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Opinions <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions> 

A new strategy for Iraq and Syria

 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/charles-krauthammer> 

By Charles Krauthammer <http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/charles-krauthammer>  Opinion writer June 18 

It's time to rethink Iraq and Syria. It begins by admitting that the old borders are gone, that a unified Syria or Iraq will never be reconstituted, that the Sykes-Picot map is defunct.

We may not want to enunciate that policy officially. After all, it does contradict the principle that colonial borders be maintained no matter how insanely drawn, the alternative being almost universally worse. Nonetheless, in Mesopotamia, balkanization is the only way to go.

Because it has already happened and will not be reversed. In Iraq, for example, we are reaping one disaster after another by pretending that the Baghdad government - deeply sectarian, divisive and beholden to Iran - should be the center of our policy and the conduit for all military aid.

Look at Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi. The Iraqi army is a farce. It sees the enemy and flees, leaving its weapons behind <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2015/05/31/al-abadi-iraq-lost-humvees-mosul/28262103/> . "The ISF was not driven out of Ramadi. They drove out of Ramadi <http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/dempsey-iraqis-weren-t-driven-out-of-ramadi-they-drove-themselves-1.347539> ," said the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our own secretary of defense admitted that "the Iraqi forces just showed no will to fight <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/defense-secretary-carter-iraqis-need-will-to-fight-to-defeat-islamic-state/2015/05/24/1f189454-022e-11e5-bc72-f3e16bf50bb6_story.html> ."

We can train them forever. The problem is one of will. They don't want to fight. And why should they? They are led by commanders who are corrupt, sectarian and incompetent.

What to do? Redirect our efforts to friendly forces deeply committed to the fight, beginning with the Kurds, who have the will, the skill and have demonstrated considerable success. This year alone <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fec9bbf84f8f401dbc27707b9583c787/iraq-families-return-tikrit-weeks-after-defeat> , they have taken back more than 500 Christian and Kurdish towns from the Islamic State. Unlike the Iraqi army, however, they are starved for weapons because, absurdly, we send them through Baghdad, which sends along only a trickle.

This week, more Kurdish success. With U.S. air support, Syrian Kurdscaptured the strategic town <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/islamic-state-routed-in-key-syrian-border-town-of-tal-abyab/2015/06/15/6d16ac36-1390-11e5-8457-4b431bf7ed4c_story.html>  of Tal Abyad from the Islamic State. Which is important for two reasons. Tal Abyad controls the road connecting the terror group's capital of Raqqa to Turkey, from which it receives fighters, weapons and supplies. Tal Abyad is "a lung through which [the Islamic State] breathed and connected to the outside world," said Kurdish commander Haqi Kobane.

Moreover, Tal Abyad helps link isolated Kurdish areas in the Syrian north into a contiguous territory, like Iraqi Kurdistan. Which suggests that this territory could function as precisely the kind of long-advocated <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/among-assads-opponents-moderation-reigns/2012/09/21/b5a6b8a4-03e1-11e2-91e7-2962c74e7738_story.html>  Syrian "safe zone" from which to operate against both the Islamic State and the Bashar al-Assad regime.

More good news comes from another battle line. Last week, the Free Syrian Army's Southern Front, backed by and trained in Jordan, drove the Syrian government out of its last major base <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/moderate-rebels-take-key-southern-base-in-syria-dealing-blow-to-assad/2015/06/09/9d6ff9c2-0ea5-11e5-a0fe-dccfea4653ee_story.html>  in eastern Daraa province, less than 60 miles from Damascus.

These successes suggest a new U.S. strategy. Abandon our anachronistic fealty to the central Iraqi government (now largely under Iran's sway  <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/pro-iran-militias-take-upper-hand-after-us-backed-forces-crumble-in-anbar/2015/05/30/22a3894a-03b8-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html> anyway) and begin supplying the Iraqi Kurds in a direct, 24-hour, Berlin-style airlift. And in Syria, intensify our training, equipping and air support for the now-developing Kurdish safe zone. Similarly, through Jordan, for the Free Syrian Army's Southern Front. Such a serious and relentless strategy would not only roll back Islamic State territorial gains, it would puncture the myth of Islamic State invincibility.

