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BERLIN COMMAND

CONSOLIDATED HISTORICAL REVIEW, 1985-86 (U)

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1985-1986 Berlin Command HISTORICAL REPORT

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PART ONE

POLITICAL BACKGROUND FACTORS (U)

(U) Introduction

(U) The years 1985-86 were characterized by a steady relaxation of the overall situation in Berlin. Earlier fears of a Soviet and GDR "salami tactic" to undercut the 1971 Quadripartitie Agreement have all but disappeared. Although the Western Allies still fought pitched diplomatic battles over Berlin status issues--the May-June 1986 diplomatic passport issue, discussed later in this report, was one example of this--these struggles had little of the drama of the past, and none of them concerned the status of West Berlin, or posed even theoretical challenges to Allied rights in the the Western sectors.

~~(C)~~ In keeping with the prevailing calm in the Berlin area, there were only two real "crisis" incidents during the reporting period. One, the 5 April 1986 bombing of the La Belle discothek, in which 2 US soldiers and one Turkish woman lost their lives, represented a spillover into Berlin of the Middle East conflict. The other, the killing by a Soviet guard of a US Military Liaison Mission officer, Major Arthur D. Nicolson, resulted not in sustained, worsened relations--despite Soviet refusal to admit wrong in the case--but in an US-Soviet agreement establishing safeguards that not only would help prevent such tragedies in the future, but effectively facilitated the work of the MLMs in the GDR.

(U) Berlin was clearly losing its place as an East-West "Front City." It was proving instead an example of a successful deterrence diplomacy which had created a fait accompli that both the Soviet and GDR governments had no choice but to accept. As a result, the political-military situation in and around the city had become not only stable, but this stability was becoming the basis of an increasingly cooperative relationship between West Berlin, on the one hand, and the GDR (and implicitly, the Soviet Union), on the other. While still largely limited to the realm of political atmospherics and expressions of intent, West Berlin's new self-image as a leading center of East-West cooperation was one of the key elements of city's politics during the reporting period, and will become increasingly important in the future. The main question is how far the East will go in abandoning its earlier, punitive posture toward West Berlin and in taking advantage of the city's eagerness to "thicken" cooperative ties with the GDR in particular, and Warsaw Pact states as a whole.

~~(C)~~ Cooperative developments between West Berlin and the GDR presupposed relatively unburdened relations between the three Western Allies and two Eastern actors in Berlin, the Soviet Union and the GDR. Nowithstanding differing views of status, and recurring GDR efforts to force a revision of Western practices, the climate between the Allies and the Soviet Union and GDR was reasonably good. In their own role as Berlin occupation power, the Soviets appeared to have aided the Allies in turning back a GDR effort to impose revised passport control procedures for diplomats crossing between East and West Berlin by refusing to back the GDR position. For their part, the GDR authorities undertook at least some

responsibility, even if not completely to the extent the Allies wished, in clamping down on Libya's use of its East Berlin embassy for terrorist activities, thereby enhancing the GDR's reputation as a "law-and-order " state.

(U) As will be explained later in this chapter, such relaxation of tensions is a welcome feature of the Berlin scene. Yet it has over the years resulted in increasing disagreement between the Allies and mainstream political leaders in West Berlin over the Berlin status question. The latter wish to extinguish the lingering image of West Berlin as a "Front City", and to play up instead the image of West Berlin as a safe place to invest and an enjoyable place to live. The United States has long recognized the importance of securing Berlin's viability as an economic center , and of reversing the decades-long decline in population. Thus, the United States as well wishes to promote a post-Cold War image of Berlin. Yet the eagerness of West Berlin leaders to renew the image of the city have made them less ready to accept Allied views on Berlin status, particularly as concerns how West Berlin relates on an official level to East Berlin and the GDR. The issue had been latent for some time--a formula had to be found to paper it over earlier, in November 1983, when then Ruling Mayor Richard von Weizsaeker devised a way to visit East German leader Erich Honecker in East Berlin--but it finally achieved currency toward the end of this reporting period, when Honecker invited West Berlin Ruling Mayor Eberhard Diepgen to the East Berlin Staatsakt celebrating the 750th anniversay of the cities founding. As ensuing discussion will show, the Honecker invitation to Diepgen--a thoroughly non-controversial matter in practically any situation outside Berlin--formed the focus of a debate on Berlin status in which the Allies, wary of acquiescing in any steps that would recognize the role of East Berlin as capital of the GDR, took a conservative line as against the Governing Mayor (supported by as the capital the majority of political leaders of all parties and by West Berlin public opinion), who called for a "dynamic" view of Berlin status.

1. (U) Sources of Relaxation: the inner-German-Context. In the past Berlin was both a barometer and a determining factor of US-Soviet relations. Today, the situation in Berlin has developed a dynamic of its own. During the chilliest recent phase of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States--from the Afghanistan invasion of December 1979, through the stationing of INF weapons on West German territory (beginning in Fall, 1983) up until the first Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva in October 1985--the Berlin situation remained calm. Indeed, there were even some noteable steps forward--for example, Richard von Weizsaeker's precedent-shattering 1983 meeting with Erich Honecker in East Berlin. The bad relations between the great powers did not very much affect Berlin.

(U) There were two primary grounds why Berlin--formerly a cockpit of East-West contention--had become autonomous area of permanent detente. One was the simple fact of a decades-long history of a US, British and French military presence which, with time, had become in Soviet eyes a stable element of the Berlin environment no one was going to change, whatever might happen in the distant future in respect to the legal status of East Berlin. The other was the extradinary improvement in the inner-German relationship that, like the Berlin situation, was following an autonomous course, largely unaffected by downturns

in the US-Soviet relationship.

a. (U) Inner-German Relations in the Aftermath of the INF Deployment. As noted in the 1983-84 Historical Report, both the FRG and GDR sought to "limit the damage" to the inner-German relationship of the Bonn government's determination to implement the scheduled deployment, in December 1983, of US Pershing II and Cruise Missles. There followed not only a remarkable expansion of the inter-government dialog, carried on with great fanfare on both sides, but also concrete steps such as the granting by West German banks of a second large state-sponsored credit--DM 950 million--to the GDR. (The first had been the famous "billion mark credit" intermediated by Bavarian Minister-President Franz-Josef Strauss.) On the GDR side, East German authorities approved in 1983 an unprecedented number of applications by GDR citizens to leave the country, resulting in 40,000 East Germans being able to emigrate legally in 1984. Also, while not revising entry procedures for tourists, GDR passport control officials administered procedures in a way that was considerably friendlier than some years ago.

b. (U) Inner-German Relations, 1985-86. The inner-German momentum continued during the reporting period. The most notable change--and one greatly for the better--was the GDR's liberalizing of the conditions under which an individual below the retirement age could visit the West under the guise of "urgent family matters." Whereas previously permission to travel might be granted to permit, for example, a grandson to visit his gravely ill grandfather in the West, the rules were altered in application so that GDR citizens began receiving permission to visit very distant relatives on quite unurgent matters (for example, the 39th birthday of an uncle twice removed.) According to the calculations of the West German government, some 220,000 East Germans under the retirement age visited the FRG in 1986, as opposed to 66,000 in 1985. East German figures put the number at around 500,000--and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl hastened to accept the GDR estimate, on the grounds that only the GDR had record of how many citizens had travelled West. (The West Germans could only record the number of East Germans who had bothered to register with FRG authorities.)

c. (U) Inner-German Relations: The Case of Berlin. West Berlin had always been a sticking point of the FRG-GDR rapprochement. The inclusion of West Berlin in inner-German agreements negotiated by the Federal Republic is a recurring issue. To cite a recent case, a long sought-after FRG-GDR cultural agreement was held up over the inevitable question of how to include West Berlin in the benefits secured by the FRG. When the agreement was finalized, an old "fudge formula" was employed, whereby institutions and individuals residing in West Berlin could participate in foreseen exchanges as individuals, but not as Berlin members of West German delegations. The continued GDR stubbornness over inclusion of West Berlin in FRG-GDR agreements has posed constant frustrations for West Berlin leaders, who complained not simply of the GDR attitude, but

also over what they feel to be Bonn's readiness to regard Berlin as an inconvenient side-issue to be dealt with, if possible, by sweeping it under the rug. In the Fall of 1986, however, there was apparent movement on the part of the GDR. The occasion for this movement was the planning of the upcoming 750th anniversary celebration of the founding in 1237 of Berlin.

d.(U) Inner-German Relations: the Anniversary Issue. Regular political contacts between the West Berlin Senat and the GDR occur through meetings between the Senat Chancellery Chief, Stronk, and the GDR State Secretary for Culture, Loeffler. During a meeting with Loeffler in Summer 1986, Stronk raised the question of coordinating the East and West Berlin 1987 celebrations of the 750th anniversary of the city. At the time, Stronk received a negative reply. It seemed as if the GDR was intent on using the event in a way that would emphasize the separate development of the two parts of the city instead of stessing the commonalities. It later appeared that the GDR would also persist in its policy of discrimination against West Berlin in relation to cities and Laender of the FRG: Letters started going out to West German Mayors and Minister-Presidents inviting them to official events in East Berlin--but significantly lacking was any invitation to the Ruling Mayor of West Berlin.

(U) On 26 September 1986, however, GDR party chief Honecker made a surprise reversal. During the official announcement of the extensive anniversary celebrations planned for East Berlin, Honecker--speaking in his capacity as chairman of the anniversay committee, stated that it was a "self-evidency" that East Berlin could not celebrate the 750th anniversary of Berlin while excluding the 2,000,000 inhabitants of West Berlin. He continued that it was also "self-eveident" that the Ruling Mayor of West Berlin and the leader of the SPD opposition should attend the Staatsakt--to be held in October 1987--capping off the anniversary observance in East Berlin.

~~(C)~~ The Honecker invitation was greeted with near unanimous enthusiasm by West Berlin political leaders. Leading figures of all political parties urged Ruling Mayor Eberhard Diepgen to accept the invitation--with the opposition trying to make political capital complaining that Diepgen was doing too little to further relations with the GDR. Significnatly, the CDU General Secretary, Landowsky--who in earlier years enjoyed a hardline reputation--added his voice to those calling enthusiastically for Diepgen to take up the East German offers. Likewise, on 29 October, Deputy Mayor Laurien (CDU), made a strong case for a Diepgen acceptance to President Reagan's special advisor on arms control, Edwin Rowny, then visiting in Berlin.

~~(C)~~ As we shall see, the Honecker invitation created something of a dilemma for the Western Allies. For there was no way Diepgen could accept the invitation without damage being done to the Western position on the Berlin status question--above all, to the Western position that East Berlin was not an integral part of the GDR or its capital. The status issue will be discussed in detail later in this report. The important point here is that from the standpoint of West Berlin leaders, the GDR was at last indicating a willingness to integrate West Berlin more fully into the steadly progressing inner-German relationship. Barring unforeseen setbacks, this has had--and will have--the double effect of reinforcing the generally relaxed climate in Berlin and of confirming the already strong West Berlin view that , to prosper, the city needs to combine the Allied defensive commitment with a policy of dialogue and cooperation with the political leadership in the East.

2. (U) Origins of the Berlin Detente: Historical Lessons of the Wall

a. (U) The 25th Anniversary of the Wall. The view that West Berlin's long-term prosperity is best promoted through a cooperative, non-confrontational posture toward the East is in large measure a product of West Berlin's experience with the Berlin Wall. The meaning of this experience was articulated with special clarity in 1986--the 25th anniversary of the sealing off of West Berlin with rudimentary barbed wire barriers on 13 August 1961.

(U) The commemoration of that event was occasion for much historical reflection in Berlin. Of particular interest were many television documentaries and interview programs, in which leading political figures with roots in Berlin reflected both on their feelings at the time, and on the lessons of the Wall for the future of the city and of Central Europe. A remarkable unanimity was displayed by political figures of all parties. In their recounting of their own feelings in the aftermath of 13 August 1961 events, they all--whether incumbent Ruling Mayor Eberhard Diepgen (CDU) or former Ruling Mayor Willy Brandt--noted that Allied public declarations (particularly the NATO communique of 8 August 1961) had stressed Allied determination to defend West Berlin, instead of affirming Allied responsibility for the city as a whole. Thus, in the view of the West Berlin politicians, the Western Allies had implicitly invited the GDR to build the Wall.

(U) It was clear that these politicians wished that the the Allies had behaved more assertively. On the other hand, in looking at the lessons of the Wall, they were unanimous in the view that only through a patient, long-run commitment to detente with the East can the effects of the Wall be diminished or undone--a view echoed in the Reichstag speech given on 13 August 1986 by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Wall, rather than demonstrating the impossibility of cooperation with the East, had in the view of Berlin leaders demonstrated that a cooperative, non-confrontational policy offered the only realistic chance for improving the situation both of West Berliners and the people on the other side. The Wall was to them a monument to the futility of the earlier, hardline "Politik der Staerke" (policy of strength).

b.(U) 15 Years of the Quadripartite Agreement. 3 September 1986 marked the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement. Just as the Wall had proven in the view of the West Berlin leadership the futility of confrontation, the Quadripartite Ageement was seen as signal proof of the benefits of detente. In particular, the Ageement was remarked on by Ruling Mayor Diepgen as a seminal success of Alied diplomacy, the basis of enormous improvements in the lives of West Berliners, and a model for future progress. Significantly, Diepgen's analloyed, positive assessment of the agreement did not differ too much from the official assessment of the GDR, which also extolled the treaty as a model of East-West cooperation based on "realism."

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3.(U) Deaths and Shootings along the Wall: the Coming to Terms.

(U) The one aspect of "realism" that is hardest to accept is the fact that, during the 1985-86 reporting period, the GDR "order to shoot" remained in effect along the Wall. Several incidents in the last 4 months of 1986 underlined that fact. The political aftermath of the shootings, however, illustrated another fact of life in Berlin: since periodic shootings and deaths along the Wall are recurring events in Berlin, public reaction to them consists of brief outrage followed quickly by resignation, and then by a getting on with business-as-usual. For the political leadership such incidents are greeted with protest, but working relations with the GDR continue, and high-level contacts are put on shortest possible pause.

a.(U) Shooting Incidents. The last part of 1986 witnessed a rising number of escape incidents. One of the most spectacular successes involved the driving of a heavy truck staight through the barriers of the East Berlin side of Checkpoint Charlie. In the course of this escape, which took place in late summer, shots were fired. Likewise during several other attempts, the standing GDR "order-to-shoot" was obeyed. In the case of one failed attempt the shots landed several yeards from a West German tour bus parked on the West Berlin side, provoking a strong protest by the Allies, and both the West Berlin and Federal German governments.

b.(U) The GDR Reaffirms the "Order to Shoot. On 24 November 1986 a young man was shot to death while trying to escape into the Frohnau district in the French sector. He had just pulled himself to the to of the Wall when a border guard gunned him down. The scene assumed a special brutality, as the guard was heard by witnesses in West Berlin to say, "Pig. I've got you." This killing followed the probable death, three days earlier, of a man who tried to drive a truck through the Wall in Neu Koelln (It was not known whether he died from gunshots or from collision with the Wall.)

(U) Shortly before these deaths, speculation had arisen over whether the GDR had quietly revised the "order to shoot." It was reported at the end of September 1986 by a successful escapee that he had been detected by GDR border guards and could have been fired upon but was not. It was therefore possible that the order to shoot might have at least temporarily been set aside. Then, on 2 October 1986 the Bildzeitung quoted a defected Lieutenant Colonel from the GDR border forces as saying that GDR border guards had been ordered only to shoot other border guards trying to flee. Further inquiry revealed that the Bildzeitung had misreported what the former Lieutenant Colonel had said: there had been no change in the order to shoot, as demonstrated by the 24 November shooting of the refugee. The GDR underscored this unwelcome message with an article in a professional military journal which justified use of violence to preserve social progress and prevent war. The same general idea was communicated in Erich Honecker's words of appreciation, delivered on the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR border forces, for "eminent services" the border troops had rendered to the cause of peace.

c.(C) Political-Reaction to Shootings. Berlin public opinion was horrified by the November killings. They also put a temporary damper on the enthusiasm in

Berlin leadership circles for acceptance by Diepgen of Honecker's invitation to attend the East Berlin Staataakt. Indeed, during a consultation with the visiting Director of the State Department's Central Europe division, Senat Chancellery Chief Stronk emphasized that Diepgen would not go if the GDR did not stop shooting at refugees along the Wall.

(U) Yet emotions subsided and enthusiasm for Honecker's invitation quickly revived. In short, the killings did not change the Senat's basic unwillingness to risk confrontation with the GDR. This reflected neither cynicism nor indifference on the part of West Berlin leaders. It reflected rather the hard calculation--derived from their reading of the lessons of the Wall--that they had simply no choice but to continue dialogue with the East German regime.

4. (U) The Permanent Role-of-the-Protective Powers.

(U) The West Berlin desire to step to the forefront of the inner-German detente implies no downgrading of the Allies' role in securing the status-quo. Rather, the Allied presence is seen as the essential, stabilizing context within which diplomatic innovations take place. Indicative of this is the fact that even within the Alternative List, complaints about the Allies center not on the Allies being in Berlin, but on the exercise of Allied reserved rights over Berlin civil affairs, and on the size of the Allied forces. (Thus, unlike the West German Greens, who incline toward FRG withdrawal from NATO, a significant part of the West Berlin Alternatives advocate the continued presence of the Allies in Berlin until such far-off time that a "new European peace order" makes this no longer necessary.) The major question for the future is therefore not whether the Allies will be welcome, but whether the Allied powers will adjust to the demands that the West Berlin political leadership has put forward: namely, that the Allies continue to perform their protective functions while leaving Berlin authorities free to do what they want vis-a-vis the East. The controversy over the Honecker invitation to Diepgen hinges on this very basic issue.

PART II
BERLIN ISSUES, 1985-86 (U)

1.(U) Terrorism: the La Belle Bombing.

(U) There were two major terrorist assaults during the reporting period. Both represented spillovers of the Middle East conflict into Berlin. On 29 March 1986 the German-Arab Friendship Society in Kreuzberg was bombed. Shortly thereafter, on 5 April, the La Belle disco, a favorite haunt of American troops, was destroyed in a bombing attack. One American soldier and a Turkish woman were killed immediately. Another American soldier died later of his wounds. Acting on evidence that the Libyan Embassy ("Libyan People's Bureau")in East Berlin had been responsible for the La Belle assualt, the United State launched retaliatory air strikes against targets in Tripoli and Benghazi in the early morning hours of 15 April. These air strikes not only paralyzed Libyan terrorist activity for many months, but also resulted in the apparent psychological paralysis of the Libyan leader, Col. Kaddahfi.

(U) The following discussion will avoid a detailed discussion of US-Libyan relations and other background elements of the La Belle bombing. The focus instead will be on the US official dealings with the British, French, Soviets and East Germans over the La Belle issue. The final section of the discussion will draw comparisons between the FRG and the GDR responses to US requests for action against Libya.

a. (S) Threat Alerts. The Berlin Command had been receiving recurrent threat alerts on possible Libyan connected attacks against US personnel or installations. [1] These alerts, however, warned of no specific threat, and could not justify going into a permanent state of extra-high readiness.

(U) From 23-26 March, US Navy forces operated in the Gulf of Sidra in order to exercise right of free passage and counter Libyan claims of sovereignty extending as far as 100 miles from the southern shore of the Gulf. During the maneuvers US forces made five attacks on Libyan vessels (seen as threatening American ships) and also launched two air attacks on a SAM missle site. Two Libyan ships were confirmed as sunk.

(S) On 25 March 1986 the Command received a threat alert from Washington.[2] The alert stated that US intelligence "strongly" suggested that Libyan operatives intended to conduct actions against US interests in Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. These actions, the alert continued, would involve terrorist attacks against American personnel, facilities and military elements. Addressees of the cable were advised simply to "increase security precautions." No mention was made of a specific threat to Berlin.

