor is there a process to review records with interagency equities. Coordination among the agencies with equities for the responsive records will be a major challenge requiring resources.

Challenges to equity reviews will present a problem across agencies. Staff at the Naval History and Heritage Command noted that there are pending referrals to some of the responsive records to the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), and the United States Air Force (USAF). Although some organizations have conducted referral reviews, it is unclear if these reviews are complete. They further noted that they have no evidence that DOE has reviewed any of the material referred to them over the last 20 years. Similarly, the Defense Threat Reduction Information and Analysis Center has

historical records that have been partially declassified. These records are not publicly available since other equity-owning agencies have not reviewed them. The largest equity-owning agency with unreviewed equities is the Department of Energy.

Any future declassification project will require additional resources including staffing, technology, and funding.

Department of Energy. The Department of Energy provided cost figures for their current declassification program. It costs \$5.50 per page for pass/fail reviews for a collection with 15% of the collection containing classified information. This cost includes the support contractor at \$5 per page (which includes scanning the documents for review) and federal staff to inspect the work at \$0.50. The cost increases to \$7.50 a page for a collection containing 100% classified documents. It costs about \$32 per page for redaction review at the sentence level and to provide a sanitized version of the document.

For the feasibility study, DOE estimated that the agency has 3.8 million pages of classified Marshall Islands records to review (1.8 million DOE pages and 2 million referral pages). DOE's survey was done at the document level or box level and this estimate is based upon an average of 10 pages per document or for boxes, at 2,500 pages per box. DOE would require additional staff for such a project. If DOE hires an additional 18 new contractors and 2 new federal staff, they estimate it would cost \$134 million (at \$35 a page) and take 23.5 years to redact 3.8 million pages of classified Marshall Islands documents.

Department of Defense. The Department of Defense provided a rough estimate to perform a Marshall Islands search, declassification review, and public release process. DoD would require an estimated additional funding allocation of \$60–80 million dollars. The funds would support a staffing increase for program managers, records management personnel, digital archivists, records research analysts, and declassification personnel. They would also require technology investments. They anticipate classified records would have to be transported to the Washington, D.C. area for digitization, review, declassification, and public release processing. DoD would also require funding to either improve or build declassification collaboration and workflow systems. This would be a multi-year project, conservatively estimated to take five years.

The PIDB also identified the following areas that would have to be addressed for any future undertaking to declassify records relating to weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. These can be grouped into three categories: structural, organizational, and policy challenges.

Structural challenges:

- Overcoming poor record-keeping practices;
- Searching large quantities of record series—including non-textual records such as film—for individual responsive records and devising a way to identify each, including their original archival file location;
- Using technology and secure systems to process and review records; and

- Addressing unclassified records identified in the search of unprocessed series of records.

Organizational challenges:

- Determining how to address and/or include records from previous declassification projects, Freedom of Information Act requests, Mandatory Declassification Review requests, or other public access requests, including those conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of Energy.

Policy challenges:

- Creating a comprehensive list of search terms;
- Adopting policy boundaries on records to include in the project;
- Agreeing to standards that permit declassification of classified national security information, including the boundaries of information that would otherwise remain classified;
- Developing declassification requirements for information that is cross-classified as “Restricted Data” in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and processes that include quality control/quality assurance reviews in accordance with section 3161 of the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act (Kyl-Lott Amendment);
- Adopting standards that sufficiently address privacy concerns, especially those that involve health information, that may permit declassification but limit or prevent public release;
- Evaluating all applicable statutes in devising criteria for declassification and for public release of information;
- Developing processes to permit multi-agency declassification review of records that have not been accessioned to the NARA or are not included in NDC processes; and
- Deciding on how to release all declassified records to the public and ensure its continued public access.

This list, while incomplete, is illustrative of the many challenges that need to be addressed for this project to be successful. Completion of such a large topical project will require new and dedicated resources. They include millions of dollars for secure communications capabilities at various facilities across the nation where classified records are currently stored, project management tools, redaction software, and web design and hosting. The project will require staff to perform searches and digitize responsive records, conduct public access and declassification reviews, and design and manage the public-facing website.

Staff assigned to the project will require Top Secret and “Q” level security clearances. Currently, it costs \$5,410 for a Tier 5 (TS/SCI) clearance while an expedited clearance costs \$5,845. Staff will require specialized training in identifying scientific and technical information related to nuclear weapons design, in making declassification and public access determinations using criteria established for the project, and in using software and project management applications. Given the geographic locations of the records across the U.S., staff will either have to travel to those locations, or new staff hired at those locations.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands

At the onset of World War II, the Marshall Islands were occupied and under the control of the Empire of Japan. The United States captured the Marshall Islands in 1944, administering it as an occupied enemy territory until 1947. The Marshall Islands, along with Micronesia, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Palau, became part of the U.S.-administered United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. At this time, the U.S. established the Pacific Proving Grounds and conducted nuclear testing on various sites in the Marshall Islands and Pacific Ocean.

Between 1946 and 1958, the United States conducted 67 atmospheric atomic and thermonuclear tests over the Marshall Islands. The tests were conducted on Bikini Atoll and on or near Enewetak Atoll. The Castle Bravo test, conducted on March 1, 1954, on Bikini Atoll, was the largest test and the detonation exceeded the expected yield. Bravo, a thermonuclear weapon, was the largest weapon detonated by the United States. Scientists calculated an expected 6 megaton explosive yield; however, they miscalculated, and the detonation was significantly larger than expected at fifteen megatons. It was a thousand times more powerful than the atomic weapon dropped on Hiroshima. The Marshallese on Bikini and Enewetak had been evacuated prior to the test. Radioactive fallout impacted the inhabited atolls of Rongerik, Rongelap, and Utirik and necessitated an emergency evacuation. According to reports, shortly before the scheduled test the winds shifted direction. This shift was within the forecast and therefore the test was deployed as scheduled. A 2013 Defense Threat Reduction Agency study concluded that the lower-altitude winds did not contribute to the spread of fallout, rather the radioactive material from the high-altitude portion of the Bravo cloud spread the fallout to the inhabited atolls of Rongelap and Rongerik. Calculations had predicted that the fallout would extend to the stratosphere, instead because of the size of the detonation, it was a one-hundred-mile cloud which dispersed the radioactive material over a much larger distance.

A few months later, those from Utirik were permitted to return to their homes while those from Rongelap would only be allowed to return home three years after the test, in 1957. By the 1980s, although the island was declared safe for human habitation, the inhabitants asked to be relocated and in 1985 Greenpeace agreed to relocate the Marshallese to other islands and atolls.

The U.S. continued to use Bikini Atoll as a testing ground until 1958. After conducting radiation monitoring and mitigation efforts and although there was still some radiation detected, the former inhabitants returned to Bikini in 1969. Their food sources from the atoll were restricted because of contamination and they would be required to undergo health monitoring. In 1974

testing discovered greater radiation and residents had higher readings than expected. In 1978 the U.S. removed the inhabitants and declared the area off-limits for at least 60 years.²

U.S. and Marshall Islands Relations

Compacts of Free Association

In 1983 the United States, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia signed a Compact of Free Association. The United States provided economic assistance, defense, and other services and benefits. In exchange, the U.S. was granted certain operating rights. The Compact was signed by President Reagan in 1986 and that year the Republic of the Marshall Islands declared independence.

The U.S. has continued to maintain a missile test facility, the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, which is operated by the Army. The U.S. has operated this facility since post World War II, initially as a Naval Station. The facility is located on Kwajalein Island and consists of the test facility and a community for U.S. Army personnel and civilian contractors. The area is leased by the U.S. and the Marshallese are excluded from living in this community although they may work on the island.

In 2003 the Compact was amended and expires in FY 2024. Currently, there are negotiations underway to amend the Compact. The Department of Interior (DOI) administers the grant funds that are disbursed to the Marshallese affected by the nuclear testing, including from the fallout. There are two interconnected grant programs. One is administered through Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association and is focused on healthcare programs for the Marshallese living on the four atolls impacted by the nuclear testing. The other grant program is broader and provides ad hoc grants. The Government of the Marshall Islands requests funding for certain projects that align with five development areas as defined in the Compact. These projects are wholly separate from those grants associated with those focused on communities affected by the nuclear tests and related activities.

The Compact allows Marshallese to migrate to the U.S. without requiring visas and permits them to obtain employment. There are large Marshallese communities in Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Missouri. Although the relocated Marshallese pay income tax, they are not eligible for other types of federal assistance such as Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid. According

² For historical background see: Holly M. Barker, *Bravo for the Marshallese: Regaining Control in a Post-Nuclear, Post-Colonial World* (Cengage Learning, 2012); Adam Horowitz and Richard Einhorn, *Nuclear Savage: the islands experiment of Secret Project 4.1* ([San Francisco, Calif.]: Video Project, 2012); Thomas Kunkle and Byron Ristvet, *Castle Bravo: Fifty Years of Legend and Lore: A Guide to Off-Site Radiation Exposures* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Information Center, 2013, DTRIAC SR-12-001); Walter Pincus, *Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders*. Diversion Books, 2021.

to a 2020 report by the Government Accountability Office, more than 94,000 compact migrants from Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, live and work in the United States and the territories.

Current concerns of the Marshallese

Long-term health concerns

The Department of Energy administers the Special Medical Care Program which provides medical examinations and treatment for potential radiation-related cancers. This program serves individuals who were exposed to radiation at the Rongelap and Utrik Atolls during the Castle Bravo test. At the time of the test there were 253 people on the atolls and according to the FY2020 DOE report to Congress, *Republic of the Marshall Islands Special Medical Care and Logistics Program Activities, FY 2019*, there were 91 eligible participants at the beginning of FY2020. At the April 20 PIDB executive session, a DOE representative noted that there are currently 74 eligible participants.

The Government of the Marshall Islands contends that the contamination from the fallout and nuclear waste has affected all aspects of their lives. According to the Marshallese, the nuclear fallout has greatly impacted their ability to rely on agriculture and fishing, resulting in a negative effect on their diet and health. This has changed their diets and their overall health. This has impacted generations of Marshallese, especially those who were forced to relocate.

The Marshallese have had a long history of distrust when it comes to their health and the information concerning their healthcare. For many years they were not given access to their own medical records, and many believed that the U.S. Government medical testing program was for research purposes instead of medical monitoring. After the Bravo test, the U.S. began a biomedical project within Operation Castle. This project was numbered 4.1 and suspicion of this project stems from many factors. The final report as well as the addenda on Project 4.1 have been declassified and are available on the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's website, [U.S. Nuclear Test Radiation Exposure Reports](#). Unfortunately, it appears that the lab records from Project 4.1 were not retained by the Department of Energy.

In their 1995 report, the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, an independent temporary advisory committee established by President Bill Clinton, concluded that there was no evidence that either the fallout exposure or the medical tests were conducted for research purposes. They noted there was a tension between data gathering and patient care since the same physician was responsible for both. Additionally, the Advisory Committee noted that insensitivity to cultural differences, failure to include the Marshallese in the planning and implementation of the program, the failure to obtain consent for the medical treatments, and the lack of openness led to the Marshallese's suspicion and distrust of the healthcare provided by the United States.

Runit Dome

Constructed in the late 1970s, Runit Dome is a containment structure on Runit Island, located on Enewetak Atoll. From 1947 to 1958, the U.S. conducted 42 tests on the atoll. Runit Island is uninhabited although the Marshallese returned to Enewetak Atoll in 1980 after a cleanup and rehabilitation program. Runit Dome contains over 100,000 cubic yards of radioactively contaminated soil, metal, concrete and testing debris which was encapsulated in concrete inside the unlined nuclear test crater created by the Cactus nuclear test.

During the 1970's, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), the predecessor agency of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was the lead agency responsible for the cleanup and the construction of the Runit Dome. Over 6,000 military service members from the Department of Defense were involved in the cleanup and construction. Cleanup activities included clearing contaminated vegetation, removing contaminated soil and debris, demolishing and removing uncontaminated buildings and debris, recovering and disposing of unexploded ordnance, and preparing the atoll for resettlement. These service members were exposed to radiation and claim that they did not have sufficient training or protective safety equipment to complete their work.

The United States was required to monitor the containment structure under the United Nations' Trusteeship of the Marshall Islands. The first Compact required an agreement for the U.S. to provide services and assistance, with the Government of the Marshall Islands assuming responsibility and control of the Runit Dome. In 2012, through the Insular Areas Act of 2011, containment monitoring and reporting was assigned to the Secretary of Energy.

The Government of the Marshall Islands is concerned that rising sea levels associated with climate change will threaten the structural integrity of the dome. According to the Department of Energy's 2020 *Report on the Status of the Runit Dome in the Marshall Islands*, the dome is not in danger of collapse or failure; however, there may be risk from the flow of contaminated groundwater from beneath the dome into the marine environment. The rising sea levels in the area, along with storm surges, may affect groundwater beneath the dome.

Previous Declassification Projects

In 1993, at the request of the Marshall Islands Government, the Department of Energy began a search and retrieval effort of documents related to the U.S. nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands. In 2001, the agency believed that they had largely completed the task after making publicly available over 14,000 Marshall Islands records. The information was provided as hardcopies and on CD-ROMs. The agency set-up a website, OpenNet database, as part of their openness initiative, which contained a third set of the information. Over the years, records or bibliographic citations have been added to the OpenNet database. The database is updated regularly as information is declassified.

After 2001 there were additional releases of information to the Marshall Islands Government. In 2005, the agency released declassified documents although the volume is not known. In 2008, the agency released an additional 12,000 records that had been declassified. In 2015, another set of CDs was provided, although this may have been a replacement set since the initial set was found to contain personally identifiable information (PII). According to the agency, the information they have on the releases is not well documented; for instance, they do not have a comprehensive list of records although they do know that a “master index” was provided in 2016. The OpenNet database is comprehensive, for example, the agency noted that all of the records from the Nuclear Testing Archive have been uploaded to the database; however, researchers mentioned that searching can be difficult and it appears, in some cases, links have been broken.

