

The following document is an excerpt from a Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State to President Gerald R. Ford. The entire document is included on the NARA website.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ACTION  
June 19, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

A. Denis Clift *ADClift*

SUBJECT:

Moscow Summit -- the President's Meetings  
with General Secretary Brezhnev

The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab A would forward background and talking points for the President's summit talks with General Secretary Brezhnev. (This is a joint NSC/State paper, with much of the drafting by Hyland and with contributions from Sonnenfeldt, Lodal, Smyser and Clift.)

The memorandum opens with a review of the President's objectives during his talks in the USSR. It then provides detailed background information and talking points for the summit agenda items, separating them into four categories:

- Arms Control Issues: SALT, ABM Agreement, Threshold Test Ban, Chemical Weapons and Restraints on Environmental Warfare.
- Economic Relations: Trade, long-term economic cooperation, MFN and Eximbank Financing.
- Bilateral Agreements: Long-Term Economic Agreement, Energy Agreement, Housing Agreement, Artificial Heart Research; new consulates communique announcement and transportation communique announcement.
- International Issues: European Security Conference, Force Reduction Talks, Berlin, Indochina, and the Middle East.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B 3  
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
 By HR NARA Date 2/8/12

The accompanying briefing book includes the texts of the ABM Protocol; the texts of the economic, energy, housing, and artificial heart agreements; additional background information on SALT; the draft communique; together with biographic material and other State background papers.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.





Your Talking Points

-- We should find a mutually acceptable plan for reductions which would enhance stability in Europe while maintaining undiminished security for all parties.

-- Last year we spoke of a small reduction to demonstrate our seriousness; this might be a fruitful approach to pursue.

-- First, however, let me make clear our view; we cannot accede to equal reductions in manpower between our forces and yours because Soviet forces are, in fact, much larger.

-- Reductions should not merely codify the existing relationship of forces in Central Europe but create a more stable balance.

-- If the USSR is willing to start the reduction process with us, we would be willing to consider small US-Soviet reductions in the beginning. Perhaps something along the lines of the 5% initial reductions mentioned some months back could offer a basis for reductions.

-- A 5% reduction of ground forces on both sides would amount to about 10,000 on our side and a little more than 20,000 on yours by our calculations, so we could agree on 5% but not less than 10,000 or more than 20,000.

-- If we agree to such reductions as a start, I am confident that our allies would regard this as a significant move. In the light of such an agreement, I am confident that negotiations toward further reductions involving our allies would proceed to a satisfactory conclusion.

C. Berlin

Early this year the Soviets began to complain about new FRG activity planned for Berlin. They directed their heaviest fire at an office for environmental affairs (FEA), which following German Parliamentary approval this spring, is to be established in Berlin. To underscore their complaint, the Soviets threatened in February unspecified retaliation on the Berlin access routes if the West Germans proceeded with plans for the environmental office.



We and our British and French Allies consider the environmental office fully compatible with the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement and have so informed the Soviets. We have also sought with our Allies to find ways to defuse this issue.

On behalf of the FRG and with the knowledge of the British and French, I discussed this issue at length with Minister Gromyko in Moscow and in Washington. While no formal agreement was reached and no papers were exchanged, the Soviets understand that: (1) Bonn will not establish Federal agencies in Berlin without prior political consultation with the Western powers; (2) if the three Western powers declare it not politically advisable to do so, the Federal Government would refrain from any establishment; (3) The Federal Environmental Agency is not a first step of any deliberate political action at unduly extending the Federal presence in Berlin; (4) the Federal Government for its part will not act without the consent of the Three Powers.

These points are proof of the interest which the Three Powers attach to the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement; we trust that the USSR will attach the same importance to the strict observance and full application of the Agreement, both in its letter and spirit.

The Soviets seem in the process of reviewing their policy toward the FRG in the light of recent personnel changes in the Bonn coalition. They would not deliberately risk a confrontation at this time with the new Schmidt/Genscher team on a Berlin related issue, and the question may not arise in Moscow.

Your Talking Points

-- The Quadripartite Agreement not only laid the basis for improvements in Berlin and Central Europe but also helped to create a climate in Western Europe and in the United States for closer cooperation with the Soviet Union.

-- As we have previously indicated, the Western Allies will not permit anything to occur in the Western sectors of Berlin which is contrary to the Quadripartite Agreement. The assurance which Secretary Kissinger provided in April should meet any legitimate concerns you may have about future activities in West Berlin.

