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By BKT/NC on 2 May 2013

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POL 38-9 H

Minister Calhoun
Mr. Hulick

~~SECRET~~

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

United States Mission,
Berlin, Germany,
March 4, 1965.

Dear John:

It has been a long time since I received from you the interesting paper on the six Berlin crises. I have turned from time to time to the preparation of a reply, but always felt that I had not given sufficient thought to the matters you are dealing with. I still have that impression, but I will commence a long overdue response in the hope that something useful will develop in the course of it.

In general the descriptions of the crises matched the picture that we had at this end. Some of the assumptions, particularly regarding Soviet motivation, differ from those we have held, but it is well known that Berlin and Washington saw things somewhat differently in this respect. There is a minor point on page 38 that I might mention also. It is implied in the third paragraph that the presence of contingency plans might have introduced a certain element of automaticity in the reaction of the US in the autobahn incident. There is no doubt that contingency plans can have this effect. The worst and most famous example is still the outbreak of the First World War. In the little incident of October 1963, however, it should be kept in mind that the contingency plan had been in existence for more than a year, during which time similar but lesser detentions had occurred and had been solved without putting into effect the plan itself. In fact, the use of the plan did not produce any real departure from the normal process of argument and protest until the ultimatum was given. This, as you know, did not happen for many hours. The earlier and lesser incidents had all been resolved well within this time period.

With respect to general conclusions which might be drawn from the handling of the various crises, one of the most interesting lessons was that there seemed to be no real and predictable pattern to the control mechanism which would come into being on each occasion. The participation

/ of Washington

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~~SECRET~~

of Washington and Berlin was a constant. The intermediate coordinating headquarters and the communication channels seemed so haphazard that one had the impression they were determined in each case by the way the first phone call was placed or by which headquarters happened to get the word first. The Peter Fechter and APC incidents were handled almost entirely by direct communication between USBER and the State Department. Intermediate military headquarters and the Bonn Embassy played almost no role. In the later autobahn incidents the Embassy, USAREUR and EUCOM all were very active, but it was almost impossible for us to predict whether General McConnell or the Ambassador would be on the phone with instructions at any given time. This is presumably inevitable, given the mixed political-military nature of the situation and the fact that there is no clear hierarchy involving the Embassy and EUCOM. As long as everyone was kept almost instantaneously informed, and we were able to do this with all three European headquarters, and as long as there were not strong differences of view at higher levels in Europe this situation did not cause any serious difficulty.

As a general rule, however, I think that once Washington took over the ultimate decision making, the intermediate headquarters ceased to play an inportant role and it might have been better if they had simply reverted to monitoring a direct command channel between Berlin and Washington. I am undoubtedly affected to some extent by parochialism, but it does seem to me that almost all the creative impulse in the autobahn and APC crises came from Berlin. This is really as it should be and is not too surprising. Washington's principal function in the heat of action was to adapt Berlin's recommendations to the demands and restrictions evident at the national level. Imaginative and vigorous prosecution of any local incident depends almost entirely on the caliber of the local staff, and the only healthy situation is one in which Washington's role is essentially that of hauling on the reins and steering slightly from time to time. It would be most unfortunate if Washington ever had to provide the steam for the handling of the situation.

In considering the post-Fechter and autobahn incidents, it seems to me that the situation would have worked out about the same in the end had the tune been called entirely from Berlin. I do not recall any important recommendations from here that were not in the end approved and implemented in substantially the original form. This was due of course to the excellent support at the staff levels in Washington and in intermediate headquarters, but it also indicates a soundness of judgment and a level of discretion on the part of the local staff which is often lost sight of. I do not contest that Washington must approve actions in a situation which can and did rapidly involve national level participation vis-a-vis the Soviets. However, it seems to me that Washington must resign itself to a number of realities in dealing with crises: 1. that it is not going to have time to create and consider alternatives to the course of action

/ recommended

recommended from the field; 2. that it is therefore essentially limited to approving (perhaps with modifications) or rejecting field recommendations; 3. that the more the field recommendations are modified or disapproved, the less vigorous and probably the less successful will be the prosecution of the crisis situation (assuming the field staff is reasonably sound and responsible).

This is somewhat overstated, but essentially I think it is sound. It indicates that if Washington really distrusts the field staff it should replace that staff with one it can trust. It should not expect to be able to design solutions itself in a crisis. It also suggests that the preparation and exercise of plans are extremely useful if only to educate the field in advance regarding the limits set by national policy, and to make the national levels aware of any serious weaknesses in the field staff.

I have treated the intermediate headquarters rather cavalierly. I should make clear that I am speaking only of those major incidents in which the national level controls all steps. Needless to say there are many situations -- the great majority -- in which the intermediate headquarters do the controlling. Also, even in a major incident, there are various planning and action operations proceeding simultaneously. In some of these the intermediate headquarters are key elements. I have in mind, for example, the advance planning for tripartite probes which was going on even while the initial stages of the autobahn convoy incidents were being worked out.

The air crisis of 1962 was of course quite different in that the intermediate headquarters had operational control. It is highly desirable to move such control as far down the line as possible commensurate with national-level requirements. Control by an intermediate headquarters in a serious situation is thus not likely except where that situation is of such long duration that its outlines become fairly clear and stabilized, and where there is no such direct confrontation involved as in the autobahn or APC situations.

This has been a somewhat rambling dissertation, but consecutive thought is hampered here by the incessant intrusion of daily affairs to the extent that I think I have become incapable of it. (This is not necessarily an unpleasant condition, since it is always easier to react to events than it is to sit down and think about them. One can always beguile oneself with the belief that, with sufficient time, one could think things through to a clear understanding and clear solution.) Your paper is a useful and provocative cut at a problem which should be the focus of considerably more systematic thought than the Department ever gives to it. The relations between Washington desks and field posts, it seems to me, would profit from a more consistent pattern, understood throughout the Service and designed to produce the most efficient results in the end. It should be founded on the principle that the people in the

/ field

field are intelligent and capable and are better able to devise means of dealing with local situations than is Washington. The latter's role should be that of providing guidance on national objectives, fitting proposed local operations into the perspective of larger national concerns and in general insuring consistency and continuity. It seems to me that this was pretty much the way the Task Force handled Berlin during your incumbency, and I think it worked very well indeed.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur R. Day
Chief, Political Affairs Section

POL:ARDay/af

AIR POUCH

Arthur R. Day
US Mission
Berlin, Germany

Dear Pete -

I'd appreciate your reading this and giving me your comments.

I'm not quite sure what I will do with it but wanted to get it out of my system.

Sincerely,

John Ausland

1) Interesting how focus of control shifted from crisis to crisis.

