The U. S. Military Response to the 1960 - 1962 Berlin Crisis

Dr. Donald A. Carter
The U. S. Army Center of Military History

The election of a new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, in November 1960 renewed the East-West tensions surrounding the city of Berlin that had simmered since the Allied occupation of Germany in 1945. Kennedy’s first meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 did nothing to diffuse the sense of confrontation. During their personal discussions, Khrushchev handed an aide-memoire to Kennedy that seemed to dare the president to oppose Soviet intentions. The missive accused the Federal Republic of Germany of cultivating “saber-rattling militarism” and of advocating revisions to the borders that had been established after World War II. Only a permanent peace treaty that recognized the sovereignty of both East and West Germany, as they had evolved, would guarantee that they would not again threaten the European peace. The conclusion of a German peace treaty, the document went on, would also solve the problem of normalizing the situation in West Berlin by making the city a demilitarized free zone registered with the United Nations. Naturally, the memorandum concluded, any treaty, whether the United States signed it or not, would terminate Western occupation rights.¹

Khrushchev’s Ultimatum

On 4 June 1961, Kennedy met privately with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to make one last effort to impress upon the Soviet leader the importance the United States placed on its commitment to the people of West Berlin. Khrushchev replied that he appreciated the frankness of Kennedy’s remarks, but if the U.S. insisted on maintaining its presence in Berlin after a treaty was signed, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to assist the German Democratic Republic in defending its borders. His decision to sign the treaty, he added, was irrevocable. The Soviet Union would sign it in December if the United States refused an interim agreement. As he departed, Kennedy closed the conversation saying it “would be a cold winter.”²

Immediately after the conclusion of the Vienna summit, in an unprecedented fireside chat on Soviet television, Khrushchev repeated his demands, telling his people that the Soviets would sign a peace treaty whether the West was ready to do so or not. He added that the Soviet Union would oppose any and all violations of East Germany’s sovereignty. The chairman of East Germany’s council of state, Walter Ulbricht, also publicly warned the West to negotiate its use of access routes into Berlin with his country or risk “interruptions.” He made it clear that the Communists wanted the Western Allies out of Berlin so that the city would no longer be a lure to refugees from the East.³

President Kennedy and his military advisers weighed their options in light of Khrushchev’s increasing belligerence. Understanding that the Communists’ initial actions would include cutting off Western access to Berlin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began refining contingency
plans for various military probes of the main roadway into West Berlin, an autobahn that ran 105 miles to the city from the town of Helmstedt on the West German border. Although they were prepared to mount an airlift similar to the one that had broken a Soviet blockade in 1949, they privately decried the lack of options available to them for dealing with the impending crisis. They informed the president and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that the Allies’ lack of military strength in Europe allowed only limited ground probes, which, if turned back by superior Communist forces, would result in a choice between accepting humiliation or initiating nuclear war. To keep that from happening, they urged the president to build up U.S. military power in Europe and to encourage the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to do the same.  

From Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR], General Lauris Norstad, also lobbied for increasing the U.S. military presence in the theater. He praised the Seventh Army in Europe as the best peacetime force the United States had ever fielded and commended the dedication and commitment of NATO units, but he stressed the overwhelming number of Soviet tanks, aircraft, and men arrayed against those forces. He urged the president to call up additional reserve units and to deploy additional battle groups to Europe under the guise of training exercises. He also wanted the president and the Joint Chiefs to position additional U.S. naval and air forces where they could contribute to theater readiness, and he suggested that the Seventh Army should conduct more exercises that would require its divisions to move into their alert positions. Those steps, combined with an increase in U.S. military strength in Europe, would give the United States greater freedom of action, the general said, and provide alternatives short of nuclear war.  