(S) On 27 March the Command received more detailed intelligence. Unlike the threat alert of 25 March, this new information pinpointed the probability of an attack on US personnel in Berlin, directed from the Libyan People's Bureau (LPB) in East Berlin. It did not, however, shed any light on prospective targets, when the assualt might occur, or what form the terrorist act might take. 3

(C) In response to the intelligence received on 25 March, a "Threat Condition Yellow" was declared by the Command; by 0600 on 28 March it had been "augmented" (eg.,fully implemented). Berlin police began checking identity documents of Libyan diplomatic vehicles at sector-sector crossing points. Following the threat alert of 27 March, these police checks were expanded to include checks on PLO diplomatic vehicles, and police were asked to be on the lookout for other suspicious vehicles. Police were also asked to follow Libyan and PLO vehicles within West Berlin. Customs officials conducted searches of such vehicles at the checkpoints, and randomly searched other vehicles that looked suspicious. Finally, both customs authorities and police increased surveillance and spot-checks of railway passenger traffic coming from East Berlin.[4]

(U) On 29 March, two days after the institution of these controls, the German-Arab Friendship Society in Kreuzberg was bombed, resulting in 11 injuries. The West Berlin police controls were so thorough-going that USBER's Public Safety Branch deemed it unlikely that the explosives were brought into Berlin during the two days the controls had been in effect. [5]

(C) On 2 April, owing to a lack of specific indications as to when and against what target a threat might materialize, the augmentation of Threatcon Yellow was discontinued. (Berlin police controls remained in effect.) Then, at 2330 on Friday, 4 April, new intelligence reached the Command. It provided not only convincing proof of Libyan involvement through the East Berlin LPB, but also specified that something would happen within the next day. On the basis of this information, the officer-in-charge ordered a renewed augmentation at 0030 on Saturday, 5 April. When the bomb exploded at approximately 1:50, US and Berlin police were in the process of checking nightclubs and bars for signs of any suspicious movements or behavior. They had no hard information that a bomb would be planted in a nightclub. The intelligence had indicated only that something wuld happen on the given date. What and where were not known.[6]

b. (S) The Allied Response: the Libyan "Exclusion Order". On Sunday, 6 April, the Allied Kommandatura met in emergency session (attended by the Commandants and Ministers of the three Allied powers) to consider an American request to expel the LPB from "Greater Berlin"--to order, in theory, the shutting down of the the Libyan embassy in East Berlin. The basis of the American request was a 1950 Kommandatura law Number 8, under which the Allies (ie. the American-British-French Kommandatura) could order the expulsion of any parties whose presence was "liable to endanger . . .public order or the prestige or security of the Allied forces." [7]

(S) The British were immediately supportive. They conveyed Foreign Secretary Howe's instructions to express "solidarity with the United States." They raised four questions in the way of matters to be considered, but said they would accept US judgment on the answers.*

* The questions were: 1) Was an exclusion order the best way to close down the LPB in East Berlin? 2) Should the UK Ambassador use the occasion of a scheduled 9 April meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin to state an agreed Allied message? 3) What should be done in keeping the West Berlin government informed and in step with Allied actions? 4) What Public Affairs line should be drafted and approved, particularly in light of the fact that the US had to date made no specific charge of Libyan complicity? USBER 1028, 6 April 1986, SECRET.

(S) The French Commandant and Minister also expressed personal support for the United States. They were, however, still uninstructed, and had to await word from Paris. They doubted whether a response could come before the meeting set for the next day, Monday 7 April. The USCOB and Acting Minister emphasized the need for rapid action.[8]

(S) At the meeting on 7 April the doubts of the French COB and Minister were borne out: a "careful" study was being undertaken in Paris, and it was not yet complete. They reported a preliminary "reluctance" and concern for "political and legal implications of an expulsion order." They said a response might come "in a day or two." They remarked that the French government was thinking of ways to reinforce security controls in Berlin as an alternative to the proposed expulsion order. The US and British representatives expressed disappointment over the French response and stressed once more the need for urgency. The French noted in reply that the US request had come at a time when a new French government was being organized in the aftermath of recent parliamentary elections.[9]

(S) On 8 April, in a meeting of the Bonn Group, the French submitted a compromise formula for dealing with the Libyans. They expressed willingness to exclude LPB personnel from West Berlin but did not want to expel them under Allied Law 8. Expulsion, in the French view, would be too confrontational and could harm French relations with other Middle Eastern countries. Also, using Law 8 would involve invoking Allied rights in "greater Berlin"--thereby touching on Soviet rights in East Berlin and causing unnecessary complications. Finally, the French argued that there were no grounds for closing the LBP as such. Therefore, they advocated less demonstrative measures that would simply keep the Libyans out of West Berlin.[10]

(S) Although the United States still strongly preferred expulsion, the State Department, on 9 April, instructed US officials in Bonn and Berlin to accept the French scheme as a fallback position.[11] As the French did not move from their position--despite further argument and personal support for the US-UK view from French authorities in Berlin--the US was forced to agree to the "exclusion" formula.

(S) The exclusion was effected not by a published Berlin Kommandatura Law, but by a BK/L--a confidential Kommandatura letter to the Berlin Senat. The draft letter was agreed to on 11 April. It stated that the Kommandatura had "serious grounds" for thinking that LPB personnel in East Berlin had participated in the La Belle attack. A list of 43 individuals associated with the LBP was submitted as an attachment to the letter. The letter authorized police removal of such persons from the Western sectors of Berlin, with the warning that if they returned they would be subject to an immediate expulsion order.[12] The public announcement of the "special measures" contained no specific mention of the Libyans, declaring merely that the Western powers were taking steps against terrorism and to esclude persons "posing a threat to the population of Berlin."[13] The practical consequence of these steps was tight police

surveillance of crossing points--including "flying squad" checks of rail platforms--for anyone who might appear to be on the list. It became, then, highly difficult for such persons to pass through the controls to West Berlin, or to go about business undetected once there.

(S) The measures associated with the exclusion order remained in effect throughout 1986, and at the time of this writing (April 1987) are still in force. They were reviewed in late October 1986 to determine whether they should be continued. By that time, the French were not--as in April--reluctant parties: They, along with the US and UK, readily agreed that controls should remain in effect "in the foreseeable future." [14] The reason for the French change of heart was that Paris itself had, on 9 July, and then on 4 occasions from 12-17 September, fallen victim to terrorist attacks that claimed 9 dead and 91 wounded, leading the French government toward a harder line. In this respect, the Paris government was coming into agreement with French officials in Berlin, who had always fully supported the US-UK position.

c. (S) Representations to the Soviets. When the Berlin Command received information on 27 March pinpointing a specific threat to Berlin, directed by the LPB in East Berlin, the Soviets were informed of the threat and requested to take action to prevent the Libyans from carrying anything out. The Soviets were not, of course, allowed to look at the actual intelligence on which the assessment was based.

(S) At 19:00 on 5 April, the Acting US Minister met with the Soviet Embassy's Political Counselor. The Soviets were told the US government was holding them responsible for "its failure to take action requisite with its obligations to contribute to the safety and security of Berlin." He demanded that the Soviet Union close down the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin.[15] On 9 April, during a meeting in West Berlin between the British Ambassador to Bonn and the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR, Kochemassov, the same message was conveyed--that in light of the American warning of 27 March, whatever actions the Soviets had taken to prevent the attack had been "inadequate." He asserted also that he had seen evidence of Libyan involvement which was "incontrovertible." [16]

(C) In response to these upbraidings the Kochemassov expressed sympathy for the US and Senat authorities and reaffirmed "total" Soviet opposition to terrorism and asserted Soviet readiness to cooperate with other states in stopping it. He promised that, where possible, the Soviets would use their influence with the "aim of avoiding complications." [17]

(C) He then remarked, however, that neither the Soviets nor the GDR authorities had any evidence incriminating the LPB and that the Americans had not shown them any. In his view, any number of groups could have committed the La Belle bombing. He added that he could not understand how the US thought the Soviet Union could shut the East Berlin LPB: The GDR was sovereign in East Berlin and therefore had sole competence over such a matter. He concluded by denying Soviet responsibility for the security of West Berlin. [18]

(C) The Soviets' position on GDR sovereignty and competence remained the standard rejoinder to Allied requests that they clamp down on the Libyans.[19] However,

in a meeting on 18 August they altered their tone. Informed by US representatives that the United States had "serious" indications of another Libyan-sponsored terrorist action against Americans and US facilities in Berlin, they did not discuss GDR sovereignty in East Berlin. Rather, they asked several factual questions (viz.: Had the GDR been informed? Was the US certain that Berlin would be the target? Did the US possess more concrete information on the identity of the plotters?) and promised to pass the information along. They implied, moreover, that they had been discussing previous US threat warnings with the GDR.[20] Their response to a subsequent US note, sent on 2 September in respect to four terrorists believed to be planning an attack US government interests in Berlin likewise did not make an issue of GDR sovereignty: instead, they asserted that they had acted on the basis of the American information "without delay" and "appealed to sides" who might, according to the American assertion, have had ties with the mentioned individuals. They once more condemned terrorism, and pledged full cooperation with other states for "the full eradication of this dangerous phenomenon." [21]

d. (C) Representations to the GDR. On 27 March the US Ambassador to the GDR, Francis Meehan, met with GDR Deputy Foriegn Minister Neugebauer to relay the information on possible Libyan terrorist activity in Berlin. Meehan requested the GDR to insure the safety of Americans in Berlin from Libyan-sponsored terrorism.[22]

(C) On 1 April the Embassy reported a slight increase in the number of police stationed in the immediate vicinity of the Chancery and a "perceptible increase in their attention to duty." Additional uniformed patrols were observed at two American residences where the Embassy had requested additional coverage.[23]

(S) There followed several weeks of harsh words between the United States and the GDR Foreign Ministry. In a series of meetings in Washington and Berlin the United States expressed displeasure with the GDR's failure to do more to stop the attack. Ambassador Meehan stated that the US government would consider it a "grave matter for broader political ties" if the GDR did not act effectively against terrorism known to be in preparation in East Berlin. The US had informed the GDR in advance that a Libya-sponsored terrorist attack was in the making and had now "incontrovertible evidence" of Libyan involvement. The bombing of 5 April served to confirm the accuracy of the US warning of 27 March. The United States was now putting its "full credit" behind its assertion of Libyan complicity. He called on the GDR to shut down the LPB in Berlin.[24]

(S) GDR officials responded with equal sharpness. They argued that the GDR was responsible only for its own territory and had in fact done "everything possible" to protect US property and personnel in the GDR. Inasmuch as West Berlin was not GDR territory, security there was a matter for the West Berlin authorities. In respect to Libyan involvement, they said, the GDR could not

simply accept unproven US assertions. The GDR itself had no knowledge of Libyan involvement, and the United States had presented no hard evidence: although US allegations were taken with "utmost seriousness", the GDR needed "documentary proof." [25]

d. (C) GDR Security Measures against the LPB. At the same time as East German officials were rejecting US complaints in principle, GDR security forces were moving against the LPB in practice. The Libyan Embassy building in Berlin-Karlshorst was surrounded by police, so that no one could enter or leave without the authorities knowing. The movements of Libyan officials were subjected to heavy, overt surveillance. American staff vehicles entering East Berlin were given GDR security escorts. The ability of the Libyans to conduct illegal operations under such close tracking was severely limited.

e. (C) The GDR Moves Closer to the US View. On 24 April the East Germans toned down their defensive rejection of American charges of inexcusable inactivity by GDR security forces. A member of a GDR think-tank with close connections to the Central Committee of the SED called the GDR's initial denial of responsibility for security in West Berlin "perhaps too much of a knee jerk reaction." The American representations had caused some rethinking of the question. Without specifying what the GDR had done, he said it had taken convincing steps to prevent another incident in either part of Berlin. He gave the impression that the Libyans had been spoken to in the strongest of terms. He agreed with the characterization of Qadhafi as a "loose cannonball of danger to friend and foe alike." In bilateral consultations held in East Berlin on 15-16 May, GDR representatives made similar promises, noting that while they could not close the LPB on "merely on suspicion," they were taking steps to inhibit any foreign mission in Berlin from sponsoring terrorist acts.[26]

g. (S) GDR Motives. It is quite interesting to note that the GDR announced its partial acceptance of the US position--and made the unflattering remarks about Qadafi--after the 14 April US raid on Tripoli and Benghazi, which the GDR publicly had professed to deplore. The explanation for this turnabout undoubtably traces to the long-term GDR project of improving relations with the US. For years, ever since the Ambassadorship of Rozanne Ridgeway, the GDR had given high priority to expanding contacts with the United States. East German officials were particularly interested in obtaining more favorable trade treatment. They had continued to express their desire to improve US-GDR relations even during the US-Soviet "freeze" following the INF deployments. Clearly, they had been disturbed by Ambassador Meehan's assertion--also made to GDR representatives in Washington--that future GDR failure to halt terrorist acts would have adverse consequences for broader political ties.[27] Since an improved relationship with the United States was more important to the GDR government than ties with Libya, it became only too clear that the GDR had to accomodate American views.

h. (S) Reduced Libyan Presence in East Berlin. The anti-Libyan security measures put into effect in both sectors of Berlin had the end effect of forcing severe reductions in the staff of the LBP. These reductions were first reported on 20 June by an East German LPB employee, who passed the information to a West Berlin policeman while crossing through Checkpoint Charlie.[28] In early August, the newly arrived Moroccan Ambassador to the GDR visited the LPB, and reported in talks with US Embassy officials that the LPB was in disorder and no one was really in charge. He reported further his impression that the LPB staff had been reduced "considerably" in recent weeks, and mentioned GDR pressure on Libya as a possible factor. [29]

i. (C) FRG Response--a Comparison. The apparent reduction in Libyan Embassy staff did not meet fully the US demand that GDR shut it down. But when they posed this demand the GDR, US officials had no real hopes that it would be met. Thus, The reduction in LPB strength, combined with the obvious hounding of Libyan personnel by GDR security forces, went about as far toward meeting US concerns as could be expected.

(C) Indeed, to the extent comparisons are in order, the GDR arguably did no less to acccomodate the US position than the FRG. In February, when US economic sanctions went into effect against Libya, West Germany, who was Libya's second biggest trading partner (after Italy), refused to join the US initiative. After the La Belle attack, the FRG government did not close the Libyan Embassy in Bonn as called for by the United States. FRG action was limited rather to the expulsion of only two Libyan diplomats. In the end, despite the initial harsh words between American and East German representatives, GDR action against the East Berlin LPB was considerably more extensive than the minimal measures taken by the West Germans against the Libyan mission in Bonn.

(C) Also, on the question of Libya's complicity in the La Belle bombing, FRG support for the United States was likewise minimal. Since the United States could not reveal its intelligence gathering methods to the GDR, it could only ask the East German government to accept US claims as being made with the "full credit" of the American government. The FRG government, on the other hand, was given the actual evidence to evaluate. Unlike the GDR government, which accepted de facto the US charges, the FRG government waffled on its assessment of the evidence. The American evidence was never represented by Bonn as furnishing conclusive proof. In the Bundestag debate of 16 April, Federal Chancellor Kohl went no farther than to call it "evidence supporting indications" ("beweistragende Hinweise").

2. (U) Terrorism: The Hasi Case and the Syrian Connection.

(C) On 17 April 1986, disastor was narrowly averted when a bomb was discovered in a bag carried by a woman about to board an El Al flight for Tel Aviv. The bomb had been planted in her bag by her boyfriend, Nezar Hindawi, whom the British police arrested. This arrest led to the apprehension by the Berlin police (acting on a British tip) of Nezar's brother, Ahmed Hasi, on 18 April.[30]

a. (S) The Hasi Confession. Hasi was arrested as a suspect in the La Belle bombing. However, the evidence against him was circumstantial and extremely thin--not enough to justify an indictment and his continued imprisonment. US and Allied officials wre concerned that Hasi might have to be released before completion of a full investigation. They were prepared to issue an Allied Kommandatura order to keep Hasi in investigative custody, but knew that, under Allied Law, there would be limits to how long Hasi could remain imprisoned. The Allies were spared having to issue the decree, when, on 28 April, a Berlin judge made a ruling of probable cause and permitted Hasi's continued detention. Allied authorities feared, however, that the decision might be reversed on appeal.[31]

(C) The detention problem was suddenly resolved. Hasi, unaware that the authorities (including the US Justice Department, which had reviewed the case) felt they had too little evidence to justify prosecution, confessed--although not to the Las Belle bombing. Rather, he confessed to the earlier, 29 March bombing of the German-Arab Friendship League, and implicated two others, including Farouk Salameh, who was also under arrest.[32]

(C) The subsequent investigation revealed no firm links between the attack on the German-American Friendship League and the La Belle bombing. Nor was any Libyan backing uncovered. Rather, the investigation turned up evidence implicating Syria.

(U) Hasi and Salehmeh were indicted on 31 July. A guilty verdict was handed down on 26 November. When the Berlin judge read this verdict from the bench, he dwelt in considerable detail on evidence of Syrian involvement in the bombing. Thus, the official verdict in the case contained a clear condemnation of Syria.

b. (C) Expulsion of the Syrians. In light of the verdict, the Allied Kommandatura agreed in principle to issue expulsion orders, under Allied Law 8, against Syrian officials and associates in East Berlin. After the Public Safety advisors drew up a list of suspected individuals, the Allied Kommandatura issued on 27 November an order for the expulsion of 33 Syrians and one Iraqi who had cooperated with the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin. Whereas in April, the French opposed the use of Allied Law 8, this time they supported its speedy application, a change of heart again attributable to the terrorist attacks in Paris.

(C) The list did not include the Syrian Ambassador to the GDR. The US and UK had favored putting his name on the list, but the French were hesitant, and a decision on this issue had to be postponed until they received instructions from Paris. These instructions never came, so the Syrian Ambassador remained off the list.

(C) In the meantime, the expulsions began. The first occurred on 11 December when a Syrian diplomat on the list tried to cross Checkpoint Charlie. He was apprehended by West Berlin police, served with an expulsion order by a Mission official, and ejected from the city at the GDR-West Berlin crossing point farthest from the center of East Berlin.[33]

c. (C) Approach to GDR on Syrian Terrorist Involvement. On 9 December, the US Ambassador to the GDR approached the East German Foreign Ministry on the problem of Syrian use of their East Berlin Embassy to support terrorist activities. The GDR representative reaffirmed that East German authorities were doing all they could to prevent abuse of diplomatic privileges by missions in East Berlin. He would not, however, accept the West German court verdict as definite proof of Syrian complicity. The American Ambassador surmised that the GDR was in fact keeping a close eye on the Libyan, Syrian, PLO and Iranian mission. He attributed the GDR's refusal to take at face value the charges against Syria to an unwillingness to to seen as "knuckling under US pressure."[34]

3. (U) Berlin Status Issues. Introduction.

(U) Despite the calm that currently prevails around Berlin, the fundamental issue of Berlin status remains unresolved. The Four Power Agreement provided for practical improvement in the Berlin situation in the context of an "agreement to disagree" on status questions. The Soviets claim that they conferred to the GDR full sovereignty--including in East Berlin--with the signing of the Soviet-GDR "Treaty of Relations" of September 1954. The Allies hold that the Soviet Union could not unilaterally change the agreed-on four power regime in Berlin, and therefore do not recognize GDR sovereignty in East Berlin. On their side, the Soviets always stress the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement affirming that West Berlin is not a component of the Federal Republic and may not be governed by it, as opposed to the Allies' emphasis on the agreement's provisions approving the further development of West Berlin's ties to the FRG.

(C) The Soviet emphasis on West Berlin's non-belonging to the FRG leads to frequent, ritual protests against the inclusion of West Berlin in international agreements concluded by the FRG. These protests are duly rejected by the Allies, only to be made again on the next occasion. The Soviet diplomatic posturing has had no practical impact on the situation.

(U) The question of East Berlin, however, is intermittantly troublesome. This is because one of the Berlin actors--the GDR--has a real stake, in terms of domestic political legitimation, in securing international recognition of East Berlin as the "capital of the GDR." It was as a result of GDR efforts to prevail (eventually) on the status question that gave rise to the three most important status-related controversies of this reporting period. The first involved the attempted issuance of GDR visas for foreign diplomats traveling between East and West Berlin. The second concerned the control of asylum seekers who entered West Berlin via Schoenefeld airport, on the outskirts of East Berlin. The third involved planning for the celebration of the city's 750th anniversary--and in particular, how the West should react to a letter from invitation from East German party chief Erich Honecker inviting West Berlin Ruling Mayor Eberhard Diepgen to attend the Staatsakt marking the culmination of the celebration in East Berlin.

4.(U) Berlin Status Issues: The Border-Border Crossing-Question.

(U) Owing to the Allies' legal view that Berlin is one city, they never set up immigration controls along the sector-sector boundary which might give it the character of an international border. Thus, East-West movement--with exception of limited customs controls--was largely uncontrolled on the Western side. In response to the 27 March 1986 threat alert, however, police controls were instituted along the sector-sector border. These controls were taken reluctantly, and with the original hope that they would be lifted.