2) Local & Top are areas of most initiative

3) Goals + capabilities

DRAFT

~~October 15, 1964~~ NOVEMBER 10, 1964

SEVENTH SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY
1964-1965 Session
August 12, 1964 - June 11, 1965

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By BKT/NC on 2 May 2013

## SIX BERLIN CRISES, 1961-1964

(A Case Study in Foreign Policy Problem Management)

During the Kennedy administration, the Berlin problem erupted into a series of crises. Although they were not all of the same intensity, each presented the United States with a serious challenge. Partly because of the nature of the challenge but mostly because of the Kennedy style, these crises brought about drastic changes in the management of the Berlin problem.

I propose to examine the six major crises related to Berlin which occured during the Kennedy-Johnson administration. The first revolved around the erection of the "wall" and lasted from the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in June, 1961 through the tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie in October. During the second, the Soviets tried to interfere with allied aircraft flying to Berlin during February and March, 1962. In August, 1962 the murder of Peter Fechter by an east German guard at the wall precipitated the third crisis, which led to rioting in west Berlin, a dispute over the use of armored personnel carriers by the Soviets in west Berlin, and the abolition of the Soviet Kommandatura in east Berlin. The fourth Berlin crisis took place in the Caribbean in October, 1962, when Khrushchev sought to improve his bargaining position by sneaking missiles into Cuba. The Cuban missile crisis was followed by a year long lull, which was ended in October and November, 1963,

when the Soviets detained American convoys traveling to or from Berlin. Finally, in June, 1964, the Soviets symbolically terminated the 1958 crisis by concluding a treaty with east Germany.

As you will see, each of these crises not only presented U.S. and allied officials with completely different opening scenarios. They also caught Allied planning in various stages of completeness (or incompleteness). Even though each crisis found the Allied team better equipped and in better training than its predecessor, they lead to adjustments in organizational and communications arrangements.

This record will essentially be a memoir, based primarily on my recollections of the three years from mid-1961 to mid-1964. Since I was at that time a member of the Berlin Task Force, my point of view will be essentially that gained sitting on the seventh floor of the State Department. This will be supplemented, however, by my observations on a half dozen trips to Europe, either alone, in the company of military officers, or with Secretary Rusk.

## FIRST "WALL" CRISIS, JUNE-OCTOBER, 1961

The Facts:

The events leading up to and following the division of Berlin on August 13, 1961 are so well known as to require only the sketchiest outline.

Khrushchev and Kennedy met in Vienna in June to take each others measure. Khrushchev used the occasion to throw down the gauntlet on Berlin, demanding that the Allies get out of the city and formally accept the division of Germany. Kennedy came away from the encounter in a sober mood, declaring that it was going to be a long, cold winter.

A period of increasing tension followed. Both the Soviet Union and the United States announced an increase in military expenditures. As fears mounted that the escape hatch would be closed, hordes of east Germans fled to west Berlin. Khruschev, meanwhile, thumped the war drums louder and louder. On July 25, President Kennedy informed the world that the United States would under no condition abandon Berlin. As tension and the flood of refugees continued to mount, the world waited for the explosion, not quite sure when it would occur or what form it would take.

The answer came early one Sunday morning, when Berliners awoke to find their city cut in two by soldiers and barbed wire.

The immediate Western reaction was cautious and limited to mild reproofs. When the west Berliners made it clear that they were not

satisfied, Kennedy sent Vice-President Johnson and a battle group to Berlin as tokens of American determination. He subsequently also asked General Lucius Clay to return to the city as his special representative.

Although these moves reassured the west Berliners of Western determination to defend them, the question of Allied rights in east Berlin remained up in the air. After a period of moves and counter-moves, in October, there was a confrontation between American and Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie, the sole Allied crossing point into east Berlin. The net result was that only American personnel in uniform continued to travel into east Berlin without showing any identification to east German police.

This cycle ended with the access routes between west Germany and West Berlin open.

The Management:

The United States and its Allies entered the 1961 Berlin crisis with a minimum of mangement tools - planning, organization, and communications.

During 1959, U.S. U.K. and French Foreign Ministers approved a remarkable planning directive, which would be hard to improve upon today. This provided for plans to safeguard access to Berlin, particularly by autobahn and air. By 1961, most of the plans involving the use of force had been completed. These included plans for company size and battalion size probes for use on the autobahn in case of blockage of Allied access. They also included plans for the use of fighter aircraft in the corridors, if this became necessary

to protect Allied aircraft. Other than the development of airlift plans, however, little was done to plan for meeting communist moves not requiring the use of force by the Allies. In addition, while there was a plethora of plans for the defense of west Berlin, there were no plans to deal with the possible division of the city.

On the recommendation of General Louis Norstad, the three Foreign Ministers approved the formation of an integrated, tripartite staff (Live Oak) in Paris to prepare military plans related to access to Berlin. They also directed the U.K. and French Ambassadors in Washington and the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs of the State Department to meet as required, to provide over-all direction to the field. The Foreign Ministers also assigned planning functions to the three Allied Embassies in Bonn, in coordination with the Commandants in Berlin.

Within the U.S. Government, planning was done by an informal working group, consisting primarily of State and Defense Department representatives. This group received plans prepared in the field, met with representatives of the French and British Embassies, and prepared instructions to the field.

These various organizations and groups depended entirely on national - U.S., British, and French - communications systems. Although the U.S. military communications were adequate, State Department communications to Europe, including Bonn and Berlin, were dangerously inadequate. A telegram sent from Berlin to the Department

by the most expeditious means took from four to six hours. There were furthermore no secure telephone facilities between Washington, Bonn and Berlin.

Although I have described these management tools as minimal, the situation was not as bad as this implies. It was saved by the fact that between 1958 and 1961, the Berlin problem had attracted a group of very capable Allied officers. It would take too much space to list them all here. I should, however, like to mention in particular Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler and Director of German Affairs Martin Hillenbrand, both of whom in 1961 were devoting their full-time energies to Berlin. At the American Embassy in Bonn, the late Francis Williamson had the primary responsibility for Berlin. In Berlin itself, Allan Lightner, an old German hand, headed an able group of Foreign Service officers, who manned the ramparts. Finally, in Paris, General Louis Norstand took a direct and personal interest in the defense of Berlin, aided by the tripartite staff headed by British Major General George Baker.

After Kennedy returned from Vienna, Washington plunged into an orgy of "policy review," which culminated in the President's July 25 policy declaration on Berlin. This was perhaps the most difficult phase of the Berlin crisis. The President and his staff, impatient with and not entirely understanding State Department processes, clamored for answers to half formulated questions. State and Defense, uncomfortable in a double harness, struggled to meet the demands placed upon them by the White House. Within State, a struggle went on as to who below the Secretary was going to "control" the Berlin problem.