Methodology for the Feasibility Study

The PIDB conducted a high-level study rather than a record-by-record assessment. This study focused on developing a more complete understanding of the status of potentially responsive records created by federal agencies, departments, organizations, units, entities, and national laboratories that participated in any aspect of nuclear weapons testing, environmental and human radiation testing, containment, storage, and cleanup activities between 1946 through 1989.

The PIDB gathered information from departments and agencies about various classified records that may be responsive and on records and records series that are:

- scheduled as permanent records;
- scheduled as temporary records;
- still in active use by the agency; and

- unscheduled.³

As part of the study, the PIDB held meetings with stakeholders, including agency representatives from the Departments of Defense and Energy, congressional staff, congressional committee staff, State Department officials, representatives from the Republic of the Marshall Islands, historians, researchers, records managers, and archivists at the National Archives. A list of stakeholders is included in Appendix F.

The NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy each provide assistance to the PIDB in conducting the study. As part of the process, the PIDB sent formal letters outlining the requirements of the feasibility study, identified the potential responsive components, and the types of information that should be included in the response. The letters are reproduced below.

³ *Permanent record* means any Federal record that has been determined by NARA to have sufficient value to warrant its preservation in the National Archives of the United States, even while it remains in agency custody. Permanent records are those for which the disposition is permanent on SF 115, Request for Records Disposition Authority, approved by NARA on or after May 14, 1973. The term also includes all records accessioned by NARA into the National Archives of the United States.

Temporary record means any Federal record that has been determined by the Archivist of the United States to have insufficient value (on the basis of current standards) to warrant its preservation by the National Archives and Records Administration.

Unscheduled records are Federal records whose final disposition has not been approved by NARA on a SF 115, Request for Records Disposition Authority. Such records must be treated as permanent until a final disposition is approved (36 CFR § 1220.18).

CHAIR

Ezra Cohen



PUBLIC INTEREST
DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY

Mark Bradley

MEMBERS

Paul-Noel Chretien
Laura DeBonis
Michael Lawrence
Benjamin Powell

MEMBERS

Trey Gowdy
Alissa Starzak
John Tierney

December 28, 2021

The Honorable
Lloyd J. Austin III
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Yesterday, President Biden signed the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (the NDAA) into law. The NDAA mandates in Section 1685 that the Public Interest Declassification Board (the Board) “conduct a study on the feasibility of carrying out the declassification review of nuclear, chemical, and ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands,” including cleanup activities and waste storage. This provision also aligns with 50 U.S.C. 3355a which requires the Board “to review and make recommendations to the President in a timely manner with respect to any congressional request... to declassify certain records, to evaluate the proper classification of certain records, or to reconsider a declination to declassify certain records.”

On behalf of the Board and pursuant to the NDAA, I request assistance from Department of Defense to complete this study as mandated by law.

Section 1685(d) specifies that the Departments of Defense and Energy “shall each provide to the Board such assistance as the Board requests” to conduct the study. Given the technical nature of the subject and the short timeframe for completion, the Board requests that three subject matter experts from the Department of Defense be assigned and detailed to the Board for a period of 90 to 120 days. The subject matter experts must hold all appropriate security clearances, including and active clearances for evaluating Formerly Restricted Data and Restricted Data. This request also aligns with 50 U.S.C. 3355a which permits Federal government employees to be detailed to the Board without interruption or loss of civil, military, or foreign service status or privilege. Section 1685(b) requires the Board to complete its study and then submit a final report to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the congressional Armed Services committees by March

27, 2022. As dictated by the NDAA, the report must address:

- The feasibility of carrying out the declassification review;
- The resources required to carry out the declassification review;
- A timeline to complete the declassification review; and
- Any other issues the Board determines relevant.

I have attached background information on the Board, its statutory authorities and responsibilities, and biographical information on our members. The point of contact for this support request is Mr. Mark Bradley, the Board's Executive Secretary. He can be reached via email at mark.bradley@nara.gov.

Very respectfully,



Ezra Cohen
Chair, Public Interest Declassification Board

Attachment

CHAIR

Ezra Cohen



PUBLIC INTEREST
DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY

Mark Bradley

MEMBERS

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Alissa Starzak
John Tierney

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Michael Lawrence
Benjamin Powell

December 28, 2021

The Honorable
Jennifer M. Granholm
Secretary of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585

Dear Madam Secretary,

Yesterday, President Biden signed the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (the NDAA) into law. The NDAA mandates in Section 1685 that the Public Interest Declassification Board (the Board) “conduct a study on the feasibility of carrying out the declassification review of nuclear, chemical, and ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands,” including cleanup activities and waste storage. This provision also aligns with 50 U.S.C. 3355a which requires the Board “to review and make recommendations to the President in a timely manner with respect to any congressional request... to declassify certain records, to evaluate the proper classification of certain records, or to reconsider a declination to declassify certain records.”

On behalf of the Board and pursuant to the NDAA, I request assistance from Department of Energy to complete this study as mandated by law.

Section 1685(d) specifies that the Departments of Defense and Energy “shall each provide to the Board such assistance as the Board requests” to conduct the study. Given the technical nature of the subject and the short timeframe for completion, the Board requests that three subject matter experts from the Department of Energy be assigned and detailed to the Board for a period of 90 to 120 days. The subject matter experts must hold all appropriate security clearances, including and active clearances for evaluating Formerly Restricted Data and Restricted Data. This request also aligns with 50 U.S.C. 3355a which permits Federal government employees to be detailed to the Board without interruption or loss of civil, military, or foreign service status or privilege. Section 1685(b) requires the Board to complete its study and then submit a final report to the

Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the congressional Armed Services committees by March 27, 2022. As dictated by the NDAA, the report must address:

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Very respectfully,



Ezra Cohen
Chair, Public Interest Declassification Board

Attachment

CHAIR

Ezra Cohen



**PUBLIC INTEREST
DECLASSIFICATION BOARD**

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MEMBERS

Paul-Noel Chretien
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Michael Lawrence
Benjamin Powell

February 10, 2022

Ms. Casey Deering
Principal Director
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters
3050 Defense, The Pentagon, Room 3B884
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Ms. Deering,

The FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), signed by President Joseph R. Biden on December 27, 2021, includes a section that mandates the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) conduct a feasibility study on the declassification of information “relating to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, or ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands, including with respect to cleanup activities and the storage of waste relating to such tests,” (Section 1685). The PIDB is required to complete this study by March 27 and submit it to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the House and Senate Armed Services committees. Given challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the extensive research and information gathering required, our staff has contacted both Armed Services Committees seeking a 60-day extension in completing the study.

The PIDB is gathering information about various records that may be responsive and intends to conduct a high-level study rather than a record-by-record assessment. The study will include a more complete understanding of the status of potentially responsive records created by U.S. Government agencies, departments, organizations, units, entities, and national laboratories that participated in any aspect of nuclear weapons testing, containment, environmental and human radiation testing, containment, storage, and clean-up activities between 1946 through 1989.

As part of this effort, the PIDB is interested in gathering information from departments and agencies on records and record series that are scheduled as ‘permanent records,’ records that are ‘unscheduled,’ records that are scheduled as ‘temporary,’ and records that are still ‘in active use’ by the agency.

In accordance with section 1685 of the FY 2022 NDAA, the PIDB requests Department of Defense (DoD) support in identifying potentially responsive records from the following DoD components and military organizations:

- The Department of the Army, to include Army components and units (e.g. Army Corps of Engineers, the 25th Infantry Division stationed at Schofield Barracks, among others);

- The Department of the Air Force, to include Air Force components and units (e.g. various Air Force Commands, among others);
- Defense Technical Information Center;
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency (predecessor agencies);
- Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- The Department of the Navy, to include Navy components and units (e.g. various Commands, the Bureau of Medicine, Naval Medical Research Institute, and the Military Surface Sea Transport Service, among others) and
- Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), to include various OSD organizations.

As each DoD organization, component, entity or unit conducts its search, the PIDB requests the following information in unclassified format for each record series or group of records:


- The formal name or title of each record series or group of records;
- Basic content, if available;
- Identifying information that aids retrieval;
- Physical location;
- The highest level of classification (Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret);
- Presence of marked Restricted Data (RD) and/or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD);
- Presence of information that is restricted from public access for non-national security/non Atomic Energy Act reasons (e.g. FOIA B6 - privacy exemption);
- The approximate volume of each record series or group of records; and
- Point of Contact and contact information.

Accomplishing this task will likely require DoD components, organizations, entities, and units to include knowledgeable staff from different offices, including records officers, records managers, historians, subject matter experts and users of information, archivists, and FOIA and declassification reviewers.

Given the tight deadline established by the Congress in completing this feasibility study, the PIDB requests this information be provided electronically by Friday, March 11, 2022.

Should you or others within DoD have questions or require additional information, please contact Sharmila Bhatia on the PIDB staff. She can be reached via email at sharmila.bhatia@nara.gov.

Sincerely,



MARK A. BRADLEY
Executive Secretary

CHAIR

Ezra Cohen



**PUBLIC INTEREST
DECLASSIFICATION BOARD**

EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY

Mark Bradley

MEMBERS

Trey Gowdy
Alissa Starzak
John Tierney

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Paul-Noel Chretien
Laura DeBonis
Michael Lawrence
Benjamin Powell

February 11, 2022

The Honorable Jennifer M. Granholm
The Secretary of Energy
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, D.C. 20585

Dear Madam Secretary Granholm,

The FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), signed by President Joseph R. Biden on December 27, 2021, includes a section that mandates the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) conduct a feasibility study on the declassification of information “relating to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, or ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands, including with respect to cleanup activities and the storage of waste relating to such tests,” (Section 1685). The PIDB is required to complete this study by March 27 and submit it to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the House and Senate Armed Services committees. Given challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the extensive research and information gathering required, our staff has contacted both Armed Services Committees seeking a 60-day extension in completing the study.

The PIDB is gathering information about various classified records that may be responsive, and intends to conduct a high-level study rather than a record-by-record assessment. The study will include a more complete understanding of the status of potentially responsive records created by U.S. Government agencies, departments, organizations, units, entities, and national laboratories that participated in any aspect of nuclear weapons testing, containment, environmental and human radiation testing, containment, storage, and clean-up activities between 1946 through 1989.

As part of this effort, the PIDB is interested in gathering information from departments and agencies on records and record series that are scheduled as ‘permanent records,’ records that are ‘unscheduled,’ records that are scheduled as ‘temporary,’ and records that are still ‘in active use’ by the agency.

In accordance with section 1685 of the FY 2022 NDAA, the PIDB requests the Department of Energy (DOE) support in identifying potentially responsive records that are still in DOE’s custody and well as the following DOE federally funded applied research national laboratories: 28

- Brookhaven National Laboratory;
- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
- Los Alamos National Laboratory; and
- Sandia National Laboratory.

As each DOE organization, component, entity or unit conducts its search, the PIDB requests the following information in unclassified format for each record series or group of records:


- The formal name or title of each record series or group of records;
- Basic content, if available;
- Identifying information that aids retrieval;
- Physical location;
- The highest level of classification (Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret);
- Presence of marked Restricted Data (RD) and/or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD);
- Presence of information that is restricted from public access for non-national security/non Atomic Energy Act reasons (e.g. FOIA B6 - privacy exemption);
- The approximate volume of each record series or group of records; and
- Point of Contact and contact information.

Accomplishing this task will likely require DOE components, organizations, entities, and units to include knowledgeable staff from different offices, including records officers, records managers, historians, subject matter experts and users of information, archivists, and FOIA and classification officials.

Given the tight deadline established by the Congress in completing this feasibility study, the PIDB requests this information be provided electronically by Friday, March 11, 2022.

Should you or others within DOE have questions or require additional information, please contact Sharmila Bhatia on the PIDB staff. She can be reached via email at sharmila.bhatia@nara.gov.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Mark A. Bradley". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

MARK A. BRADLEY
Executive Secretary

Appendices

Appendix A

National Defense Authorization Act of 2020

SEC. 1685. STUDY BY PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD RELATING TO CERTAIN TESTS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS.

(a) Study.--The Public Interest Declassification Board established by section 703 of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 3355a) shall conduct a study on the feasibility of carrying out a declassification review relating to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, or ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands, including with respect to cleanup activities and the storage of waste relating to such tests.

(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Board shall submit to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the congressional defense committees a report containing the findings of the study conducted under subsection (a). The report shall include the following:

(1) The feasibility of carrying out the declassification review described in such subsection.

(2) The resources required to carry out the declassification review.

(3) A timeline to complete such the declassification review.

(4) Any other issues the Board determines relevant.

(c) Comments.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may submit to the congressional defense committees any comments the respective Secretary determines relevant with respect to the report submitted under subsection (b).

(d) Assistance.--The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy shall each provide to the Board such assistance as the Board requests in conducting the study under subsection (a).

Appendix B

Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000, as amended

See: Public Law 106-567 (December 27, 2000)

SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the “Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000”. SEC. 702.

FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

- (1) It is in the national interest to establish an effective, coordinated, and cost-effective means by which records on specific subjects of extraordinary public interest that do not undermine the national security interests of the United States may be collected, retained, reviewed, and disseminated to Congress, policymakers in the executive branch, and the public.
- (2) Ensuring, through such measures, public access to information that does not require continued protection to maintain the national security interests of the United States is a key to striking the balance between secrecy essential to national security and the openness that is central to the proper functioning of the political institutions of the United States.

SEC. 703. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT. —

- (1) There is established within the executive branch of the United States a board to be known as the “Public Interest Declassification Board” (in this title referred to as the “Board”).
- (2) The Board shall report directly to the President or, upon designation by the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General, or other designee of the President. The other designee of the President under this paragraph may not be an agency head or official authorized to classify information under Executive Order 12958, or any successor order.