(C) The GDR, for reasons of its own status interpretations, was not unpleased that the West Berlin police was controlling traffic into West Berlin. It was within this context that the East German government announced, in a circular note sent to diplomatic missions in East Berlin on 21 May, that new procedures would be introduced for diplomats crossing between East and West Berlin. Whereas previously diplomats accredited to the GDR passed to and from West Berlin on presentation of a red identity card issued by the GDR Foreign Affairs Ministry, as of 26 May they would have to display their passports to make such a crossing. Furthermore, diplomats not accredited to the GDR who wanted to make day visits to East Berlin would have to conform to GDR Visa requirements, although Visas would be issued gratis to diplomatic passport holders.[35]

(C) The GDR later explained that these changes were being taken exclusively for security reasons in light of reproaches over GDR inadequacies in this respect.[35] The Allies did not understand why the GDR considered a passport issued by foreign governments to be more reliable as identification than a diplomat's card issued by the GDR. In the Allied view, the GDR, by demanding the presentation of passports, was clearly trying to buttress its position that the sector-sector boundary constituted an international border. Also, the new demand that diplomats must accept visas clashed with the Allied views on free circulation in the whole of Berlin.

a.(U) The Allied Response. Allied rejection of the GDR move was quick and unanimous. On 23 May, the British, French and US Ambassadors, joined by the head of the FRG permanent mission, met in East Berlin. They decided that the GDR note should be returned and that "maxiumum solidarity" be urged on the other NATO states. Joining the meeting later, the NATO Ambassadors agreed to return the note and to continue the old procedure (presentation of GDR diplomatic identity cards) on and after 26 May. At a meeting held in West Berlin under British auspices, colleagues from NATO military missions and Consulates General agreed not to allow the placing of a GDR stamp in their passports at sector crossings.[37]

b.(C) Tri-Partitite Military Administrations Exempted from Controls. The initial GDR note left unclear whether the GDR intended to change procedures for the British, American and French military administrations. In a meeting with US representative Lissfelt on 23 May, Soviet Embassy Counselor Nikotin gave assurances that neither military nor civilian members of the occupation forces would be wobe affected by the changes.[38] In order to confirm the Soviet statement, the Allies agreed on 24 May that the United States would carry out a set of probes, consisting of 4 different entry practices, in the early morning of the 26th. These probes, in addition to one UK and one French Flag tour, went routinely through the checkpoint.[39] This left then three issues open: procedures for

tri-partite diplomatic personnel in East Berlin; procedures for non-tripartite diplomatic personnel; and procedures for military missions and consulates general in West Berlin.

c. (C) NATO puts on the Pressure. The NATO countries were determined to force a return to the status quo ante. At the Four Power (ie. US, UK French, FRG) Berlin Ministerial Meeting in Halifax on 28 May, the allies agreed to a firm stance, and commissioned Ambassador Burt, in Berlin, to make strong representations to the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR. This he did in a lunch meeting on the 29th. On 30 May the NATO ministers issued a public statement underlining the importance of maintaining freedom of circulation in Berlin. Refusing to show passports to GDR border guards at Checkpoint Charlie, diplomatic personnel of non-tripartite NATO countries began entering West Berlin by taking a long route out of East Berlin, then entering West Berlin from GDR territory. NATO states made follow-up representations to the Soviets and the GDR in their own capitals, and in Berlin and Moscow. In short, the Eastern side faced a united NATO front against the GDR move.[40]

d. (S) The GDR backs down. The GDR had overplayed its hand. What remained to it was to find a way to back down. Early on, it started a piecemeal retreat. On 26 May, a GDR official explained that--notwithstanding the GDR insistence on visas for diplomats not accredited to the GDR--passports would not have to be stamped, or even handed over. By 30 May it had become clear that tripartite diplomats in East and West Berlin would be entirely exempt from the new procedures. Then, in a meeting with SPD Parliamentary chairman Vogel on 28 May, GDR Party Chairman Erich Honecker signalled his avenue of full retreat. The GDR, he said, true to its determination to stop terrorism, was preparing a new forgery proof identity card. When issued, such cards would be adequate for crossing the sector boundary.[41]

(C) On 7 June the US Embassy in Berlin received a note from the GDR foreign Ministry announcing the issue of the "forgery proof" identification cards, starting on 15 June. With this solution, involving a tortuous return to the old status quo, the matter was settled. The only outstanding question was whether the GDR would permit members of military missions and consulates general in West Berlin to enter East Berlin without a visa. It was readily established through a number of entries into East Berlin by military mission and consular officials that the GDR had dropped its visa demands for this category as well. In a cable of 23 June USBER declared the chapter "closed." [42]

e. ~~(C)~~ Post Mortem. The GDR retreat is explicable by the combination of NATO unity over the issue and the tepidness of Soviet support.

(C) When the GDR attempted to change the rules for sector-sector diplomatic transit it might have thought it could divide the NATO missions. One reason was that precedent did not clearly support the Allied case: prior to 1974, Western diplomats to the GDR had used passports, without protest, in crossing sector boundaries. Thus, the GDR was not proposing an unheard-of change.[43] However, when the NATO missions did not divide ranks, the GDR was presented with the prospect of a prolonged stand-off that was contrary to other interests it had in developing ties with the West.

(C) What the GDR did not know when it gave in on the issue was that Norway had begun to complain of the inconvenience and had indicated that it could not "from purely practical considerations, continue to circumvent the new East German regulations."[44] If the East German authorities had waited somewhat longer, they might have provoked at least some NATO partners into abandoning the united front. Yet, for the GDR, the diplomatic costs were starting to mount. On 2 June the UK cancelled a planned visit of a deputy trade and industry minister. On the same day the French ambassador in East Berlin postponed a call on the GDR foreign trade minister, which was designed to pave the way for the minister's planned visit to Paris. On 13 June the Canadian government cancelled the visit of an arms control delegation to East Berlin.[45] Even if the GDR knew of the possibility of Norway's breaking ranks, which might have led others to follow, it nonetheless might not have been willing to suffer any further freezing of its dealings with the West.

(C) In addition, it seems that the Soviet Union was not ready to give the GDR the support it needed to prevail. At first the Soviets supported the GDR position with a standard Eastern view that the Quadripartite Agreement applied only to West Berlin and that the GDR was within its sovereign rights in controlling the GDR border as it saw fit. The Soviets added that they had secured an exception for the Western Allies in Berlin and intimated that the Allies should be grateful for the favor. But later the Soviets altered their tone somewhat: while continuing to express their legal position on GDR sovereignty, they asserted that they did not want to "dramatize" the situation or raise tensions.[46] In an analysis of the affair, the Bonn Group concluded: "Initial Soviet support for the GDR was apparently overridden by a reluctance to be drawn into an extended dispute over Berlin as well as, perhaps, by a desire to demonstrate the GDR's limited room for maneuver."[47] Likewise, in a conversation with US Embassy officials in East Berlin, a "usually well-informed GDR source" gave it as his "personal" analysis that the initiative originated with the GDR and had been "cleared only perfunctorily, if at all, with the Soviets." The same source speculated that the GDR effort was an "attempt to probe Allied unity and score a quick point on Berlin status."[48]

5.(U) Berlin Status Issues: the Asylum Problem.

(U) In 1985, West Berlin experienced a big increase in the number of asylum seekers--mainly from Third World countries--coming through the city. In 1986 that number roughly doubled. Inasmuch as most asylum seekers do not stay in West Berlin, but move on to West Germany, the refugee influx became a political issue in the Federal Republic. The solution of it, however, involved Berlin status questions, since the problem arose in the first instance because the East Berlin-West Berlin boundary is not held by the West to be an international boundary, and is thus not controlled. This enabled Eastern bloc--and also Third World--airlines to do a profitable business transporting refugee traffic to Schoenefeld airport, on the outskirts of East Berlin, where the asylum seekers were then transported to the Friedrichstrasse train station for an uncontrolled entry via the S-Bahn to West Berlin. The GDR's insistence that West Berlin authorities deal with the problem by controlling their own boundary clashed with the Western concept of a legally united "greater Berlin." The key to resolving the issue was in prevailing upon the GDR to control traffic transiting through Schoenefeld--giving no transit visas to anyone who did not have a visa for his country of final destination.

a. (U) The Asylum Problem: 1985. Prior to 1985, the record year for refugees given "first asylum" in West Berlin was 1978, when there 15,173 such cases. In 1984 12,005 individuals received first asylum in West Berlin, of which 3,709 came from Sri Lanka. In 1985, the number of asylum seekers entering West Berlin almost doubled, reaching 22,908.[49] Again, as in 1984, the Sri Lankans were the one of the predominant groups seeking asylum.

b. (C) The GDR Agrees to Control the Sri Lankans. Inasmuch as the Sri Lankan problem could only be resolved through the GDR, the Bonn government approached GDR officials early in March 1985 about closing off the refugee stream from Sri Lanka. The GDR responded that it was up to the Federal Republic to refuse entry to non-documented persons seeking to come to West Germany. The East Germans furthermore disclaimed any responsibility the Senat's refusal to introduce "necessary" border controls for reasons of an "alleged" quadripartite status.[50] When Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl again raised the issue with Erich Honecker in Moscow, at the end of March, Honecker merely replied that the GDR would "consider" the matter.[51]

(C) In an effort to step up the pressure on the GDR, the FRG Permanent Representation in East Berlin committed a status blunder of its own. In an uncoordinated action, the Permanent Representation went about the the tri-partite embassies in East Berlin requesting that they approach the GDR. Washington considered this a breach of standing practice: the Allies did not discuss Berlin issues with the GDR. Nor were Allied embassies in East Berlin an appropriate forum. The US Embassy in Bonn was instructed to express Washington's displeasure over both FRG and Senat actions that were "inattentive" to fundamental Allied principles in Berlin.[52]

(C) The issue simmered until early July. Then, in a sudden action, the GDR announced to Federal German authorities, and also to airlines operating out of Berlin Schoenefeld, that as of 15 July any Sri Lankan passangers who arrived at Schoenefeld without valid papers or transit visas would be turned immediately back. Although in theory such passengers could obtain a transit visa from the GDR, it would have to be obtained before departure, and it was apparent that it would not be readily granted unless travellers had obtined visas for their final destinations.[53]

(U) The West German press had little difficulty explaining what had happened. The announcement of new GDR control procedures--communicated on 4 July by the GDR airline, Interflug--coincided with the announced extension of the FRG "Swing Credit" to the GDR. It did not require much imagination to see in this coincidence a GDR quid pro quo to the West Germans.

c. (C) The Problem gets Worse. The closing off of the Sri Lankan traffic reduced, but did not end, the refugee traffic. The Sri Lankans were replaced by thousands others, with Iran now becoming the main point of origin for asylum seekers. In September, FRG officials made another approach to the GDR government, this time requesting that the same restrictions the GDR had applied to the Sri Lankans be applied to persons of all nationalities.[54]

(C) This request proved fruitless. In 1986 a record number of asylum

seekers entered West Berlin. In January 3,102 asylum applications were filed in the city. In February, the figure fell to 1,852, but increased steadily in the following months: by July roughly 3,000 to 3,500 asylum applicants were arriving in West Berlin. In August, the figure rose to more than 5,000, bringing the year's total to 24,500--roughly 2,500 more than all of 1985. In September, another new high was registered: 6,389, mostly Iranians.[55]

(U) By July the refugees had swamped the city's emergency lodging facilities: many had to be quartered in tents pitched in city parks. This immediate problem was initially solved through accelerated redistribution of refugees from Berlin to receiving facilities in West German communities. Yet the larger problem remained of to what degree the Federal Republic could absorb tens of thousands of refugees, and of how their entry into West Berlin could be restrained without Allied or Berlin authorities instituting passport or visa controls.

(C) Some West German CDU politicians advocated grappling with the problem by amending the FRG Basic Law to restrict the right of asylum. This was also advocated by the right-wing Berlin CDU politician Heinrich Lummer, who occupied the posts of Interior Senator and Deputy Ruling Mayor until forced out in the midst of the Berlin construction scandal. (Lummer had in fact advocated changing the FRG asylum law as early as February 1985).[56] The position of the Berlin Senat, whose view was represented by Lummer's successor as Deputy Ruling Mayor, Renate Laurien (CDU), rejected a change in the Basic Law, except as a very last resort. It advocated instead a more expeditious processing of applications for asylum, and a prompt expulsion of those whose applications were turned down. The SPD and FDP were against any change in the Basic Law, and, like the Berlin CDU, tended to advocate a more expeditious treatment of asylum cases with the present law, with more distinction being made between "political" refugees, who had claim to asylum, and "economic" refugees, who did not. The Alternatives/Greeens and church groups opposed any stemming of the refugee flow into Berlin, on the grounds that people escaping hunger had a strong claim to asylum, and that anyone coming from a country like Iran suffered ipso facto from political persecution.

d.(C) The GDR Rubs It in. As in the case of the Sri Lankans, the problem could not be solved without the cooperation of the GDR. In September 1985 the Federal Republic asked the GDR to assist in cutting off the refugee stream just as it had cut off access to the Sri Lankans--ie., by refusing GDR transit visas to individuals not possessing visas for countries of final destination. The West Germans repeated their request on 30 December. In January 1986 Sweden and Denmark asked the GDR to take steps to impede the flow of refugees into Skandanavia.[57]

(C) In mid-January 1986 the GDR promised the Skandanavian countries that no GDR transit visas would be issued to persons stating an intention to proceed to Sweden or Denmark who lacked Danish or Swedish visas. The result was a significant drop in asylum requests to those countries. Two weeks later, on 30 January, the GDR extended this arrangement to the FRG.[58]

(C) Yet in extending the arrangement to the FRG, the GDR refused to include West Berlin. Thus, travellers who did not declare the Federal Republic as their point of final destination, but whose first stop was West Berlin, would not be controlled by the GDR. Since one-third of asylum seekers in West Germany came initially through West Berlin, the exclusion of West Berlin meant that the door was still wide open for increasing numbers of refugees. Indeed, asylum seekers quickly adjusted to the new GDR procedures: by late summer 1986, roughly 60 per cent of West German asylum seekers were coming initially into West Berlin via Schoenefeld.[59]

(C) The GDR persisted in its tough attitude into mid-September. The GDR, it said, was pursuing a humanitarian policy in full conformity with international law and practice. West Germany had the responsibility for solving its own problems in respect to asylum. As for West Berlin, it was an entirely different case. Entry into West Berlin was an issue for "those who. . .are in charge in West Berlin."[60]

e.(C) GDR Motives. We can only speculate on the motives of the GDR government in refusing to control transit through Schoenefeld airport. The GDR airline, Interflug, was doing a hard currency business in transporting asylum seekers to Berlin, but its earnings from this business were not considerable: according to figures of the FRG Interior Ministry, 60 to 70 per cent of the traffic was flown by the Soviet firm, Aeroflot, while the remainder was divided between Interflug, Syrian Arab Airlines, Balkan Airlines and Turkish Airlines.[61]

(U) The most likely explanation is that the GDR saw this as an apt occasion to make the Western side squirm over the status question. When the GDR refused, in January, to help control traffic into West Berlin, it declared that the West Berlin Senat would be welcome to discuss the problem directly with the GDR. It later tendered an offer of cooperation to the Allies via press release: since, as the GDR put it, the asylum question was an issue for the Allies in West Berlin to settle, if they wanted GDR help, they should simply raise their concerns face-to-face with the GDR. Either of these "invitations", if accepted, would have compromised Western status positions. Direct Senat-GDR discussions would have lent credence to the GDR's depiction of West Berlin as a third German state; and GDR discussions with the Allies would have undermined the Western view that the GDR has no legal competence in Berlin.

f.(U) The Issue is Abruptly Resolved. On 18 September the issue reached abrupt resolution. On that date, following parallel negotiations conducted in East Berlin by Chancellor's Office representative Wolfgang Schaueble and by SPD security expert Egon Bahr, the East German news agency ADN released a press statement by the GDR Foreign Ministry informing that as of 1 October travellers to the GDR would not be issued transit visas unless they had valid visas to their final destinations in Western or Northern Europe.

(U) Both the FRG government and the SPD scrambled to claim credit for the GDR turnabout: indeed, SPD Chancellor candidate Johannes Rau announced news of the GDR decision shortly before the ADN release, giving some evidence that the GDR wanted to help the SPD lay claim to authorship of the settlement.[62]

(U) The reason for the GDR's sudden shift probably rests with a set of cultural, scientific, and economic cooperation treaties which were ready for signing, but which the Bonn government was holding up pending an East German shift toward more "good neigborliness" on the refugee problem. The pending treaty on the environment was of special significance, because when it goes into effect it will involve substantial West German subsidies that the GDR urgently needs to cope with a deepening environmental crisis, much worse than the dying forest problem in the West.

g. (C) The Allied Role. The Allies agreed with the West Berlin Senat that the refugee issue was primarily an inner-German matter. Thus, the chief responsibility for resolving it rested with Bonn.

(C) There was never any question of the Allies instituting controls, whether in the guise merely of expanding anti-terrorist measures or otherwise. Such controls would have undermined the Allied status interpretation. They would have also been ineffective unless conjoined with a concurrent suspension of the applicability to Berlin of Article 16 of the FRG Basic Law positing the right to asylum.[63]

(C) Allied action was therefore limited to backing West German diplomacy through approaches to the Soviet Union. In connection with the Sri Lankan problem of 1985, the Allies, through their Embassies in East Berlin, prepared an approach to the Soviet Union on the use of Aeroflot in transporting refugees to Schoenefeld. The problem was, however, resolved by the GDR before the document reached final draft. In July and August 1986, Allied representatives approached the Soviets in Paris, London, Washington, Moscow and Berlin in relation to the flow of "pseudo-political" refugees into the Federal Republic through Berlin. The Soviets were reminded of their obligation under the Quadripartite Agreement to "eliminate tensions" and "prevent complications" in Berlin.[64]

(U) It is difficult to assess what effect these Allied approaches had in resolving the problem. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the inner-German dealings--especially the private, "parallel diplomacy" conducted by the SPD--were the prime factor in getting the GDR to bend.

h. (C) Internal Political Consequences. The refugee influx provoked a number of anti-foreign incidents in Berlin. On 19 July right-wing groups gathered in front of a sports field in the Neukoelln district where approximately 100 refugess were being housed in tents. Battles broke out between these groups and leftist counter-protesters and police. A week later, several empty tents set up in a park in Steglitz were fired bombed; at the same time, two refugees were sprayed with mace while using a public phone. Unidentified attackers also hurled stones through the windows of an SPD neigborhood office in Wilmersdorf, and left behind stickers with anti-foreign messages.[65]

(C) On the whole,. whoever, the situation in Berlin remained calm. With the exception of Heinrich Lummer, Berlin politicians did not subscribe to calls to

change the provisions of the FRG Basic Law establishing the right to asylum. This issue was played up by elements of the national CDU, which hoped to turn the problem to electoral advantage in January 1987 national elections. But the Berlin CDU flatly rejected the game being played by its West German colleagues, and accused them of overdramatizing the issue.[66]

i.(U) Refugee Flow Cut Off. When the GDR announced on 18 September that it was permitting no transit through the GDR to persons lacking visa to the FRG or another Western country, there were initially some questions as to how effectively the initiative would be implemented. The evidence of the last three months of 1986 showed that implementation was almost perfect.

(U) West German authorities reported drastic reduction in the number of asylum seekers coming into the FRG through the GDR over Helmstedt. In September, 1045 asylum seekers were registered at Helmstedt. In October the number fell to 101. For November the count was zero. In Berlin itself, only 62 people applied for asylum in November. This meant, in a stunning reversal of the situaiton of the summer, that in January 1987 Berlin started receiving asylum seekers from West Germany, as part of its obligation to take 2.7% of all refugees countrywide.[67]

6.(U) Berlin Status Issues: Honecker's Invitation.

(U) On 26 September 1986 GDR party chief Erich Honecker declared it "self-evident" that the Ruling Mayor (and opposition chief) of West Berlin be invited to attend the October 1987 Staatsakt marking the 750th anniversary of Berlin. The written invitation was delivered to the Schoeneberg Rathaus on 8 October. It was accompanied be a second invitation from the "Mayor"--not recognized by the Allies as such--of East Berlin, Erwin Krack, inviting Diepgen to attend the June 1987 International Mayors Conference in East Berlin. Two days later, the leaders of the SPD and Alternative List received invitations to the October 1987 Staatsakt.[68]

(U) Honecker's invitation represented a turnaround from the normal GDR practice of boxing West Berlin out of overall progress in inner-German relations. In this respect, it was a welcome initiative, most of all to West Berlin politicians. But in the respect of preserving the Allied status position, it was something of a poisened apple. For if Diepgen accepted the invitation and attended the Staatsakt, it would help legitimize GDR claims that East Berlin is the capital of the GDR and undermine Allied views on the legal unity of the city.

(C) The Honecker invitation gave rise thus to a conflict between the Allied desire to maintain a watertight position on status and the desire of West Berlin politicians to score their own successes in inner-German relations. This conflict would strain relations on both sides. It was not, moreover, only a matter of the Honecker invitation. It had to do as well with the Senat's longing to strike a more independent course in dealing with the East. This

longing was directly related in part to Diepgen's personal desire to follow his predecessor's path in opening direct contacts with the GDR. It also had something to do with the stepping up of FRG and Allied contacts with the East German regime--as manifested in particular by the June 1985 visit of French Premier Laurent Fabius to East Berlin.

a. (C) 1985: The Stronk-Loeffler Meetings. In May 1985 Senat Chancellery Chief Detlef Stronk met with Kurt Loeffler, deputy chairman of the East Berlin anniversary organizing committee (and also state secretary in the GDR Culture Ministry.) This was the first of many meetings between these two men to discuss possible East Berlin-West Berlin coordination of the anniversary celebrations.