After several weeks of discussions with his cabinet, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a variety of other advisers, the president made his decision. At 2200 on 25 July, he addressed the nation on the situation in Berlin. After summarizing the course of events since his meeting with Khrushchev, he stated that the United States would never allow the Soviet Union to drive it out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. He then announced a series of steps that he was taking to increase military readiness. First, he would ask Congress for an immediate additional appropriation of $3.2 billion for the armed forces, about half of which would go to the procurement of conventional ammunition, weapons, and equipment. A request would then follow, Kennedy said, to augment the total authorized strength of the Army from 875,000 to 1 million men, and increase the Navy and Air Force active-duty strength by 29,000 and 63,000, respectively. He also called for a doubling and tripling of draft calls in the coming months; the activation of some reservists and certain ready-reserve units; and the extension of tours of duty for soldiers, sailors, and airmen scheduled to leave the service in the near future. Finally, the president postponed programs to retire or mothball older ships and aircraft and delayed the deactivation of a number of B–47 bomber and aerial refueling wings. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that 50 percent of the Strategic Air Command’s bomber wings would be placed on 15-minute ground alert and that three of the Army’s divisions in the United States would be relieved of training duties and prepared for emergency deployment to Europe.
Meanwhile, the situation continued to deteriorate. Soviet and East German soldiers increased their harassment of U.S. vehicles and troop trains trying to enter the city, and Soviet authorities periodically renewed attempts to conduct unauthorized inspections of Allied vehicles as they crossed checkpoints into and out of Berlin. The Soviets also tried to institute new restrictions on flights approaching the city while allowing their fighters to buzz Allied aircraft flying through approved access corridors. In May 1960, Soviet fighter aircraft forced down an American C–47 transport that had strayed off-course on a flight from Copenhagen to Hamburg. Although the plane and its crew were released a few days later, the incident heightened the tension for pilots flying the Berlin routes. Border officials slowed barge traffic, as well, by implementing new inspections and controls.

In response, the two battle groups of the U.S. Army’s 6th Infantry that made up the bulk of the U.S. garrison in West Berlin increased their tempo of training and placed additional emphasis on riot-control drills and combat operations in the city. West Berlin’s expansive Grunewald Park, the only open space in the sector where units could train, hosted a series of exercises where the troops tested their readiness to attack and defend. Companies donned civilian clothing and acted as rioters to test the ability of their compatriots to maintain order in the face of Communist-inspired civil disturbances. In some cases, U.S. commanders went out of their way to ensure that the Soviets knew exactly what they were doing. It was an essential element in the American effort to convince the Soviets that the United States would fight for West Berlin and that, while U.S. forces might not be able to hold the city, they would inflict unacceptable losses on the attacker. In response, the East Germans built an observation tower to get a better view of the training. One American lieutenant colonel commented that he did not mind the close observation. As a matter of fact, he said, “We want them to know that we’re here to stay.”

For the Communists, however, time was apparently running out. Khrushchev’s repeated threats to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany spurred an increase in the already considerable number of refugees heading west. Since 1945, well over three million people fled from the East. German authorities recorded that more than half of those had come through West Berlin, making the city unmistakably the “escape hatch” from the Soviet zone. In 1960, manpower shortages reached a point where the German Democratic Republic experienced difficulties in completing winter planting and harvesting and admitted to a shortage of five hundred thousand workers of all types in East Berlin alone. By the end of the year, for example, only 380 dentists remained in the Soviet sector, as compared to 700 the year before. Complicating matters, some 20,000 of the 150,000 refugees who entered West Berlin were of military age, a serious loss in East German military manpower. The trend accelerated in 1961. During February, the exodus averaged 2,650 persons per week. By the end of May, this figure had risen to 3,200. In July, more than 30,000 refugees crossed over to the west, the largest monthly total since 1953. In an appeal broadcast to its own citizens, the East German
government said that the mass migration was disrupting the economy, damaging the nation’s standing abroad, and threatening its future.\(^9\)

Communist efforts to stem the tide grew desperate. The East Germans employed more than 5,000 police to guard the borders around West Berlin. When that proved to be insufficient, they began drafting members of the “Free German Youth,” a Communist political organization, to assist transportation police in checking buses and trains at crossing points. Party officials took steps to force East Berliners working in West Berlin to give up their jobs. Vigilante groups sanctioned by the Communist government turned in persons suspected of planning to flee the East or of helping others to do so. Increased propaganda meanwhile labeled refugees as traitors and accused the West of plotting to sabotage the East German economy through blackmail and a trade in slaves.\(^10\)