In theory, we should also be giving direct aid to friendly Sunni tribesmen in Iraq whose Anbar Awakening, brilliantly joined by Gen. David Petraeus' surge, utterly defeated the Islamic State progenitor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, in 2006-2007. The problem is, having been abandoned by us once, when President Obama liquidated our presence in 2011, why should the Sunnis ever trust us again?

As for the Iraqi army, we can go through the motions, but the best we can hope for is wobbly containment, ultimately guaranteed by Iranian proxies. Not a happy prospect, but the best that we can do having forfeited our dominant position in Iraq in 2011 .

At the time, Iraq was a functioning state <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/at-fort-bragg-obama-hails-the-end-of-the-iraq-war/2011/12/14/gIQA7jkDuO_story.html> . That state is now gone. We should not expend treasure or risk blood trying to resurrect it. Our objective right now is to defeat the Islamic State and to ensure the fall of the Assad regime. That does not require an American invasion. It does require recognizing reality and massively supporting our few genuine allies on the ground.

On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter testified <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/17/pentagon-chief-defends-growing-training-program-in-iraq-but-acknowledges-problems/>  that we won't quite meet our objective of training 24,000 Iraqi troops by this fall. Why? A recruitment problem. Iraqis don't seem to want to join. We are 15,000 short.

It's a fool's errand anyway. If we need to pretend to support the Baghdad government, fine. But our actual strategy should be to circumvent it and help our real allies carry the fight.

Read more from Charles Krauthammer's archive <http://www.washingtonpost.com/charles-krauthammer/2011/02/24/ADJkW7B_page.html> , follow him on Twitter <https://twitter.com/krauthammer>  orsubscribe to his updates on Facebook <http://www.facebook.com/charleskrauthammer> .

 

 

Alexander S. Mackler

Office of the Vice President

202-456-2672 (o) | 202-503-5370 (m)

 