(C) From the Allied standpoint, meetings at such a level posed considerable status problems. In a meeting on 31 May, Nelson Ledsky, US Minister at the time, reminded Diepgen of these problems. In reply, Diepgen implied that he saw no such problems. Ledsky then asked for a full report of the meeting and for advance notice to the Allies before any further contacts took place. The Senat's response to Ledsky's request for full reports was what USBER termed a "skimpy one-page account of Stronk's almost two-hour meeting with Loeffler on June 28." In a Commandants' meeting in July the Allies again made clear to Diepgen that Stronk-Loeffler contacts represented an important issue that would have to be discussed. Diepgen responded that since the GDR would use the 750th anniversary celebrations to stress the separateness of the two parts of the city, it was important, in the interests of possible cooperation, that the Stronk-Loeffler meetings take place.[69]

b. (C) Fundamental Disagreements. These exchanges set the tone of Allied-Senat dealings. The Allies were much more concerned over the status problem, and feared that an independent Berlin Ostpolitik would weaken a position the Allies had long struggled (originally at the Germans' behest!) to maintain. On the Senat side, there was an obvious chafing at the status regime, especially when the Allies' status interpretations seemed to be getting in the way of realizable progress.

(C) One of the clearest illustrations of the differences between the two sides (and this, over a year before Honecker's invitation to Diepgen) is the minutes of the introductory conversation between the newly arrived US Minister, John C. Kornblum, and Ruling Mayor Diepgen. Toward the end of the conversation, Kornblum gently raised the issue of Senat-GDR contacts, noting that it was time to take stock of common interests of Berlin and the Allies, and that the prevailing disagreement had not been "helpful." Diepgen, refusing to take a hint, said that he too was disturbed by the disagreement--but then laid the blame for it squarely on the Allies. The Senat, he said, was not interested in changing the ground rules for dealings with the East: it was simply "natural" that the Senat and the GDR should discuss together the 750th anniversary. Turning next to a more fundamental point, he adverted to internal political pressure in West Berlin that was "driving such contacts." The Berlin public simply would not understand, he asserted, if the Senat left stones unturned in organizing the commemoration.[70]

c. (C) The Conflict goes into Remission. By the end of December, 1985, there had been a certain meeting of minds between the Allies and the Senat. In September

the Senat grudgingly accepted an allied compromise formula whereby no further Stronk-Loeffler meetings would be scheduled (beyond one that had already been set for 27 September, which, after postponement, took place on 8 November) until warranted by progress in lower-level "experts" talks. When these talks produced no promise of ready results, Stronk announced to the Allies in December that the Senat had taken some of the Allied concerns to heart, and that he would not meet again with Loeffler unless there were progress in the experts' discussions. USBER concluded that the Senat seemed to have listened to warnings from both Berlin and Bonn, although the contacts question would continue to be a difficult one.[71]

(C) The prediction of difficulties proved correct, as the Stronk-Loeffler discussions were renewed in March despite a lack of progress at the experts' level. The Senat argued that for "political reasons" it could not break off the talks without clear indication that progress was impossible. Also, Diepgen was planning to meet Erich Honecker in Leipzig on 16 March, and wanted to insure a good atmosphere.[72]

(C) By July, however, the Senat had come to the conclusion that the GDR was not interested in cooperating on the anniversary. Diepgen reacted by composing a letter to the Minister-Presidents of the FRG Laender. The letter, sent on 4 July, remarked that "the other side" was preparing a "highly politicized" celebration portraying East Berlin "as an integral part and capital of the GDR." West Berlin was going to counteract this with a commemoration stressing the unity of the city, "free of petty concern for competition (with the East)." In view of such a situation, the letter continued, Berlin was in need of solidarity with the Laender. He then asked the Laender to abstain from participation in "any state acts. . . conducted by the GDR, the East Berlin City Council and Governing Mayor. . ." Due to the four-power status of Berlin, Diepgen asserted, such participation would be "inappropriate."[73]

(C) At roughly the same time, the Bonn Group was addressing the very concerns Diepgen had raised in his letter to the Laender Minister-Presidents. By the end of August, it had developed a guidance paper for use by NATO nationals, and particularly NATO officials, to try to forestall excessive damage to Allied status views resulting from participation by Western nationals in the 750th anniversary festivities in East Berlin. The key admonition in the paper was that participation in state ceremonies organized either by GDR or East Berlin officials be avoided in order not to help the GDR promote its claim that East Berlin is an integral part of the GDR and its capital.[74]

(C) This guidance was accepted by the West Berlin Senat with two reservations: one, it did not want to give any impression that the Allies were trying to throttle a proposed international mayor's conference in East Berlin, and two, it objected to wording in the guidance that referred to the West Berlin Senat as being the only "legitimate" government of the city. The grounds for these reservations: the Senat wanted to emphasize the unity of Berlin, and therefore wanted to avoid language that might suggest rivalry and confrontation between East and West Berlin.[75]

(C) The Bonn Group accepted the Senat's reservations and redrafted the guidelines accordingly. Thus, for exactly one week, the Allies and the Senat found themselves in tune. Honecker's 26 September oral invitation would shatter this brief-lived harmony.

d. (C) The Allies Between two Stools. The GDR invitation created something of a dilemma for the Allies. There was no way Dipegen could accept the invitation without some damage being done to Western concepts of Berlin status. Yet, if forced into the position of appearing to obstruct inner-German contacts, the Allies would suffer political damage in Berlin. This became immediately apparent when leading figures of all the political parties called on Diepgen to accept the invitation--with the opposition trying to make political capital complaining that Diepgen was doing too little to further relations with the GDR. Significantly, the CDU General Secretary, Landowsky--who in earlier years enjoyed a hardline reputation--added his voice to those calling enthusiastically for Diepgen to take up the East German offer. Likewise, on 29 October, Deputy Mayor Laurien (CDU), made a strong case for a Diepgen acceptance to arms control special advisor Rowny, then visiting in Berlin.[76]

(C) At first, Diepgen himself was not so quick to jump at the invitations as his fellow Berlin politicians. At a meeting with the Allied Commandants and Ministers in 16 October, he promised that his final decision would be reached only after thorough discussion with the other side. He nonetheless made it clear that he wanted to go. He underlined this with remarks he made in Paris in mid-November about the "dynamic" nature of Berlin status. Not too much time passed before it became clear that Diepgen's characterization of a "dynamic" Berlin status, rather than his promises of careful consideration and "thorough discussion," gave the best indication of his true attitude toward the invitation.[77]

e. (C) Allied Tactics. During the last three months of 1986, the Bonn Group worked hard to juggle a formula to reconcile the objective, on the one hand, of preserving Berlin's status, and on the other, of promoting maxiumum contact between the two parts of the city. By the end of 1986, a number of options had been worked out. The most prominent ones were: 1) a "controlled attendance," and 2) a counterinvitation (proposed by FRG Chancellery Chief Wolfgang Schaeuble.)

(C) A "controlled attendance" would involve accepting some loss on status considerations, but would then demand conditions be met by the GDR so as to compensate for this loss. The Allies would first of all seek to minimize the damage by coming to a clear understanding on the nature of the Staatsakt (viz., who would attend it, who would make the speeches and what they would say, whether certain features of the event would portray East Berlin as the GDR capital, etc.) They would formulate conditions tough for the GDR to accept--but not tough enough so as to be transparently designed to provoke a GDR refusal. Additionally, they would seek practical advantages for the populations of East and West Berlin.[78]

(C) Finally, as a third, more modest, alternative, it was proposed that Diepgen and Honecker agree to exchange visists to non-status sensitive events such as exhibits or cultural affairs.[79]

f.(C) Divergent Aims. Although Allied tactics left open a Diepgen acceptance under certain conditions, the Allies formulated these conditions in the expectation that they would not be met. They hoped, in short, to provide a political reason for Diepgen not to go, short of simply ordering him not to do so. The Senat, on the other hand, wanted from the very beginning to make an acceptance possible, and saw the status issue has something to finesse. The result, according to a USBER assessment of 11 December, was an increasingly strained relationship with Diepgen and his staff, who, in USBER's view, had come to assume that the Allies were against them and to blame the Allies for blocking Diepgen's way to East Berlin. USBER also reported at this time considerable Senat anger over the Bonn Group's recommendation that the preliminary task of "sounding out" the GDR be delegated to the head of the GDR permanent representation in East Berlin. This, the Senat believed, would remove the issue from its proper place at the communal level.[80]

(C) By the end of 1986, a pattern had already emerged that would characterize Allied-Senat relations over the coming year. The Allies told Diepgen they wanted to avoid an open split with the Senat and regretted the disagreements on the issue. They also made it clear that, in the final reckoning, they did not think a Diepgen acceptance would be consistent with maintaining Allied status principles. But instead of flatly refusing to let Diepgen go, they left it to the Senat to come to the understanding that Allied-Senat unity would be best maintained by the Senat accepting Allied views. When the Senat refused to take a hint, and persisted in trying to find a way to accept the invitation, considerable frustration appeared on both sides.

g.(U) The Outcome. On 6 May 1987, Diepgen finally turned the invitation down. His action came after the GDR had essentially disinvited him in professed anger over the conduct of the 30 April Festakt officially opening the commemoration in West Berlin. The GDR action was most likely forced by the Soviet Union, which had its own status reservations about the out-of-control inner-German dialogue. A detailed discussion of somewhat frenetic outcome of the Honecker invitation will follow in the 1987 Annual Report.

7.(U) Berlin Status Issues: Draft Evasion in Berlin.

(U) Owing to Berlin's demilitarized status, Berlin males are not subject to FRG military service. This means that if an FRG resident leaves West Germany and assumes residence in West Berlin, he cannot be called into the Bundeswehr. Significant numbers of West German males of draft age come to Berlin to take advantage of this loophole.

(U) From time to time, cases have arisen--usually provoked by overly-zealous local draft boards in the FRG--where the FRG authorities have tried to extradite West Berlin residents for draft evasion. In such cases, the Allies have upheld the exemption of West Berlin residents from West German conscription. The key requirement for exemption is that a subject male have taken up West Berlin residence before being called up by the Bundeswehr. In other words, if an individual is called up before becoming a bona fide resident of Berlin, and then goes to

Berlin to avoid military service, he cannot legally avoid the draft. But anyone who establishes Berlin residence before his call-up is not answerable to FRG law.

(C) In 1985-86 the disposition of these "Berlin draft-dodgers" became an issue between the Allies, on the one side, and the FRG government and Berlin Senat, on the other. Unlike the other significant status issues of this reporting period, it involved the of status West, rather than East, Berlin.

a. (C) The FRG Wants to Clamp Down. Owing to a declining birth rate, the Bundeswehr is going to find it impossible to maintain its present strength of roughly 495,000 men: there are simply not enough individuals of draftable age to keep the West German forces up to current strength--and the problem will get worse in the 1990's. One means of meeting the problem was to increase the duration of service time from 18 to 24 months. This was decided in 1985. Another expedient (albeit quite minor, in view of the magnitude of the problem) was to clamp down on the use of West Berlin as a haven from the draft. In December 1984, Foreign Minister Genscher announced that the FRG was studying this, and would present its proposals to the Bonn Group when they were ready.[81]

(C) In April 1986, FRG representatives delivered a "non-paper" to the tripartite members of the Bonn Group. The non-paper proposed that potential conscripts who took up residence in Berlin without permission of recruiting authorities could be served legally binding induction papers to an address in the FRG, whereupon they would be extradited from West Berlin. In other words, the Federal German authorities were proposing the possible return to West Germany of men who had arrived in Berlin prior to notice of induction.

(C) The Allies rejected the proposal. They considered it in direct violation of Berlin's demilitarized status. They noted that--according to FRG figures--the number of potential conscripts who took residence in Berlin had declined since 1980 by around 20 per cent. They felt that the raising of the age of those liable for conscription from 28 to 32 would further reduce the number of draft evaders in Berlin. In any case, there were other measures which the Bonn government could take without violating Berlin's status. The Allies noted in particular that under FRG law, only modest administrative fines were levied against individuals who came to Berlin before receiving their draft notice. Implicit in this Allied remark was a feeling that the Bonn authorities were trying to foist the onus of solving the problem onto the Allies, when the solution was quite within he power of FRG itself.[82]

b. (C) The Senat Plays Politics. The Senat also raised the draft issue with the Allies, who deemed the problem a Federal issue and did not appreciate interventions from West Berlin. The Allies were especially annoyed that Diepgen brought the subject up with then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt only a couple of months after FRG Foreign Minister Genscher had said that the FRG was studying it and would return as necessary to the Bonn Group.[83]

(C) In October 1985, then Interior Minister Lummer made another unwanted intervention, proposing that alternative civil service be introduce for permanent male residents of Berlin. This proposal, which had little support in Lummer's own party, was clearly based on FRG conscription law (which provided for alternative service) and thus, from the Allied view, not acceptable.[84]

lly, in early October, Diepgen attempted to get the Allies to delay al response to the (unacceptable) FRG proposals. Communicating cellery Chief Stronk, he made a baldly political argument. The aft dodgers, said Stronk, was changing the composition of the Berlin This, he argued was "not in the interests of any of us." [85]

ther words, Diepgen and his colleagues were asking the Allies to conscription laws as a means of ridding Berlin presumably objec- ers. It goes almost without saying that the Senat got nowhere with ts.

8.(U) US-Soviet Relations: the Killing of USMLM Officer Major Arthur Nicolson.

(U) Shortly before 4 pm on 24 March 1945, a member of a US Military Liaison Mission patrol, Major Arthur D. Nicolson, Jr., was shot and killed by a Soviet sentry in a local training area of a Soviet tank regiment near Ludwigslust, a town in the GDR northwest of Berlin. Soviet behavior in the immediate aftermath of the shooting was nothing short of outrageous: roughly an hour passed before the Soviets rendered Major Nicolson medical help (by then far too late), and the first Soviet public announcements blamed Major Nicolson for provoking his own death by conducting intelligence operations on prohibited territory.

~~(C)~~ For a full history of the incident, the reader is referred to two classifed studies: a) to the 1985 USMLM Unit History, which has an excellent short treatment of the Nicolson shooting, and b) to a comprehensive study conducted by the Center for Military History in Heidelberg. Since USMLM activities come under USAREUR, rather than USCOB, auspices, this treatment will be limited to an outline of key events and outcomes.

a. ~~(C)~~ Immediate Aftermath. On 25 March the USMLM brought Major Nicolson's body back to Berlin. A memorial service was held in the Berlin Brigade Chapel on 28 March; and on 30 March Major Nicolson was buried in Arlington Cemetary. Anger over the incident was not relieved by continued Soviet refusal to apologize. Nonetheless, the Department of State decided early on to pursue a damage-containment policy. In particular, the Department warned against a retaliatory use of persona non grata expulsions of Soviet MLM personnel. This, the Department reasoned, might initiate a cycle of such expulsions that would in the end reduce US and Allied MLMs in Potsdam. The US policy of restraint was reflected in President Reagan's comments at press breakfast on 28 March, where he characterized the killing as an "unwarranted tragedy."[86]

b. ~~(S)~~ General Otis's Protest and the Soviet Response. On 29 March 1985 the USMLM delivered to the Chief of Staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) a strong but measured protest letter from USAREUR Commander in Chief General Glenn K. Otis to the GSFG Commander in Chief General Zaytsev. General Zaytsev's reply arrived on 10 April. It was curious document. Most of it was

(C) Finally, in early October, Diepgen attempted to get the Allies to delay their official response to the (unacceptable) FRG proposals. Communicating through Chancellery Chief Stronk, he made a baldly political argument. The influx of draft dodgers, said Stronk, was changing the composition of the Berlin electorate. This, he argued was "not in the interests of any of us." [85]

(C) In other words, Diepgen and his colleagues were asking the Allies to enforce FRG conscription laws as a means of ridding Berlin presumably objectionable voters. It goes almost without saying that the Senat got nowhere with such arguments.

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not Secret

devoted to "proving" American responsibility for the Nicolson death. In the last three paragraphs, however, he called for a personal meeting with General Otis to discuss ways the prevent repetition of such incidents. When the letter was delivered to USAREUR headquarters by the Chief of the Soviet MLM in Frankfurt, the Soviet officer emphasized only the contents of the last part of the letter, stating that General Zaytsev had thorougly reviewed the situation and knew that the MLMs were unarmed. He continued that General Zaytsev wanted to meet with General Otis "to agree on how such incidents can be precluded in the future."[87]

c. (C) US-Soviet Talks. The Otis-Zaytsev exchange was prelude to a 12 April 1985 meeting between the US and Soviet Commanders in Chief. Their meeting laid the groundwork for USAREUR-GSFG staff negotiations, beginning on 14 June, to enhance the safety of MLM personnel. The resulting agreement was concluded on 30 December 1985, and formally signed on 10 April 1986.[88]

(C) Despite apparent Soviet sincerity in wanting to preclude violent actions against MLM members, they did not readily yield points at the negotiating table. For details of the bargaining, the reader is referred to the two works cited above. It suffices here to say that in the final agreement, the Soviets gave considerable ground to US negotiators. The "Permanent Restricted Areas" were reduced considerably (on a mutual basis), and the roads which bordered them were opened to movement by MLM members. The agreement thus provided access to areas that had been closed for decades. The Soviets agreed, moreover, to follow the American practice and issue cards to all military personnel. These cards would address procedures to be followed with regard to MLM members, and would stipulate, at the minimum, that use of force or weapons against them, or any other act that would jeopardize their safety, is "categorically prohibited."[89]

d. (C) Verdict on the Agreement. No definitive verdict can yet be reached on the effectiveness of the agreement. The Soviets have issued the cards of instruction, and these cards do contain an absolute prohibition on use of violence against MLM personnel. Yet safety cannot be taken for granted, because even the most totally sincere Soviet policy prohibiting violence against MLMs cannot provide complete protection against actions by often semi-literate 19 year-old sentries, who are rotated into position every six months. It can be said, however, that ever since the Nicolson shooting, there have been only two serious incidents. The first occurred almost immediately afterwards: on 13 July 1985 Soviet soldiers rammed a vehicle containing USMLM commander Col. Roland Lajoie. The second occurred on 17 September 1987, when 5 Soviets fired on a USLM vehicle northwest of Berlin. The driver received superficial wounds on his left arm and the side windows of the vehicle were shot out. This time the Soviets admitted guilt and offered an outright apology. The USMLM concluded that the shooting was a panicked reaction of immature Soviet troops and not a premeditated effort to harm MLM members.[90]

9. (U) US-Soviet Relations: the Air Reservation Issue.

(C) As related in the 1983-84 Annual Report, on 24 February 1984, the Soviet Union--with practically no prior notification--announced that it was reserving the air space up to 4,500 feet along the entire length of all three corridors, up to the edge of the Berlin Control Zone. This action contrasted with earlier Soviet practice: prior to 24 February 1984 they had reserved airspace (mostly for training flights) within specified geographical limits specified by towns that marked the beginning and end of the reserved space. These towns normally were 20-30 miles distant from the edge of the BCZ. Thus, the Soviets had not been in the practice of reserving the whole length of the corridors.[91]

(C) The Allies protested the Soviet reservations on both technical and political grounds. Technically, they argued that space was needed outside of the BCZ to permit commercial flights safely to descend. Politically, they argued that the Soviets had no right unilaterally to change the air regime. Details of the 1984 controversy are found in the 1983-84 Annual Historical Report.

a. (C) Allied Reactions. At the time the Soviets first reserved the full corridors, the Allies insisted, on grounds of safety, that no airspace be reserved within the region 20 miles from the edge of the BCZ. For a year there was no positive Soviet response. However, in early December 1984 the Soviets entered into a de facto compromise with the Allies. Without formally responding to Allied requests, they announced a reservation with an eastern limit set at 44 km from the center of the BCZ. They later announced reservations with expanded limits of 49 km from the center of the BCZ. This meant that they had tacitly accepted Allied arguments on the need for geographical limits. The limits they announced were, on the other hand, still half-a-loaf for the Allies: the 49 km distance from the center of the BCZ translated into 10.5 miles from the rim of it, whereas the Allies had on safety grounds argued for 20.[92]

b. (C) Further Allied Representations. Following the half-way Soviet concession on geographical limits, Allied air control specialists worked up a set of guidelines for the management of Soviet airspace reservation requests. These guidelines were presented in May 1985. They contained the following provisions:

i. Reservation requests for corridor airspace should be kept at a minimum;
ii. Reservations should be requested only for those sections of the corridors during periods in which activities will actually occur;
iii. Reservation requests should be made at the BASC at least 24 hours in advance and should indicate specifically the area to be used and the exact duration of the reservation;
iv. Allied flights should always be able to take off and land safely according to long-standing Berlin flight procedures;
v. Reservations should never extend closer to BCZ than safety and operational requirements of Allied aircraft permit;
vi. Reservations should take account of weather and traffic conditions;
vii. Flight safety is to be guaranteed to same number of flights during a reservation period as at other times;

viii. Allied requests for individual aircraft to fly through reserved airspace should be coordinated on a case-by-case basis.[93]

In respect to guideline v., the Allies pressed for a 17 mile reservation-free area outside of the BCZ. They had thus reduced by 3 their original request of 20 miles, but still regarded the 10.5 mile limit practiced by the Soviets as not fully adequate.[94]

c. (C) Soviet Response. The Soviets procrastinated in responding formally to the Allied guidelines. Soviet staff at the BASC could only note, in reply to repeated Allied inquiries, that the issue was being considered at higher levels. It was in fact not until 21 January 1987 that the Soviet reply finally came, turning the Allies down.