On 12 August 1961, the East German regime announced that all but 13 of the 120 border-crossing points between East and West Berlin would be closed to both vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Then, in the predawn hours of 13 August, East German police, armored cars, and tanks were deployed along the entire border of the Soviet sector of the city. Workers set up barbed-wire barricades and began construction of permanent cement-block walls. In some places, sections of the cobblestone streets were removed. Although West Berliners and Allied personnel were still allowed in and out of East Berlin through a few well-guarded checkpoints, decrees from the East German government forbade its citizens from entering West Berlin. As a precaution against an internal uprising in East Berlin, it appeared that the Soviet 10th Guards Tank Division and 19th Motorized Rifle Division deployed to the north and south of the city, and Soviet tanks moved into East Berlin to take positions at various locations in the city. To western reporters and military personnel who could still move about East Berlin, the Soviets clearly wanted no uprisings of the sort that had occurred in Hungary in 1956 in response to the imposition of Soviet power.\(^11\)

Over the course of the next several days, the East Germans worked to complete the isolation of West Berlin. They announced that train traffic would be reorganized so that there would no longer be direct service between the two parts of the city. In the future, travelers would have to change trains and submit to identity checks before entering the eastern sector. Trains from West Germany into West Berlin would pass normally, but they would no longer be allowed to continue into the Communist sector. Local commuter trains and buses from outside the city limits as well as those originating in East Berlin were also denied access to West Berlin. Even the pleasure boats that transported tourists from lakes in East Berlin to the Havel River in the western sectors were terminated. Within a week, the East Germans designated a crossing point at Friedrichstrasse in the American sector as the only point of entry into East Berlin for the Allies and other foreign nationals. As East German police and workmen sealed off doors and windows in buildings that made up portions of the barricade and replaced barbed wire with concrete, the grim reality of a divided city began to sink in to citizens on both sides of the wall.\(^12\)

U.S., West Berlin Indecisive on Reaction to Wall – Too Little, Too Late
Politicians in West Berlin urged U.S. commanders to remove the wire by force, and officers within the Berlin garrison drew up a plan to pull down the wire and barricades with bulldozers. Those moves, however, were overruled by the troop commander, Brigadier General Frederick O. Hartel, who reminded his men that the barriers had been constructed one or two meters inside East Germany. As a result, U.S. forces would have to go into East Berlin to tear the walls down—and they were not going to because it would make them the aggressor.  

Despite the long-simmering crisis and repeated indications that the Communists would have to do something to contain the exodus of refugees, the Americans were unprepared to launch an immediate reaction when the time came. What planning there was had been predicated as a response to Communist harassment of Allied personnel or threats to Allied access rights in West Berlin. No one had foreseen that the East Germans might establish a blockade to keep their own people from crossing over to the West.

Although the United States immediately lodged a protest with the Soviets, its initial reaction to the construction of the wall was surprisingly understated. The president’s special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, summed up the consensus among many in the president’s cabinet that the action was something the East Germans were bound to do sooner or later. It was just as well that it happened early, he said, and that it was so clearly a unilateral action on their part. In response to that assessment, President Kennedy asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk to consider what steps the United States could take to exploit the development “politically propaganda-wise.” The situation offered, he said, a very good stick to use against the Soviets, one they would certainly use against the United States if the situation were reversed.

Political opportunities, of course, were of little comfort to West Berliners, whose leaders complained bitterly to the Americans over the lack of a more forceful response. They were equally distressed at West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, who issued high-minded statements of protest while taking no concrete steps against the Communists. The American mission in Berlin, for its part, warned the State Department that unless the United States responded more firmly to the construction of the wall, morale in the city would plummet and along with it support for the United States. No one there, he said, was asking for a violent reaction, only for some indication that this was not to be a replay of “Hitler’s takeover of the Rhineland.”

After several days of high-level consultation and public condemnation of the wall, President Kennedy elected to continue the military buildup he had initiated following his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna. On 17 August, Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. announced a freeze in service for more than eighty-four thousand enlisted men whose time in service was scheduled to end between 1 October 1961 and 30 June 1962. He also extended the tours of Army personnel in Germany and Japan by six months and confirmed the activation of 113 reserve units, a move that called up for duty more than 23,000 soldiers. Finally, Stahr indicated that he would send 3,000 more troops to Europe, bringing the Seventh Army and other U.S. units committed to NATO up to full strength. A day later, the White House
announced that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson would fly immediately to Europe to meet with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Mayor Willy Brandt. Accompanying the vice president would be retired General Lucius D. Clay. Since Clay had been the Allied commandant in Berlin during the 1948–1949 blockade, his presence, much more than Johnson’s, helped restore morale and reassure West Berliners that they had not been abandoned.17