(b) PURPOSES. — The purposes of the Board are as follows:

- (1) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and such other executive branch officials as the Board considers appropriate on the systematic, thorough, coordinated, and comprehensive identification, collection, review for declassification, and release to Congress, interested agencies, and the public of declassified records and materials (including donated historical materials) that are of archival value, including records and materials of extraordinary public interest.

- (2) To promote the fullest possible public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of significant United States national security decisions and significant United States national security activities in order to—
- (A) support the oversight and legislative functions of Congress;
 - (B) support the policymaking role of the executive branch;
 - (C) respond to the interest of the public in national security matters; and
 - (D) promote reliable historical analysis and new avenues of historical study in national security matters.
- (3) To provide recommendations to the President for the identification, collection, and review for declassification of information of extraordinary public interest that does not undermine the national security of the United States, to be undertaken in accordance with a declassification program that has been established or may be established by the President by Executive order.
- (4) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and such other executive branch officials as the Board considers appropriate on policies deriving from the issuance by the President of Executive orders regarding the classification and declassification of national security information.
- (5) To review and make recommendations to the President in a timely manner with respect to any congressional request, made by the committee of jurisdiction or by a member of the committee of jurisdiction, to declassify certain records, to evaluate the proper classification of certain records, or to reconsider a declination to declassify specific records.

(c) MEMBERSHIP. —

- (1) The Board shall be composed of nine individuals appointed from among citizens of the United States who are preeminent in the fields of history, national security, foreign policy, intelligence policy, social science, law, or archives, including individuals who have served in Congress or otherwise in the Federal Government or have otherwise engaged in research, scholarship, or publication in such fields on matters relating to the national security of the United States, of whom—
- (A) five shall be appointed by the President;
 - (B) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
 - (C) one shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate;
 - (D) one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; and
 - (E) one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
- (2)
- (A) Of the members initially appointed to the Board by the President—
 - (i) three shall be appointed for a term of 4 years;
 - (ii) one shall be appointed for a term of 3 years; and
 - (iii) one shall be appointed for a term of 2 years.

(B) The members initially appointed to the Board by the Speaker of the House of Representatives or by the majority leader of the Senate shall be appointed for a term of 3 years.

(C) The members initially appointed to the Board by the minority leader of the House of Representatives or the Senate shall be appointed for a term of 2 years.

(D) Any subsequent appointment to the Board shall be for a term of 3 years from the date of the appointment.

(3) A vacancy in the Board shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

(4) A member of the Board may be appointed to a new term on the Board upon the expiration of the member's term on the Board, except that no member may serve more than three full terms on the Board.

(d) CHAIRPERSON; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. —

(1)

(A) The President shall designate one of the members of the Board as the chairperson of the Board.

(B) The term of service as Chairperson of the Board shall be 2 years.

(C) A member serving as Chairperson of the Board may be redesignated as Chairperson of the Board upon the expiration of the member's term as Chairperson of the Board, except that no member shall serve as Chairperson of the Board for more than 6 years.

(2) The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the Board.

(e) MEETINGS. —

The Board shall meet as needed to accomplish its mission, consistent with the availability of funds, but shall meet in person not less frequently than on a quarterly basis. A majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.

(f) STAFF. —

Any employee of the Federal Government may be detailed to the Board, with the agreement of and without reimbursement to the detailing agency, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil, military, or foreign service status or privilege.

(g) SECURITY. —

(1) The members and staff of the Board shall, as a condition of appointment to or employment with the Board, hold appropriate security clearances for access to the classified records and materials to be reviewed by the Board or its staff, and shall follow the guidance and practices on security under applicable Executive orders and Presidential or agency directives.

(2) The head of an agency shall, as a condition of granting access to a member of the Board, the Executive Secretary of the Board, or a member of the staff of the Board to

classified records or materials of the agency under this title, require the member, the Executive Secretary, or the member of the staff, as the case may be, to—

(A) execute an agreement regarding the security of such records or materials that is approved by the head of the agency; and

(B) hold an appropriate security clearance granted or recognized under the standard procedures and eligibility criteria of the agency, including any special access approval required for access to such records or materials.

(3) The members of the Board, the Executive Secretary of the Board, and the members of the staff of the Board may not use any information acquired in the course of their official activities on the Board for nonofficial purposes.

(4) For purposes of any law or regulation governing access to classified information that pertains to the national security of the United States, and subject to any limitations on access arising under section 706(b), and to facilitate the advisory functions of the Board under this title, a member of the Board seeking access to a record or material under this title shall be deemed for purposes of this subsection to have a need to know the contents of the record or material.

(h) COMPENSATION. —

(1) Each member of the Board shall receive compensation at a rate not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay payable for positions at ES–1 of the Senior Executive Service under section 5382 of title 5, United States Code, for each day such member is engaged in the actual performance of duties of the Board.

(2) Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of the duties of the Board.

(i) GUIDANCE; ANNUAL BUDGET. —

(1) On behalf of the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall provide guidance on policy to the Board.

(2) The Executive Secretary of the Board, under the direction of the Chairperson of the Board and the Board, and acting in consultation with the Archivist of the United States, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall prepare the annual budget of the Board.

(j) SUPPORT. —

The Information Security Oversight Office may support the activities of the Board under this title. Such support shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

(k) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF RECORDS AND REPORTS. —

(1) The Board shall make available for public inspection records of its proceedings and reports prepared in the course of its activities under this title to the extent such records and reports are not classified and would not be exempt from release under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) In making records and reports available under paragraph (1), the Board shall coordinate the release of such records and reports with appropriate officials from agencies with expertise in classified information in order to ensure that such records and reports do not inadvertently contain classified information.

(l) **APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS.** — The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Board under this title. However, the records of the Board shall be governed by the provisions of the Federal Records Act of 1950.

SEC. 704. IDENTIFICATION, COLLECTION, AND REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION OF ARCHIVAL VALUE OR EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC INTEREST.

(a) **BRIEFINGS ON AGENCY DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS.** —

(1) As requested by the Board, or by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the head of any agency with the authority under an Executive order to classify information shall provide to the Board, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, on an annual basis, a summary briefing and report on such agency's progress and plans in the declassification of national security information. Such briefing shall cover the declassification goals set by statute, regulation, or policy, the agency's progress with respect to such goals, and the agency's planned goals and priorities for its declassification activities over the next 2 fiscal years. Agency briefings and reports shall give particular attention to progress on the declassification of records and materials that are of archival value or extraordinary public interest to the people of the United States.

(2) (A) The annual briefing and report under paragraph (1) for agencies within the Department of Defense, including the military departments and the elements of the intelligence community, shall be provided on a consolidated basis.

(B) In this paragraph, the term "elements of the intelligence community" means the elements of the intelligence community specified or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(b) **RECOMMENDATIONS ON AGENCY DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS.** —

(1) Upon reviewing and discussing declassification plans and progress with an agency, the Board shall provide to the head of the agency the written recommendations of the Board as to how the agency's declassification program could be improved. A copy of each recommendation shall also be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

(2) Consistent with the provisions of section 703(k), the Board's recommendations to the head of an agency under paragraph (1) shall become public 60 days after such recommendations are sent to the head of the agency under that paragraph.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS ON SPECIAL SEARCHES FOR RECORDS OF EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC INTEREST. —

(1) The Board shall also make recommendations to the President regarding proposed initiatives to identify, collect, and review for declassification classified records and materials of extraordinary public interest.

(2) In making recommendations under paragraph (1), the Board shall consider the following:

(A) The opinions and requests of Members of Congress, including opinions and requests expressed or embodied in letters or legislative proposals, and also including specific requests for the declassification of certain records or for the reconsideration of declinations to declassify specific records.

(B) The opinions and requests of the National Security Council, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other agencies.

(C) The opinions of United States citizens.

(D) The opinions of members of the Board.

(E) The impact of special searches on systematic and all other on-going declassification programs.

(F) The costs (including budgetary costs) and the impact that complying with the recommendations would have on agency budgets, programs, and operations.

(G) The benefits of the recommendations.

(H) The impact of compliance with the recommendations on the national security of the United States.

(d) PRESIDENT'S DECLASSIFICATION PRIORITIES. —

(1) Concurrent with the submission to Congress of the budget of the President each fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall publish a description of the President's declassification program and priorities, together with a listing of the funds requested to implement that program.

(2) Nothing in this title shall be construed to substitute or supersede, or establish a funding process for, any declassification program that has been established or may be established by the President by Executive order.

(e) DECLASSIFICATION REVIEWS. —

(1) IN GENERAL – If requested by the President, the Board shall review in a timely manner certain records or declinations to declassify specific records, the declassification of which has been the subject of specific congressional request described in section 703(b)(5).

(2) AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD – Upon receiving a congressional request described in section 703(b)(5), the Board may conduct the review and make the recommendations described in that section, regardless of whether such a review is requested by the President.

(3) REPORTING – Any recommendations submitted to the President by the Board under section 703(b)(5), shall be submitted to the chairman and ranking minority

member of the committee of Congress that made the request relating to such recommendations.

SEC. 705. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND OTHER INFORMATION.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the authority of the head of an agency to classify information or to continue the classification of information previously classified by that agency.

(b) SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS. — Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the authority of the head of an agency to grant or deny access to a special access program.

(c) AUTHORITIES OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. — Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence as the head of the intelligence community, including the Director's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure as required by section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(6)).

(d) EXEMPTIONS TO RELEASE OF INFORMATION. — Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit any exemption or exception to the release to the public under this title of information that is protected under subsection (b) of section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the "Freedom of Information Act"), or section 552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the "Privacy Act").

(e) WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM CONGRESS. — Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress.

SEC. 706. STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES.

(a) LIAISON. —

(1) The head of each agency with the authority under an Executive order to classify information and the head of each Federal Presidential library shall designate an employee of such agency or library to act as liaison to the Board for purposes of this title.

(2) The Board may establish liaison and otherwise consult with such other historical and advisory committees as the Board considers appropriate for purposes of this title.

(b) LIMITATIONS ON ACCESS. —

(1)

(A) Except as provided in paragraph (2), if the head of an agency or the head of a Federal Presidential library determines it necessary to deny or restrict access of the Board, or of the agency or library liaison to the Board, to information contained in a record or material, in whole or in part, the head of the

agency or the head of the library shall promptly notify the Board in writing of such determination.

(B) Each notice to the Board under subparagraph (A) shall include a description of the nature of the records or materials, and a justification for the determination, covered by such notice.

(2) In the case of a determination referred to in paragraph (1) with respect to a special access program created by the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, or the head of any other agency, the notification of denial of access under paragraph (1), including a description of the nature of the Board's request for access, shall be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs rather than to the Board.

(c) DISCRETION TO DISCLOSE. —

At the conclusion of a declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the public's interest in the disclosure of records or materials of the agency covered by such review, and still properly classified, outweighs the Government's need to protect such records or materials, and may release such records or materials in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 12958 or any successor order to such Executive order.

(d) DISCRETION TO PROTECT. —

At the conclusion of a declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the interest of the agency in the protection of records or materials of the agency covered by such review, and still properly classified, outweighs the public's need for access to such records or materials, and may deny release of such records or materials in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 12958 or any successor order to such Executive order.

(e) REPORTS. —

(1)

(A) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Board shall annually submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities of the Board under this title, including summary information regarding any denials to the Board by the head of an agency or the head of a Federal Presidential library of access to records or materials under this title.

(B) In this paragraph, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), notice that the Board has been denied access to records and materials, and a justification for the determination in support of the denial, shall be submitted by the agency denying the access as follows:

(A) In the case of the denial of access to a special access program created by the Secretary of Defense, to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(B) In the case of the denial of access to a special access program created by the Director of National Intelligence, or by the head of any other agency (including the Department of Defense) if the special access program pertains to intelligence activities, or of access to any information and materials relating to intelligence sources and methods, to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(C) In the case of the denial of access to a special access program created by the Secretary of Energy or the Administrator for Nuclear Security, to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(f) NOTIFICATION OF REVIEW. — In response to a specific congressional request for declassification review described in section 703(b)(5), the Board shall advise the originators of the request in a timely manner whether the Board intends to conduct such review.

SEC. 707. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Nothing in this title limits the protection afforded to any information under any other provision of law. This title is not intended and may not be construed to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or its employees. This title does not modify in any way the substantive criteria or procedures for the classification of information, nor does this title create any right or benefit subject to judicial review.

SEC. 708. FUNDING.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. —

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this title amounts as follows:

(1) For fiscal year 2001, \$650,000.

(2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2001, such sums as may be necessary for such fiscal year.

(b) FUNDING REQUESTS. —

The President shall include in the budget submitted to Congress for each fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, a request for amounts for the activities of the Board under this title during such fiscal year.

SEC. 709. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) AGENCY.—

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term “agency” means the following:

- (i) An Executive agency, as that term is defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.
- (ii) A military department, as that term is defined in section 102 of such title.
- (iii) Any other entity in the executive branch that comes into the possession of classified information.

(a) The term does not include the Board.

(2) CLASSIFIED MATERIAL OR RECORD.—

The terms “classified material” and “classified record” include any correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing, diagram, pictorial or graphic work, photograph, film, microfilm, sound recording, videotape, machine readable records, and other documentary material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that has been determined pursuant to Executive order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interests of the national security of the United States.

(3) DECLASSIFICATION.—

The term “declassification” means the process by which records or materials that have been classified are determined no longer to require protection from unauthorized disclosure to protect the national security of the United States.

(4) DONATED HISTORICAL MATERIAL.—

The term “donated historical material” means collections of personal papers donated or given to a Federal Presidential library or other archival repository under a deed of gift or otherwise.