Finally, President Kennedy called in Dean Acheson to advise him and Secretary Rusk on Berlin. Although there were a number of papers produced in the summer of 1961, the Acheson papers were by far the most influential, if only because of the personal authority he exercised. He, on the other hand, was obviously impatient with the confusion he found swirling aound him. He apparently blamed this primarily on President Kennedy. In speaking to the Foreign Service Association, he referred to Kennedy as "a gifted amateur." In a meeting of the Berlin Task Force, he declared at one point, "Gentlemen, you might as well face it. This nation is leaderless!"

Despite the disorder, the bureaucracy managed to throw together two voluminous studies containing the raw material for policy discussion. Policy, however, finally took the form of the President's July 25 speech and a brief policy paper prepared for the Allies, which indicated what the U.S. planned to do and what was expected of them.

During this period, the idea of forming a Berlin Task Force kept cropping up. The White House favored this. Officials in Defense did also. Many State Department officials were opposed, however, on the grounds that in such a group State would "lose control of the problem." (This assumed that they <u>were</u> in control of it, when in fact no one was on a full-time basis.) Finally, however, Foy Kohler agreed with Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze and Major General David Gray of the Joint Staff to establish

the nucleus of a task force. This step took place shortly before August 13. It consisted of an officer from Defense, Col. Showalter, an officer from the Joint Staff, and an officer from State, myself. This group did little more than hold the fort and get acquainted while their principles went to Paris for a meeting.

Shortly after this conference in Paris broke up, the Soviets divided Berlin. With the pressure for action really on, Foy Kohler directed us to call a meeting of the full task force. We made up a list of people who had been working on the Berlin problem during the past several months, announced a meeting, and shortly after August 13 the first full meeting of what became known as the Berlin Task Force was held.

For the next year or so, this group became the primary locus for coordination of policy within the U.S. government. The three key persons were Foy Kohler, who was chairman or Director, Paul Nitze and Major General David Gray. Each of these men enjoyed the confidence of their superiors, and what they agreed upon normally became policy. Other government departments, such as USIA, CIA, and Treasury, were also represented, but they had more specialized roles.

This is the way the task force usually worked, with the entire process not infrequently compressed into a single day. When a problem presented itself, a team consisting of officers from the agencies directly concerned - normally State, Defense, and the Joint Staff - would prepare a staff study. This would be reviewed and either

amended or approved in a meeting of the full task force. It would then be sent, often simultaneously, to the White House, Secretary Rusk, Secretary MacNamara, and the Joint Chiefs. If the decision required approval by the President, MacGeorge Bundy would arrange a meeting with the President. This would normally be attended by Secretary Rusk, assisted by Ambassador-at-Large, Charles Bohlen, Foy Kohler, and Martin Hillenbraud; Secretary MacNamara, assisted by Paul Nitze; General Hemnitzer, assisted by Major General Gray; MacGeorge Bundy; and the President's Special Military Adviser, General Maxwell Taylor. Although this group invariably submitted any recommendations to extremely critical examination, the task force enjoyed a very high batting average.

In view of the friction between the White House staff and the State Department, MacGeorge Bundy asked Foy Kohler to nominate a liaison officer on European problems. Kohler selected David Klein, a Foreign Service officer on detail to the task force who had served in Moscow, Berlin, and Bonn. Although friction was by no means eliminated, he deserves a great deal of credit for absorbing what he could and improving working relations between Pennsylvania Avenue and Foggy Bottom.

Management of and in the field posed quite different problems. In the first place, there was an honest difference of views over whether the problem should be managed in Berlin, in Washington, or somewhere in between.

Both the soldiers and the civilians in Berlin have chafed for many years under what they consider excessive control by Bonn,

Washington or both. President Kennedy made it clear, however, early in the piece that he intended to oversee not only strategy but tactics. He felt that the stakes involved required that he do the bidding and play the hand. In addition, there was no one in the field in mid-1961 in whom he had sufficient confidence to delegate any authority.

The appointment of General Lucius Clay as the President's Special Representative shortly after the wall only exacerbated the management problem. Whatever Kennedy's reasons for acquiescing in Willi Brandt's request to send Clay to the rescue, they clearly did not include an intention to abdicate the responsibilities he had assumed for managing the Berlin crisis. When, therefore, Clay began using escalation tactics to deal with the Soviets, the White House sent word to Foggy Bottom to tighten the reins. Since neither Kennedy nor Clay could admit publicly that their concepts of tactics differed, the State Department inevitably became the goat.

Clay also soon ran afoul of the military chain of command. Clay had no command authority in Berlin. Major General Watson, the Commandant, reported in his military capacity to General Clarke in Heidelberg, who in turn reported to General Norstad in Paris. General Norstad, who took a particular interest in Berlin, objected strongly to Clay's giving instructions to Watson. His objections on technical grounds were compounded by the fact that he believed Clay's tactics unnecessarily risky.

The Embassy in Bonn, on the other hand, soon all but withdrew from the game. Ambassador Dowling apparently decided the better part

of wisdom in the circumstances was to lie low.

While General Clay was fencing with Soviet General Koniev, in Berlin, the Allied team in Washington plunged into a whirlwind of planning. Having been caught off base on August 13, it was determined to examine every conceivable contingency. In order to cope with the work load, the Ambassadorial Group - with the Germans added - established a number of sub-groups. Partly as a result of a Soviet note of ________________, a military sub-group chaired by Paul Nitze reviewed and expanded the previous air access planning. This expanded planning provided in particular for use of military crews on civil aircraft in case the civilian crews refused to fly. The military sub-group also prepared and pushed through the North Atlantic Council a directive to NATO military authorities, calling for preparation of NATO military plans which went beyond existing tripartite plans. (These tripartite plans extended to a battalion size operation on the autobalm and attacks against ground installations in east Germany firing at Allied fighter aircraft.) A political sub-group, chaired initially by Martin Hillenbrand, began preparation of a comprehensive catalogue of possible contingencies regarding access and within Berlin, along with an indication of possible reactions. An east German sub-group, chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard H. Davis, prepared plans related to a possible east German uprising. An economic sub-group, chaired by Under Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler, obtained NATO agreement to use economic counter-measures in certain circumstances.

While there was intense Allied coordination in Washington and Paris, this was not the case in Bonn and Berlin. This was partly

because Washington suddenly became very active and was slow to involve the field. In addition, however, the Americans in Bonn and Berlin were generally unenthusiastic about cooperating too closely with the British and French, on the grounds that this would force the United States to adopt the cautious approach of the British. This overlooked, however, the fact that Washington was often little more inclined to be adventuresome than London.