(C) The Soviet procrastination, followed by the eventual negative reply, reflected Soviet reluctance to give in to the Allies on principle. It did not, however, signal any intention of creating difficulties in the actual management of the air regime. As remarked in an assessment prepared in October 1986 by the three Allied Missions, the Soviets had marked up a "generally positive record of compliance" with the Allied guidelines--even as they refused to accept the guidelines de jure. For example, they were not significantly increasing the number of reservations; they were reserving with an average advance notice of 25.2 hours; and were reserving small blocks of time.

(C) The one main exception to this positive Soviet record of tacit compliance with the Allied guidelines was continued Soviet reluctance to accept the 17 miles reservation-free space requested by the Allies. However, the Soviets came some distance toward acknowledging Allied concerns: whenever they reserved space above 3,500 feet, they consistently added 3.7 miles to their 10.5 miles reservation-free zone for each additional 1,000 feet above the 3,500 feet level.[95]

d. (C) Air Regime Summary. Soviet airspace reservations did not prove harmful to the functioning of the four-power air regime of Berlin. In the eyes of Allied air safety experts, the 10.5 mile limit was technically "adequate", although a 17 mile limit would contribute significantly to operational flexibility, and thus to overall safety. The major issue was procedural--that the Soviets had acted unilaterally.

10.(U) US Media in Berlin: RIAS Television

(U) By virtue of its cultural programming and its objective newscasting, RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor) has held a respected place in the West Berlin media scene since 1946. Recently, this place was reinforced through program changes in the Channel RIAS II, which operates now on a completely popular music format--with interspersion of high-quality news features--and claimed the greatest single listenership in Berlin. (Indeed, it proved so popular that the GDR channel, Stimme der DDR, has copied it almost entirely, to the point of reaching nearly total elimination of propaganda spots.)

(U) On 10 November 1985, this American media presence in Berlin was further enhanced with the announced, formal establishment of RIAS television. The

announcement came two and a half years after the project was originally proposed --in itself, good indication of the many problems which had to be overcome.

a.(U) Origins of RIAS Television. The initial proposal for RIAS television came not from the American side, but from Governing Mayor Eberhard Diepgen. In a meeting with USIA Director Charles Z. Wick, Diepgen proposed in early April 1984 that USIA consider adding television to RIAS. He pressed his proposal in a subsequent meeting in Washington on 17 April.[96] In reply, Director Wick stated in a letter of 7 May that he was "very interested" in a RIAS television station. He asked Diepgen to commission a study that would address practical questions--staffing, funding, programming, channel selection, etc.

b.(U) The Senat Feasibility Study. In August 1984 the Senat sent its completed feasiblity study to Washington. The study proposed that a RIAS TV would run 4 hours a day of programming. Such programming would require a yearly operating budget of DM 50 million. Outside sources--such as the USIA television branch--would provide roughly 60 per cent of program materials, the rest to be produced in-house. An initial, one-time capital investment of roughly DM 25 million would be required to get the station going.[97]

(U) At the same time as the Senat completed its study, Hans Tuch (USIS, Bonn) sent Director Wick a letter summarizing the study and proposing three additional points for consideration:

1.(U) That US "sovereignty" over the station be represented by the RIAS American Director and by ultimate Allied control over the TV signal. A German Intendant would be Chief Operating Officer.

2.(U) That USIA make a substantial, one-time capital investment in plant and equipment.

3.(U) That the Germans be responsible for the operating budget, thus sparing USIA the uncertainties of the yearly Congressional appropriation process.

(U) Taken together, the Senat study and the Tuch proposals approximated the final form in which RIAS-TV took shape.[98]

c.(U) The RIAS-TV Funding Agreement. On 18 January 1985 Hans Tuch sent a letter to Rehlinger of the Ministry for inner-German Relations informing that the US government favored in principle the Senat study. Negotiations followed between USIA and the various German agencies involved in the project: the Inner-German Ministry, the Senat, and the Post Ministry. These negotiations resulted in a funding agreement, concluded in September 1985. The agreement provided for:

1. a USIA one-time grant of $9-10 million for constructing and equipping a television broadcasting facility;

2. an FRG yearly contribution of roughly DM 60 million to pay program production costs, the money to be furnished by the Inner-German Ministry;

3. American payment for transmission costs--approximately DM3 million (at the time, $1 million) in the case of terrestial transmission, more in case of a cable hook-up.

These monies would finance 4 to 6 hours of daily programming.

d.(U) Problem Areas. The problems confronting the RIAS project were at once technical, budgetary and political--and they were all interrelated. For the sake of simplicity, they will be reduced to four problem areas: the Cable Problem, the Frequency Problem, the Funding Problem and the Political Problem.

1.(C) The Cable Problem. At the time RIAS-TV was first proposed, the FRG Post Ministry was investing massively in cable television. West German Post and Communications Minister Christian Schwarz-Schilling viewed a potential RIAS hook-up as a selling point for the system. Thus, he became a strong supporter within Bonn circles of RIAS-TV.

(C) From the American standpoint, however, there were both legal and budgetary objections to including RIAS in the FRG cable system. A RIAS cable hook-up would carry RIAS broadcasting into FRG territory, making it potentially subject to West German communications law, which requires that a broadcasting organization maintain "distance" from the state and be governed by a "broadcasting council" composed of representatives of political parties and of social and religious interest groups. Thus, if RIAS-TV did not observe FRG communications law, its existence in the Federal Republic could well be illegal. But to observe to law required that the project lose its American character--and that USIA relinquish control. For obvious reasons, neither option was seen as advantageous to the United States.

(C) Moreover, even if the legal difficulties could be overcome--and they realistically could not--the simple expense of a RIAS cable transmission made it unattractive to American officials. According to RIAS estimates, an initial hook-up into the FRG cable net would cost DM 2 million, plus DM 3 per connected household. Given Postal Ministry estimates that 2 million households would be hooked up by 1987, the yearly cost of cable transmission would be DM 6 million, as opposed to terrestial transmission costs of DM 3 million.[99] This would pose real budgetary problems to USIA, because, as noted, transmission costs (as opposed to program costs) are a US responsibility.

(C) Finally, a cable hook-up would not fulfill one of the most basic RIAS goals: to bring American television into households in the GDR. Clearly, unless the GDR were somehow to undertake the vast expense of establishing its own cable net, and then hooking it into the FRG system, programming on FRG cable would not reach GDR audiences. To accomplish that, RIAS would have to operate a terrestial transmission in addition--at that time (and now), a budgetary impossibility.

2.(C) The Frequency Problem. The difficulties of cable transmission, coupled with the fact that broadcasting to a GDR audience requires terrestial transmission, meant that there was no alternative to finding a terrestial frequency.

(C) Yet, owing to the extreme crowding of the Berlin airwaves, finding such a frequency was no easy matter. The matter was complicated by the fact that Berlin frequencies had to be coordinated with the GDR, and such coordination was negotiated between the Federal Post Ministry and the GDR Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Thus, neither USBER nor USIA had direct control over the carrying out of these negotiations.

(U) Technical studies conducted by the FRG Post Ministry located two frequencies that seemed still to be free--Channels 23 and 58. It proved impossible, however, to coordinate the frequencies with the GDR. Responding to a 16 December 1985 inquiry from the FRG Post Ministry, the GDR Post and Telecommunications authorities responded that, as of 23 October 1985, the GDR had already been operating--on a trial basis--a television relay transmitter on Channel 23, which the GDR had previously operated in Cottbus. They explained that the GDR needed this frequency in order to close gaps in coverage, adding further that West Berlin broadcasters were currently using 6 channels in the Berlin area, as opposed to 2 being used by the GDR.[100]

(U) On 14-25 February 1986, representatives of the FRG and GDR Post Ministries met to discuss frequency coordination issues. At this time, the Federal Post Ministry conceded the GDR's technical objections--and not only in respect to Channel 23. In the course of discussion, the GDR pointed out that it had long used Channel 58 for air navigation ground control purposes. Apparently the Federal Post Ministry had simply not conducted a sufficiently thorough check of of frequency utilizations.[101]

(U) USBER was informed of these concessions third-hand (ie., the Federal Post Ministry informed the Ministry for Inner-German Realtions, which informed RIAS Intendant Schiwy, who informed USBER). In USBER's eyes, the concessions were unnecessary: perhaps Schwarz-Schilling had bargained away the two frequencies in order to secure GDR approval 1) of several cable frequencies, needed for his cable television project, and 2) of an added FM radio channel for West Berlin. Indeed, USBER had already received ample, earlier indications that RIAS-TV was of real interest to Schwarz-Schilling only as an element of cable broadcasting. It stood to reason, then, that the Post Minister was not inclined to expend bargaining chips with the GDR to gain a terrestial channel for RIAS.[102]

(U) Finally, in July 1986, a possible solution appeared. Channel 25 had been assigned to the Landespostdirektion (LPD) as a relay frequency through which programs originating in West Germany would be transmitted to Berlin. Owing to completion of a new fiber optic cable in Spring 1987, the channel would be no longer needed for this purpose and could be assigned for television broadcasting. Since LPD use of the frequency had already been coordinated with the GDR, no further negotiation would be necessary.

(C) Even here, however, there were possible stumbling blocks. RIAS was not the only potential television broadcaster desiring a frequency: there were also parties who wanted to set up private television operations, and who might put in competing bids for time on Channel 25. Thus, it was not certain--particularly in

view of the private claimants--that the Berlin Kabelrat, which had control of allocating airtime among the various applicants, would provide time to RIAS.[103]

(U) Neither problem materialized in fact. The private applicants came to see a time-sharing arrangement with RIAS as enhancing their own products; and the Kabelrat proved fully cooperative, announcing, on 17 November 1986, the granting to RIAS of 4 hours a day of broadcast time--2 1/2 hours reserved in the morning, up to one hour in the early evening, and a half-hour at the end of the broadcast day. The Kabelrat decision corresponded exactly to requirements presented to it by RIAS on 12 November.[104]

3. (U) The Funding Problem. The Federal German government acted quickly to provide an initial share of the financing foreseen in the September 1985 US-FRG agreement: in November, the Bundestag Budget Committee appoved an appropriation of DM 8 million to support the planning of RIAS-TV. The appropriation was not, however, made immdeiately available. Rather, the funds were blocked pending appropriation by the US Congress of the one-time US contribution to capital costs. This sum, originally pegged at roughly $10 million, had been increased to $12 million, partly to offset the decline in the value of the dollar.

(U) Congress had reservations, and it was touch-and-go as to whether the $12 million would be approved. Indeed, the situation looked so grim in June 1986 that US Minister John Kornblum suggested approaching the Berlin regional broadcasting organization, Sender Freies Berlin (SFB), on the possibility of contracting to use SFB airtime to transmit scaled-down RIAS program.

(U) Such an expedient was not needed. Owing to the persistent lobbying of USIA Director Wick, who refused to let the project die in Congress, the $12 million start-up capital was finally approved by Congress of 25 October 1986. This led in turn to the formal announcement, on 10 November, of the establishment of RIAS-TV, followed a week later by the allocation by the Kabelrat of airtime on channel 25. On 3 June 1987, the Bundestag Budget Committee duly released the funds it had set aside two years earlier.

(C) This was not the end, however of the funding problem. With the passage of time, the production costs of the proposed RIAS program have risen: at the time of this writing (November 1987), RIAS estimates that it wouid need roughly DM 75 million to carry out its minimal plans. Yet Federal Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg cut the 1988 appropriation to DM 50 million--that is, DM 10 million less than the originally envisioned sum of DM 60 million. RIAS will cope with this cut in the first year by setting back the start date of its television broadcasting from April to June, 1988. But this "fixes " the problem for only the first year. Later, when the year cannot be conveniently shortened, the unwillingness of the Finance Minister to provide the full DM 75 million could present real difficulties.[105]

4. (C) The Political Problem. The political problem facing RIAS consists of three separate problems: first, the legal reservations as whether RIAS-TV is compatible with West German communications law; second, the opposition of SPD and Alternative List politicians who fear that RIAS-TV could become a CDU propa-

ganda channel; and three, the fears of the West Berlin regional broadcaster, SFB, that RIAS might prove an uncomfortably successful competitor. Naturally, the last two, practical misgivings are inevitably expressed in terms of the legal reservations as well.

i.(U) Communications Law: the "Advisory Council." As noted in the discussion of the "cable problem," RIAS cannot operate incompatibly with FRG communications law so long as RIAS does not broadcast in the FRG. Thus, there are no legal inhibitions on RIAS broadcasting in Berlin--although objections will still raised over the the FRG contribution to the RIAS budget. (Such a contribution would, in the FRG, be flatly illegal inasmuch as authority over broadcasting rests with the Laender and not with the central government.) The key point is that, despite the "grayness" of the issue, no RIAS oppponent as gone to the extent of taking the matter to court--in itself an indication that opponents recognize that a legal challenge would be futile.

(C) Although RIAs opponents did not see themselves in a position to mount a legal challenge, RIAS planners were eager to soften objections by bringing the project more into line with FRG practice. In this spirit, FRG State Secretary for Inner-German Affairs Rehlinger brought up in January 1986 the idea of setting up an "advisory board." (fn. USBER 0317, 31 January 1986, LOU) Such a board--similar to the broadcasting councils that govern radio and television in the FRG--would consist of representative elements of political-social-religious interest groups in Berlin. The vital difference would be that the board would remain "advisory"--that is, ultimate authority would rest in the hands of the American management. American planners accepted the idea, and included it in the draft "RIAS-TV Statute" in April 1986. (fn. USBER 1008/1, 4 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL) They hoped, thus, to fend off at least part of the criticism over German money bering spent on the project with no German public oversight.

ii.(C) SPD Misgivings. SPD fears of a partisan use of RIAS-TV by the CDU had a certain grounding in truth, in that Diepgen could very well have wanted to use RIAS for such purposes. Otherwise, there was little practical sense to remarks, made by the Mayor and his colleagues to US officials, about the need for a "balance" or "counterweight" to both the regional SFB and the national ARD. (fn. See, for example, remarks made by Winifried Fest, Senat Press spokesman, to the US Director of RIAS, Patrick Nieburg, in Nieburg to Tuch, 6 June 1984, UNCLASSIFIED) The Americans were well aware of the opposition's anxieties, and had in fact their own suspicions of the Mayor's motives. These anxieties persist. One means of overcoming them will be through a pluralistic represenataion on the advisory board. They will not, however, be laid fully to rest until RIAS-TV begins operations and proves through practice its commitment to non-partisan and non-ideological journalism.

iii.(U) SFB Misgivings. The Berlin regional channel, Sender Freies Berlin (SFB), has suffered over the past several years from staff turmoil and a severely strapped financial situation. The former SFB Intendant, Lothar Loewe, was friendly toward the RIAS project. However, becasue of of open warfare conducted against him by the SFB staff, his position became untenable. (Also, he was blamed for the massive SFB budget shortfall.) Loewe's replacement as Intendant, Dr. Guenther Herrmann, has made no secret of his unease over RIAS-TV. In November

1986 he complained that SFB had to make a contribution to the FRG Deutschlandfunk, while at the same time the FRG government intended to finance a new television program, "for which not everyone recognizes a need." He also raised the question of whether state financing for RIAS-TV was compatible with the legal requirement that broadcasters keep "distance" from the state.[108]

(C) Although Herrmann articulated his complaints in terms of legal principles, he was also concerned about potential competition from RIAS-TV--particularly in view of SFB's financial problems. (This concern he made clear, without any veiling, in a 30 October 1987 meeting with the US Minister.)[109] Although the planned RIAS operating hours do not overlap very much with SFB's, RIAS can scarcely avoid becoming a competive factor in Berlin broadcasting. The problem thus posed will be difficult to overcome, because to the degree RIAS-TV repeats the success of RIAS-II Radio, it will reinforce SFB misgivings. In other words, too much success could prove troublesome.

11.(U) Berlin Viability.

(U) West Berlin's status as an "island city" has created severe economic disadvantages. The overcoming of these disadvantages is just as important an element of the city's security as the maintenance of political-military guarantees: if West Berlin cannot remain economically viable, it will be sapped by the lingering debilities of obsolescent industry, shrinking population, and a low-skilled, low-income labor force.

(U) As we shall see, developments during the period 1985-86 had both positive and negative elements. While West Berlin during the eighties improved considerably on the performance of the seventies, particularly in respect to reversing the population decline, there were also disturbing weaknesses in the West Berlin economy.

a.(U) Background. Before the second World War Berlin was not only the political center of Germany, but an industrial and financial center as well. Because of the division of the country, and the geographical separation of West Berlin from its markets and suppliers, it was destined to lose its leading role, as West German cities became the new industrial centers (Duesseldorf, Essen, Stuttgart, Munich), and as German banking concerns also moved West, mainly to Frankfurt. Over the the years, West Berlin industry became increasingly dependent on Federal German subsidies to remain profitable; the FRG share of the city budget grew from 27.7% in 1950 to 51.8% in 1986, and an increasing portion of the West Berlin workforce found employment in the public sector. Moreover, the city suffered from steady loss of population, a trend that accelerated in the seventies. (See figure A.)

Figure A--Population, Employment and Budget Trends in West Berlin

	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980	1984
WEST BERLIN POPULATION (millions)	2.147	2.202	2.122	1.984	1.896	1.849

	1970	1980	1984
WORKING POPULATION (000s)	855.5	802.4	793.8
Proportion employed in public sector (%)	15.8	20.5	21.9

	1950	1960	1970	1980
CITY BUDGET (billions DM)	1,78	2.77	7.10	17.14
Federal Assistance as per cent of budget	27.7	*	39.7	53.3

* rump budget owing to change in fiscal year

(U) As an inevitable effect of such developments, Berlin was derisively labelled "subventionen Stadt" (Subsidy City), and built an unhappy reputation as an uninteresting place to work, and one where serious people could not stay in the forefront of their professions.

b.(U) 1983-84: Recovery. The city election of 1981 broke a long period of SPD dominance in the Schoeneberg Rathaus, as Richard von Weizsaeker, following a vote of the Berlin House of Representatives on 11 June 1981, assumed the post of Governing Mayor.

(U) When von Weizsaeker took office, the mood in the city was gloomy: the SPD governments of the previous ten years had presided over a deepening economic stagnation, and had been ridden with scandal. The situation had been so extreme by January 1981 that the SPD national leadership installed Hans-Jochen Vogel (previously Federal Justice Minister) as Governing Mayor to clean the situation up. Although an extremely talented administrator, Vogel simply did not have the time to turn the situation around and to stave off a CDU victory.

(U) It is unlikely that any government could have managed significantly better economic results in the seventies, particularly inasofar as Berlin, with its traditional industrial structure, was hard-hit by both the 1974 and 1979 oil shocks. Nor could corruption be avoided when public authorities control so much patronage as in West Berlin. Yet the sheer fact of change introduced an element of optimism into the Berlin scene.

(U) In 1983-84, the optimism was born out by concrete economic results. In most major indicators of performance--Berlin did better than the FRG. Berlin

also successfully sold itself as a place of innovation, actively seeking to promote advanced, technology-intensive industries. In 1985 the trend continued. As the following figure shows, the overall situation, comparatively speaking, showed more favorable development in West Berlin than in West Germany. The one black spot, a somewhat higher unemployment rate--was offset by the fact that unemployment fell in West Berlin while it rose in the FRG.

Figure B
COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 1985-1986 (Changes in Per Cent)

	1985		1986	
	Berlin	FRG	Berlin	FRG
Real GNP growth	3.2	2.5	2.5	2.5
Real Investment	-1.5	-0.1	3.1	3.3
Orders	9.2	5.2	-4.5	-0.1
Employment	2.0	0.7	0.9	1.0
in manufacturing	3.1	1.0	1.3	1.5
Vacancies	30.1	25.1	33.8	39.9
Part-time employment	-40.7	-38.9	27.1	-15.8
Unemployed	-0.8	1.7	4.7	-3.3
Unemployment rate	10.0	9.3	10.5	9.0

(U) In addition to the (relatively) welcome economic statistics, 1985 also saw the first good news in some time in respect to population. After many years of decline the population grew in 1985 by roughly 11,500 over the previous year. The figure was not large--bringing the city population to somewhat less than it was in 1982--but it brought hope that the worst was over, and that the city could look forward at least to population stability and maybe slow but steady growth. A further grounds for optimism is that for the first time in 20 years, there was growth in the German population of West Berlin--only 2,500, but growth nonetheless.