**Kennedy Ignores Advisors, Plays Image Card to Reassure West Berlin, Challenge Soviets**

In addition to dispatching Johnson and Clay to Berlin, on 17 August Kennedy decided to make the American commitment to West Berlin absolutely clear to both the West Berliners and the Communists by instructing the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, to send a reinforced battle group to Berlin to augment the forces already there. Lemnitzer, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and General Norstad all expressed reservations on the grounds that the move would weaken existing defenses in West Germany while adding little to the capabilities of the West Berlin garrison. Kennedy, however, set aside their objections, noting that he had made the decision for political, psychological, and morale purposes. With the president’s intent in mind, Norstad and the commander of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), General Bruce C. Clarke, implemented the contingency plans that the command had prepared for a probe along the route into Berlin. Under that scenario, administrative checkpoints and undefended obstacles would be bypassed. If the column met a superior military force, it would halt and defend itself as necessary in an attempt to remain in place. The commander had the authority to disengage if he believed he was in danger of becoming cut off or overrun.18

Around midnight on 18 August 1961, General Clarke alerted the force that would conduct the probe, the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division. In order to meet the time schedule established by the president, he bypassed the chain of command—Seventh Army, V Corps, and the 8th Infantry Division headquarters—and issued orders directly to the battle group commander, Colonel Glover S. Johns Jr. At 0530 the next day, Johns’ force moved out of its home station at Coleman Barracks, Mannheim, Germany, and proceeded to a bivouac area near the American checkpoint at Helmstedt. Promptly at 0630, one day later, the first set of vehicles stopped at the Soviet checkpoint at Marienborn, where the autobahn entered East Germany. Although the Soviet guards raised perfunctory challenges, that initial convoy, followed by the rest of the battle group, cleared the checkpoint in a short time and made a triumphant entry into West Berlin that afternoon. In full battle gear, the troops paraded through the center of the city to be reviewed by Vice President Johnson and General Clay.19

Kennedy’s initial impulse had been to appoint Clay as commander of U.S. forces in Berlin, but Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer advised against such a move on the grounds that it would complicate and strain existing command relationships. Instead, he made the general the senior American official in Berlin with authority to communicate directly with him and the secretary of state. After that, the president considered Clay his primary representative in Berlin, so much so that he sometimes excluded General Norstad and General Clarke from decisions affecting the U.S. military in the city. As a result, Clay soon found himself
in conflict with General Clarke, who protested Clay’s use of American troops without consulting the U.S. Army, Europe, or U.S. European Command commanders. Despite Clarke’s objections, most decisions and policies on Berlin, including the deployment of U.S. forces there, would be made in Washington after consultations with Clay or Norstad.  

Confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie

On 23 August, as a further display of force and of their intent to retain freedom of action in the city, the commanders of the three Allied garrisons in Berlin—U.S., French, and British—placed their troops on alert, established checkpoints near border-crossing sites, and began extensive patrolling along the newly constructed barriers. Two American tanks supported by infantry guarded the Friedrichstrasse crossing point while British and French forces also deployed to various positions along the border. Two companies of the 2d Battle Group, 6th Infantry, patrolled while three others stood by in reserve at Tempelhof Airport. By 1 September, the command was running three patrols along the border each day while also maintaining a mobile reserve of one rifle platoon mounted in armored personnel carriers and a light section of tanks at the airport. Gradually, forces that were deployed along the border withdrew to garrison locations. On 26 September, the command handed the border-security mission over to the West Berlin police, ceased all patrolling, and returned all troop units to their barracks.  

Over the next few months, East German harassment of U.S. and Allied personnel entering East Berlin led to American concern that the crossing point at Friedrichstrasse might be closed. On 30 August, East German police detained a U.S. military sedan in East Berlin. A mobile reserve of five mechanized infantry squads moved to the site, at which time the sedan was released. In order to maintain a constant American presence at the crossing point, U.S. military police stationed a permanent detachment there, designating the post Checkpoint Charlie. Checkpoints Alpha and Bravo were the U.S. military access points onto and off of the autobahn in East Germany. U.S. forces also resumed their patrols along the border to provide visible evidence of U.S. military support for the West Berlin police.  

