


35/6 lim

*File*  
*S-Bahn*

A I R G R A M

A-65

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~



TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BONN  
INFO : LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, USAREUR

FROM : USBER, BERLIN  
SUBJECT: Recent Developments in West Berlin S-Bahn Controversy  
REF : Berlin's 35 to Dept. 28 to Bonn

July 23, 1962

Paris also for USRO, Stoessel and McGuire  
USAREUR for POLAD

OAC  
USCOB  
POL 3  
EA 2  
ECON  
USIS  
RIAS  
ASAG 3  
IO 2  
BBde  
BC/G-2  
SLSD  
OSI  
F&R 2

In the week immediately following Governing Mayor Brandt's departure for a month's vacation, the problem of control over and operation of the Berlin S-Bahn system has engendered public controversy within West Berlin regarding the wisdom of Brandt's and the Senat's public statements concerning the status of the S-Bahn.

On July 14, during his first press conference in West Berlin, FedRep Press Chief von Hase warned that Senat request in connection with the S-Bahn question might endanger Allied rights in Berlin. von Hase said that the S-Bahn was a very complicated problem which touched on Allied rights. Therefore, the FedGovt must cooperate very closely with the Allies since Allied rights are the most important basis of the Western Powers' policy on Berlin and must not be jeopardized in any respect. von Hase said he had sympathy for the proposals made by the West Berlin Senat but could give no assurance that an immediate solution of the S-Bahn problem along such lines could be expected.

The next day, West Berlin's Tagesspiegel (ind) carried a long editorial which took the position that direct West Berlin police control over S-Bahn installations would be unrealistic at the present time but urged that the Allies should show their presence at S-Bahn installations. Text of the editorial, which was written by Deputy Editor Boelke, and which Mission considers a constructive and reasonable examination of the problem, is attached as Enclosure 1.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

*Mac*  
EAS:JGMacCracken/POL:WGAllen:bjf

POL - A. R. Day

PAGE 2 of AIRGRAM NO. A-65 TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE FROM BERLIN

The day after the von Hase press conference in Berlin, SPD spokesman Barsig attacked von Hase for the latter's remarks on the solution of the S-Bahn problem, alleging they were undiplomatic and, since discussions were still pending, the public should not be told that no solution of the type sought by the Senat could be expected. Subsequently, von Hase and Barsig exchanged further recriminations, each reiterating his original position. As a result of this controversy, the West Berlin Senat decided that it must in turn make some sort of a statement, and on July 17 issued a somewhat ambiguous declaration. In effect, the Senat said that its efforts to have the S-Bahn premises in West Berlin placed under supervision of the West Berlin police were not inconsistent with Allied rights and that it had been determined that the Allies were open-minded toward the problem. At the same time, West Berlin Interior Senator Alberts, writing in an issue of the magazine Unteilbares Deutschland published July 17, stated that the West Berlin Reichsbahn premises should be subject to the clear control of the West Berlin police. Alberts, however, disclaimed any desire to interfere in technical aspects of Reichsbahn operations.

The East Berlin press hailed von Hase's statement as a "rebuff" for Brandt, and Neues Deutschland on July 16 endeavored to construe the FedRep press chief's remarks as representing "confirmation" by the Bonn official of the East German thesis that the "S-Bahn belongs to the territory of the GDR" and that the West Berlin Senat has no right to interfere with its operation in any way. Meanwhile, Communists continued to use West Berlin Reichsbahn premises as centers for agitation and propaganda. On July 9, for example, Eugene HENAFF, Secretary General of the Communist-dominated French Trade Union Confederation (CGT) addressed a political rally held in the Reichsbahn shops in West Berlin-Grunewald, and on July 13, Robert HERNIOT, Secretary of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions, made a speech to workers at the Reichsbahn shops in West Berlin-Tempelhof, in which he described West Berlin as a "center of imperialistic provocation" and demanded the solution of the "West Berlin problem" along Communist lines.

The East Germans also made an effort to keep alive their claim that the West Berlin Senat is inspiring acts of sabotage against the S-Bahn. An ADN release published in Neues Deutschland July 17 claimed that during the period July 11-15, 25+ train windows were smashed and a number of other acts of vandalism were committed against S-Bahn property. These East German allegations were dismissed by West Berlin police as "unprovable assertions."


East and West Berlin papers maintained differing stands on the question of whether West Berliners are or are not standing firm in their voluntary mass boycott of the S-Bahn. The West Berlin transportation authority BVG issued a statement claiming that during the first half year of 1962, traffic on West Berlin U-Bahn, bus and streetcar lines had risen by 65 million fares, representing a 19.2 per cent increase over the first half year of 1961. The gain in passenger traffic on the BVG, it was implied, represented traffic lost to the S-Bahn as a result of the boycott.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

PAGE 3 of AIRGRAM NO. A-65 TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE FROM BERLIN

In recent conversations, West Berlin union officials have indicated that the boycott continues to have widespread support, and that there has been no significant change in the situation since Mission's D-513 of April 24, 1962. Nevertheless, East Berlin press has consistently followed the line that West Berliners are losing interest in the boycott and are flocking back to the S-Bahn, which they allegedly realize offers "safe, sure, and convenient" transportation under efficient East German management. It is clear, however, that since S-Bahn trains are running less than half full, line must be running at more of a loss than ever, and it is questionable whether its West-mark receipts cover its West-mark expenditures.