Figure C--Berlin Population Development

1984	1985	1986
1,848,585	1,860,084	1,879,225

Source: Statistiches Landesamt

d.(U) 1986: Negative Results. In 1986, a troubling reversal took place. As shown in figure B, in nearly all areas, Berlin fared more poorly than the FRG. Particularly distressing were the employment figures: whereas part-time employment dropped 15.8 % in the FRG, it rose 27.1% in West Berlin. And where the

unemployment rate dropped from 9.3% to 9% in the FRG, it rose from 10% to 10.5% in West Berlin. (These negative developments--with West Berlin doing not as well as the FRG--continued in 1987). These figures, moreover, could well have been worse if it were not for hefty increases since 1981 in the Berlin business subsidy program (see Figure D).

Figure D--Berlin Business Promotion (Investment Subsidy) Program

	Expenditure for business promotion from Berlin Land budget (millions DM)	Expenditure for business promotion directly paid by FRG (millions DM)	Total (millions DM)
1980	2,953	3,293	6,246
1981	3,150	3,436	6,586
1982	3,555	3,715	7,270
1983	3,741	3,896	7,637
1984	3,672	3,799	7,471
1985	4,169	4,394	8,563
1986	4,263	4,485	8,748

Source: Senator fuer Wirtschaft und Arbeit

(U) Another distressing element of the downtown was the negative development in the data processing industry. (See Figure E) This is the sort of environmentally "clean", high-value-added industry that the city hopes to develop to replace the heavy industry that had been Berlin's mainstay, but which is plagued worldwide with overproduction and devastating competition from low-wage developing countries. After steady growth since 1980, the data processing industry also took a dive in 1986 in terms of sales and orders. Employment grew slightly--to 4,859--but the figure is still way below what is needed to balance job losses in traditional industries.

Figure E--Development of Data Processing Industry

	1980	1984	1985	1986
Employed	3,062	4,139	4,644	4,859
Sales (000 DM)	698,096	2,675,285	3,795,023	3,305,674
Index of New Orders (1980 = 100)	100	454.8	649.0	497.9

Source: Senator fuer Wirtschaft und Arbeit

(U) 1986: Positive Results. Balancing the negative statistics were good results in respect to income and population growth.

(U) Among salaried workers in West Berlin, average income rose in 1986 by

4.2%--to an average of DM 3,781 per month. Among industrial workers, paid by the hour, gross weeekly earnings increased by 3.6%, to an average of DM 684 per week. With an inflation rate hovering around zero, these earnings increases constituted real increases in income. The meaning of these income statistics is that, despite high unemployment, there was growing prosperity among those who had work--particularly among workers employed in advanced, higher-skill service industries. That in to say: the greater part of the suffering is concentrated among the unemployed, and among those holding traditional "proletarian" jobs in older branches of industry.

Figure F-- Average Gross Monthly wages of Salaried Workers and Hourly Workers in West Berlin, 1985-1986

	1985	October in DM	1986	Change in Per Cent
Salaried Employees (monthly earnings)	3,628		3,781	4.2
Hourly Wage Workers (weekly earnings)	660		684	3.6

Source: Landespressedienst, Statistisches Landesamt, 11 March 1987, nr. 49

(U) In addition, population trends were once more favorable. As shown in Figure C, population grew for a second year--by 19,141 to 1,879, 225. This growth was spurred by the largest net immigration since 1950: 106,290 persons moved to West Berlin, offset by 74,110 persons who moved away, resulting in an immigration gain of 32,180. Again, the number of Germans moving to Berlin increased, rising from 20,611 in 1985 to 20,798 in 1986. [110]

e.(U) Berlin's Problems in Comparison. Many of Berlin's economic problems are not unique to Berlin. Like the Saar, the Ruhr, and the shipbuilding regions of northern Germany, Berlin was shaped by the "Second Industrial Revolution"--the industrial revolution of steel, chemicals, electricity and the internal combustion engine. All such regions of this second Industrial Revoution are suffering similar problems, structural in nature, arising from world overproduction and stiffening competition. They are characterized by large workforces adopted to assembly-line work that is disappearing from Western Europe. These workforces are not instantly adaptable to new conditions in the labor market: thus, exceptionally high unemployment prevails.

(U) Indeed, if one compares the situation in Berlin with that in the Land Nordrhin-Westfalen, or with the Saarland, or with Bremen, Berlin is not doing all that poorly in making a difficult adjustment. In all of these Laender unemployment is higher than in Berlin, and the prospects for finding their way out of the structural crisis are, if anything, less bright that in West Berlin.

(U) Yet the fact that Berlin comes out better in the making of sad comparisons also carries uncertainties and dangers. Given the deep structural crises in the steel, coal and shipbuilding industries, more Laender are going to make increased claims for aid during the difficult transition period ahead. These increased claims could well lead to harder questioning of the monies spent for West Berlin. Any significant cut in FRG support for Berlin would prove highly detrimental to the city's economic prospects. So, while West Berlin is withstanding the present economic upheaval better than the true "crisis" regions of the Federal Republic, this very fact could--through the cutting of Federal support for Berlin in order to use the money elsewhere--occasion a reversal in city's economic fortunes.

12. (U) Internal Politics: the Corruption Scandal.

(U) One of the negative aspects of West Berlin's image in the FRG has been its reputation for corruption, arising from the tremendous patronage controlled by the city government. Beginning in 1976, the former SPD governments were rocked by a series of scandals. The so-called Garski scandal, uncovered in December 1980, led to the fall of the Dietrich Stobbe Senat in early 1981. One of the promises of CDU politicians was thus to led West Berlin out of the "swamp."

(U) The von Weizsaeker and Diepgen governments made good initial progress in promoting an image of probity. However, in late 1985, a scandal blew up in Diepgen's face with the arrest of Charlottenburg District Building Commissioner Wolfgang Antes (CDU) on charges of bribe-taking.

(U) The arrest caused an uproar, yet both Diepgen and CDU Secretary General Landowsky succeeded in limiting the political damage with loud statements that any CDU member who acted corruptly would be promptly thrown out of the party.

(U) The scandal, however, went beyond Antes. At the end of January 1986, Kurt Franke, a prominent building and hotel owner, was also arrested on bribery charges. Particularly distressing for the Christian Democrats was that investigators also discovered records of massive donations from Franke to the CDU.

(U) In February still more charges surfaced. Housing and Construction Senator Klaus Franke (not to be confused with Kurt Franke) was accused by the opposition parties of on several occasions overruling district building administrators in order to throw favors to certain builders. City Planning and Environmental Affairs Senator Horst Vetter (FDP) came under fire for admittedly having received DM 10,000 from Kurt Franke. (Franke's records, moreover, showed that Vetter had received not DM 10,000, but DM 50,000). On 30 January Wilmersdorf District Building Commission Joerg Herrmann (CDU), who had been suspended for taking bribes from Franke in 1982-83, was arrested from his hospital bed and transported to the prison hospital in Moabit out of fear that he attempt flight.[110]

(U) On 25 March, after something of a lull in the action, the charges went two higher up in the Berlin establishment. A West German used car dealer named Otto Putsch, who was one of those passing bribes to Antes, revealed to the TV news magazine "Monitor" that he had had business dealings with Interior Senator, and Deputy Mayor, Heinrich Lummer. Putsch claimed under oath that as early as

1984 Lummer appeared to know of Antes' bribe taking. To these charges were added a revelation by Der Spiegel that in 1971 Lummer had paid DM 2000 to a right-wing extremist group to sabotage the SPD election campaign.

(U) Lummer's denials and explanations were exceedingly weak. The West Berlin and West German press turned at once against him--even moderate or conservative newspapers like the Berlin Tagesspiegel and the national Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. They, and many other voices, called for Diepgen to fire Lummer.[111]

(U) Apparently hoping that the crisis would blow over, Diepgen had taken no decisive action for the previous three months. Now, even in the face of the Monitor charges against Lummer, and of Lummer's admission to having given money to the rightest political group, Diepgen hesitated. Indeed, his first instinct was to label the Monitor charges "banalities." Under heavy political pressure, however, he was forced in early April into taking personnel actions he had resisted for three months. In the resulting cabinet reshuffle, Lummer, Klaus Franke and Vetter were all forced out.

(U) The construction affair then went into a three month remission. In early July a new scandal cropped up. The Deputy Senator for Finance Schackow (CDU) was suspended from office because of his connections to a shady Bavarian contractor who had confessed to tax evasion and bribe-distribution in Berlin. Despite his suspension from office on 8 July, Schackow was acccused only of indescretion: in recognition of his long career in the West Berlin Civil Service, he was allowed to keep several posts on the boards of publicly-owned corporation.[112]

(U) But in October, much to the chagrin of the Senat, Schackow was placed under arrest, charged with abuse of official position, embezzlement and bribe-taking to the tune of DM 3 million. If this was not embarrassment enough, a bribery investigation against the CDU Mayor of the Tiergarten district (Quell) was reopened, and the CDU Parliamentary Caucus leader, Dankward Buwitt, was discovered somehow to have had new heating equipment installed in his house without paying for it.[113]

b.(U) Legal Proceedings. On 25 April Antes went on trial, making the novel defense that he had in fact accepted money from Franke, but had not let himself be bribed with it. Hermann's trial followed on 21 August. Putsch was tried elsewhere, and Franke escaped the law altogether on grounds of poor health.

(U) By the end of the year, both Antes and Putsch had been convicted and sentenced. In early November, Putsch received 2 years imprisonment, and on 12 December Antes was given a jail term of 5 years. Hermann's sentence of 27 months came on 27 January 1987.

c.(C) Implications of the Scandal. As noted, the von Weizsaeker and Diepgen administrations (the latter until the beginning of 1986) had made some progress in building an image of greater probity. The construction scandal set this effort back, and reconfirmed all the older preconceptions about the "Berlin swamp." As a result, it had a potentially negative impact on West Berlin's efforts to attract business by discouraging reputable companies from wanting to

operate in such an unsavory environment. It also ended Diepgen's political honeymoon with both the media and the West Berlin public, as he conveyed an image of utmost irresolution by dawdling for 3 months prior to taking action--and then only under political duress.

(U) As of the time of this writing (January 1988), the scandal is not a current political theme, but rather a festering memory. Provided nothing new arises, the real setback to Berlin viability can prove quite limited and transitory. Yet, in a context of a sharper questioning in the FRG of support for West Berlin, the city can ill-afford such affairs in the future.

NOTES TO PART TWO

1. For example, STATE 325496, 23 October 1985, SECRET.

2. STATE 091656, 25 March 1986, SECRET.

3. Interview, DCS-PM and USBER Public Safety, CONFIDENTIAL. The information itself was top secret. It is referred to in US Intra-Berlin no. 129, 27 March 1986, SECRET.

4. USBER 0956, 12 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

5. USBER 0987, 3 April 1986, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE.

6. Interview, DCS-PM and USBER Public Safety, CONFIDENTIAL.

7. USBER 1018/1, SECRET/TERREP EXC.

8. USBER 1028, 6 April 1986, SECRET.

9. USBER 1048, 7 April 1986, SECRET.

10. BONN 011031, 8 April 1986.

11. STATE 109235/01, 9 April 1986.

12. USBER 1128/1, 11 April 1986,SECRET.

13. New York Times, 13 April 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

14. USBER 3687, 29 October 1986, SECRET.

15. USBER 1018/1, 5 April 1986, SECRET/TERREP EXC.

16. British Intra-Berlin no. 144, 10 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. USBER 1394, 30 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 1833, 6 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; US Intra-Berlin no. 237, 9 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

20. USBER 303, 18 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

21. USBER 3035, 9 September 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

22. EMBERLIN 001011, 28 March 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

23. EMBERLIN 001022, 1 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

24. Ambassador Meehan made these his points in meetings of 6 April and 18 April

1986. EMBBERLIN 001101/01, 6 April 1986, SECRET; EMBBERLIN 001262/01, 18 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL. The same bluntness characterized US talks with GDR officials in Washington. See, for example, conversation of 18 April 1986, in STATE 119984/01, 19 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

25. EMBBERLIN 001101/01, 6 April 1986, SECRET: EMBBERLIN 001262/01, 19 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; STATE 119984/01, 19 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

26. EMBBERLIN 001352, 24 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; EMBBERLIN 001656, 20 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; EMBBERLIN 001681/01, 22 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

27. EMBBERLIN 0010101, 6 April 1986, SECRET; STATE 119984/01, 19 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

28. USBER 1949, 20 June 1986, SECRET.

29. EMBBERLIN 002565, 5 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

30. USBER 1251, 21 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

31. British Intra-Berlin no. 178, 25 April, 1986 ,CONFIDENTIAL; STATE 131564, 26 April 1986, SECRET; USBER 1347, 28 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

32. Der Tagesspiegel, 7 May 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

33. USBER 4214, 11 December 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

34. EMBBERLIN 094091, 10 December 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

35. EMBBERLIN, 001701/01,23 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

36. EMBBERLIN 001720/01, 26 May 19896, CONFIDENTIAL.

37. EMBBERLIN 001705, 23 May 19086, CONFIDENTIAL; British Intra-Berlin no. 221, 23 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

38. USBER 1640, 26 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

39. USBER 1641, 24 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 1643, 26 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

40. US Intra-Berlin no. 219, 30 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; STATE 171180, 31 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; BONN 035514/01, 4 November 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

41. EMBBERLIN 001720/01, 26 May 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; STATE 169747, 30 May 1986, SECRET;BONN 035514/01 4 November 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

42. EMBBERLIN 00000, 7 June 1986, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE; USBER 1923, 18 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 1934, 19 June 1986,CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 1981, 23 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

43. HAGUE 004098, 2 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

44. OSLO 003598, 6 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

45. BONN 035514/01, 4 November 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

46. MOSCOW 005212, 7 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

47. BONN 024762/01, 7 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

48. EMBBERLIN 001951, 12 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

49. USBER 1351, 10 May 1985, UNCLASSIFIED; USBER 0077, 7 January 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

50. BONN 007480/01, 14 March 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

51. BONN 009291/01, 28 March 1985.

52. STATE 078313/01, 28 March 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

53. EMBBERLIN 002078, 6 July 1985, CONFIDENTIAL: USBER 1979, 11 July 1985, CONFIDENTIAL; BONN 020158, 12 July 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

54. BONN 030093, 4 October 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

55. USBER 0579, 26 February 1986, UNCLASSIFIED; USBER 0752, 14 March 1986, UNCLASSIFIED; USBER 2195, 11 July 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 2846, 5 September 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USIS, Berlin Press Review, 2 October 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

56. USBER 0532, 26 February 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

57. BONN 001971, 18 January 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

58. NEW DELHI 002931, 4 February 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; BONN 003908, 5 February 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

59. USBER 2846, 5 September 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

60. EMBBERLIN 002740/ 01, 19 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

61. US Intra-Berlin no. 286, 6 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

62. EMBBERLIN 0031236, 18 September 1986, UNCLASSIFIED; Der Tagesspeigel, 19 September 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

63. USBER 2333, 24 July 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

64. STATE 197880, 28 June 1985, CONFIDENTIAL; BONN 01310, 3 July 1985, CONFIDENTIAL; STATE 23543, 31 July 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 2445, 1 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; British Intra-Berlin no 313, 4 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL: Bonn 025190, 9 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

65. USBER 2361, 29 July 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

66. USBER 2398, 11 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

67. Der Tagesspiegel, 6 November 1986, UNCLASSIFIED; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 December 1986, UNCLASSIFIED, USIS, Berlin Press Review, 10 December 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

68. Der Tagesspiegel, 27 September 1986, UNCLASSIED; Der Tagesspiegel, 9 October 1986, UNCLASSIFIED; Der Tagesspiegel, 11 October 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

69. USBER 1514, 31 May 1985, COMFIDENTIAL; USBER 2099/1, 19 July 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

70. USBER 2577, 4 September 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

71. USBER 2795, 24 September 1985, CONFIDENTIAL; US Intra-Berlin no 279, 27 September 1985, CONFIDENTIAL. USBER 3858/1, 24 December 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

72. US Intra-Berlin No. 00623, 19 February 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 0630, 4 March 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

73. The full text of the letter was transmitted in USBER 2934, 12 September 1986, CONFIDENTIAL. It was summarized in Der Tagesspiegel, 1 April 1987, UNCLASSIFIED.

74. BONN 026844/01, 22 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

75. BONN 030358/012, 19 September 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

76. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,29 September 1986, UNCLASSIFIED; Der Tagesspiegel, 10 and 17 October 1986, UNCLASSIFIED; USBER 3720, 28 October 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

77. USBER 3375, 16 October 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 3837, 7 November 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

78. BONN 036217, 10 November 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; BONN 03694/01, 18 November 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; BONN 038051/ 01, 29 November 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; STATE 379357/01, 16 December 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

79. Ibid.

80. USBER 4200, 11 December 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

81. British Intra-Berlin Message no. 56, 25 February 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

82. USBER 3073, 17 October 1985, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 1808, 5 June 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; BONN 02421/01, 3 August 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

83. British Intra-Berlin Message No. 56, 25 February 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

84. USBER 3073, 17 October 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

85. British Intra-Berlin no. 382, 7 October 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

86. STATE 093456/01, 28 March 1985, CONFIDENTIAL; STATE 093331/01, 28 March 1985, UNCLASSIFIED.

87. BONN 010572/01, 11 April 1985, SECRET.

88. For a copy of the agreement, see MLM Unit History, 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

89. Ibid.

90. USBER 3173, 17 September 1987, CONFIDENTIAL.

91. Interview with COL. R. Bartholomew, former Chief Controller, Berlin Air Safety Center, CONFIDENTIAL.

92. Interview, ibid; BONN 002613/01, 29 January 1985, CONFIDENTIAL.

93. The guidelines were summarized in USBER 3677, 29 October 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.; interview COL R. Bartholomew, CONFIDENTIAL.

96. USIS Memorandum of Conversation, 17 April 1984, UNCLASSIFIED.

97. The Senat study is summarized in Tuch (USIS, Bonn) to Wick 30 August 1989, UNCLASSIFIED.

98. Ibid.

99. RIAS to USBER, 23 December 1985, UNCLASSIFIED.

100. USBER 0495, 19 February 1986, LOU.

101. USBER 0495, 0653/1, 6 March 1986, LOU.

102. Ibid.; USBER 3425/1, 15 November 1985, LOU.

103. USBER 2337, 25 July 1986, CONFIDENTIAL; USBER 3001, 18 September 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

104. USBER 3939, 18 November 1986, LOU.

105. Interview, RIAS Director Robert C. Voth, July 1987.

106. USBER 0317, 31 January 1986, LOU; USBER 1008/1, 4 April 1986, CONFIDENTIAL.

107. US Director of RIAS, Patrick Nieburg, in Nieburg to Tuch, 6 June 1984, UNCLASSIFIED.

108. Berliner Morgenpost, 18 November 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

109. USBER 3617, 30 October 1987, CONFIDENTIAL.

110. Der Tagesspiegel, 1, 6 and 7 February 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

111. Der Tagesspiegel, 26 and 27 March 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

112. Der Tagesspiegel, 3, 4 and 8 July 1986, UNCLASSIFIED.

113. Der Tagesspiegel, 7, 11, 14, 21, 24 and 28 October 1986.

PART THREE

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. (U) Command Personnel and Personnel Changes.

(U) During the whole of the reporting period, Major General John H. Mitchell, who had assumed command on 27 June 1984, served as US Commander, Berlin. From 25 July 1984 until 3 June 1986, the Commanding General of the Berlin Brigade was Brigadier General Thomas N. Griffin, Jr., who was succeeded on the latter date by Brigadier General Jack D. Woodall. Colonel Jack T. Clark served the entire period as Chief of Staff. On 4 July 1985 Colonel Micheal Collins took over as Deputy Brigade Commander from Colonel Frank Adams.

2. (U) US Army Mission in Berlin.