On the evening of 22 October, the East Germans denied the assistant chief of the U.S. Mission, Berlin, Edwin A. Lightner Jr., entry to East Berlin when he refused to show them his identity papers. The American policy was to show identification papers only to the Soviets and to refuse to show them to the East Germans. After the guards declined Lightner’s request to see a Soviet officer, the U.S. command sent a tank-infantry team to the checkpoint. While the team remained in position, an armed military police squad escorted Lightner through the access point into East Berlin. Two days later, U.S. military personnel in civilian clothes riding in a USAREUR-licensed vehicle were also denied entry into East Berlin when they rejected guards’ requests to produce identity papers. The U.S. forces in Berlin again responded, this time deploying tank platoons and infantry squads at various points along the border. The command also initiated a series of probes using USAREUR-licensed civilian automobiles to test Allied access rights at the Friedrichstrasse crossing. After one attempt to travel into East Berlin succeeded, the East German border guards denied access to a second vehicle. The Americans
sent a third forward through the checkpoint, supported by a tank-infantry team and escorted by military police. That group successfully passed through the checkpoint. The command held similar tests two days later on 26 October. They likewise prevailed only when escorted by military police supported by combat-ready forces.\textsuperscript{23}

The Americans attempted to repeat the process again on the twenty-seventh, but this time the Communists were ready for them. After the civilian vehicle passed through the checkpoint, once again with a military police escort, ten Soviet tanks moved into position on the East German side of the entryway. While American leaders boasted that they had once again demonstrated their right of access into East Berlin, and General Clay announced that the presence of the Soviet tanks indicated Soviet responsibility for the harassment at the checkpoint, armed tanks and infantry faced each other across three hundred yards of an urban no-man’s-land, each waiting for the other to make the next move.\textsuperscript{24}

With the American command on general alert, the standoff lasted for seventeen hours. Then, at 1045 on 28 October, having made their point, the Soviet tanks withdrew from the border crossing. A little more than an hour later, the American tanks and most of the infantry also pulled back. The U.S. mission initially instructed all Americans in civilian clothing, except news reporters, to refrain from trying to enter East Berlin through Checkpoint Charlie. After twenty-four hours, it once again allowed civilians to make the crossing, but the command asked servicemen and official U.S. personnel to continue to avoid travel into East Berlin. The Americans maintained one battle group on alert status for the next two weeks. Although the force continued regular patrols along the border, it stopped testing access rights and making armored demonstrations at Checkpoint Charlie.\textsuperscript{25}

**Winding Down the Confrontation**

As the standoff in Berlin wore on, the Kennedy administration continued with its plans to increase defense spending and to strengthen the U.S. position in Europe. In September, the Department of Defense agreed to Army proposals to provide personnel to restore the Seventh Army’s line units to their required strengths and nondivisional support units to fill out logistical shortfalls in the rear. By mid-October, the first of forty thousand reinforcements landed in France to begin Kennedy’s buildup in Europe. In addition to the individual fillers and support units, the president also ordered the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment to deploy from its base at Fort Meade, Maryland, to Germany. The unit, with its 2,700 soldiers and 122 tanks, began arriving at Bremerhaven in mid-November and became operational in Kaiserslautern, Germany, by the end of the month. General Norstad also directed USAREUR to rotate new battle groups into West Berlin every two to three months to replace the reinforcements it had sent in August. The Joint Chiefs approved the change, with the understanding that no more than three battle groups would be present in the city at any one time. With that in mind, on 7 December, elements of the 1st Battle Group, 19th Infantry, began to replace the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, which had moved into the city earlier that year.\textsuperscript{26}
Not satisfied with the extent of the buildup to that point, Secretary McNamara and General Norstad continued to press for the deployment of additional combat divisions to Germany. Although the president remained reluctant to go beyond the reinforcements he had already approved, he did authorize the services to begin planning for such a deployment and, in particular, to begin pre-positioning enough vehicles, weapons, and equipment in Europe to completely outfit two U.S. divisions. This meant that after air movement to Europe from the United States, troops could pick up their equipment and be operational in the field in a minimum amount of time. During November and December 1961, U.S. Army and Air Force officials debated the requirements to move such a force and bit by bit developed a contingency plan for doing so.27