(5) FEDERAL PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY.—

The term “Federal Presidential library” means a library operated and maintained by the United States Government through the National Archives and Records Administration under the applicable provisions of the Federal Records Act of 1950.

(6) NATIONAL SECURITY.—

The term “national security” means the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.

(7) RECORDS OR MATERIALS OF EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC INTEREST.—The term “records or materials of extraordinary public interest” means records or materials that—

- (A) demonstrate and record the national security policies, actions, and decisions of the United States, including—
 - (i) policies, events, actions, and decisions which led to significant national security outcomes; and
 - (ii) the development and evolution of significant United States national security policies, actions, and decisions;
- (B) will provide a significantly different perspective in general from records and materials publicly available in other historical sources; and
- (C) would need to be addressed through ad hoc record searches outside any systematic declassification program established under Executive order.

(8) RECORDS OF ARCHIVAL VALUE.—The term “records of archival value” means records that have been determined by the Archivist of the United States to have sufficient historical or other value to warrant their continued preservation by the Federal Government.

SEC. 710. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This title shall take effect on the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Appendix C

Public Interest Declassification Board Member Biographies

Presidential Appointees

Ezra Cohen (Chair)

On January 11, 2021, President Donald J. Trump appointed Ezra Cohen to a three-year term on the Board and designated him to serve as Chair for a two-year term. Prior to his appointment to the Board, Mr. Cohen served in senior leadership positions at the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community, most recently as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and Director for Defense Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2020 to January 2021. In this role, he exercised authority, direction, and control over the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and Combat Support Agencies. Additionally, he served as the principal civilian intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all military intelligence related matters, including signals intelligence, human intelligence, sensitive activities, geospatial intelligence, sensitive reconnaissance, counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security. His previous government positions include Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC); Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-Narcotics and Global Threats; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs on the National Security Council; Deputy Defense Intelligence Officer for South Asia at the Defense Intelligence Agency; and as a DoD Operations Officer. Mr. Cohen began his government service as an intern researching 1820's tariff legislation in the Center for Legislative Archives, a part of the National Archives and Record Administration. Mr. Cohen has also worked in the private sector for Oracle Corporation. Mr. Cohen received a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from the University of Pennsylvania.

Paul-Noel Chretien

On December 30, 2020, President Donald J. Trump appointed Paul-Noel Chretien to a three-year term on the Board. Mr. Chretien began his legal career in private practice at a Washington, DC, law firm and then moved to the U.S. Department of Justice, where he practiced Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act law. He represented federal agencies in court, adjudicated over 1,200 administrative appeals of FOIA determinations by Justice Department components, and taught classes on the FOIA and Privacy Act. From 2000 until 2019, Mr. Chretien worked at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), where he held a variety of positions, including Chairman of the Publications Review Board and Liaison Representative to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) at the National Archives. In his role as Liaison Representative, Mr. Chretien was responsible for justifying either the declassification of CIA documents or their continued classification to protect national security. For his work at the ISCAP, the Information Security Oversight Office recognized Mr. Chretien with an honorary Notice for his significant contributions to the increased productivity of the panel. Mr. Chretien also served as a Senior Reviewer for the High-Value Detainee Prosecution Task Force; Associate Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer; Inspector in the Office of Inspector General; and

Chief Policy Officer in the Office of Identity Management. Mr. Chretien retired from the CIA in 2019 and is now a management consultant and technical writer at Leidos. Mr. Chretien graduated with honors from Virginia Tech, with a B.A. in economics. He received his J.D. from the George Washington University Law School.

Laura A. DeBonis

Laura A. DeBonis was appointed by President Joseph Biden to serve a term on the Board from November 30, 2021 through December 29, 2023. Ms. DeBonis previously served on the Board from 2015-2018 as an appointee of President Barack Obama. She has over 20 years of experience in the information technology and media fields. She currently serves as a board member and treasurer for the Digital Public Library of America, an organization dedicated to creating an open network of online resources from libraries, archives and museums and making them freely available to all. Her past professional experience includes a variety of leadership roles at Google, including her last position there as the Director of Library Partnerships for Book Search. Since Google, Ms. DeBonis has been a consultant to business startups and non-profit organizations, including chairing the technology review team for the Internet Safety Technical Task Force at the Berkman Klein Center at Harvard University. Ms. DeBonis is an emerita trustee for the WGBH Educational Foundation in Boston and has also served as a trustee of the Boston Public Library. She received a B.A. from Harvard College and a M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. Ms. DeBonis is serving her second term on the Board.

Michael G. Lawrence

On October 9, 2020, President Donald J. Trump appointed Michael G. Lawrence to a three-year term on the Board. Mr. Lawrence entered the Senior Executive Service in 1999. He retired in June 2019 after a 20+ year career in the Intelligence Community (IC) where he held leadership positions at several IC components. In his last assignment, he set up and then served as the Director of the Enterprise Functional Team at the National Security Agency (NSA). Previously, he served as the Senior Advisor to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) from 2013 to 2018. In this role, he was responsible for advising the DNI and other IC senior leaders on capabilities, policy, coordination, and oversight relating to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Between 2008 and 2013, Mr. Lawrence served as the National Security Agency Chair at the National Defense University (NDU) at Ft. McNair. In this role, he was the highest-ranking Intelligence Officer at NDU. As a member of the faculty, he taught courses on Strategic Leadership and Executive Communication for Strategic Leaders, Space and Industry, Media and Industry, and courses on regional security issues. Mr. Lawrence was awarded the Meritorious Civilian Award by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for instructing the next generation of Senior Military leaders. Mr. Lawrence served as the Director in the Office of Strategic Communications, Business Plans, and Operations at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from 2007 to 2008 where he was responsible for directing and implementing all NRO interactions with the Congress, IC, and other Executive branch agencies, the press, and the private sector. Mr. Lawrence received the NRO's Distinguished Service Medal for his work. Between 2001 and 2007, he served as the Principal Director for Legislative Affairs at the NSA and provided critical leadership in shepherding critical legislation through Congress to support the NSA's post-9/11 Mission. He received the Director's Distinguished Service Medal for this work to support NSA's mission. Mr.

Lawrence began his career at the Office of National Drug Control Policy in the legislative affairs office, rising to become the Acting Director. Mr. Lawrence graduated with honors from John Jay College, with a BS in Criminal Justice. He also attended Western Michigan University Law School. Currently, Mr. Lawrence is a volunteer with Sowing Seeds in Marshfield, MA.

Benjamin A. Powell

On October 9, 2020, President Donald J. Trump appointed Benjamin A. Powell to a three-year term on the Board. Mr. Powell is currently a partner at WilmerHale, where he co-chairs the cybersecurity and privacy practice. Mr. Powell was confirmed by the Senate as General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2006. He served as General Counsel to the first three Directors of National Intelligence. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Associate White House Counsel from 2002 to 2006, where he was responsible for Intelligence Community-related legislation and intelligence transformation initiatives. This included efforts related to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, National Counterterrorism Center, enhancing Central Intelligence Agency capabilities, and terrorism information sharing. He was the White House representative to the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Commission examined issues related to the Intelligence Community's approach to threats from Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, Al-Qaeda, and other entities. Mr. Powell clerked on the United States Supreme Court for Justices John Paul Stevens and Byron White, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for Judge John M. Walker, Jr. Mr. Powell served in the United States Air Force prior to law school and also worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As an officer in the Air Force, Mr. Powell supported intelligence missions of the United States Space Command Joint Space Intelligence Center, Fleet Intelligence Centers, National Maritime Intelligence Center, United States Central Command, Air Combat Command, and counter-narcotics tactical intelligence centers. Mr. Powell received degrees in applied science from the School of Engineering and Applied Science and in finance from the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania. He received his J.D. degree from Columbia Law School.

Congressional Appointees

Carter Burwell

On January 13, 2022, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell announced his intention to appoint Carter Burwell to serve on the Board for a three-year term beginning on February 15, 2022. Mr. Burwell currently serves as Counsel in the White Collar and Regulatory Defense practice at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. Before joining the firm in 2021, Mr. Burwell spent more than 15 years in various senior roles across the federal government. Most recently, Mr. Burwell served as Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, where he was responsible for helping to lead the Department's national security mission. Prior to his time at the Treasury Department, Mr. Burwell served as one of the top lawyers on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, including as Chief Counsel to former Assistant Majority Leader and U.S. Senator John Cornyn and as Counsel to former Chairman and U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley. In the Senate, Mr. Burwell worked to reform and modernize national security

and technology laws and conducted rigorous oversight of government officials. Mr. Burwell began his career in public service as a counter-terrorism prosecutor at the Department of Justice, where he served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Violent Crime and Terrorism Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of New York and in the National Security and International Crimes Unit in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Earlier in his career, Mr. Burwell was a law clerk for the Honorable John Gleeson, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, and for the Honorable Karen Henderson on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Mr. Burwell is also an adjunct professor at George Mason University's Antonin Scalia Law School and was a Wasserstein Fellow at Harvard Law School. Mr. Burwell received his J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law, an M.Phil from the University of Cambridge, and a B.A. from Columbia University.

Harold W. ("Trey") Gowdy

On August 24, 2020, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy appointed Harold W. ("Trey") Gowdy, III to a three-year term on the Board. Mr. Gowdy served four terms in the U.S. House of Representatives from South Carolina's 4th congressional district from 2011-2019. In Congress, Rep. Gowdy's committee assignments included the Judiciary Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Education and Workforce Committee, and the Ethics Committee. He chaired the Oversight and Government Reform Committee and the U.S. House Select Committee on Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi. Prior to entering Congress, he served for 16 years as a prosecutor in South Carolina, including six years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney and federal prosecutor, and ten years as the elected 7th Circuit Solicitor for Cherokee and Spartanburg Counties. Mr. Gowdy holds a Bachelor of Arts in History from Baylor University (1986), and a Juris Doctor from the University of South Carolina (1989). He clerked for John Gardner on the South Carolina Court of Appeals and for U.S. District Judge George Anderson, Jr. After retiring from Congress, Mr. Gowdy returned to Greenville, SC where he is a Partner in the law firm Nelson, Mullins, Riley, and Scarborough. Mr. Gowdy is a public speaker and the author of *Doesn't Hurt to Ask: Using the Power of Questions to Communicate, Connect, and Persuade* (August 18, 2020).

Alissa M. Starzak (Vice Chair)

On February 1, 2022, Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer announced his intention to appoint Alissa M. Starzak to serve on the Board for a three-year term beginning on February 15, 2022. Ms. Starzak was first appointed by then Senate Minority Leader Schumer on February 27, 2018. The current authorizing legislation extended her term to February 14, 2022. She serves as vice chair of the Board, as elected by the members. She served as Acting Chair from June 5, 2020, to January 11, 2021. Presently, Ms. Starzak is Vice President and Global Head of Public Policy at Cloudflare, a web security and optimization company. Prior to joining Cloudflare, Ms. Starzak worked for the U.S. government in a variety of national security positions. Most recently, she served as the 21st General Counsel of the U.S. Department of the Army, after confirmation by the Senate. As General Counsel of the Army, she was the primary legal counsel to the Secretary of the Army and the Army's chief legal officer. Her appointment as Army General Counsel followed service as the Deputy General Counsel for Legislation at the U.S. Department

of Defense, where she advised on legal issues with a legislative or congressional component and managed an office of attorneys responsible for developing the Department of Defense legislative program. Prior to moving to the Department of Defense, Ms. Starzak served as Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, focusing on legal issues relating to intelligence collection and covert action, and as an Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of General Counsel. She also worked in private practice in Washington, D.C., and clerked for The Honorable E. Grady Jolly, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. She graduated from Amherst College and the University of Chicago Law School, where she served as an editor of the University of Chicago Law Review. Ms. Starzak is serving her second term on the PIDB.

John F. Tierney

On July 1, 2020, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi appointed John F. Tierney to a new three-year term on the Board. He previously was appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives on July 11, 2017, for a three-year term that was extended to June 29, 2021, in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. He resigned his position on the Board on June 30, 2020, to realign the House of Representatives appointments. His current three-year term will end on June 30, 2023. He is presently Executive Director at the Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation and its sister organization, The Council for a Livable World. His work focuses on national security issues, nuclear non-proliferation, missile defense, and areas concerning peace and security. Mr. Tierney is a former nine-term Massachusetts Congressman who served on the House Intelligence Committee and chaired the National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the Government Oversight and Reform Committee. His 18-year career included oversight of the Government Accountability Office's annual assessment of the Pentagon's Weapons Selection Programs and reform of overall Pentagon spending. Additionally, Mr. Tierney was a senior member of the Education and Workforce Committee of the House, where he served as Ranking Member on the Health, Employment, Labor and Pension Subcommittee, and served on the Higher Education and Workforce Development Committee where he had a prominent role in several Higher Education Reauthorization and Workforce Opportunity Reauthorization Acts and related legislation. Prior to being elected to Congress, Mr. Tierney was a Partner in the law firm Tierney, Kalis, and Lucas, counsel for several community governments, a Trustee of Salem State College (now University), and member and President of the local Chamber of Commerce. He holds a B.A. from Salem State College and J.D. from Suffolk University Law School.

Appendix D

Potentially Responsive Record Collections

NARA Holdings and Accessioned Records

Federal Records Relating to Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands

This list identifies federal records within the holdings of the National Archives that may be responsive for the feasibility study. The first section includes a list of Operations and links to search results in the National Archives Catalog. The second section is arranged by record group and also contains links to descriptions within the Catalog. Archivists identified series that are restricted for national security or privacy. Included in this list are unrestricted records that may be responsive. These records may be either unprocessed or not fully described.