(U) Since the early 50s, the mission of the US Army in Berlin remained unchanged: to underwrite the security of Berlin. This mission is fulfilled in three ways:

a.(U) War-fighting capacity. The presence of well-armed troops trained to fight vigorously in an urban environment has historically functioned as a deterrent to any Soviet-GDR attempt to make a quick grab for West Berlin that could have potentially created a fait-accompli. Despite vastly superior numbers, Soviet or GDR forces could not attack West Berlin with hopes of easy victory: even with relatively small numbers, a highly trained force fighting an explicitly defensive battle in an urban environment can stall a superior force for a long time and inflict such heavy casualties that any eventual Soviet or GDR "victory" would not be worth the cost--epecially inasmuch as in a war situation, the Soviets would need their troops elsewhere.

b.(U) Deterrence. US forces also defend the city through the simple fact of their presence, functioning as a symbol of US will and determination to maintain the status of the city. Implicit in this symbolism is a certain "hostage" role: any attack on the force would result in the loss of American lives and would, as a result, call into play the full power of the United States.

c.(U) Confidence Strengthening. In order for West Berlin to remain viable over the long run, both West Berliners and West Germans must be confident that the independent status of the city will not change. This psychological security is essential to population stability and economic growth. Thus, it is of great importance to reassure the West Berlin and West German publics that the United States is serious in its commitment to Berlin. One of the functions of US Army troops in Berlin is to document that commitment so as to remove any doubts as to the permanence of the status quo.

3.(U) Strength and Structure.

(U) The assigned strength of the US Command, Berlin during 1985-86 amounted to roughly 6,000 uniformed personnel--4,900 Army and 1,100 Air Force. The US Army combat force is organized around a core of 3 Infantry Battalions, supported by a tank company and an artillery battery, plus service and support units. The

Air Force units consist of an Air Base Group (in charge of operating Tempelhof Airport), and an Electronic Security Group. US Army tenant units comprise the US Army Field Station, Berlin, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, the United States Military Liaison Misssion, and the 766th Military Intelligence.

(U) The units of the US Army, Berlin units coming under USCOB authority numbered during the 1985-86 reporting period roughly 3,700 men and women--a figure that represented little change (viz., a reduction of 300) from USAB strength in the mid-sixties. "Tenant" units numbered approximately 1,200, and, as noted above, Air Force strength stood at approximately 1,100. The US community as a whole, including US government civilian employees and dependents, stood at roughly 14,400 persons. For a more specific breakdown of personnel figures, the reader is referred to Appendix 1, "Personnel Distribution, US Forces, Berlin," in which the detailed figures are shown for 31 December 1985 and 30 June 1986. Page 7 of both reports displays USAB strength in Berlin by month.

4. (U) Redesignation.

(U) Although the Brigade did not undergo any structural changes during the reporting period, one redesignation took place in connection with the Army-wide adoptation of a regimental system: Battery C, 94th Field Artillery was redesignated as Battery E, 320th Field Artillery. The new designation officially took effect on 2 October 1986; the resignation ceremony was held in Berlin on 16 October.

4. (U) US Command-Relationships.

(U) On 7 April 1983, Headquarters, United States European Command, issued an updated Directive Number 55-41, superceding ED 55-41 of 3 November 1978. This directive governed command relationships during the reporting period. It contained the following main provisions affecting the military aspects of USCOB authorities:

1) (U) that the USCOB in peacetime reports to USAREUR;

2) (U) that in peacetime the USCOB exercises coordinating authority over all US military elements assigned and deployed to Berlin;

3) (S) that in time of confrontation (for example, an access crisis) the USCOB answers directly to USCINCEUR, who takes direct operational command;

4) (S) that a USCINCEUR initiative assuming direct operational entails immediate, automatic establishment of the United States Task Force/ United States Joint Task Force, Berlin (USTF/USJTF, Berlin);

5) (S) that the USCINCEUR designates the specific elements (viz. specified Berlin-based tenant units) be included in the USTF/USJTF,Berlin, and exercises command over these elments through the USCOB, who becomes Commander USTF/USJTF, Berlin.

(U) In addition to these main provisions concerning USCOB military authori-

ties and responsibilities, the Directive gave also a statement of USCOB political functions, and of USCINCEUR and USAREUR responsibilities. The document as a whole appears in Appendix 2.

5. (U) Allied Command Arrangements.

(S) On 22 August 1986 USCINCEUR General Bernard D. Rogers signed the text of an agreement setting out new Allied command arrangements in case of threatened or actual hostilities against West Berlin. The agreement gave the Commander of LIVE OAK (viz., the USCINCEUR) coordinating responsibility for all Berlin-related military activities outside Berlin during a transition period up to appointment of a "Single Commander, Berlin," and coordinating responsibility both inside and outside the city once the Single Commander had been appointed. It was agreed, moreover, that this Single Commander would be the USCOB.

(S) These allied command arrangements were the logical consequence of the agreement in 1983 on a joint Allied defense plan for Berlin, "EPIC EAGLE." (Before this plan was worked out, each of the Allies had a separate plan for defense of their own sectors.) Without agreement that the USCOB would become Single Commander, this responsibility would have fallen by chance to whomever at the moment of crisis happened to be Chairman of the Commandants-in-Committee.

(U) The text of the agreement on Allied Command Arrangements is reproduced in Appendix 3.

6.(U) Plans

(U) At the end of 1983 a decision was made to reexamine all operational plans, and to revise them as needed, so as to reflect current conditions, capabilities, and coordination with the Allies in Allied Staff Berlin and Live Oak. In connection with this overall reexamination, in 1986 a total of 6 plans were published after reworking. These plans are shown in the following figure.

Plans Published, 1986

Secret OPLAN 1000 (U), 18 March 1986, Defense of Key Installations (S)
Secret OPLAN 1300 (U), 5 February 1986, Unilateral Defense of US Sector (S)
Confidential OPLAN 1400 A (U), 26 June 1986, General Defense (C)
Draft Confidential OPLAN 2300 (U), 1 June 1986, US Unilateral Relief/ Release Operations (C)
Confidential OPLAN 3110 (U), 23 May 1986, Community Transition (C)
Unclassified OPLAN 8100 (U), 5 February 1986, Counterterrorism (U)

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a. (S) Coordinating Plans Revisions. Generally speaking, British and French input is peripheral to changes in US plans, which are essentially unilateral. The reason that unilateral planning can be carried out is that the joint plan

"EPIC EAGLE" parcels out responsiblities for each of the Allies to fulfill. How they fulfill these responsibilities is the prerogative of each Ally individually, although any matters that touch upon another Allied sector or another Allied plan are naturally discussed in the framework of the Allied Staff Berlin, or of the troop commanders meetings and the Commandants-in-Committee. Also, any issues mutually affecting the three allies are regularly discussed in these forums.

b.(U) Plans Revision: Gaming. In order to assess the need for plan changes, a mechanism must exist for exercising current plans in scenarios that reflect current military and political conditions in Berlin. One of the chief such mechanisms is war gaming done at both the inter-Allied level and within the Commmand. The major such games are the TCRP (Tactical Command Readiness Program) and the CPX (Command Post Exercise) games. The TCRPs involve the very most senior officers in Berlin (including the Ministers) and their immediate staffs. The CPXs involve the Commanding Generals and their battle staffs. Both games are played in both inter-Allied and US-only variants.

(U) The aim of the games, as noted, is to test current plans by exercising them in scenarios that reflect the realities of the Berlin environment. In the course of the gaming, questions inevitably arise which must then be answered by responsible parties. As needed, these answers, coupled with discussions and observations of game participants, form the basis of plan amendments, or potentially, wholesale plan revisions.

c. (U) Innovation: Allied TCRP. The TCRP games were introduced to Berlin in 1983. They are played out in two sessions. In the first session the leader of the game is the Chief of Staff. The second session is led by the USCOB and the Minister. The advantage of the two-session approach is that the first-session, Chief of Staff games permit scenarios to be improved, and issues to be raised and refined, before the start of the second-session, COB/Minister games.

(S) In October 1986 a major innovation occurred in the holding, under US auspices, of the first inter-Allied games. Like the US-only games, these involved a Chiefs-of-Staff session and a COBs/Ministers session. The joint games provided a valuable means not only of testing unilateral US plans, but also gave all parties a chance mutually to exercise, and to amend as necessary, their joint plan, "EPIC EAGLE."

7.(U) Force Modernization

(C) At the same time as the Berlin Brigade has not increased in numbers, its combat effectiveness has steadily improved with the introduction of better weapons systems employing advanced technologies. Among the systems which arrived during the 1985-86 reporting period were the Stinger Guided Missle System (which proved its effectiveness against Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan), the Copperhead precision guided artillery shell, a computerized fire control system for the Brigade Artillery Battery, the TOW II Heavy Antitank System, and the SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon). Together with a Combat-in-Cities training emphasis, (see below), these sorts of weapons give relatively small numbers of

troops a significant ability to hold off far larger forces in a defensive combat fought on urban terrain. In particular, weapons like the Copperhead and TOW would make mechanized operations--already difficult because of urban terrain factors--exceedingly costly for an aggressor. The following figure summarizes major weapons improvements made in 1985-86.

MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS FIELDED IN BERLIN 1985-86

~~(S)~~ Stinger/ Guided Missle System HHC Bln Bde; ADA PLT	96 Total
~~(S)~~ Copperhead/ Precision Guided Artillery Shell	54 Total
~~(S)~~ AN/TAS-5 Dragon Night Sight 502nd Inf	27 Total
~~(C)~~ AN/GYK-29 / Battery Computer System C Battery, 94th FA (redesignated October 1986 to E Battery, 320th FA)	2 Total
~~(C)~~ TOW II / Heavy Antitank Weapons Systems 502nd Inf	All Missles
(U) GEMSS, M128 / Mine Scattering System Engr Co.	1 Total
~~(C)~~ Squad Automatic Weapon / Lightweight Machine Gun 502nd Inf.	162 Total

8.(U) Training.

(U) The training regime of the Berlin Brigade was determined by the special situation of Berlin. Unlike other units in USAREUR, the emphasis of the Brigade's training was not conventional warfare, but Combat-in-Cities. This emphasis is designed to give the Brigade the skills needed, in conjunction with high-quality weapons systems, to maximize the advantages that numerically inferior forces possess when conducting defensive combat in cities. Central to such urban-warfare training are exercises conducted in Doughboy City, a mock urban battlefield built in 1975.

(U) At the same time, conventional skills were not neglected. These were sharpened during frequent training visits to NATO training sites in West Germany, Italy and Crete (where the Air Defense Singer Platoon participates in the annual USAREUR Live Fire Evaluation.) Also, because of restraints on the firing of heavy munitions in Berlin, the Brigade's artillery and tank units conduct live fire training at Grafenwoehr and Bergen-Muenster.

(U) As has been the case since its introduction in 1976, training activities were scheduled according to a blocking system, so named because of colored blocks shown on the training calendar. This system was devised to resolve the conflicting demands on training time by blocking types of training into dedicated periods. During the blue block period, priority was given to individual training and education. During the yellow block period, units trained at below the battalion level. The green block, devoted to battalion level tasks, was the time when major unit exercises took place. The red blocks (which encompassed the Christsmas and parade seasons) were times when no training took place.

(U) The blocked time allocation for the reporting period is shown in Appendix 4, where the 1985-86 training calendars are reproduced. These calendars also detail the training activities that took place, the units involved, and the dates.

9. (U) DM Budget, 1985-86.

(U) In Berlin, the United States pays salary and weapons costs of American troops and GS employees. Other upkeep costs, such as housing, utilities, office equipment and maintenance, are financed by the FRG government through the Occupation Cost Budget. In German Fiscal Year 1985, this support from the FRG amounted to DM 462,718.8 million. In Fiscal Year 1986, the figure stood at DM 486,466.3 million.

(U) For a specific breakdown of the Occupation Cost Budget, the reader is referred to Appendix 5. It suffices here merely to point out that this budget comprises a substantial financial contribution from the West German authorities which at least partially balances the strategic risk the Allies accept by stationing troops in such an exposed, forward location as Berlin. It also contributes to the maintenance of services, facilities and housing of a generally highest quality.

APPENDICES

US ARMY BERLIN PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT AS OF 31 DEC 85

MTOE UNITS	MTOE/TDA AUTH STR OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL	ASSGD STR OFF	FEM	WO	ENL	FEM	TOTAL	FEM	% of AUTH
HHC 4th Bn, 502 Inf	15	3	148	166	15		3	175		193		116
CO A	6		140	146	6			136		142		98
CO B	6		140	146	6			129		135		92
CO C	6		140	146	7			137		144		99
CSC	5		94	99	5			107		112		113
TOTAL 4/502	38	3	662	703	39		3	684		726		103
HHC 5th Bn, 502 Inf	15	3	148	166	12		3	164		179		108
CO A	6		140	146	5			127		132		90
CO B	6		140	146	5			136		141		97
CO C	6		140	146	5			131		136		93
CSC	5		94	99	4			110		114		115
TOTAL 5/502	38	3	662	703	31		3	668		702		100
HHC 6th Bn, 502 Inf	15	3	148	166	17		3	181		201		121
CO A	6		140	146	6			125		131		90
CO B	6		140	146	6			127		133		91
CO C	6		140	146	6			129		135		92
CSC	5		94	99	5			109		114		115
TOTAL 6/502	38	3	662	703	40		3	671		714		102
C Btry, 94th FA	8		199	207	7			215		222		107
CO F, 40th Armor	6	1	134	141	7		1	146		154		109
42d Engr Co	5	1	149	155	6		1	152		159		103
43d Chem Det	1		20	21	1			19	1	20	1	95
HHC CO CSB (H&S)	15	2	43	60	18	1	2	53	9	73	10	122
A Co CSB (S&T)	2		27	29	2	1		21	1	23	2	79
B Co CSB (Maint)	1	1	26	28	1		1	31	1	33	1	118
C Co CSB (Admin)	7	3	66	76	7	4	3	72	19	82	23	108
D Co CSB (Med)			1	1				1		1		100
Helmstedt Spt Det	2		28	30	2			27		29		97
TOTAL CSB TOE UNITS	47	8	693	748	51	6	8	737	31	796	37	106

US ARMY BERLIN PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT AS OF 31 DEC 85

MTOE UNITS	MTOE/TDA AUTH STR				ASGD STR							
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL	OFF	FEM	WO	ENL	FEM	TOTAL	FEM	% of AUTH
TOE UNITS (HHC)												
HHC BBDE (SEP)	60	6	153	219	69	2	8	184	29	261	31	119
USCOB	21	1	34	56	23	2	1	38	6	62	8	111
76th CHEM DET	2		8	10	2			7	1	9	1	90
287th MP CO (SEP)	5		173	178	5	2		161	19	166	21	93
TOTAL HHC TOE UNITS	88	7	368	463	99	6	9	390	55	498	61	108
298th ARMY BAND		1	40	41			1	37	3	38	3	93
TDA UNITS (HHC)												
HHC BBDE (AUG)	12	1	41	54	13	1	1	49	4	63	5	117
287th MP Co (AUG)	3		30	33	3	2		41	3	44	5	133
SIG SPT CO	4	2	110	116	3		2	135	16	140	16	121
TOTAL HHC TDA UNITS	19	3	181	203	19	3	3	225	23	247	26	122
TOTAL USAB	268	28	3268	3564	279	15	30	3412	112	3721	127	104

NON-BDE UNITS PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT AS OF 31 DEC 85

UNITS	TDA AUTH STR				ASGD STR							
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL	OFF	FEM	WO	ENL	FEM	TOTAL	FEM	% OF AUTH
H&S Co	23	4	232	259	23	3	4	249	47	276	50	107
Co A	2	3	255	260	4	1	3	275	87	282	88	108
Co B	7	12	231	250	4	3	12	230	47	246	50	98
Inst Mgmt TM Berlin			2	2				1		1		50
Config MGMT TM Berlin			1	1				1	1	1	1	100
USASSD FSB	1		3	4	1			2		3		75
TOTAL USAFSB	33	19	724	776	32	7	19	758	182	809	189	104
USAISC	2	1	120	123	2		2	126	15	130	15	106
USMLM	11		26	37	12			33	2	45	2	122
766th MI Det (SEP)	4	3	23	30	5	1	1	29	2	35	3	116
766th MI Det (AUG)			4	4				3		3		75
TOTAL 766th MI Det	4	3	27	34	5	1	1	32	2	38	3	112
MEDDAC	49	1	96	146	49	18	1	108	29	158	47	108
DENTAC	8		12	20	9			12	4	21	4	105
168th Medical Det	1		6	7	1			6	2	7	2	100
Medical Hold	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
TOTAL USAH	58	1	114	173	59	18	1	127	35	187	53	108
USASSD	2		2	4	2			2	1	4	1	100
TOTAL NON-BDE UNITS	110	24	1013	1147	112	26	23	1078	237	1213	263	106

US ARMY BERLIN GRADE STRUCTURE AS OF 31 DEC 85

UNIT	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	WO	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3	E2	E1	TOTAL	
HHC 4th Bn, 502 Inf				1	1	7	4	2	3	1	2	11	14	50	80	9	3	5	193	
A Co						1	2	3			1	4	11	31	55	14	13	7	142	
B Co						1	3	2			1	6	11	24	53	15	8	11	135	
C Co						1	3	3			1	3	12	28	60	13	13	7	144	
CSC						1	4				1	1	11	20	61	7	5	1	112	
TOTAL 4/502				1	1	11	16	10	3	1	6	25	59	153	309	58	42	31	726	
HHC 5th Bn, 502 Inf				1	1	4	6		3	1	2	11	11	44	69	10	7	9	179	
A Co						1	2	2			1	3	10	22	56	11	12	12	132	
B Co						1	3	1				3	10	34	46	12	18	13	141	
C Co						1	1	3			1	2	16	27	55	9	10	11	136	
CSC						1	3				1	3	8	21	46	11	6	14	114	
TOTAL 5/502				1	1	8	15	6	3	1	5	22	55	148	272	53	53	59	702	
HHC 6th Bn, 502 Inf				1	2	7	5	2	3	1	3	12	21	38	84	9	6	7	201	
A Co						1	3	2				3	7	29	55	15	8	8	131	
B Co						2	3	1			1	2	16	17	66	12	9	4	133	
C Co						1	4	1			1	2	11	26	62	13	6	8	135	
CSC						1	4				1	2	10	22	56	12	6		114	
TOTAL 6/502				1	2	12	19	6	3	1	6	21	65	132	323	61	35	27	714	
C Btry, 94th FA						2	4	1			1	8	24	41	112	9	14	6	222	
Co F, 40th Armor						1	2	4	1		2	3	20	40	47	14	8	12	154	
42d Engr Co						1	3	2	1		2	4	17	48	53	12	6	10	159	
43d Chem Det						1							1	6	11	1			20	
HHC Co CSB (H&S)				1	5	4	8		2	1	4	9	5	12	20	1		1	73	
A Co CSB (S&T)						2					1	3	1	6	8	1		1	23	
B Co CSB (MAINT)						1			1		2	8	2	8	9	1	1		33	
C Co CSB (ADMIN)					1	2	3	1	3		6	7	6	23	25	1	3	1	82	
D Co CSB (MED)															1				1	
HELMSTEDT SPT DET					1		1					2	4	8	9	4			29	Incl 2
TOTAL CSB TOE Units				1	7	14	21	8	8	1	18	44	80	192	295	44	32	31	796	

US ARMY BERLIN GRADE STRUCTURE AS OF 31 DEC 85

UNIT	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	WO	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3	E2	E1	TOTAL
HHC, BBde (SEP)		1	2	12	18	25	11		8	4	14	21	24	46	40	14	17	4	261
USCOB	1		3	4	6	7	2		1	1	2	6	9	10	8	1	1		62
76th CHEM DET						1		1				3		3	1				9
287th MP Co (SEP)						1	3	1			1	3	14	43	70	10	7	13	166
TOTAL HHC TOE Units	1	1	5	16	24	34	16	2	9	5	17	33	47	102	119	25	25	17	498
298th Army Band									1		1	4	19	9	3	1			38
HHC BBde (AUG)				2	1	4	4	2	1		1	9	17	16	6				63
287th MP Co (AUG)					1	1	1						10	23	7			1	44
US Army Sig Spt Co						2		1	2		1	6	13	43	58	12	2		140
TOTAL HHC TDA UNITS				2	2	7	5	3	3		2	15	40	82	71	12	2	1	247
TOTAL USAB	1	1	5	22	37	86	92	35	30	9	55	164	365	818	1392	254	189	166	3721

NON-BDE UNITS BERLIN GRADE STRUCTURE AS OF 31 DEC 85

UNIT	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	WO	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3	E2	E1	TOTAL
H&S Co FSB			2	1	7	10	3		4	3	12	33	48	77	65	7	4		276
Co A						2	2		3		2	15	42	122	86	7	1		282
Co B						1	3		12		3	17	45	72	81	12			246
Inst Mgmt TM Berlin													1						1
Config MGMT TM Berlin													1						1
USASSD FSB								1				1		1					3
TOTAL USAFSB			2	1	7	13	8	1	19	3	17	66	137	272	232	26	5		809
USAISC					1		1		2	1	3	7	18	40	45	11	1		130
USMLM			1		10	1					1	3	12	8	9				45
766th MI DET (SEP)				1	1	3			1		2	2	10	10	4			1	35
766th MI DET (AUG)													1	1	1				3
TOTAL 766th MI DET				1	1	3			1		2	2	11	11	5			1	38
MEDDAC			3	3	14	25	3	1	1		2	12	16	31	44	1	1	1	158
DENTAC			1	2	3	3						1	3	3	5				21
168th Medical Det						1							1	4	1				7
Medical Hold																		1	1
TOTAL USAH			4	5	17	29	3	1	1		2	13	20	38	50	1	1	2	187
USASSD						1	1					1		1					4
TOTAL NON-BDE UNITS			7	7	36	47	13	2	23	4	25	92	198	370	341	38	7	3	1213