In September 1960, the Joint Chiefs had proposed a test of strategic mobility that would deploy three battle groups from the United States to Germany. Although the initial effort, scheduled for April 1961, was canceled because of a crisis in Laos, planners rescheduled it for January 1962 and tailored it to supplement the ongoing reinforcement of the Berlin garrison. In an exercise labeled Operation LONG THRUST II, beginning on 16 January 1962, three battle groups of the 4th Infantry Division flew from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Germany, where they took possession of pre-positioned equipment and moved out for field training. At the end of the exercise, the 1st Battle Group, 22d Infantry, turned in its equipment and returned to its home station; the 2d Battle Group, 47th Infantry, reinforced the Berlin garrison; and the 2d Battle Group, 39th Infantry, remained in Germany as temporary reinforcement for the Seventh Army. In addition to providing part of the buildup during the Berlin crisis, the exercise proved that rapid deployment plans and the issue of pre-positioned equipment were feasible. Due to the expense, however, future exercises of the sort would occur on a smaller scale.28

Whatever the perceived successes, the crisis exposed a redundancy in the Army’s command structure in Berlin that complicated the flow of information and directives from higher headquarters. U.S. military responsibilities in the city had, since 1952, been assigned to two agencies, both reporting to the USAREUR commanding general: the Berlin Command—a USAREUR headquarters with a tactical mission—and the Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin, whose senior officer was the American member of the Allied Kommandatura and the single point of U.S. military contact in Berlin with the Soviet government and other governments participating in the occupation of the city. Even before the onset of the August 1961 crisis, the USAREUR commander, General Clarke, had expressed concern about the overlap. On 1 December 1961, he consolidated all of the U.S. Army forces in Berlin into a single overall command, the U.S. Army, Berlin, and designated the headquarters as a major subordinate command of USAREUR. Without relinquishing any of his former responsibilities or authorities, the U.S. commander, Berlin, thus became the commanding general, U.S. Army, Berlin. The tactical units that had formerly constituted the Berlin command became elements of a new subordinate command designated the Berlin Brigade.29

By the end of the year, a calm settled over the city as both sides moderated their military activities near the border. With the wall in place, the Communists had stemmed the flow of refugees that threatened to deplete their work force and military manpower.
Meanwhile, with the recent confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie fresh in their memory, the Americans avoided overt challenges of the East German authorities while still maintaining their refusal to recognize the regime. The United States, its allies, and the Soviet Union then entered into a new round of negotiations concerning the future of Germany. Slowly at first, but with increasing clarity, U.S. military and political leaders began to recognize that, if Western access to Berlin was a vital interest for the United States, open access to East Berlin, while crucial, was hardly important enough to justify the use of force or to risk escalation into a wider conflict. 


4 Memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for the President, 14 Jun 1961, sub: Supply Levels in Berlin, and Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Improved Position Anticipated from U.S. and Allied Build-up, 14 Jul 1961, both in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, Record Group (RG) 218, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).


Memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff for USCINCEUR et al., 11 Aug 1961; Memo, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, et al., 12 Aug 1961, sub: U.S. Contingency Planning for Berlin; Memo, Chief of Naval Operations for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 Aug 1961, sub: Possible Uprisings in East Germany; all in Joint Chiefs of Staff Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP.

Memos, President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs for President Kennedy, 14 Aug 1961, and President Kennedy for Secretary of State Rusk, 14 Aug 1962, both in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:330–32.


Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group, 17 Aug 1961, and Msg, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad), to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 Aug 1961, both in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:347–51; Msgs, JCS 1168, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to USCINCEUR and Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR), 18 Aug 1961, and JCS 1185, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 19 Aug 1961, both in Joint Chiefs of Staff Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP.


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10 Telg, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Europe (Norstad), 25 Aug 1961, pp. 370–71; Memo, Col Lawrence J. Legere for President’s Military Representative (Taylor), 11 Nov 1961, pp. 583–84; Memo, President’s Special Assistant for National security Affairs (Bundy) for President Kennedy, 22 Nov 1961, p. 619; all in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 14.