



1 August 1962

SOVIET POLICY ON BERLIN

- I. Chances are good that USSR will heighten Berlin crisis this fall.
 - A. Khrushchev has evidently concluded little chance exists of gaining Berlin agreement on terms favorable to him.
 - B. Soviets deliberately creating hostile atmosphere and are apparently willing to allow talks to become stalemated.
 - C. Recent authoritative Izvestiya article echoed Khrushchev in stressing that peace treaty will be "no mere act of formality" but that West will have to deal with GDR.

- II. Rusk-Gromyko talks in Geneva and Thompson-Khrushchev farewell conversations in Moscow indicate Soviets expect little from negotiations.
 - A. Khrushchev declared already clear that the dialogue was coming to an end but added no final decision yet reached.

- III. Seems likely that West will be confronted with greatly increased pressures in Berlin over next month or two.
 - A. New unilateral steps by Soviets can be expected.
 - B. Will probably undertake harassments aimed at probing for possible Western concessions.
 - C. Pressures would also be designed to accomplish gradually some of the objectives of peace treaty and to sound out



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Western reaction to its implementation.

- D. Khrushchev has already indicated that Soviets will proceed cautiously, posing series of minor challenges, each limited to minimize sharp Western reaction.

IV. Increasing indications that USSR will move to encroach on Western interests and attempt to impede Allied access.

- A. Soviets might close off East Berlin to Western military traffic, withdraw from Berlin Air Safety Center.
- B. Soviets may seek to associate East Germans more actively with administration of access controls.
- C. East German authorities fortifying and deepening defenses along Berlin Wall.
- D. Communists reportedly tightening controls along entire 850 mile zonal border with West Germany.
- E. To date however, we have noted no repositioning of Soviet or East German military forces which might suggest anticipated action.

V. While chances for treaty during next several months seem to have increased, particularly if Soviet tactics produce no significant success, Soviets still holding door open to further negotiations.

- A. This course enables USSR to maintain a degree of control over situation and provides opportunity for Soviets to assess impact of their actions on West.

B. Some indication that USSR interested in bringing matter before UN where they would hope capitalize on world-wide concern over issue.

VI. Although Soviets have set no deadline, early fall would seem most probable time for signing peace treaty.

A. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] all conclude that if no movement in negotiations, peace treaty will probably be signed after August.

B. If USSR preparing gradually to extend GDR sovereignty over land access routes into West Berlin, likely period would be just before or during fall military maneuvers in September-October.

C. Tentative indications that Moscow already sounding out friendly neutrals, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] for support of peace treaty and attendance at peace conference.

D. Could sign abbreviated treaty altering conditions of access but without complete turnover of controls to East Germany.

[REDACTED]