For the Assistant Chief of Mission:

  
Stephen A. Koczak  
Acting Chief  
Eastern Affairs Section

Enclosure:

Translation of July 15, 1962  
Der Tagesspiegel editorial.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

(Translation)

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

July 15, 1962

S-BAHN and ACCESS ROUTES

Recently the Berlin Senat has, on occasion in an urgent manner, pointed to the necessity of bringing some of the questions which are important to the internal and external security of West Berlin to an eventual final solution. In a Government Declaration before the House of Representatives, Governing Mayor Brandt requested the Allies to deal with the problem of the Communist-administered S-Bahn in West Berlin and to turn over the control of S-Bahn grounds to West Berlin authorities. From the very beginning the Senat has thus taken a maximum position. It would like to see the operating rights of the S-Bahn withdrawn from the Communist Reichsbahn in the Soviet Zone; it further requests a full control by the West Berlin police over the operating grounds of the S-Bahn. There is no question but that the fulfillment of this request represents an ideal situation, the result of which would be that after the breach of the four-power status by the Soviet side the remnants of the quadripartite agreements would not be a unilateral burden on West Berlin.

Nonetheless, it is questionable whether the Senat was well advised when it raised this maximum demand in public polemics with the responsible Allied authorities. It should have been clear to the Senat from the very beginning that its demands would touch on interests of the Allies and that the complete fulfillment of its wishes was not within the realm of the possible. The operating rights of the S-Bahn have been vested in the Communist Reichsbahn-Direktion of the Soviet Zone by quadripartite agreement. As long as the West is seeking a solution on Berlin by negotiations in which such details as the S-Bahn traffic would ~~play~~ play an essential role, the Allies would not be inclined to take unilateral steps unless they are simply of vital importance for the existence of West Berlin. Moreover, the East Berlin argument that steps against the S-Bahn would have consequences for the traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic is not entirely unfounded, at least not in a technical respect. The interlocking of S-Bahn and long-distance traffic which has organically developed in decades would be hard to dissolve technically. Finally, there is also a solid political argument. The technical questions of goods and passenger traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic have since long been settled in connection with the Interzonal Trade Agreement, that means on the German level. If the Allies transferred the operating rights of the S-Bahn to German agencies and if the East answered by taking measures against the freight and passenger traffic with West Berlin, this dispute would then take place between German authorities in East and West Berlin. It would be difficult for the Allies to intervene in this dispute and to exercise their responsibility. We wish these arguments, undoubtedly also known to the West Berlin authorities, would have been treated with more tact because it cannot serve any useful purpose when disputes on political considerations and causes of action are conducted too openly in public.

Something quite different is the question of sovereign rights of the police over S-Bahn grounds. It is well known that the SED extensively uses operating buildings of the S-Bahn as political bases and that this constitutes a security risk which is hard to evaluate. This risk is so hard to evaluate because no one has ever looked into details and no one knows for sure whether a civil war potential is not also hiding behind the *façades* of the S-Bahn operating buildings. Here too, it would be better if the Allies themselves appeared at the critical points and clearly displayed Allied responsibility. Apparently new Allied instructions to the Senat are to be expected which will contain new regulations for the treatment of S-Bahn grounds by the West Berlin police. The decisive reservations of Allied competence will certainly be preserved. In that case, it should be emphatically demanded that the Allies exercise their undeniable sovereign right over the territory of the S-Bahn and themselves keep possible security risks under control. In this respect the Allies failed to take action in the past.

The second question which now concerns the Senat even more is the one of security of access routes. In this case, however, the responsibility for negligence in the past must be borne by the Senat itself. Since abolition of the interzonal pass, which was an Allied document, travel on interzonal routes has come more and more under the control of the "GDR" authorities. West German and West Berlin sides tried to counteract this by tying the Interzonal Trade Agreement to the condition, brought to the attention of the East, of undisturbed traffic on interzonal routes. However, this does not change the situation which has meanwhile developed under which West Berliners and West Germans are practically subject to "GDR" laws and their arbitrary interpretation. There was even a case recently when a "People's Policeman" wanted to apply "GDR" laws and impose a fine on a uniformed member of the American Forces on the Autobahn. When the American soldier insisted on the sole competence of the Soviets, and was finally confronted with a Soviet guard, the latter at first only volunteered to act as "agent" for the East German authorities. If the American soldier did not want to enter into contact with the "People's Policeman", he, as a member of the Soviet Forces, would accept the fine and would turn it over to the "People's Policeman".

As far as the German traffic is concerned, such disputes do not even take place. The individual driver is exposed to the arbitration behavior which is demonstrated every day by arrests on the interzonal routes. For some time now no one quite wanted to take cognizance of the numerous cases of arrest. No considerable alarm to the travelers should be caused. As wrong as it would be to unnecessarily dramatize the situation, the Berliners, and we hope also the West Germans, are adult enough to be told what the situation is in detail. That is not even mention that many arrests that could have been avoided had timely hints and advice been given in time.

Finally, the feeling of insecurity can only be increased if there is no public office that immediately establishes the disappearance of a traveler on interzonal routes and that possesses a clear picture of the individual cases. The establishment of a registration system, now being prepared by the Senat is, therefore, overdue. The Allies also have a right to accurate information.

If they make free access to Berlin one of the essential elements which are to be defended, they must in any case know what the status is that they are to defend. All these questions of internal and external security of West Berlin have in common that they must be carefully considered and dealt with in close cooperation with the Allies who, particularly in Berlin itself, can in no way evade the facts. For this reason alone this is important, since new steps by Moscow on the Berlin question are in no way to be excluded.