**EVALUATION:**

Although the U.S. and its Allies went into the 1961 crisis with a minimum of planning and organization, they managed to emerge without any serious disaster. This was mainly due to the quality of the improvisation of the Allied team, for which neither planning nor organization in a substitute.

The weakest performance was related to the division of Berlin beginning August 13. This was due to a failure by Allied officials - particularly in capitals - to recognize promptly the requirements of this event. There were several reasons for this failure. First, the Allies for several years had thought of and planned for a Berlin crisis in terms of a threat to access. Thus although many Berlin experts had recognized for years that the Soviets might one day divide the city, they did not plan for this contingency and hence were slow to recognize its significance. In addition, many high officials were preoccupied in early August with the possibility of an east German uprising. They saw east Germany as a pressure cooker, with west Berlin as a safety valve. They were concerned that, if it were closed, there might be an explosion. This concern led them to want to go easy on August 13, lest a more vigorous Allied response lead to unwarranted expectations in east Germany.

It remained, however, for later Soviet moves to demonstrate whether intensive planning would improve the Allied performance.

AIR CORRIDOR EXERCISE

The Facts:

Whatever is said concerning the Allies reaction to the "wall," it obviously did not discourage Khrushchev from pressing his demands. After a note exchange during the fall of 1961, the Soviets launched during February and March, 1962 a cautious but determined effort to disrupt Allied air access to Berlin. They sought at first to reserve two corridors for several hours for use by Soviet military aircraft for maneuvers. They then tried to reserve certain attitudes in corridors for use by Soviet aircraft. They also demanded some changes in flight procedure, such as a requirement that Allied flight plans specify the time aircraft would cross the east-west German border. Finally, they directly harassed Allied flights, particularly by buzzing some with Soviet fighters.

The Allies responded in a determined but cautious way. They concentrated on keeping the civil airlines flying at as close to their normal schedules as possible. They flew some military and civilian probe aircraft without passengers at critical attitudes. They declined to alter their procedures under pressure. Finally, they placed fighter aircraft on ground alert.

Although these measures preserved Allied rights to fly the corridors at times of their choosing, they did not bring sufficient pressure on the Soviets to cause them to cease their harassing tactics. General Clay recommended that the U.S. show its determination by flying fighters in the corridors and by flying military aircraft over ten thousand feet.

The Allies maintain that they have these rights, but they have not exercised them for years. The Soviets have threatened dire consequences if they try. Although the Allies had agreed before the Soviet campaign began to use fighters under certain circumstances, these did not arise. Both General Norstad and governments rejected General Clay's recommendation that the ground rules be changed to permit the use of fighters as a demonstration. General Norstad did recommend that he be given authority to fly over 10,000 feet but elected not to use the authority after it was given to him.

The Soviets finally ceased their campaign only after Secretary Rusk and British Foreign Secretary Home upbraided Gromyko for trying to carry on a discussion in Geneva while kicking them on the shins in Germany.

The Management:

The Allies went into the air corridor exercise much better prepared than they had been on August 13. In the first place, they had done extensive planning over a period of years directed toward preserving air access. As a matter of fact, the final instruction to General Norstad was dispatched by the Ambassadorial Group only weeks before the Soviet campaign began. Secondly, the Allied team was much better organized. This is not to say, however, that the planning or the organization were perfect.

Although the planning had been pretty thorough, it had concentrated on possible Soviet moves requiring a response involving use of force. This was probably due to the fact that prior to 1961 most of the planning had been done at LIVE OAK in Paris. This military bias was reinforced when the Defense Department took the

lead within the U.S. government in 1961 on air access planning and the quadripartite planning was done in the Military sub-group of the Ambassadorial group. Thus, although this review was done primarily by civilians, it concentrated upon the military aspects, building upon the planning done by LIVE OAK.

Ironically, in 1959 the Foreign Ministers' basic directive on Berlin planning anticipated Soviet moves not involving use of force. They allocated this planning to the Embassies in Bonn. Although the Embassies began such planning, it was never completed, primarily for want of guidance from the Foreign offices.

This military orientation of planning had at least one important result for the management of the air exercise. When the Soviet campaign began, the American Embassy in Bonn and General Clay in Berlin began sending in recommendations which largely ignored the previous Allied planning. The State Department promptly called to their attention the fact that considerable ##### discretion on air access matters had been delegated to General Norstad. The Department directed Bonn and Berlin therefore to coordinate with their British and French colleagues and to send their recommendations to Paris. Although this pleased General Norstad immensely, it was galling to Ambassador Dowling and his staff, to say nothing of General Clay.

Nevertheless, the day to day management of flights in the corridors fell to the LIVE OAK staff, under the close supervision of General Norstad. Without exception, his approach-which was based on matching but never raising Soviet bets-was supported by governments. As a matter of fact, President Kennedy subsequently

commended General Norstad's careful handling of this crisis.

While General Norstad and his LIVE OAK staff managed the flights in the corridors, the Ambassadorial Group monitored ~~his~~ their activities and concentrated on the diplomatic aspects of the Soviet campaign. This covered two aspects, the legality of the Soviet flights in the corridors and the Soviet demands for changes in procedure.

The State Department early in the game sent to the field and gave to the Allies a legal opinion that the Soviet flights were within the framework of the post-war agreements. Some people interpreted this to mean that the U.S. government did not object to the Soviet flights. Unfortunately, this led to considerable confusion, one of the results of which was that the three Allies did not officially protest the Soviet flights at the government level until very late in the game. This protest, when finally sent, took the common sense position that these flights were a threat to the safety of Allied aircraft and should cease.

The Ambassadorial Group referred the question of the Soviet request for changes in procedure to the quadripartite group in Bonn for study. No agreement was reached, and the Soviets stopped pushing their demands without receiving a definite tripartite response.

The critical element, however, during this period was probably the desire of the U.S. and U.K. governments not to allow the Soviet campaign to disrupt the dialogue on Berlin. This led to an effort to minimize publicly the nature and significance of the Soviet campaign. This policy almost went off the track when the Soviets dropped some chaff in the corridors shortly before Secretary Rusk left for Geneva. He considered cancelling his trip but was dissuaded.

In the west, this was probably just as well, because his and Lord Home's intervention with Gromyko was apparently primarily responsible for the Soviet decision to end their campaign.

EVALUATION:

Although the Allied performance regarding the air corridors was far from perfect, it was an improvement over their response to the "wall." In addition, they emerged from this experience far better organized than they went in. Although General Norstad and his staff were the heroes, the Quadripartite Group in Bonn worked together much better than previously. In addition, the Ambassadorial Group resisted the temptation to try to manage the day to day tactics from Washington. The only place the Allies did not work together was Berlin, where General Clay steadfastly refused to be shackled by "the lowest common denominator." As a result, he was able to play no large role and soon resigned to return to New York.