Section I: Possibly Responsive Records by Operation

Operation Crossroads (1946) - Fission - 2 tests: [RG 77](#), [RG 107](#), [RG 165](#), [RG 374](#), [RG 494](#)

Operation Sandstone (1948) - Fission - 3 tests: [RG 341](#), [RG 374](#)

Operation Greenhouse (1951) - Fission - Proto-Fusion (George) - 4 tests: [RG 374](#)

Operation Ivy (1952)- Mixed - Pure Fission/1st Fusion - 2 tests: [RG 112](#), [RG 374](#)

Operation Castle (1954) - Mixed - Fusion - 6 tests (Bravo - Largest detonation): [RG 374](#)

Operation Redwing (1956) - Mixed - Fusion - 17 tests - [Multiple RGs](#)

Operation Hardtack I (1958) - Mixed - Fusion - 35 tests - [Multiple RGs](#)

Operation Dominic (1962) - Mixed Fusion - 36 tests - [Multiple RGs](#)

Section 2: Possibly Relevant Records by Record Group(s)

Record Group 19: Records of the Bureau of Ships (1946-66)

Entry P 38 - Records Relating to Operation CROSSROADS [Item S-48]

UD-06W 1 - Operation "Crossroads" Project Files [Operation Crossroads Project Files, 1948]

UD-WW 13 - Operation "Crossroads" Project Files [OPER CROSSROADS INFO BX2 1956; Acc. # 0A-1-2708]

[Records Relating to Operation TRANSIT III, ca. 1952 - 1957](#)

General Correspondence and Unclassified Correspondence may also contain pertinent records. These are not restricted and therefore are not itemized below. Confidential Correspondence and Secret Correspondence that remain classified to some extent are listed below.

[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1950 - 1950](#)

[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1952 - 1952](#)

[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1953 - 1953](#)

[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1954 - 1954](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1955 - 1955](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1956 - 1956](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1957 - 1957](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1958 - 1958](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1959 - 1959](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1960 - 1960](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1961 - 1961](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Confidential General Correspondence, 1960 - 1962](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1947 - 1966](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1950 - 1950](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1951 - 1951](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1952 - 1952](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1953 - 1953](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1954 - 1954](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1955 - 1955](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1956 - 1956](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1957 - 1957](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1958-1958](#)
[CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1959-1959](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1961-1961](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1962-1962](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Secret General Correspondence, 1964-1964](#)
[CLASSIFIED] [Bulky Enclosures to Secret General Correspondence, 1943 - 1963](#)

Record Group 24: Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel

Deck logs of US naval vessels involved in the tests arranged by year and then by name or designation (if unnamed). Access restrictions will depend on dates and type of vessel.

Record Group 38: Records of the Chief of Naval Operations

[CLASSIFIED] [UD-06W 45 Chief of Naval Operations \(OP-75\), Top Secret Serial Files and Armed Forces Special Weapons Project \(AFSWP\) Directives, 1951-1956 - 1 FRC](#)
[CLASSIFIED] [Entry UD-WW 157 Armed Forces Special Weapons Project \[Atomic Energy Division and Guided Missile Division; OP-602\] - 1 FRC](#)
[CLASSIFIED] [Entry UD-WW 158 Armed Forces Special Weapons Project \[Atomic Energy Division and Guided Missile Division; OP-602\] - 27 FRCs](#)
[CLASSIFIED] [Entry UD-WW 159 Armed Forces Special Weapons Project \[Atomic Energy Division and Guided Missile Division; OP-602\] - 7 FRCs](#)
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Entry UD-WW 160 Armed Forces Special Weapons Project \[Atomic Energy Division and Guided Missile Division; OP-602\] - 19 FRCs](#)
[CLASSIFIED] [Entry UD-WW 162 Armed Forces Special Weapons Project \[Atomic Energy Division and Guided Missile Division; OP-602\] - 22 FRCs](#)
[Possibly OP-36 later became OP-602. NN3-038-00-002/038-76-0081]
[PARTLY CLASSIFIED] [Entry UD-WW 22: Records Relating to the Development and Use of Atomic Energy, Atomic Weapons, and Guided Missiles \[Part of 038-76-0081\]](#)

Record Group 48: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior

[RESTRICTED FOR PRIVACY] [UD-11W 23 Records Relating to the Administration of Territories, 1965 - 2003](#)

Record Group 52: Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

Entry A1 1018 - [Records Relating to Nuclear Testing, Contamination, and Exposure](#) - 11 LGAs
[General Correspondence, 1972 - 1979](#) - 71 FRCs

[RESTRICTED FOR PRIVACY] [Commander's General Correspondence Files, 12/1979 - 1990](#) - 73 microfiche boxes

[General Correspondence, 1/1947 - 12/1951](#) - 204 LTAs

General Correspondence of the Administrative Division, 1952 - 1971 - 2,011 LGAs

[Security Classified Correspondence, 1942 - 1972](#) - 15 boxes

As well as correspondence series from 1940's to the 1970's

Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State

All identified records are declassified.

The central files contain documentation on various aspects of the U.S. relationship with the Trust Territory of the Pacific (TTPI), which includes the Marshall Islands.

- In the Central Decimal File, the country number "99" covers "Pacific Islands," including the Marshalls. See Class 7 and Class 8.
- In the Subject-Numeric File, the country designator "PAC TT" covers the Trust Territory. See the following file categories: DEF, POL, HLTH, and SOC.

RG 59 Entry UD-14W-115: Subject Files Relating to the Micronesia Status Negotiations, 1979-1982.

Record Group 74: Record of the Bureau of Ordnance (1946-59)

Possible information related to Operation Crossroads:

[CLASSIFIED] A1 1003B General Correspondence, Unclassified and Confidential, 1948-1959 {1948-1952}

A1 1003 C Unclassified and Confidential General Correspondence Files, 1948-1959

Record Group 77: Records of the Army Corps of Engineers

If the Army Corps of Engineers was involved in any post-test cleanup efforts that occurred in the Marshall Islands, it is likely that the Engineers based in Honolulu, Hawaii would have been involved. There are a number of potentially-relevant [RG 77 textual series described in the Catalog](#).

Record Group 90: Records of the Public Health Service

UD WW Entry 35 [Pollution and Water Quality Files, 1949 - 1959](#) Unrestricted

[RESTRICTED FOR PRIVACY] UD WW Entry 31 [General Files Relating to Special Health Services, 1949 - 1954](#) FOIA (b)(6)

[RESTRICTED FOR PRIVACY] P Entry 6 [General Subject Files, 1953 - 1968](#) FOIA (b)(6) Does include mentions of some of the Nevada tests and information on radioactive elements in Inuit and walrus (Project Chariot). Might of interest for comparative purposes.

[Director's Files, 1949 - 1973](#) (unrestricted) These records include reports about the effects of Project Chariot in Alaska, which may be of interest for comparative purposes. Location: National Archives at Seattle.

Record Group 181: Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments

Record series in San Francisco - Island commands

[CLASSIFIED] [Aerial Photographs of Atomic Bomb Tests, 1947-1990](#), 48,000 images, 64 FRC Cartons

Record Group 218: Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman Files
Geographic Files

Record Group 220: Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards

Records of the Commission on Human Radiation Experiments
[RESTRICTED FOR PRIVACY] [Research Document Library Files, 1/15/1994 - 12/31/1995](#)
[Territory Contact Files, 12/28/1990 - 10/7/1991](#) (unrestricted)

Record Group 313: Records of Naval Operating Forces

Commander, Naval Forces, Marianas
Commander, Naval Forces, Marshalls and Gilberts
CINCPAC
Military Sealift Command/Military Sea Transportation Service
Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands
https://www.archives.gov/research/military/navy/guided-topics/tpi?_ga=2.268305613.276623033.1644232701-99020587.1615890619 - This includes more than RG 313

Record Group 326: Records of the Atomic Energy Commission

[RESTRICTED] A1 Entry 89: [Operation Sandstone](#) FOIA (b)(3)
A1 Entry 73 A and 73B: [Records Relating to Fallout Monitoring and Studies, 1953 - 1964](#) Only boxes 53 - 55 are classified FOIA (b)(1). There's a folder list in the Finding Aids Master.

National Archives at Riverside

[Enewetak Atoll Survey Field Books](#) Unrestricted
[RESTRICTED FOR CUI] [Site Background Files](#) FOIA (b)(3)
[Enewetak Atoll Photographs](#) Unrestricted
[Manuals, ca. 1949 - ca. 1967](#) Unrestricted
[Program Files Relating to the Development of Enewetak Atoll](#) Unrestricted
[RESTRICTED FOR CUI] [Project Files of Holmes and Narver](#) FOIA (b)(7)
[Jobsite Photographs of the Pacific Islands](#) Unrestricted
[RESTRICTED FOR PRIVACY] [Administrative and Reference File](#) FOIA (b)(6)
[Project Photographs](#) Unrestricted

Record Group 338: US Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (World War II and Thereafter), 1917-1999

RG 338 (UD) 37042 [Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations \(World War II and Thereafter\). Unit Histories, 1943 - 1967](#)

Record Group 344: Records of the Naval Sea Systems Command (1966 -)

Components of Ordnance after dissolution of Naval Ordnance Command
Records related to Special Projects Office (SPO) and Polaris

Record Group 359: Records of the Office of Science and Technology (OST)

Presidential scientific advisor records in the appropriate Presidential libraries. Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology 1957-1972 and Science Advisor to the President, 1973-76.

Record Group 374: Records of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DNA reports and records of the Joint Task Forces

[Human Radiation Exposure \(HRE\) Report on Search for Human Radiation Experiment Records, 1995-2005](#)

[RESTRICTED FOR PRIVACY] [Case Module Data Files, 1/9/1994-10/16/2002](#)

[CLASSIFIED] RG 374 NM-16 60 [General Files, 1949 - 1951](#).

Record Group 385: Records of the Naval Facilities and Engineering Command

Ethnographic studies

Record Group 402: Records of the Bureau of Weapons (1959-66)

Entry UD-UP 74: Records Relating to the Transfer of Kwajalein Pacific Missile Range Facility to the United States Army

Record Group 407: Records of the Adjutant General's Office

RG 407 (NM3) 427 [Records of the Adjutant General's Office. World War II Operations Reports, 1940 - 1948](#)

RG 407 (NM3) 429 [Records of the Adjutant General's Office. Command Reports, 1949 - 1954](#)

Record Group 412: Records of the Environmental Protection Agency

UD UP Entry 36: [Surface Impoundment Assessments for States and Territories, 1979 - 1981](#)
Unrestricted

UD 11W Entry 69: [Regulations, Standards, and Guidelines Related to the Radiation Impact and Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 1973 - 1979](#) Unrestricted

[RESTRICTED FOR CUI] UD 11W Entry 243: [Records Relating to Nuclear Pollution and Ionizing Radiation, ca. 1976 - 1985](#)

[RESTRICTED FOR CUI and PRIVACY] UD 11W Entry 242: [Controlled and Major Correspondence Files of the Director, 1/1988 - 12/1988](#) Presidential Records Act (p)(6)
Personal Privacy, FOIA (b)(4)

[RESTRICTED FOR CUI] UD UP Entry 77: [Program Development Files Relating to Policy Decisions, ca. 1970 - ca. 1975](#) FOIA (b) (3)

Record Group 434: Records of the Department of Energy

UD 12W Entries 40, 41, 42, and 46: [Research and Development Project Case Files Related to Ecology, 1/1/1962 - 12/31/1979](#) Unrestricted

[RESTRICTED FOR CUI] UD 14W Entry 4: [Records Relating to Studies of Radioactive Waste Disposal, 1/1/1955 - 3/31/1977](#)

[CLASSIFIED] A1 Entry 12: [Records Relating to the Study of Health and Mortality Among Atomic Energy Workers, ca. 1959 - ca. 1978](#) FOIA (b)(1) Not directly related, but useful in terms of long-term exposure.

[RESTRICTED FOR CUI] UD 12W Entry 51: [Research and Development Project Case Files Relating to Health and the Environment, 8/1/1963 - 12/31/1979](#) FOIA (b)(3) Again not directly related, but maybe useful.

[CLASSIFIED] FRC Transfer PT-434-2010-0275: [R&D PROJECT CASE FILES](#) Secret - RD/FRD, Restricted- Fully FOIA (b)(1) National Security; FOIA (b)(3) Statute (1 FRC-S) Enewetak resettlement (approved, awaiting transfer)

Record Group 443: Records of the National Institutes of Health

UD WW Entry 28: [Records Relating to Radiation Research Groups, 1977 - 1988](#) Unrestricted

Record Group 494: Records of US Army Forces in the Middle Pacific

Operational Area of Marshall Islands (1945/46)

Record Group 496: Records of GHQ, SW Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II)

Operational Area and forerunner to US Army, Pacific and Far East Command

Record Group 550: Records US Army, Pacific

(A1) 1 [Records of the U.S. Army, Pacific. Organizational History Files, 1959 – 1973](#)

(A1) 2 [Records of the U.S. Army, Pacific. Classified Organizational History Files, 1959 - ca. 1974](#)

Archivists were unable to locate any circa 1946-58 Army records specifically for the Bucholz Army Airfield or the Kwajalein Atoll, but were able to locate the following unprocessed records:

[CLASSIFIED] [General Records, 1951 - 1972](#)

Record Group 593: Records of Strategic Systems Projects Office (SSPO)

Records related to Special Project Office and Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Projects

Polaris

Poseidon

Trident

San Francisco Federal Records Center

The Federal Records Center, located in San Bruno, California holds records from several agencies that may be responsive. These records are in the legal custody of the creator agency and may be included in the lists provided by the Departments of Defense and Energy. Information about these records, along with finding aids, are available upon request.

