


Berlin, German Eastern Policy



Where the Situation Now Stands

We originally took the initiative following your first European trip to suggest that if there is to be an era of negotiation, Berlin should be removed or at least reduced as a source of recurrent crises. Consequently, we and our Western allies, including the FRG, worked out a series of measures which we felt would enhance the viability of West Berlin, make crises less likely but leave the basic four-power responsibility for the city as a whole untouched. We did not have in mind any new arrangements concerning the military garrisons since these are already covered by agreements and understandings.

We always recognized that any agreement about Berlin would be vulnerable to sudden Soviet and/or East German violation because geography simply could not be altered. Consequently, we were always reluctant to consider concessions in the present status but aimed at its improvement. We did not know whether the Soviets might have a similar interest but thought it worth testing them.

Then Brandt came into office and activated his Ostpolitik. As it turned out, its center-piece, as distinct from past German efforts to reach agreements with the East, was an agreement with Moscow on renunciation of force and recognition of borders. The Germans hoped by this to allay Soviet fears that they were trying to disaffect the Soviet satellites by dealing only with them but not with the USSR.

Under pressure from the opposition CDU, and coming from Berlin himself, Brandt recognized that he could never claim success in his Eastern policy if it did not include an improved arrangement for Berlin. As a result, the Berlin negotiations became intimately entangled in the Ostpolitik to the point that the Germans said they would not ratify their treaty with the Soviets (in which the FRG made all the concessions, which the Soviets gladly pocketed) unless there were first a new agreement on Berlin.

In agreement with the FRG, the allies worked out a proposal that would (1) regularize civilian access to the city, (2) confirm and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between West Berlin and the FRG, and (3) maintain an FRG political presence in West Berlin. In return, the FRG was willing to curtail certain activities the Soviets found especially obnoxious, like meetings of FRG constitutional organs.

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*

E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *3/8/84*

NSC Memo. 3/30/06, State Dept Guidelines

By *HR* NARA, Date *3/15/12*

The Germans argued that the Soviets were so interested in getting the Moscow treaty ratified (because of their concern with China and their desire to get German economic assistance -- which the Soviets were already getting anyway), that skillful negotiating tactics by the Western allies would induce the Soviets to accept the Western list even though most of the concessions would be Soviet.

There has never been any evidence to support this. In several Ambassadorial meetings, the Soviets proceeded to put forward a series of proposals which, in effect, would make of West Berlin a third German state (somewhat like their old "free city" proposal minus any demands for our military pullout). They would agree to various economic and cultural ties between the city and the outside world, including the FRG; to safeguards for civilian access; but not to any political ties between the city and the FRG. In addition, the Soviets demanded termination of a whole series of "subversive" activities, like radio broadcasts and rejected any discussion of East Berlin, although they do not reject the continuation of four-power (US, UK, French, Soviet) responsibilities for the city as a whole, mainly because they do not want to be excluded from a role in the Western sectors. In fact, the Soviet proposals have aggravated the Berlin position, not eased it.

#### Gromyko's Probable Line

In discussing this subject, which is now deadlocked over the issues described above, Gromyko may

-- reiterate Soviet readiness to safeguard the economic life of West Berlin and civilian access to it;

-- reaffirm the continued validity of four-power responsibility for the city as a whole;

-- but reject any political ties between the FRG and West Berlin;

-- in effect enunciate the idea of West Berlin as a third German state with membership in the UN but without any change in the Western military/civilian presence;

-- reject the idea that there can be any discussion of East Berlin which the Soviets regard as the capital of the GDR and a closed subject.

(NOTE: There have recently been some indications that the Soviets might consider some low-key FRG political representation in West Berlin. This has aroused interest in Brandt's entourage (Bahr) who has frequent



surreptitious contacts with Soviet officials. We may at some point be faced with German schemes for reducing or transforming the FRG's political presence in West Berlin in an effort to get an agreement which would then permit Brandt to claim success and submit his Moscow treaty for ratification. But as a quid pro quo for such an arrangement the situation may evolve in which the Germans pay twice, on Ostpolitik and on Berlin.)

In Response to Gromyko, You Should

-- avoid details;

-- avoid leaving the impression that you are willing to scale down the Western position since the Soviets will immediately carry this back to the Germans (and the French, who, if anything, have been the most reluctant to negotiate about Berlin at all because they want to keep their position in Berlin unimpaired as leverage vis-a-vis the Germans);

-- reiterate your basic view that there can be little hope of peace and quiet in Europe if Berlin boils up into crisis periodically;

-- state your conviction that there ought to be improvements in the life of the West Berliners, if only on humanitarian grounds;

-- note the basic reality that the FRG feels intimate ties with the city and that there can be no thought of making it a third German state;

-- express the hope that the Ambassadors will continue their work and reach a mutually acceptable agreement which would be bound to have beneficial effects beyond Berlin itself.