The most important operational lesson learned from this exercise related to communications. LIVE OAK found that it was severely hampered by poor quadripartite communications, particularly to Bonn and Berlin. This led in due course to the creation of an excellent quadripartite communications system, which tied together the three Commandants in Berlin, LIVE OAK, and the Quadripartite Group in Bonn.

The exercise also provided the value of secure telephonic communications between State and the field, for - as action officer - I used our secure telephone to Bonn, Berlin, Paris regularly. This means of communication became even more important during the second wall crisis in the fall of 1962, during which it was decided to

manage the tactics from Washington.

## SECOND WALL CRISIS

THE FACTS:

During the summer of 1962, tension began to mount again regarding Berlin. There was a marked increase in incidents along the wall. Khrushchev resumed his threatening tone. The Soviets on June 7, protested the "Fascist" behavior of West Berlin policemen. The Allies countered two weeks later with a proposal for quadripartite talks in Berlin directed toward ending violence along the wall.

On July 2, the U.S. announced the withdrawal of some of the troops it had sent to Europe during the summer of 1961. A week later, Khrushchev called for the withdrawal of Allied troops from Berlin and their replacement by UN-supervised troops from the smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

Smelling smoke, the Allied Berlin team ~~stopped the engine and~~ began practicing their fire drill.

The smoldering fire began to throw off sparks on August 13, the first anniversary of the "wall," when a West Berlin crowd rioted at the wall. It burst into flames a few days later when an east German refugee named Peter Fechter was wounded by east German guards and was allowed to bleed to death on the east Berlin side of the wall. Tension mounted in west Berlin, and West Berliners - frustrated and angry - rioted for three nights. After a period of uncertainty as to whom to blame, they began ######## stoning buses bringing guards to the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin near the Brandenburg Gate.

After a short period of hesitation, the Soviets reacted. On August 21, they began bringing their guards into West Berlin in

armored personnel carriers. The following day, they announced the abolition of the Soviet Kommandatura in East Berlin.

Since there was nothing the Allies could do to prevent the Soviets from abolishing the Kommandatura, they limited their reaction to a statement that this step would not affect Allied rights in Berlin. They then quietly acquiesced in the Soviet action, by using alternate means of dealing with the Soviets concerning east Berlin.

The Soviet armored personnel carriers presented a greater challenge. The Allies finally decided to handle this in two bites. They first told the Soviets on September 2, that they should use a crossing point nearer the Soviet memorial than Checkpoint Charlie. Then, about two weeks later they told them to stop using the armored cars. The Soviets acquiesced in both these demands.

In retrospect, it appears clear that they did this because they had bigger fish frying elsewhere. On September 11, three days before the Soviets abandoned the use of armored personnel carriers, TASS issued a statement that the Kremlin would wait until after the American elections to resume the dialogue on Berlin.

The U.S., however, continued to gird for battle over Berlin. During October, the Administration posted more and more storm warnings. This lead Congress to issue a resolution regarding American intentions to remain in Berlin. Shortly thereafter, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy stated publicly that, if necessary, the U.S. would "go it alone" on Berlin.

With attention thus focused on Berlin, few people seemed to notice that the TASS statement on Berlin came at the end of a policy declaration on Cuba!

THE MANAGEMENT:

Within the U.S. government, the second wall crisis was run from Washington. President Kennedy took a close personal interest and made the critical decisions. For example, the key decisions related to the Soviet use of armored personnel carriers were made in meetings at the White House. Kennedy was at first inclined to take a sanguine view of this practice and so informed one of his press conferences. Secretary Rusk was inclined toward this view also. Practically everyone else on the U.S. Berlin team, however, felt that it could not be tolerated. They gradually wore the President down, and he went reluctantly along.

The day to day and hour to hour tactics were managed by a group of Berlin Task Force officers from the State Department Operations Center. They were unenthusiastic about this role - prefering to leave the tactics to U.S. authorities in Berlin - but were forced into it by the desire of the President and Secretary Rusk to call the shots. In view of the slowness of telegraphic communications to Berlin, these officers had to rely primarily on the secure telephone to convey in advance the contents of instructions.

While one could disagree with the effort of the President to manage details from Washington, one cannot complain that he procrastinated or slowed down the decision making process significantly. Both the Secretary and President were very accessible and acted quickly on recommendations. For example, Berlin, early one morning, requested urgently by secure telephone reconsideration of an instruction sent them the night before. I drafted a reply. Acting Secretary

Ball took my hand written draft immediately to the White House, where it was approved by the President - after he added a sentence. I telephoned the text of the instruction to Berlin, within an hour of their original request for instructions.

Allied coordination took place primarily in Berlin, where the Commandants worked extremely well together.

The Ambassadorial Group in Washington prepared, obtained approval by governments, and issued a statement about the abolition of the Soviet Kommandatura within twenty-four hours, a great improvement over its performance at the time of the "wall."

The U.S. and Allied reactions were largely improvised, since it would have been difficult to forsee the Soviet use of armored personnel carriers and the abolition of the Soviet Kommandatura was unanticipated. The Allies had for years had elaborate plans to deal with riots in West Berlin. The difficulty in this case was reluctance on the part of West Berlin authorities to suppress the riots and failure on the part of Allied authorities to understand the impression these riots were creating outside Berlin - and particularly in Washington. This deficiency was corrected when Secretary Rusk called Charles Hulick, Acting head of the U.S. Mission, by secure telephone to urge him to see that action was taken to stop the riots.

EVALUATION:

The second wall crisis found the Allied team very well prepared. It was anticipating trouble, even though it took an unanticipated form. The Allied Commandants in Berlin deserve the major credit for the coordination of the Allied effort.

Although the lack of detailed planning slowed down the Allied

reactions to the Soviet use of armored personnel carriers, this factor probably did not alter the ultimate outcome, which was apparently determined by Khrushchev's desire to avoid a confrontation in Berlin at a time when he had set the wheels in motion to move the game to the western hemisphere.

The second wall crisis demonstrated anew to the Allied Berlin team the importance of rapid, secure tele-communications. In addition to the ~~military~~ requirement for a network linking Bonn, Berlin, and Paris, it was found that the political staffs in Berlin were severely hampered by lack of effective communications. Located in separate parts of Berlin, the spent an undue amount of timing travelling to and from meetings. This was corrected subsequently by establishing secure teletype communications between the British, French, and U.S. political offices.

The requirement for effective communications was to be demonstrated ~~were~~ even more dramitically during the Cuban crisis.