Presidential Libraries Records Relating to Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library

Collections possibly containing classified records on nuclear testing in Marshall Islands

Collection Title	Series	Subseries	Box #	Folder Title
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records	NSC	Briefing Notes	1	AEC--Nuclear Testing
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records	NSC	Briefing Notes	2	[Atomic Testing] Eniwetok Test--Summer of 1958 (Reduced Radioactive Fallout)
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records	NSC	Subject	1	Atomic Weapons and Classified Intelligence-Misc. (1)
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records	OCB	Subject	4	Missile Program (1)
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records	Special Assistant	Subject	11	Nuclear Testing
White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Records	Subject	Alphabetical	21	Nuclear Testing - Cessation (1)-(3)
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology			2	Disarmament - Nuclear Test Policy (1)-(3)
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology			8	Disarmament - Nuclear Test Policy (1) (2) (5)-(7)
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology			13	Nuclear Test Suspension - Seismic data (2) (3)
White House Office, National Security Council Papers	Exec. Secretary's Subject File		7	#38 Feasibility of Cessation - Nuclear Testing (1)-(4)
White House Office, National Security Council Papers	Disaster File		41	Science and Technology - Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development (1)
John A. McCone Papers			4	RESandD 1-2 -- TESTING -- MARCH

				1960 - JULY 1960 (1)-(3)
John A. McCone Papers			4	RESandD 1-2 -- TESTING -- AUGUST 1960 - DEC. 1960 (1)-(3)
John A. McCone Papers			6	Testing files
John A. McCone Papers			7	Test files
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament Records			5	Nuclear Weapons Tests files
White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament Records			6	Nuclear Weapons Tests files
U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee Records			4	Nuclear Weapons

Herbert Hoover Presidential Library

The papers of Lewis Strauss, Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1953 to 1959, were donated to the Hoover Presidential Library. The inventory contains 733 items which are classified. An unclassified item-level inventory of the Strauss documents is available upon request.

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library

The Carter Library holds a small volume of classified records. These records have not been reviewed for declassification.

- NSA 24 (NLC-24); Container 65, Folder: PRM-19 (Micronesia), 2/77-4/77, 47 pages, NSC, unreviewed. Note that this box is (mis?)labeled NLC-24-64.
- NSC Institutional Files, 1977-1981; Container 61, Folder: PRC 015 - Micronesia, 4/28/77
- NSC Institutional Files, 1977-1981; Container 68: Folder: PRC 059 - Micronesia Political Status
- Negotiations - 4/4/78

There are 6 unclassified file units.

- Micronesia - [Marshall Islands District, Supplemental Budget Request, FY 1978], Domestic Policy Staff; Al Stern's Subject File, 1976 - 1981, Container: 41.
- [NAID: 159045](#): Radiation - Marshall Islands, 1977 - 1981 Domestic Policy Staff. 3/26/1978-1/1981; Franklin White's Subject File, 1977 - 1981, Container: 21
- [NAID: 159889](#): Micronesia - (Marshall Islands District, Indicative Development Plan, 7/30/76), 1976 -1981 Domestic Policy Staff; Al Stern's Subject File, 1976 - 1981, Container: 41
- [NAID: 160249](#): Micronesia - Marshall Islands, 6/1979 - 12/1980 Domestic Policy Staff - Jeffrey Farrow's Subject File, Container: 16

- [NAID: 160250](#): Micronesia - Marshall Islands Disaster Declaration, 6/1979 - 12/1980
Domestic Policy Staff; Jeffrey Farrow's Subject File, Container: 16
- [NAID: 12161854](#): Letter to the President of the Marshall Islands, 1/17/81, 1977 - 1981
Office of the Executive Clerk; Tom Jones' Legislative Bills, Reports and Announcements
Files, 1977 - 1981, Container: 38

The Center for Legislative Archives Records Relating to Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands

The Center for Legislative Archives identified holdings of two congressional committees that contain responsive records. An overview of each records series follows. These records require declassification review, but contain no other sensitivities.

Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Series: Classified General Subject Files, 1947 – 1977 (40 cubic feet)

There are several folders of potentially responsive records (approx. 2,000 pages). Subjects include weapons tests generally, Operations Crossroads, Sandstone, Greenhouse, Ivy, Castle, Redwing, Hardtack, and Dominic, radiation fallout, and others. This series contains correspondence, memoranda, reports, and materials sent to or received from the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense. These records are classified up to Top Secret/Restricted Data.

Series: Classified Transcripts of Executive Session Meetings and Hearings, 1947-1977 (37 cubic feet)

There are 18 potentially responsive transcripts (approx. 1,200 pages) identified from the finding aid dated from 1951 to 1963. Subjects discussed in the transcripts include selection of target areas, Pacific Proving Ground Tests, Joint Task Force Eight, UK payment of claims for tests in the Christmas Islands, and others. These records are classified up to TS/RD.

Records of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Series: Classified Committee Papers, 1965 – 2010 (15 cubic feet)

There are three potentially responsive hearings (165 pages) from 1966 – 1968 covering civil government in the Trust Territory of Pacific Islands. The records are classified up to Secret.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DoD) components conducted a search of potentially responsive records and estimated approximately 16,000 FRC-equivalent boxes totaling an estimated 35-40 million pages that may be responsive for the feasibility study. The classification levels for these records range across the classification spectrum from unclassified through top secret, sensitive compartmented information, formerly restricted data, restricted data, and including foreign government information/NATO classified originated records.

For this feasibility study, the DoD components conducted the searches using search terms such as ballistic missile testing, chemical weapons testing, cleanup, waste storage, nuclear testing, as well as, Marshall Islands-specific search criteria. DoD reported the metrics provided were not largely representative as figures directly responsive to the Marshall Islands-specific criteria, but more responsive to the general search criteria.

DoD Components provided differing levels of granularity in their reporting (document level vs page level vs accession/box level, etc.). The overall DoD metrics presented are to be interpreted as a rough estimate.

U.S. Army

The following Army components reported no responsive records found: the US Army Special Operations Command; the US Army Pacific; the Pacific Ocean Division, the US Army Corps of Engineers; and the US Army War College.

US Army Center of Military History, Library at Fort McNair

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 5 documents which are copies of records in NARA's holdings

Historical Reference Collection Geog Files

Historical Reference Collection #1

Historical Manuscript Collection #2

The content or subject is identified as:

Commander, Joint Task Force ONE Operation Plan No. 1-46

- Contains a copy of British Information Services news release of Churchill's April 5, 1954 speech with references to testing on Marshall Islands by the US
- Contains a War Department Press Release for October 30, 1946 titled "Calendar of Important Events in the Development of Atomic Energy 1938-1946"
- Lists Bikini tests in 1946
- Paper by David Alan Rosenberg titled "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision" circa 1977
- History manuscript produced by JCS with a section on Atomic weapons (including the testing at Bikini Atoll)

Army Declassification Directorate

Military History Institute

Classification: Confidential through Secret/Formerly Restricted Data

Volume: 19 documents

Location: Washington National Records Center

General Wickham's Papers, Microfilm Reels

US Army History and Education Center

Classification: Confidential through Top Secret/Formerly Restricted Data

Volume: 47 documents

- Joint Task Force One, Director of Ship Material, Historical Report Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker (Operation CROSSROADS) Vol 2 of 3 1946
- Commander, Joint Task Force One, Navy Department, Report on Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker (Operation CROSSROADS) Vol I 1946 (Copy 1)
- Commander, Joint Task Force One, Navy Department, Report on Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker (Operation CROSSROADS) Vol I 1946 (Copy 2)
- Commander, Joint Task Force One, Navy Department, Report on Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker (Operation CROSSROADS) Vol I 1946
- Joint Task Force Seven, Classified Scientific Meteorological Information Operation SANDSTONE, Sandstone No. 35
- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Volume II, Part II - Evaluation of Program 2
- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Volume II, Part III - Evaluation of Programs 3 to 6 and 8
- Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.0 - The Test of Structures, Office, Chief Engineers
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.1 - Army Structures Test Volume I, Interim Report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.1 - Army Structures Test Volume II, Appendix, Permanent Effects, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.1 - Army Structures Test Volume III, Interim Report, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Navy Department
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.2 - U. S. Navy Structures Test, Air Installations Division, Headquarters, Air Material Command
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.3 - Air Force Structures Test, Volume I, Air Installations Division, Headquarters, Air Material Command
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.3 - Air Force Structures Test, Volume II, Air Installations Division, Headquarters, Air Material Command
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.3 - Air Force Structures Test, Volume III, Air Installations Division, Headquarters, Air Material Command
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 3.3 - Air Force Structures Test, Volume IV, Air Force, Cambridge Research Center

- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 4.1 - Cloud Studies Parts I, II, and III, Army Chemical Center
- Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 6.10 - Evaluation of Collective-Protector Equipment
- Joint Task Force 132, History of Operation Ivy
- Joint Task Force Seven, History of Operation Castle
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Summary Report of the Commander, Task Unit 13 - Military Effects, Programs 1-9
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Project 2.2 - Gamma Rate vs Time
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Project 2.5a - Distribution and Intensity of Fallout
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Project 2.5b - Fallout Studies
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Project 2.7 - Distribution of Radioactive Fall-Out by Survey and Analysis of Contaminated Sea Water
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Final Report Project 4.1, Study of Response of Human Beings Accidentally Exposed to Significant Fallout Radiation
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Final Report Project 4.1 Addendum, Exposure of Marshall Islanders and American Military Personnel to Fallout
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Project 6.5 - Decontamination and Protection
- Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Operation Castle, Project 6.6 - Effects of Nuclear Detonations on the Ionosphere, Rand Corporation, Fallout Computations and Castle-Bravo -A Case Study, RM-1855
- Headquarters Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency, Operation Redwing, Technical Summary of Military Effects, Programs 1-9

U.S. Navy

The following components reported no responsive records found: Strategic Systems Programs.

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 57 boxes

Location: Federal Records Center, St. Louis

RG 52, Event Logs and Patient Registers, Dental records from Kwajalein NS, Subordinate Command Policy - Medicine and Dentistry, Medical treatment records

Naval Sea Systems Command

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 126 boxes

Location: Federal Records Center, Seattle

RG 181, Ship Drawings - Components and Subsystems

CV38, Shangri-La, ship plans and original drawings - Operation Crossroads, May 1946

Commander Naval Surface Force

Dept of the Navy, US Pacific Fleet

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 5 boxes

Location: Federal Records Center, St. Louis and Seattle

RG 181, Radiation Exposure Reports, Agency Payroll Record for Each Pay Period, Enewetak Atoll Cleanup Project 76-80

Naval History and Heritage Command

Classification: Confidential through Top Secret/Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data/NATO

Volume: 13,250 boxes

- AR/547 Post 1946 Operations Plans. 1946-1973 Partially declassified, includes TS, RD/FRD, includes OPLANS related to specific weapons tests in the Marshalls.
- AR/534 Post 1 January 1946 Command File. 1946-1973 Partially declassified, includes TS, RD/FRD, includes Command Histories of various Navy commands and other official documentation; includes Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG) that are responsive and remain classified. May include records from other commands that are responsive.
- AR/59 Post 1946 Reports. 1946-1960s Partially declassified, includes TS, RD/FRD, includes a wide variety of reports that may include weapons testing reports and planning for tests in the Marshalls.
- AR/663 Post 1 January 1974 Command File. 1974-1989 Partially declassified, includes TS, RD/FRD, includes Command Histories of various Navy commands and other official documentation; may include material related to remediation efforts in the Marshalls
- AR/540 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO): Top Secret Control Files. 1942-1981, partially declassified. Includes TS, possibly RD/FRD, includes records related to tests in the Marshalls that have been excluded from Automatic Declassification review and sometimes referred to other agencies including USAF and DOE. Also includes records on nuclear weapons testing and missile tests.
- AR/66 Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office Files. 1947-1959, partially declassified includes TS, RD/FRD. The immediate office files of the CNO which cover a wide variety of subjects and includes responsive records on weapons testing.
- AR/134 Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office Files. 1960-1969, partially declassified includes TS, RD/FRD. The immediate office files of the CNO which cover a

wide variety of subjects and may include records on weapons tests and remediation efforts in the Marshalls

- AR/162 Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office Files. 1970-1979, partially declassified includes TS, RD/FRD. The immediate office files of the CNO which cover a wide variety of subjects and may include info on remediation efforts in the Marshalls
- AR/133 Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office Files. 1980-1989, partially declassified includes TS, RD/FRD. The immediate office files of the CNO which cover a wide variety of subjects and may include info on remediation efforts in the Marshalls
- AR/513 Vice Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office Files. 1960-1974, partially declassified includes TS, RD/FRD. The immediate office files of the VCNO which cover a wide variety of subjects and may include info on weapons testing or remediation efforts in the Marshalls
- AR/131 CNO Strategic Plans Division and predecessor organizations. 1940-1970, partially declassified, contains TS, has information related to the development and/or planning for nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
- AR/328 Chronological Files. 1946-1989, partially declassified, includes SECRET, RD/FRD. This collection comprises various documents from several naval commands, as well as other Department of Defense agencies, spanning the years 1946 thru 1989. The files include news releases, intelligence bulletins, annual reports, operations reports, briefing notes, and special interest documents.
- AR/149 Records of the Secretary to the CNO (OP-004) for JCS Matters, aka "JCS Records." 1940s-1980s, partially declassified includes TS, RD/FRD. Includes records on weapons tests in the Marshalls. May include info on remediation efforts in the Marshalls.
- AR/46 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Publications. 1942-2004, partially declassified, contains SECRET and includes information related to the testing of weapons systems including Regulus and Polaris missiles.
- AR/132 Military Sealift Command. 1950s-1999, has not had a declassification review, contains SECRET, may include info related to the movement of Marshallese and/or USG personnel during the testing era and afterward.
- AR/562 Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Collection [includes records from predecessor organizations]. 1898-2006, partially declassified, contains CONFIDENTIAL and RD, includes information on missile tests, possibly in the Marshalls.
- AR/124 Arthur W. Radford Papers. 1940-1957, partially declassified, contains TS and RD, Radford was CINPAC/CINCPACFLT and then Chairman of the JCS, the two positions covering the years 1949-1957. May contain records related to tests in the Marshalls.
- AR/472 Forrest P. Sherman Papers. 1917-1951, partially declassified, contains TS, Sherman was a CNO during the testing period. May contain records related to tests in the Marshalls.
- AR/417 Robert B. Carney Papers. 1886-1965, partially declassified, contains TS, Carney was a CNO during the testing period. May contain records related to tests in the Marshalls.
- AR/136 Arleigh A. Burke Papers. 1930-1980s, partially declassified, contains TS, Burke was a CNO during the testing period. May contain records related to tests in the Marshalls.