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	<div class="rtf-section">
		<p><span>Opinions &lt;http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions&gt; </span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>A new strategy for Iraq and Syria</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span> &lt;http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/charles-krauthammer&gt; </span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>By Charles Krauthammer &lt;http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/charles-krauthammer&gt;<span style='white-space: pre;'> </span> Opinion writer June 18 </span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>It's time to rethink Iraq and Syria. It begins by admitting that the old borders are gone, that a unified Syria or Iraq will never be reconstituted, that the Sykes-Picot map is defunct.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>We may not want to enunciate that policy officially. After all, it does contradict the principle that colonial borders be maintained no matter how insanely drawn, the alternative being almost universally worse. Nonetheless, in Mesopotamia, balkanization is the only way to go.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>Because it has already happened and will not be reversed. In Iraq, for example, we are reaping one disaster after another by pretending that the Baghdad government - deeply sectarian, divisive and beholden to Iran - should be the center of our policy and the conduit for all military aid.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>Look at Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi. The Iraqi army is a farce. It sees the enemy and flees, leaving its weapons behind &lt;http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2015/05/31/al-abadi-iraq-lost-humvees-mosul/28262103/&gt; . &quot;The ISF was not driven out of Ramadi. They drove out of Ramadi &lt;http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/dempsey-iraqis-weren-t-driven-out-of-ramadi-they-drove-themselves-1.347539&gt; ,&quot; said the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our own secretary of defense admitted that &quot;the Iraqi forces just showed no will to fight &lt;https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/defense-secretary-carter-iraqis-need-will-to-fight-to-defeat-islamic-state/2015/05/24/1f189454-022e-11e5-bc72-f3e16bf50bb6_story.html&gt; .&quot;</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>We can train them forever. The problem is one of will. They don't want to fight. And why should they? They are led by commanders who are corrupt, sectarian and incompetent.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>What to do? Redirect our efforts to friendly forces deeply committed to the fight, beginning with the Kurds, who have the will, the skill and have demonstrated considerable success. This year alone &lt;http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fec9bbf84f8f401dbc27707b9583c787/iraq-families-return-tikrit-weeks-after-defeat&gt; , they have taken back more than 500 Christian and Kurdish towns from the Islamic State. Unlike the Iraqi army, however, they are starved for weapons because, absurdly, we send them through Baghdad, which sends along only a trickle.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>This week, more Kurdish success. With U.S. air support, Syrian Kurdscaptured the strategic town &lt;https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/islamic-state-routed-in-key-syrian-border-town-of-tal-abyab/2015/06/15/6d16ac36-1390-11e5-8457-4b431bf7ed4c_story.html&gt;<span style='white-space: pre;'> </span> of Tal Abyad from the Islamic State. Which is important for two reasons. Tal Abyad controls the road connecting the terror group's capital of Raqqa to Turkey, from which it receives fighters, weapons and supplies. Tal Abyad is &quot;a lung through which [the Islamic State] breathed and connected to the outside world,&quot; said Kurdish commander Haqi Kobane.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>Moreover, Tal Abyad helps link isolated Kurdish areas in the Syrian north into a contiguous territory, like Iraqi Kurdistan. Which suggests that this territory could function as precisely the kind of long-advocated &lt;https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/among-assads-opponents-moderation-reigns/2012/09/21/b5a6b8a4-03e1-11e2-91e7-2962c74e7738_story.html&gt;<span style='white-space: pre;'> </span> Syrian &quot;safe zone&quot; from which to operate against both the Islamic State and the Bashar al-Assad regime.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>More good news comes from another battle line. Last week, the Free Syrian Army's Southern Front, backed by and trained in Jordan, drove the Syrian government out of its last major base &lt;https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/moderate-rebels-take-key-southern-base-in-syria-dealing-blow-to-assad/2015/06/09/9d6ff9c2-0ea5-11e5-a0fe-dccfea4653ee_story.html&gt;<span style='white-space: pre;'> </span> in eastern Daraa province, less than 60 miles from Damascus.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>These successes suggest a new U.S. strategy. Abandon our anachronistic fealty to the central Iraqi government (now largely under Iran's sway<span style='white-space: pre;'> </span> &lt;https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/pro-iran-militias-take-upper-hand-after-us-backed-forces-crumble-in-anbar/2015/05/30/22a3894a-03b8-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html&gt; anyway) and begin supplying the Iraqi Kurds in a direct, 24-hour, Berlin-style airlift. And in Syria, intensify our training, equipping and air support for the now-developing Kurdish safe zone. Similarly, through Jordan, for the Free Syrian Army's Southern Front. Such a serious and relentless strategy would not only roll back Islamic State territorial gains, it would puncture the myth of Islamic State invincibility.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>In theory, we should also be giving direct aid to friendly Sunni tribesmen in Iraq whose Anbar Awakening, brilliantly joined by Gen. David Petraeus' surge, utterly defeated the Islamic State progenitor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, in 2006-2007. The problem is, having been abandoned by us once, when President Obama liquidated our presence in 2011, why should the Sunnis ever trust us again?</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>As for the Iraqi army, we can go through the motions, but the best we can hope for is wobbly containment, ultimately guaranteed by Iranian proxies. Not a happy prospect, but the best that we can do having forfeited our dominant position in Iraq in 2011 .</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>At the time, Iraq was a functioning state &lt;https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/at-fort-bragg-obama-hails-the-end-of-the-iraq-war/2011/12/14/gIQA7jkDuO_story.html&gt; . That state is now gone. We should not expend treasure or risk blood trying to resurrect it. Our objective right now is to defeat the Islamic State and to ensure the fall of the Assad regime. That does not require an American invasion. It does require recognizing reality and massively supporting our few genuine allies on the ground.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter testified &lt;https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/17/pentagon-chief-defends-growing-training-program-in-iraq-but-acknowledges-problems/&gt;<span style='white-space: pre;'> </span> that we won't quite meet our objective of training 24,000 Iraqi troops by this fall. Why? A recruitment problem. Iraqis don't seem to want to join. We are 15,000 short.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>It's a fool's errand anyway. If we need to pretend to support the Baghdad government, fine. But our actual strategy should be to circumvent it and help our real allies carry the fight.</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>Read more from Charles Krauthammer's archive &lt;http://www.washingtonpost.com/charles-krauthammer/2011/02/24/ADJkW7B_page.html&gt; , follow him on Twitter &lt;https://twitter.com/krauthammer&gt;<span style='white-space: pre;'> </span> orsubscribe to his updates on Facebook &lt;http://www.facebook.com/charleskrauthammer&gt; .</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span> </span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span> </span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>Alexander S. Mackler</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>Office of the Vice President</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span>202-456-2672 (o) | 202-503-5370 (m)</span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
		<p><span> </span></p>
		<p><span>&#160;</span></p>
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