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## CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

THE FACTS:

In August, 1961, the policy level of the U.S. government was bracing itself for a Soviet challenge to Allied access to Berlin or for an uprising in east Germany. Instead, the Soviets divided Berlin. During the summer and fall of 1962, the U.S. government was battening down the hatches for a storm over Berlin. Instead, the Soviets tried to sneak some missiles into Cuba. These weapons may, however, have not been as unrelated to Berlin as their distance would seem to appear. Khrushchev had promised to resume the dialogue over Berlin after the American elections. It was probably no coincidence that at that time he expected the missiles in Cuba to be operational.

THE MANAGEMENT:

When President Kennedy and his advisers decided to counter this Soviet move with a naval blockade of Cuba, the thought occurred immediately that the Soviets might counter with a blockade of Berlin. Key members of the Berlin Task Force were, therefore, called into the White House or State Department the week-end before President Kennedy made his speech, which was on a Monday. Since there was little that could be added to planning for Berlin at that point, they were drawn into the complex of activities related to Cuba.

The President's Executive Committee of the National Security Council, which was called into being to deal with the missile crisis, established a sub-committee on NATO and Berlin, chaired by Paul Nitze. Although as it turned out this group did not have much work

to do, it did serve to keep those people working on Berlin informed of what was happening concerning Cuba.

The only operational problem concerning Berlin which arose during that critical October week was removed from the agenda promptly. A dispute arose between Soviet checkpoint personnel and a U.S. military commander over procedures for processing his convoy. Although it was resolved without a lengthy detention, the U.S. Mission in Berlin recommended that we take advantage of the Soviet preoccupation with Cuba to precipitate a showdown on the procedure issue, which had been looming for about a year. The difficulty with this suggestion was that the leaders of the U.S. were also somewhat preoccupied with Cuba, and the last thing they wanted was a crisis in Berlin. After checking with my colleagues in Defense and on the Joint Staff and getting Martin Hillenbrand's approval, I called Berlin on a secure telephone and advised them to avoid if possible difficulties on the autobahn.

Although the formal charter of the quadripartite Ambassadorial Group does not extend beyond Berlin and Germany, it was found convenient to utilize it to brief the British, French, and German Embassies on Cuba. Paul Nitze called a meeting of the Military sub-group to receive an accound of the intelligence on Soviet activity in Cuba and hear President Kennedy's speech. Other than the fact that the State Department Operation Center's antiquated T.V. set did not produce a picture, only sound, this was a useful exercise. The Ambassadorial Group subsequently met several times to be briefed by its Chairman, Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson, who was playing an important role in White House discussions.

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EVALUATION:

The most important implication of the Cuban crisis for the management of the Berlin problem was the effect of placing the Strategic Air Command and other strategic forces on a high state of alert. Confronted with the certainty of destruction if they made a mis-step, the Kremlin behaved extremely cautiously. This had been predicted by the military members of the Berlin Task Force (particularly Col. Chauncey Meacham), and their view seemed to be born out by the war-peace games we had played on Berlin. There was no way, however, to be sure what the effect on the chess game would be until the queen was actually advanced. After Cuba, SAC if possible played an even larger role in our thinking on Berlin and gave me at least the assurance that the Soviets would thereafter try to keep any crisis below the level at which the U.S. would place its strategic forces on a high state of alert.

The Cuban crisis also laid bare some of the deficiencies in the U.S. government's and particularly the State Department's communications. These had long been known, but Cuba brought them forcibly to the attention of the President and Secretary Rusk. As a result of a "crash" program to correct these deficiencies, the State Department greatly improved its communications capabilities to Europe, including with Bonn and Berlin. In addition, Secretary Rusk obtained the agreement of his British, French, and German colleagues to the creation of a quadripartite teletype conference facility, for use by the Foreign Ministers in event of another Berlin crisis. This facility became operational in the spring of 1964.

These preparations were based on the assumption that Cuba had by no means eliminated the possibility of another crisis over Berlin. This was proved correct one year after Cuba, when the postponed dispute over convoy procedures erupted.

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## CONVOY INCIDENTS

THE FACTS:

During October and November, 1963 the dispute over convoy procedures that had been going on for several years came to a head.

Although there have been disagreements over procedures for processing Allied convoys since the war, the 1963 crisis had its origins in the battle group sent to Berlin in August, 1961. In order to speed up processing, the commanding officer, Col. Glover Johns, ordered his men to dismount to be counted by Soviet personnel. The Soviets took advantage of this by insisting that subsequent convoys dismount. When the U.S. authorities in Berlin learned of this practice some months later, they tried to stop it - but too late.

Out of this situation a running dispute arose over which size convoys would dismount and which would be counted in the trucks. The situation was complicated by the fact that U.S. and British procedures differed. (The French transported their troops by train). Attempts were made to agree on standard procedures but without success. When, therefore, the Soviets detained a U.S. convoy on October 10, 1963, there was not only a dispute between the U.S. and Soviets over procedures but the U.S. and British were not agreed either.

The October 10 incident was preceded over the day before by a dispute over dismounting, which was resolved without a detention. When the Soviets refused to clear a Berlin bound convoy at the western end of the autobahn on October 10, U.S. authorities in Berlin were ready for touble and promptly implemented the

contingency plans. The key to these was that, after having been detained for about fifteen hours, the convoy commander informed the Soviet officer in charge that, if the convoy were not processed within two hours, the convoy would proceed without processing. This information was also passed to the Soviet headquarters at Wundsdorf through the U.S. Military liaison Mission at Potsdam.

Just before the time limit expired, the Soviets processed the convoy and it proceeded toward Berlin, only to be detained by the Soviets at that end. This time the Soviets allowed the time limit set by the convoy commander expire. When the convoy attempted to proceed, their way was blocked by Soviet troops in armored personnel carriers. The U.S. Commandant in Berlin, Major General James Polk, thereupon halted an outbound convoy of troops at the checkpoint, to bring counter-pressure to bear.

The U.S. protested strongly and repeatedly both ######### in ######## Germany and at the government level. President Kennedy protested to Gromyko on October 10. Secretary Rusk protested to Ambassador Dobrynin on October 11, while Ambassador Kohler was talking to Zorin in Moscow. Fifty-two hours after the original detention the Soviets finally released the convoy without the troops dismounting.

A British convoy was subsequently halted on October 16 but was allowed to proceed after nine hours.

These detentions had a number of results. First, the three Allies agreed upon harmonized procedures regarding dismounting. Second, they transmitted these agreed procedures to the Soviets . Third, they sent a U.S. convoy on November 4, to test Soviet intentions.

The Soviets detained this inbound convoy at the western end of the autobahn for 41 hours. When the convoy attempted to move forward the first day of the detention, the Soviets again deployed troops in armored personnel carriers to block it.

In addition to protesting, the Allies took two steps. On the second day of the detention, the British and French sent convoys identical to the U.S. convoy from Berlin. Second, General Lemnitsor ordered the assembly of the tripartite company size probe force near the western end of the autobahn.