- COLL/439 George W. Anderson Papers. 1917-1976, partially declassified, contains TS, Anderson was a CNO during the testing period. May contain records related to tests in the Marshalls.
- AR/197 David A. Rosenberg Papers. 1940s-1970s, partially declassified. Historical materials gathered by CAPT David Rosenberg, USNR (ret), PhD, for his writing projects. CAPT Rosenberg is renowned for his knowledge and research on early US nuclear policy and strategy—may contain weapons testing information.
- AR/125 Waldo K. Lyon Papers. 1940s-1990s, partially declassified, contains SECRET, included records related to Operation Crossroads. Lyons was an eminent scientist.
- COLL/662 Bureau of Ordnance Information. 1944-1968 Has not had a declassification review, may not be fully processed, and includes RD. Also includes information from the Bureau of Weapons.
- COLL/712 Williams S. Parsons Papers. 1940s-1950 Declassification status uncertain. BUORD specialist, CAPT Parsons worked on Manhattan Project and was Little Boy weaponeer, continued to work special weapons post World War II; may contain weapons testing information.

Unprocessed Collection:

- Chief of Naval Operations (CNO): Atomic Energy Division/Guided Missile Division, 1943-1961 has not been reviewed for declassification, no other data.

U.S. Fleet Forces

Classification: Unclassified through Confidential

Volume: 3 records

- 1988 Naval Arms Control Briefing Book
- U.S. Strategic Interests and the Future of the Trust Territory
- Summary of the Interim Findings of the PEACE Program

DRMD Declassification Program

Classification: Confidential through Top Secret/Restricted Data

Volume: 355.5 boxes

Location: Washington National Records Center and Navy Declassification Program

RG 038, DRMD Declassification Program Database

NARA Navy 01-Report, DRMD Declassification Program Database

NCIS Declassification Program "Legacy Database"

NARA Navy 01-Report

U.S. Air Force

SAF/CNZA - Department of the Air Force (DAF) Records Office (DAFRO)

Classification: Unclassified through Secret/Top Secret

Volume: 62 boxes

Location: Washington National Records Center and Federal Records Center, Seattle

Operation Sandstone: 10 boxes
Kwajalein: 47 boxes
Atomic: 5 boxes

Air Force Historical Research Agency

Classification: Unclassified through Confidential/Secret/Restricted Data
Volume: 858 records
List of records and retrieval information is available upon request.

Joint Chief of Staff

JS/Information Management Division
Classification: Top Secret/Formerly Restricted Data
Volume: 10,459 database keyword search results

JS/Joint History Office

Classification: Top Secret/Formerly Restricted Data
Volume: 4 reels of microfilm, 443 documents

Defense Technical Information Center

Classification: Confidential through Secret
Volume: 1,340 records, 172,200 pages

Technical Reports, 1953-2015.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Classification: Unclassified through Confidential/Secret/Top Secret/Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data

Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis Center (DTRIAC), Albuquerque, NM
Volume: 300,000 documents, 20,000 motion picture film, 2,000,000 still images

Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR), Fort Belvoir, VA
Volume: 500,000 digital items

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

The following components reported no responsive records found: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters; OSD/Comptroller; Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Programs); DoD Chief Information Officer (includes Defense Information Systems Agency); Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security; and Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Classification: Unclassified through Top Secret/SCI/Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data
Volume: 669 boxes

Undersecretary of Defense Policy

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 5 documents

1. IP Nuclear Legacy CLEARED.docx
2. IP 17 - Nuclear Legacy.docx
3. 2012 Prepcom - Nuclear Testing in the Pacific.docx
4. 2012 0323 Drafo Op-Ed on Nuclear Issues to Loi.docx
5. 04-501.4-Marshall-Islands-Compact-SOFA.pdf

OSD Records Office (WHS/ESD/RDD)

Classification: Unclassified through Top Secret/SCI/Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data
Volume: 1.67M pages from 41 accessions within 669 boxes (568 boxes digitized and electronic/101 hard copy boxes at WNRC)

Location: OSD Executive Archive Electronic Repository and the Washington National Records Center

- DA&M Policy Files (1977-1999) AI15 212-01.1-7 PERM
- OUSD(AT&L) SARS Acquisition Reports (1980-2005) AI15 212-01.7 PERM NC1-330-78-7 Item 1a
- DOD/WHS Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that pertain to Relations with the White House, Executive office of the President, Congress, or the Public: DA&M-WHS GP&A SCI, OSD AI 15 212.01, NCI-330-78-07, Item 1a
- DOD/WHS Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that pertain to Relations with the White House, Executive office of the President, Congress, or the Public: DA&M-WHS GP&A SCI, OSD AI 15 212.01, NCI-330-78-07 Item 1a
- Defense Health Agency 00 - 212-01 - CHAMPUS AND TRICARE (DHA) SIGNATURE FILES BX 1 OSD AI 15 212/01, NI-330-11-10, Item 1
- THIS IS A COLLECTION OF SCI PULLED FROM PREVIOUS ACCESSIONS (OR FROM COLLECTIONS PRIOR TO TH, These records are the record copies of the ASPR Committee and the contract administration panel, ASPR Committee. They contain the Legislative history of Department of Defense procurement policies, minutes of meetings, drafts, proposed regulations, comments on the proposals by other government agencies and government contractors. These records relate to transactions which establish precedents with respect to the general procurement program of the Department of Defense, which include the criteria for contracts, and final action and approval for printing, 1968 Official Records (secret and below) of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
- FILES FROM THE IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VAULT (M.R. LAIRD) (1969-1972). NOTE THAT THESE FILES HAVE HISTORICAL VALUE

- Correspondence Directives Division Department of Defense Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos -- These Records are of historical value, OSD AI 15 01-3
- OSD/Deputy Secretary of Defense Various Congressional Rebuttal Material on Combat Readiness, 1967 and 1968, OSD AI 15 01-8
- OUSD(C), Official Records (Secret & Below) of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Special Assistant to SECDEF/DEPSECDEF (1970) AI15 212-01 PERM NC1-330-77-4"
- OASD(C), Minutes of the Armed Forces Council (Aug 1950 - Dec 1972), AI15 212-01 PERM
- OSD Official Records (Secret & below) of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Special Assistant to SECDEF/DEPSECDEF (1972) AI15 212-01 PERM NC1-330-77-4.
- OSD, Official Records (Secret & below) of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Special Assistant to SECDEF/DEPSECDEF (1973), AI15/5 01-3a PERM UNSCH
- OASD USDR&E Records Section M&RS Chron Files 1978, OSD AI 15 102-16.2
- OSD Official Records (Secret & Below) of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Special Assistant to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1980), AI15 212-01 PERM
- OSD Official Records (Secret & Below) of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Special Assistant to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1980) AI15 212-01 PERM
- OSD Official Records (Top Secret) of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Special Assistant to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1979), AI15 212-01 PERM
- OSD Official Records of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF and Executive Assistant to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1981), AI15 212-01 PERM
- ENVIRONMENTAL AND LIFE SCIENCE - 1977-81 Environmental & Life Sciences Weteye
- OSD Official Records of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Exec Assistant to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1982), AI15 212-1 PERM
- OSD Official Records of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Exec Assistant to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1982) AI15 212-1 PERM
- OSD Official Records of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Executive Secretary to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1985) AI15 212-1 PERM
- OSD Official Records of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Executive Assistant to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1984) AI15 212-01 PERM
- OSD Official records of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Executive Secretary to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1986) AI15 212-1
- OSD Official Records of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Executive Secretary to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1949-1969) AI15 212-1 PERM NCI-330-78-7
- WHS CCD Official Records of SECDEF Caspar Weinberger (Armed Forces Policy Council Records) (1981-1987), AI15 212-1a PERM NCI-330-78-7
- DOD/WHS Special Weapons and Support Case Files OSD AI 15 1402-01
- Advanced research reports and studies
 - OASD, OASD/ISA Functional Field International Security DOD Participation Policies Plans Arms Control Disarmament Foreign Agreements Military

- Assistance Sales Activities MAAG United States Missions Organization
 Conferences NATO SEATO CENTO DPC Brussels NPG Copen, OSD AI 15 01-3
- DOD/WHS R&D Studies sponsored by DARPA/Tactical Technology Office 1971-1978, OSD 1308-03
 - OASD USDRE Policy Files of 1979 OSD AI 15 1301"m
 - DOD/WHS Defense Research 6 Engineering DARPA/STO (Naval Warfare - formerly known as Ocean Control Ocean Monitoring). Jan 70 - Dec 77. OSD AI 15 1308-03
 - DOD/WHS OSD OASD DDR&E DR&E DARPA ARPA Office Assistant Secretary Defense Director Reserve DARPA/TTO 1969-1980 OSD AI 15 1308-03
 - LAND WARFARE, ODDR&E 1950-1971
 - OASD USDRE Policy Files of 1979 OSD AI 15 1301
 - DOD/WHS Files Pertaining to Project SORAK sponsored by DARPA/TTO from Jan 1980-1983 OSD AI 15 1308-02
 - DOD/WHS OSA OASD ISA Office Assistant Secretary Defense International Security Affairs 1980 General Files ASD/ISA Policy Files OSD AI 15 801-01
 - OASD USDRE Policy Files of 1979 OSD AI 15 1301
 - OASD USDRE Policy Files of 1979 OSD AI 15 1301
 - OSD Official Records of SECDEF, DEPSECDEF & Executive Assistant to SECDEF & DEPSECDEF (1987) AI15 212-1
 - DOD/WHS Defensive Systems OSD AI 15 1307-01
 - DOD/WHS Strategic and Space Systems Jan 72-July 86 OSD AI 15 1307-04
 - OASD USDRE Policy Files of 1979 OSD AI 15 1301

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

Classification: Unclassified through Secret

Volume:

1. OHA 104 Atomic Bomb Materials Collection - 120 clinical (patient) photographs including micrographs and x-rays (47 boxes, 22.5 linear ft.)
2. OHA 343 U.S. Signal Corps - 1 photograph of casualties on the Marshall Islands during WWII (12 boxes, 3 drawers, 11 linear ft).
3. U.S. Navy BUMED Library and Archives - 4 photographs from WWII of field medicine on the Marshall Island (digital)
4. Deseret Test Center (DTC) Test 68-50 was to determine the potential casualty area and associated casualty levels for the F-4/AB45Y-4/PG2 weapon system during the 1960s - 25 to 30 pages

Department of Energy

The Department of Energy conducted a search of potentially responsive records and estimated 118,010 (66,572 classified, 782 controlled unclassified information, and 50,656 unclassified) records may be responsive for the feasibility study. These records are in a variety of formats: paper, digital, and audio/visual and differing levels of granularity was provided in their reporting (document level, reels, boxes, etc). The classification levels range from unclassified, controlled unclassified information to classified. The records are located at the facilities listed below, along with the formats, and classification level.

The DOE entities conducted searches using the terms atoll, Enewetak (also Eniwetok), Bikini, Kwajalein, Pacific Proving Grounds – (Specific to Marshall Islands), Operation Crossroads, *Shot Able*, *Shot Baker*, Operation Sandstone, *Shot Yoke*, Operation Castle, *Castle Bravo*, Operation Greenhouse, *Shot Easy*, Operation Ivy, *Mike Shot*, *King Shot*, Operation Redwing, Operation Hardtack I, *Oak*, Runit Island, and Runit Dome.