After a brief period of hesitation, the Soviets processed the British and French convoys without their dismounting. Before these convoys reached the western end of the autobahn, they released the U.S. convoy detained there.

The Soviets subsequently replied to the Allied communications concerning procedures, by setting forth ~~theories~~ theirs. Although they were not the same as the Allied, they were compatible.

The U.S. sent one more test convoy about the middle of November, but it went through without incident.

It was thus that east and west reached a "negotiated" agreement on procedures for dismounting by Allied convoys. The procedures were essentially the same as the U.S. had followed prior to the detentions. The differences were that the British in substance adopted U.S. procedures, the Allies informed the Soviets what the procedures were, and the Soviets implicitly accepted them.

THE MANAGEMENT:

Since the October 10 convoy detention found me in Berlin, I had an opportunity to observe the management of the crisis in Berlin, Paris, and Washington. I spent the first day observing the Berlin end of theoperation, the second day at LIVE OAK in Paris, and I returned to Washington in time for the detention of the British convoy on October 16.

As soon as word was received that a U.S. convoy was having difficulty on October 10, the key military and civilian staff gathered in the Berlin Emergency Operations Center, under the chairmanship of General Polk's Chief of Staff, Col. Thomas Foote. By the time General Polk arrived from a meeting with the British and French Commandants, the teleconference facility with Heidelberg had been opened. General Polk began pressing within a short time for authority to set a time limit, at the end of which the convoy would proceed.

Before he got this authority, Heidelberg had opened its teleconference facility with Paris, and Paris in turn was in contact with Washington. When the White House learned of the proposal to set a "time limit," the term used was "ultimatum." The ~~cofrontation~~ use of this term led to a telephone call from David Klein to Grover Penberthy of the Berlin Task Force, instructing him to tell Paris not to issue an "ultimatum" until it had been approved by the President. Penberthy called General McConnell, Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Europe. As a result, orders were issued to Berlin to withhold setting a time limit. These arrived in time to halt the wheels at the checkpoint but the military liaison mission officer

was already on his way to Potsdam, and General Polk could not contact him because he did not have a radio in his vehicle. After some confusion, the White House flashed the green light, and the time limit was set at the checkpoint.

When I arrived in Paris, I found LIVE OAK monitoring the detention but not playing any active role. The point of control was the Operations Center at EUCOM, several miles away from the LIVE OAK headquarters. The LIVE OAK staff did discuss the desirability of assembling the tripartite company-size probe force but did not recommend this.

LIVE OAK, however, subsequently played a key role in working out the "harmonized" Allied procedures. Using the recommendations of the three Commandants in Berlin and the comments of the Embassies in Bonn and British, French, and U.S. military headquarters, General Lemnitzer submitted to governments his recommendations regarding procedures. He recommended, however, against giving them to the Soviets.

At this point, the Contingency Coordinating Sub-group of the Ambassadorial Group took over and coordinated governmental agreement on the procedures.

The U.S. started out with a division between the political and military sides on two questions. The Joint Staff, as is their habit, backed General Lemnitzer's recommendation against notifying the Soviets. It also opposed a British proposal to agree on a procedure regarding lowering tailgates. Defense sided with State on these points, and we were able to overcome the resistance of the

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Joint Staff.

We had received informal word from the White House some time before that McGeorge Bundy favored harmonization of procedures. Before going to the President, therefore, we worked out a preliminary quadripartite position for ########### reference to governments.

This lead to a meeting with President Kennedy. Under Secretary George Ball represented Secretary Rusk, assisted by Assistant Secretary Tyler, Richard Davis, and me. Secretary McNamara represented Defense; General Taylor, JCS; and John McCone, CIA. McGeorge Bundy also attended. Each of the principles went into the meeting with briefing papers which supported the agreement reached in the quadripartite group.

Under Secretary Ball lead off by reading the key elements of our briefing memorandum. President Kennedy, as was his want, opposed the recommendations, on the grounds that they would involve a change in procedures. He also wanted to impress the Soviets at the governmental level, rather than in Germany - as the French insisted. I am not sure why he always seemed to begin by opposing the solution brought to him but suppose that he wanted to force its advocates to defend it. In any event, in this case, support soon melted. I hoped that McGeorge Bundy would come to the rescue, but for some reason he did not.

Just as I had resigned myself to a defeat, the President looked across the table at me and said, "You've been working on this job for some time. What do you think?" As soon as I recovered from my surprise, I made a brief ~~agreement~~ argument for harmonization. While

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this did not sweep the field, the meeting broke up without a definite decision. During the following days, the position gradually moved to support of the quadripartite proposal. This was cinched when Ambassador Thompson returned to Washington and supported it. As a result, first McGeorge Bundy and then President Kennedy-if with some reluctance-approved an Ambassadorial Group instruction to the field regarding convoy procedures.

The next step was to get out an instruction regarding the next "non-dismount" convoy. The field and particularly General Lemnitzer - were clamoring to send a convoy as soon as possible, so as not to give the Soviets the impression we were afraid.

A team of officers from State, Defense, and the Joint Staff prepared a draft instruction to the field about the convoy, specifying in some detail its composition. The main dispute was about how soon the convoy should go. Ambassador Thompson and I wanted to send it within a few days after the Soviets received the procedures, or on Friday, November 8. General Taylor for some reason wanted to send it on the following Monday. Ambassador Thompson and I caught the President after a meeting in the Cabinet Room and he and General Taylor presented their points of view. The President finally suggested that we leave the decision to General Lemnitzer. Since Lemnitzer had been pressing to send the convoy, I welcomed this outcome.

When he recieved the instruction, however, Lemnitzer indicated that he wanted to delay the convoy for a whole week. I later learned that this was because he would be absent from Paris and wanted to be there when the convoy went. Ambassador McGhee telephoned him and urged that the convoy go no later than the Monday,

November 10. Lemmitzer agreed.

When the convoy went, we were braced for trouble. Grover Penberthy spent the night at the Operations Center and called me at about 4:00 a.m., when it was clear that the convoy had been detained. By the time Ambassador Thompson and the Secretary arrived at the office, we had gathered the Berlin Task Force team.

In the middle of the morning, Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Thompson, and I went to the White House. President Kennedy opened the discussion by saying that it was clear now that there was no misunderstanding and that there was a test over who would determine the procedures. After ### some discussion, he said that if the convoy were not released in several hours, he would approve setting a time limit.

After I returned to the Operations Center, the task force group discussed what we would do if the Soviets again stopped the convoy by deploying troops in armored personnel carriers. The consensus was that at that point it would be necessary to make the operation tripartite. Two possibilities were discussed, sending identical British and French convoys and using one of the smaller tripartite probe forces.