Headquarters Defense Programs

Classification: Classified

Volume: 4 Hardcopy Documents

- Trust Territory Vol. 1 - SOP's PASO Kwajalein, Johnston, and Enewetak Atolls 1982-1983
- Trust Territory Vol. 2 - National Parks SOP/Functions/Presentations Marshall Islands
- Trust Territory Vol. 3 - Survey/Radiological Bikini Atoll 1984
- Trust Territory- Special Folder - Enjebi Island Dose Assessment, photographs, transcription of meeting, The Mid-Pacific Research Laboratory (MPRL)

Classification: Controlled Unclassified Information/Unclassified

Volume: 1 Hardcopy Document

- Trust Territory Vol. 1 - PS Marshall Islands Transfer of Functions 1982

Headquarters DOE Records Management Historians Office

Classification: Classified

Volume: 18 Hardcopy Documents, 36 Boxes

- MR&A Hardtack 1
- Sandstone Reports, 15 Reports
- Memo Planned Experiments for 1951 Test Operation at Eniwetok
- Greenhouse Eniwetok Test Rpt
- Results of Hardtack
- Redwing test series
- Results of Redwing

- Rongelap-Utirik, TWXS 1954
- Other Pacific Shots Redwing
- OPER Redwing-Background Radio
- Operation Castle Documentary
- Operation Redwing, Post Operation Report Program 22 Reaction History Measurements
- Establish of Eniwetok Atoll
- Operation Castle Documentary
- MRA7-1 Proving Grounds
- Military Applications Correspondence

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 11 Hardcopy Documents, 3 Boxes

- Operation Ivy
- Operation Castle Nat Extent of
- Holmes & Narver, Inc
- History of Operation Castle, 1952-1954
- DBM files - area exposure, Redwing, fallout maps, gummed paper
- DBM files - conference on long term studies and surveys of Marshall Islands 1954
- DBM files - redwing, general
- MHS 3-7 Utirik Atoll
- EHSS (Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security): Marshall Islands
- Mccraw files - Pacific fallout, Office of Operational Safety
- Hearing - Resettlement of Rongelap Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands Senate Hearings Bef Cmte on Energy & Na'l Resources
- meeting with President Note Republic of Marshall Islands

Headquarters Environmental, Health, Safety, and Security

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 30 Boxes

Headquarters Federal Records Center (WNRC)

Classification: Classified

Volume: 304 Boxes

- Part of EH-64 Effort, 1945-1962
- Safety Mgmt Record, 1958
- Safety Mgmt Records, 1957
- Military Applications, 1959 - 1963
- Military Applications, 1946 - 1965
- Safety Mgmt Records, 6/1944-4/1950
- Safety Mgmt Records, 5/1950-5/1952
- Safety Mgmt Records, 2/1943-1951
- Safety Mgmt Records, 10/1950-3/1951

- Commr Subj, 1966-1972
- Hist Bkgd Files, 1975
- Commr Palfrey Corres, 1954-1970
- Administrative Management Records, 1960-2007
- Administrative Management Records, 1976-1990
- Administrative Management Records, Weapons Program, 1960-2000
- General Correspondence - r&d, BX 2, 1967
- Commr Ramey LS, 1973
- Seaborg File, 1970
- Hist Rec, 1947-1965
- Gen Corres, 1975
- Corres, 1975-1977
- Admin Main Fact Corres, 1977

Brookhaven National Laboratory

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 2 Electronic Documents

- 3/9/1999 - Medical Department - Brookhaven Lab - Transfer of MIMP Radiographs to Dr. A. Vaswani - Draft The Brookhaven Medical Program to Detect Radiation Effects in the Marshallese People: A comparison of the people's vs. the program's attitudes
- 6/28/1998 - Records Transfer Notification and Confirmation: 65 boxes of records on the Marshall Islands were transferred to Thomas Bell, Office of International Health Programs, DOE HQ - Germantown, Maryland

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Classification: Secret through Restricted Data

Volume: 7,000 Hardcopy Documents

- Engineering design drawings of physics packages tested
- Test event photos
- Test event device radiographs
- Test event documentation, presentations, reports, data, and results

Classification: Controlled Unclassified Information

Volume: 126 Boxes

- Field and Lab record from the Marshall Island Program. Lab gamma records, in situ gamma records and meteorological records. Gamma counting facility historical data. Action logbooks. 45 Boxes.
- 1975-1995 Printouts: Bikini, Rongelap, Majuro, Utirik, Enewetak, Kwajalein. 68 Boxes.
- 1953-1958 Off site personnel exposures; C.R & D, Nevada Pacific 1953 -1954-195AA7 Hardtack, Phase 1 & 2 1958 Binder 1443-(21721). 1 Box.

- Punched data cards - Northern Marshall Islands, misc. 2 Boxes.
- Slides and Photos of Bikini Trip 1 & 2. 1 Box.
- November 1993 Bikini/Rong #7168-7213, 9000-9199, April 1994 Enew/Utirik #1-499. 1 Box.
- Litigation Files. 8 Boxes.

Los Alamos National Laboratory - Institution Records Management

Classification: Classified

Volume: 57 Boxes

- 1955 J-10, Atmospheric Test, Measurements Also TR #83
- 1958 Hardtack tests
- 1958 Operation Hardtack files
- 1958 Operations: Hardtack, Redwing, Teapot
- 1959 Hardtack & Redwing corr.; admin files
- 1963 Upshot/Knothole, Greenhouse, Ivy; logs to TR#8907
- 1967 Hardtack, Plumbbob, Redwing, Newton, Castle, Teapot
- 1961-1984 Sequence files; test shot data
- 1947-1976 H-3; ESH-5, HSR-5, HS-5; Safety, Accidents, NTS, Rover, Safety, Pacific Proving Grounds, Red Hat, High Altitude, Colloquiums, Hardtack, Mark Mills Accident, Plumbbob, Redwing, Tea Pot, Castle, IVY, Greenhouse, & Panda.
- 1981 NTS, Pacific Proving Ground, Public Relations, Yields
- ESS-7; Aftac, Buster/Jungle, Castle, Dominic, Foreign Test, Greenhouse, Gundi/Screamer, high altitude (TR scanned)
- 1957 Plumbbob, Redwing, Teapot, Weapon Effects Tests
- 1989-1998 P-15; Shot data, Fulcrum, Grenadier, Redwing, Quicksilver; Praetorian, Phalanx, Cresset
- P-23; P-15; Nuclear Device and effects testing records: NTS Shot Data
- WX-5; Weapon Data, Shot Records (TR scanned)
- 1982-2009 WT-DO; Assembly Shots, Weapon Data, Drawings 18y, Detonator, Assembly, W76, W80, B61, ESA, WT-3
- 1963-1990 W-DO; NTS Test-Site. Weapons Data, Shots, Soviet Equipment, Cable Holes, Underground Testing, Cable. (Box 2 of 30 in ARCHIVES)

Classification: Controlled Unclassified Information

Volume: 8 Boxes

- 1962-1988 H-1 General Monitoring Section; Photodosimetry films
- 1944-1973 Test Operation & Fallout, Trinity, Nougat, Project 56
- 1944-1963 Test Operation, Exposure, Accidents, Cleary, Ciesleik
- 1943-1975 H-DO; microfiche (ref tr#5226 for hardcopy)
- Instrument Chart - Operation Hardtack - Phase II Firing Data HN - 161; J-6-6725

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 61 Boxes

- 1953-1955 J-10; Weapons, Effects, Film, Nevada Proving Ground, Blast, Calculation
- H-1; Film Badges; Group Correspondence, Redwing Exposure
- 1945-1962 CRMO/ Records Center; Microfilms, 1945-1962, Continental & Pacific History, NV-1 thru NV-24. Received from REECO.
- 1948-1954/1965 IS-9; Shots, Motion Picture Film, Kodak Film, ARB 001 thru ARC 012 Dollies, CPS Master. Sandstone Series, 1948; Greenhouse, Castle, Pacific Test Ground Level, Trinity/Alamogordo, Aerial, NTS, South Site, Buckman Area, TNT Tower, Postmortem, Assembly. 1948-1965.
- 1972-1996 and 1987-1993 Proprietary Information Agreements 1987 thru 1993 by PIA Number 1972-1996
- 1984-2007 WT-8; 34y, Hydro Test, Jo Pin, Hydro General Pro E Drawings, J-7 Events, General Drawings. 1980-2007
- 1965-2002 W-DO; Nuclear Device and Effects Testing Records, Project Records 1970 - 2002

Los Alamos National Laboratory - Weapons Records Services

Classification: Classified

Volume: 35,759 Hardcopy Documents, 6,853 Electronic Documents, 145 Photo/Neg Folders, 1,552 Film Reels, 4 Videos, 5 Microfilm Reels

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 1,883 Hardcopy Documents, 3,691 Electronic Documents, 82 Film Reels

- Motion Picture Film
 - Crossroads-Able: Estimated 4 Films, Estimated 2 Videos
 - Crossroads-Baker: Estimated 20 Films, Estimated 2 Videos
 - Castle-Bravo: Estimated 220 Films
 - Sandstone-Yoke: Estimated 135 Films
 - Ivy-Mike: Estimated 165 Films
 - Ivy-King: Estimated 100 Films
 - Redwing: Estimated 955 Films
 - Hardtack I-Oak: Estimated 35 Films
- Photo Negatives/Prints
 - Crossroads
 - Shot Baker- 6 Folders of Negatives/Prints
 - Shot Able- 4 Folders of Negatives/Prints
 - Crossroads Shot not listed- 29 Folders of Negatives/Prints
 - Crossroads Shot not listed- 1 Folder of Film (Motion Picture)
 - Sandstone
 - Sandstone shot not listed- 42 Folders of Negatives/Prints/Teletypes
 - Sandstone shot not listed- 2 Folders of Film (Motion Picture)
 - Castle

- Castle shot not listed- 13 Folders of Negatives/Prints
 - Greenhouse
 - Greenhouse shot not listed- 15 Folders of Negatives/Prints
 - Ivy
 - Ivy shot not listed- 9 Folders of Negatives/Prints
 - Redwing
 - Redwing shot not listed- 12 Folders of Negatives/Prints
 - Hardtack I
 - Hardtack I shot not listed- 4 Folders of Negatives/Prints
 - Kwajalein Atoll
 - Kwajalein Atoll- 1 Folder of Negatives/Prints
 - Bikini Atoll
 - Bikini Atoll- 7 Folders of Negative/Prints
- Microfilm: 5 reels of microfilm (~2,500 images per film)
- NSRC Hardcopy Collection
 - Castle Bravo (22 folders = 600 docs)
 - Castle, 1950 (23 folders = 1, 150 docs)
 - Enewetak Atoll (4 folders = 200 docs)
 - Greenhouse, 1951 (32 folders = 1,600 docs)
 - Greenhouse, Shot Easy (2 folders = 100 docs)
 - Kwj. Atoll (3 folders = 150 docs)
 - Crossroads, 1946 (135 folders, 6,750 docs)
 - Crossroads, Shot Able (12 folders = 600 docs)
 - Crossroads, Shot Baker (19 folders = 950 docs)
 - Operation Hardtack I (62 folders = 3,100 docs)
 - Operation Hardtack I, 1958 (12 folders = 600 docs)
 - Operation Hardtack I, Oak Shot (4 folders = 200 docs)
 - Operation Ivy, 1952 (37 folders – 1,850 docs)
 - Operation Ivy, King Shot (8 folders = 400 docs)
 - Operation Ivy, Mike Shot (17 folders = 850 docs)
 - Operation Redwing, 1956 (12 folders = 600 docs)
 - Operation Redwing (200 folders = 10, 000 docs)
 - Operation Sandstone, Shot Yoke (15 folders = 750 docs)
 - Operation Sandstone, 1948 (15 folders = 750 docs)
 - Pacific Proving Grounds, Marshall Islands (22 folders = 1,100 docs)
 - Runit Dome (~ 2 docs)
 - Runit Island (~ 2 docs)
 - Classified Technical Reports Collection (3,140 documents)
 - Field Testing (2,917 documents)
- Digital Files: Online Vault (7,214 documents)

Los Alamos National Laboratory - Weapons Records Services-Project Y Index

Classification: Classified

Volume: 36 Boxes

- 2/12/1946 - 353 Crossroads / Memo from Martin to Jette on the schedule for initiator production for the Navy Tests. Document is classified CRD.
- 10/26/1945-8/24/1946 - 471.6 Crossroads - Proposed Tests / Three documents concerning possible Crossroads tests. Included are a memo from Parsons to Bradbury, 10/26/45, on a Navy meeting held to develop plans for Crossroads; letter from Bradbury to Groves, 4/12/1946, concerning the character of the second test at Crossroads; and a memo by Groves, 8/24/1946, requesting an inventory of bomb parts at Wingate, Sandia, and Los Alamos, All documents are classified CRD.
- 3/4/1946-3/5/1946 - 353 Crossroads - Bomb Preparations / Three documents on bomb preparations at Crossroads. Two copies of a memo from Doll to Warner, 3/4/1946, entitled "Bomb Commander Briefing;" and a memo from Doll to Warner, 3/5/1946, entitled "Disaster Chart Considerations for a 1561 Bomb." All documents are classified CRD.

Classification: Controlled Unclassified Information

Volume: 114 Boxes

List of records available upon request.

Nevada National Security Site

Classification: Controlled Unclassified Information

Volume: 28 Electronic Documents, 314 Boxes

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 3,221 Electronic Documents, 264 Boxes, 33,091 Images, 2 Microfilm Reels

List of records available upon request.

Office of Scientific Technical Information

Classification: Classified

Volume: 300 Electronic Documents

Classification: Controlled Unclassified Information

Volume: 192 Electronic Documents

Classification: Unclassified

Volume: 8,170 Electronic Documents

List of records available upon request.

Sandia National Laboratory

Classification: Classified


Volume: 1 Hardcopy Document, 14,355 Electronic Documents, 19 Boxes, 81 Images, 40 Film Reels, 2 Videos, 1 Microfilm Reel

Classification: Unclassified



Volume: 90 Electronic Documents, 34 Boxes, 7 Images, 12 Film Reels, 1 Video, 2 Microfilm
Reels
List of records available upon request.

Appendix E

National Declassification Center Review Process Flowchart



CURRENT PROCESS FOR 25-YEAR AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW



Appendix F

List of Stakeholders Consulted

During its study the Public Interest Declassification Board and its staff met with individuals and groups from federal agencies, representatives from the Republic of the Marshall Islands Nuclear Commission, congressional staff, congressional committee staff, historians, and researchers.

- Congressional Organizations
 - Representative Katie Porter's Office
 - House Armed Services Committee
- Department of Defense
 - Defense Threat Reduction Agency
 - Office of the Secretary of Defense
 - Naval History and Heritage Command
 - Washington Headquarters Services
- Department of Energy
 - Enterprise Records Management
 - Office of Health and Safety
 - Office of Classification
- Department of Interior
 - Office of Insular Affairs
- Department of State
 - The Historian's Office
 - Marshall Islands Desk Officer
- National Security Council
- Republic of the Marshall Islands Nuclear Commission
- Trust Fund for the People of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
- Independent Researchers/Consultants/Historians
 - Trudy Huskamp Peterson
 - Walter Pincus

The following organizations within the National Archives and Records Administration provided support for the study:

- Agency Services
 - National Declassification Center
 - Records Management Operations
- Research Services
 - Archives II Reference, Research Rooms & Augmented Processing Branch
 - Field Records Division
 - San Francisco Federal Records Center
 - San Francisco Regional Archives
 - Special Media Records Division
- Legislative Archives, Presidential Libraries, and Museum Services

- Office of Presidential Libraries
- Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum
- Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum
- Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum
- Center of Legislative Records

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