When the Soviets prevented the convoy from proceeding, Ambassador Thompson and I went to see the Secretary. It was about six o'clock. We recommended that we ask the British and French to sent convoys and request General Lemnitzer to assemble the company-size tripartite probe force. Rusk called Secretary McNamara ###, who approved, and McGeorge Bundy, who undertook to get presidential approval.

I called a quadripartite meeting for 8:00 p.m. and asked the British and French representatives to convey to their governments the request that they send identical convoys the following day from Berlin. We also instructed Berlin to ask the British and French Commandants to make plans for convoys, ~~providing~~ pending receipt of instructions - which they did. The JCS sent an instruction to General Lemmitser, advising him to assemble the tripartite probe force.

At the same time as this was taking place, there was rising pressure within the government for some sort of non-military counter-measures, which President Kennedy endorsed in principle. As a result, a meeting took place at the White House in the afternoon on the second day of the detention. Various possible counter-measures were discussed but no consensus developed. The President was reluctant to use the strongest one available, which was to cancel the wheat deal. Before any decision was taken, a report was received - which later proved incomplete - that the Soviets had released the convoy. The meeting broke up in some confusion.

The Soviets did, however, release the convoy some hours later, after an agreement over whether the convoy should be processed before or after the Soviet troops were removed. The Soviets finally folded, and the convoy went on its way, without the troops dismounting to be counted and without tailgates being lowered - the Soviet fall-back demand.

EVALUATION:

The convoy incidents brought out several aspects of problem management.

The Allied Berlin team had seen the crisis approaching for eighteen months. It had prepared specific plans for dealing with a detention. It had, however, been unable to agree on measures which might have avoided the crisis, such as an Allied agreement on procedures which would have been conveyed to the Soviets.

The existence of plans to deal with a detention undoubtedly facilitated the management of the crisis. In Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin officials were able to work from a single document approved by governments. This document did not provide all the answers, but it provided a point of departure for improvisation. The field made the suggestions, and Washington coordinated the conclusions, the government whose convoy was involved providing leadership.

It could be agreed, however, that the existence of the plans accelerated the crisis. There had been detentions before, such as in 1958, and these were resolved in less time just by arguing with the Soviet checkpoint personnel. This may, however, have been insufficient in 1963.

this happened after plans existed too

The critical aspect of the plans, however, which raised the most serious problem was the "time limit." The plans formally delegated to the Commandants in Berlin authority to set a time limit, at the end of which the convoy would attempt to proceed, even if it had not been processed. This delegation of authority was approved by governments, including President Kennedy, in mid-1962. When, a year later, the Soviets detained a convoy, the President and other high ranking officials had forgotten the delegation of authority. IN

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addition, the convoy detention occurred in unanticipated circumstances. Gromyko was at the very time in Washington and calling on President Kennedy. The net result was an attempt to withdraw the authority at the last moment. This failed, simply because a U.S. officer on his way to Potsdam did not have a radio in his vehicle. As a result of this experience, Washington withdrew the authority to set a time limit on future convoys.

Although by the time of the convoy incidents theAllied organization was esteblished and experienced, it had become a bit rusty. This resulted largely from some changes in personnel during the year since the Cuban crisis. It also took awhile for the organization to adjust to the channels required by the specific situation. The pertinent lines of authority evolved, however, during the first convoy detention. The wrinkles were smoothed out during the "harmonization" of Allied procedures. By the time of the second U.S. convoy detention, the Allied team was operating in high gear.

SOVIET-GDR TREATY

The Berlin crisis reached its denoument on June 16, 1964, with the signature of a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the east German regime. This treaty stated that West Berlin was "an independent political unit," but reaffirmed the Potsdam Agreement (and hence Allied rights in Berlin).

Having been warned two days in advance by theSoviets, the Ambassadorial Group, on behalf of governments, instructed their Ambassadors in Moscow to reserve Allied rights before the treaty was actually signed. The communique issued that same day after Chancellor Erhard's talk with President Johnson also warned that the Soviets "would be solely responsible for the consequences of any attempt at interference with Allied rights that might result from implementation of the new treaty." Two weeks later, the Allies issued a statement, worked out by the Ambassadorial Group, in which they reaffirmed their goal of German unity. They also stated that, contrary to the treaty, West Berlin was not "an independent political unit" and that it had "close ties" with the Federal Republic.

Thus did the artificial crisis created by Khrushchev in 1958 end six years later with something short of a bang.

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CONCLUSIONS:

From these case studies, certain conclusions emerge fairly clearly.

1. Planning: It is evident that planning was a useful tool. It was not a substitute for judgment and improvisation, but it provided an agreed point of departure. It also provided the planners, who were in most cases also the action officers, an opportunity to become acquainted and acquire a common vocabulary which greatly facilitated exchanging views and making decisions in a crisis. Finally, planning lead to the creation of resouces, particularly military, which otherwise could not have been made available quickly enough.

On the other hand, planning for Berlin suffered from several disabilities. First, no plans existed for several key incidents, particularly the wall and the abolition of the Soviet Kommandatura in east Berlin. In the case of the wall, a response was improvised, but very slowly. More rapid improvisation permitted a quicker abolition of the Kommandatura, but the Allied team was saved primarily by the fact that this event became last in the confusing situation which emerged following the Peter Fechter murder. The second disability was that the planning became so complex that only a few individuals understood it. This placed a heavy burden on these officers. It also created the ever present possibility that, in an emergency, the planning might create such confusion that it would have to be abandoned. While this would not necessarily lead to disaster, it would result in a loss of time.

In brief, planning is useful, but it should be kept simple.

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In addition, it is not a substitute for judgment, guts, and an ability to improvise.

2. <u>Delegation of authority</u>: These incidents demonstrated that delegation of authority can be a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it creates the possibility of a more rapid response. On the other, it may lead to undesirable actions or ill timed actions by authorities who have only a part of the picture, as was the case with the "time limit" for the first U.S. convoy. It can also result in a failure of the subordinate authority to take action which Washington desires, such as with the failure of General Norstad to fly aircraft over 10,000 feet in March, 1962.

From this, I come to the conclusion that Washington should delegate full authority to make preparations but should reserve the authority regarding timing of implementation. It should in particilar not delegate authority when it does not really mean it, since this only leads to confusion.

3. <u>Organization:</u> Organizational arrangements should be as simple and flexible as possible. They should be based on the best communications available, both telegraphic and telephonic. Between crises, the organization machinery should be kept turning over with planning. The acquaintance which is fostered by planning should be perfected through personal visits. There is nothing more important in a crisis than knowing whom you think you can rely on.

These conclusions are drawn from the 1961-1964 phase of the Berlin crisis. I suspect, however, that they would apply with some validity to other problem areas.

John C. Ausland