US ARMY BERLIN, PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT GRADE STRUCTURE
AND TOTAL STRENGTH 31 DEC 85 AND PRECEDING EIGHT MONTHS

TOTAL STRENGTH MONTH	MTOE/TDA OFF	MTOE/TDA WO	AUTH ENL	STR TOTAL	OFF (FEM)	WO	ASSIGNED STRENGTH ENL (FEM)	TOTAL (FEM)	% OF AUTH
MAR	265	27	3252	3544	282 (14)	30	3299 (94)	3611 (108)	102
APR	265	28	3252	3545	279 (13)	30	3328 (92)	3637 (108)	103
MAY	265	28	3252	3545	277 (13)	29	3271 (93)	3577 (106)	101
JUN	265	28	3252	3545	272 (14)	26	3243 (95)	3541 (109)	100
JUL	265	28	3252	3545	271 (14)	31	3224 (94)	3526 (107)	99
AUG	265	28	3252	3545	279 (14)	31	3236 (99)	3546 (107)	100
SEP	267	28	3258	3553	275 (14)	31	3266 (110)	3572 (124)	101
OCT	268	28	3268	3564	287 (14)	31	3369 (108)	3687 (122)	103
NOV	268	28	3268	3564	286 (14)	30	3410 (113)	3726 (127)	103
DEC	268	28	3268	3564	279 (15)	30	3412 (112)	3721 (127)	104

GRADE STRUCTURE USAB

OFFICER	AUTH	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAJ GEN	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
BRIG GEN	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
COLONEL	4	5	5	7	6	6	6	6	6	5	5
LT COLONEL	23	20	20	20	20	20	21	20	20	21	22
MAJOR	40	33	34	35	33	33	36	36	37	37	37
CAPTAIN	82	95	90	85	80	80	84	84	90	92	86
LIEUTENANT	104	127	128	128	131	130	130	127	132	129	127
WARRANT	27	30	30	29	26	31	31	31	31	30	30
TOTAL OFFICERS	282	312	309	306	298	302	310	306	318	316	309
ENLISTED											
E-9	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9
E-8	56	46	47	45	47	48	48	53	57	58	55
E-7	168	183	178	178	178	177	173	178	174	172	164
E-6	376	375	380	374	372	356	351	341	355	359	365
E-5	614	760	772	785	813	802	778	775	803	817	818
E-4	1143	1487	1532	1490	1451	1432	1464	1458	1420	1399	1392
E-3 - E-1	908	438	409	389	372	399	412	452	551	596	609
TOTAL ENLISTED	3274	3299	3328	3271	3243	3224	3236	3266	3369	3410	3412

US COMMUNITY PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION AS OF 31 DEC 85

	OFFICER/WO		ENLISTED		TOTAL		CIVILIANS		OFF DUTY MILITARY	
	AUTH	ASSGD	AUTH	ASSGD	AUTH	ASGD	ASGD		EMPLOYED	
USAB	268/28	279/30	3268	3412	3564	3721	DAC (ESP)	39	ARMY	66
USAF	91/0	88/0	1020	1031	1111	1123	DAC (APP)	80	AIR FORCE	44
							DOD	113		
NON-BDE & MISC UNITS	110/24	113/23	1013	1110	1147	1246	DAC-(NAF)	269		
							DAFC (APP)	32		
							DAFC (NAF)	99		
TOTALS	469/52	480/53	5301	5553	5822	6090		632		

	Residing in Government Quarters						Residing in Economy Quarters					
DEPENDENTS	MILITARY		CIVILIANS		TOTAL		MILITARY		CIVILIANS		TOTAL	
	Spons	FM	Spons	FM	Spons	FM	Spons	FM	Spons	FM	Spons	FM
Army	2000	5266	118	301	2118	5567	588	840	43	101	631	941
Air Force	368	963	23	40	391	1003	196	226	10	18	206	244
TOTAL	2368	6229	141	341	2509	6570	784	1066	53	119	837	1185

OFFICIAL U.S. MILITARY COMMUNITY

Military*	6090
State Department/USIA	44
Civilian	632
Family Members	7755
GRAND TOTAL	14,521

*Includes all USMLM, Navy, Air Force Personnel

US ARMY BERLIN PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT AS OF 30 JUN 86

MTOE UNITS	MTOE/TDA OFF	MTOE/TDA WO	AUTH ENL	STR TOTAL	ASSGD STR OFF	FEM	WO	ENL	FEM	TOTAL	FEM	% of AUTH
HHC 4th Bn, 502 Inf	15	3	147	165	15		3	156		174		105
CO A	6		140	146	6			128		134		92
CO B	6		140	146	5			129		134		92
CO C	6		140	146	5			128		133		91
CSC	5		94	99	5			105		110		111
TOTAL 4/502	38	3	661	702	36		3	646		685		98
HHC 5th Bn, 502 Inf	15	3	147	165	15		3	151		169		102
CO A	6		140	146	7			122		129		88
CO B	6		140	146	8			126		134		92
CO C	6		140	146	7			124		131		90
CSC	5		94	99	5			103		108		110
TOTAL 5/502	38	3	661	702	42		3	626		671		96
HHC 6th Bn, 502 Inf	15	3	147	165	18		3	171		192		116
CO A	6		140	146	4			122		126		86
CO B	6		140	146	5			124		129		88
CO C	6		140	146	6			125		131		89
CSC	5		94	99	5			89		94		95
TOTAL 6/502	38	3	661	702	38		3	631		672		96
C Btry, 94th FA	8		199	207	7			189		196		95
CO F, 40th Armor	6	1	134	141	8		1	140		149		106
42d Engr Co	5	1	149	155	4		1	153		158		102
43d Chem Det	1		20	21	1			19	1	20	1	95
HHC CO CSB (H&S)	14	2	43	59	18	1	2	51	8	71	9	120
A Co CSB (S&T)	2		27	29	1	0		28	4	29	4	100
B Co CSB (Maint)	1	1	26	28	1		1	36	1	38	1	136
C Co CSB (Admin)	7	3	63	73	9	4	3	67	19	79	23	108
D Co CSB (Med)			3	3				2		2		67
Helmstedt Spt Det	2		28	30	2			28		30		100
TOTAL CSB TOE UNITS	46	8	692	746	51	5	8	713	33	772	38	103

US ARMY BERLIN PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT AS OF 30 JUN 86

MTOE UNITS	MTOE/TDA AUTH STR				ASGD STR							
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL	OFF	FEM	WO	ENL	FEM	TOTAL	FEM	% of AUTH
TOE UNITS (HHC)												
HHC BBDE (SEP)	60	6	153	219	70	3	10	174	23	254	26	116
USCOB	21	1	32	54	21	1	1	36	4	58	5	107
76th CHEM DET	2		8	10	1			6	1	7	1	70
287th MP CO (SEP)	5		173	178	5	2		163	23	168	25	94
TOTAL HHC TOE UNITS	88	7	366	461	97	6	11	379	51	487	57	106
298th ARMY BAND		1	40	41			1	37	3	38	3	93
TDA UNITS (HHC)												
HHC BBDE (AUG)	12	1	45	58	13	2	1	51	4	65	6	112
287th MP Co (AUG)	3		32	35	3	2		33	2	36	4	103
SIG SPT CO	4	2	107	113	3		2	128	19	133	19	118
TOTAL HHC TDA UNITS	19	3	184	206	19	4	3	212	25	234	29	114
TOTAL USAB	267	28	3265	3560	283	15	32	3244	112	3559	127	100

NON-BDE UNITS PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT AS OF 30 JUN 86

UNITS	TDA AUTH STR				ASGD STR							
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL	OFF	FEM	WO	ENL	FEM	TOTAL	FEM	% OF AUTH
H&S Co	18	4	203	225	21	4	4	242	48	267	52	119
Co A	2	3	254	259	2		2	258	89	262	89	101
Co B	7	12	203	222	5	1	12	209	41	226	42	102
Inst Mgmt TM Berlin			2	2				2		2		100
Config MGMT TM Berlin			1	1				1	1	1	1	100
USASSD FSB	1		3	4	1			2		3		75
TOTAL USAFSB	28	19	666	713	29	5	18	714	179	761	184	107
766th MI Det (SEP)	4	3	23	30	6	1	3	34	2	43	3	143
766th MI Det (AUG)			4	4				5		5		125
TOTAL 766th MI Det	4	3	27	34	6	1	3	39	2	48	3	141
USASSD	2		2	4	3			2	1	5	1	125
MEDDAC	49	1	96	146	49	18	1	96	29	146	47	100
DENTAC	8		12	20	8			11	4	19	4	95
168th Medical Det	1		6	7	1			7	2	8	2	114
Medical Hold	0	0	0	0				1		1		0
TOTAL USAH	58	1	114	173	58	18	1	115	35	174	53	101
USMLM	11		26	37	12			31	2	43	2	116
USAISC	2	1	119	122	2		2	115	15	119	15	98
TOTAL NON-BDE UNITS	105	24	954	1083	110	24	24	1016	234	1150	258	106

US ARMY BERLIN GRADE STRUCTURE AS OF 30 JUN 86

UNIT	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	WO	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3	E2	E1	TOTAL
HHC 4th Bn, 502 Inf				2	2	5	3	3	3	1	1	11	12	50	68	9	3	1	174
A Co						1	1	4				4	13	29	47	25	7	3	134
B Co						1	1	3			1	5	14	27	47	19	8	8	134
C Co						1	2	2			1	3	13	32	46	27	3	3	133
CSC						1	4				1	2	12	21	53	10	4	2	110
TOTAL 4/502				2	2	9	11	12	3	1	4	25	64	159	261	90	25	17	685
HHC 5th Bn, 502 Inf				2	2	6	4	1	3	1	2	11	15	32	68	11	5	6	169
A Co						2	2	3			1	2	14	30	39	16	15	5	129
B Co						1	3	4			1	3	15	26	38	23	9	11	134
C Co						1	2	4			1	2	13	26	39	22	12	9	131
CSC						1	3	1			1	3	10	23	38	10	14	4	108
TOTAL 5/502				2	2	11	14	13	3	1	6	21	67	137	222	82	55	35	671
HHC 6th Bn, 502 Inf				1	2	5	8	2	3	1	3	7	21	41	77	10	5	6	192
A Co						1	2	1				3	12	29	52	20	6		126
B Co						1	2	2			1	2	11	31	61	14	4		129
C Co						1	2	3			1	2	14	36	52	11	7	2	131
CSC						1	4				1	4	8	18	48	6	3	1	94
TOTAL 6/502				1	2	9	18	8	3	1	6	18	66	155	290	61	25	9	672
C Btry, 94th FA						1	4	2			1	8	21	54	78	24	1	2	196
Co F, 40th Armor						2	3	3	1		1	5	19	38	50	19	7	1	149
42d Engr Co						1	2	1	1		1	4	17	47	54	21	5	4	158
43d Chem Det							1						2	7	9	1			20
HHC Co CSB (H&S)				1	4	5	7	1	2	1	4	6	12	9	18			1	71
A Co CSB (S&T)						1					1	6	2	9	7	2	1		29
B Co CSB (MAINT)						1			1		2	10	7	9	7	1			38
C Co CSB (ADMIN)					2	2	3	2	3		3	5	7	20	25	5	2		79
D Co CSB (MED)													1		1				2
HELMSTEDT SPT DET					1		1					3	5	8	12				28
TOTAL CSB TOE Units				1	7	13	21	9	8	1	13	47	93	201	261	73	14	10	772

US ARMY BERLIN GRADE STRUCTURE AS OF 30 JUN 86

UNIT	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	WO	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3	E2	E1	TOTAL
HHC, BBde (SEP)		1	1	14	17	28	8	1	10	5	13	19	23	43	47	20	3	1	254
USCOB	1		3	4	5	7	1		1	1	2	6	8	10	6	2		1	58
76th CHEM DET						1						3		2	1				7
287th MP Co (SEP)						1	2	2			1	4	16	51	69	16	3	3	168
TOTAL HHC TOE Units	1	1	4	18	22	37	11	3	11	6	16	32	47	106	123	38	6	5	487
298th Army Band									1		1	3	17	11	4	1			38
HHC BBde (AUG)				1	1	4	5	2	1		1	10	20	17	3				65
287th MP Co (AUG)					1	2							5	21	7				36
US Army Sig Spt Co						2		1	2		1	6	15	43	57	5	1		133
TOTAL HHC TDA UNITS				1	2	8	5	3	3		2	16	40	81	67	5	1		234
TOTAL USAB	1	1	4	25	37	87	80	48	32	10	48	162	394	850	1228	350	126	76	3559

NON-BDE UNITS BERLIN GRADE STRUCTURE AS OF 30 JUN 86

UNIT	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	WO	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3	E2	E1	TOTAL
H&S Co FSB			2	1	8	5	3	2	4	4	11	34	47	67	68	7	3	1	267
Co A						2			2		1	12	48	141	54	2			262
Co B						4	1		12		3	15	45	63	72	8	1	2	226
Inst Mgmt TM Berlin													1		1				2
Config MGMT TM Berlin													1						1
USASSD FSB							1					1		1					3
TOTAL USAFSB			2	1	8	11	5	2	18	4	15	62	142	272	195	17	4	3	761
766th MI DET (SEP)					3	3			3		2	4	11	12	4	1			43
766th MI DET (AUG)													1	2	2				5
TOTAL 766th MI DET					3	3			3		2	4	12	14	6	1			48
USASSD					1	1	1					1		1					5
MEDDAC			3	4	18	22		2	1		4	11	18	29	29	2	2	1	146
DENTAC			1	3	2	2						1	3	3	4				19
168th Medical Det						1								5	1		1		8
Medical Hold																		1	1
TOTAL USAH			4	7	20	25		2	1		4	12	21	37	34	2	3	2	174
USMLM			1		11						1	3	10	11	5		1		43
USAISC					1		1		2	1	2	8	19	32	39	9	3	2	119
TOTAL NON-BDE UNITS			7	8	44	40	7	4	24	5	24	90	204	367	279	29	11	7	1150

US ARMY BERLIN, PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT GRADE STRUCTURE
AND TOTAL STRENGTH 30 JUN 86 AND PRECEDING EIGHT MONTHS

TOTAL STRENGTH MONTH	MTOE/TDA AUTH STR OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL	OFF (FEM)	WO	ASSIGNED STRENGTH ENL (FEM)	TOTAL (FEM)	% OF AUTH
SEP	267	28	3258	3553	275 (14)	31	3266 (110)	3572 (124)	101
OCT	268	28	3268	3564	287 (14)	31	3369 (108)	3687 (122)	103
NOV	268	28	3268	3564	286 (14)	30	3410 (113)	3726 (127)	103
DEC	268	28	3268	3564	279 (15)	30	3412 (112)	3721 (127)	104
JAN	253	28	3259	3540	287 (17)	30	3423 (113)	3740 (128)	106
FEB	253	28	3259	3540	285 (17)	30	3358 (113)	3673 (130)	104
MAR	268	28	3266	3562	288 (18)	31	3349 (113)	3668 (130)	103
APR	261	28	3265	3554	287 (17)	31	3316 (113)	3634 (130)	102
MAY	267	28	3264	3559	284 (17)	32	3241 (113)	3557 (130)	100
JUN	267	28	3265	3560	283 (15)	32	3244 (112)	3559 (127)	100

GRADE STRUCTURE USAB

OFFICER	AUTH	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAJ GEN	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1
BRIG GEN	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			1
COLONEL	4	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4
LT COLONEL	23	21	20	20	21	22	22	23	23	24	26	25
MAJOR	40	36	36	37	37	37	38	37	37	36	36	37
CAPTAIN	82	84	84	90	92	86	91	92	93	89	88	87
LIEUTENANT	104	130	127	132	129	127	129	126	129	132	128	128
WARRANT	27	31	31	31	30	30	30	30	31	31	32	32
TOTAL OFFICERS	282	310	306	318	316	309	317	315	319	318	316	315
ENLISTED												
E-9	9	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	10	10	10
E-8	56	48	53	57	58	55	49	49	48	49	46	48
E-7	168	173	178	174	172	164	162	166	166	158	158	162
E-6	376	351	341	355	359	365	378	383	388	389	386	394
E-5	614	778	775	803	817	818	825	806	814	824	815	850
E-4	1143	1464	1458	1420	1399	1392	1382	1352	1373	1349	1293	1228
E-3 - E-1	908	412	452	551	596	609	618	593	551	537	533	552
TOTAL ENLISTED	3274	3236	3266	3369	3410	3412	3423	3358	3349	3316	3241	3244

US COMMUNITY PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION AS OF 30 JUN 86

	OFFICER/WO		ENLISTED		TOTAL		CIVILIANS		OFF DUTY MILITARY	
	AUTH	ASSGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	ASGD		EMPLOYED	
USAB	267/28	283/32	3265	3244	3560	3559	DAC/DAFC	36	ARMY	63
USAF	89/0	95/0	1010	989	1099	1084	DAC (APP)	73	AIR FORCE	39
							DOD	104		
NON-BDE & MISC UNITS	106/24	111/24	984	1049	1114	1184	DAC-(NAF)	262		
							DAF/CIV	31		
							DAFC (NAF)	94		
TOTALS	462/52	489/56	5259	5282	5773	5827		600		

	Residing in Government Quarters						Residing in Economy Quarters					
DEPENDENTS	MILITARY		CIVILIANS		TOTAL		MILITARY		CIVILIANS		TOTAL	
	Spons	FM	Spons	FM	Spons	FM	Spons	FM	Spons	FM	Spons	FM
Army	2116	5415	101	257	2217	5672	537	647	68	153	605	800
Air Force	385	995	17	29	402	1024	167	190	14	27	181	217
TOTAL	2501	6401	118	286	2619	6696	704	837	82	180	786	1017

OFFICIAL U.S. MILITARY COMMUNITY

Military*	5827
State Department/USIA	44
Civilian	600
Family Members	7713
GRAND TOTAL	14,184

*Includes all USMLM, Navy, Air Force Personnel

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

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DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 55-41

APO 09128
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OPERATIONS

Responsibilities Relating to Berlin (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To define United States Military responsibilities pertaining to Berlin. This directive is applicable to all elements of USEUCOM and has been approved by JCS as it affects non-USEUCOM assigned US military forces.

2. (U) References.

a. (U) Executive Order No.10608, subj: US Authority and Functions in Germany, dated 5 May 55 (UNCLASSIFIED).

b. (U) Letter Delegation of Authority from American Ambassador to FRG to United States Commander, Berlin dated 6 Jul 81 (SECRET).

c. (U) American Embassy, Bonn, FRG Directive, subj: Mission and Organization, United States Element, Berlin Air Safety Center, dated 26 Feb 73 (UNCLASSIFIED).

d. (U) Allied Control Authority Air Directorate Document, subj: Flight Rules for Aircraft Flying in Air Corridors in Germany and the Berlin Control Zone (BCZ), dated 22 Oct 46 (UNCLASSIFIED).

e. (U) Allied Kommandatura Berlin BK/Memorandum, (73)1, subj: Allied Kommandatura Internal Procedure (U) (RESTRICTED).

f. (U) JCS Pub. 1, subj: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (UNCLASSIFIED).

g. (U) JCS Pub. 2, subj: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (UNCLASSIFIED).

h. (U) JCS Pub. 6, subj: Joint Reporting Structure (TOP SECRET).

CLASSIFIED by Multiple Sources
DECLASSIFIED ON: OADR

This directive supersedes ED 55-41, 3 Nov 78.

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i. (U) JCS SM-381-75, subj: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (Current Year) (U) (TOP SECRET).

j. (U) USCINCEUR Letter of Instruction of Chief, US Element, BASC, dated 10 Dec 68 (SECRET).

k. (U) USEUCOM Directive 25-8, subj: Disclosure of U.S. Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (U) (CONFIDENTIAL).

l. (U) USEUCOM Directive 40-1, subj: Intelligence Missions and Responsibilities (U) (SECRET).

m. (U) USEUCOM Directive 40-6, subj: Operation and Administration of EUDAC (U) (SECRET).

n. (C) USEUCOM Directive 40-13, subj: USEUCOM Participation in the Defector Program (C) (SECRET).

o. (U) USEUCOM Directive 40-18, subj: United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) (U) (SECRET).

p. (U) USEUCOM Directive 55-2, subj: Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge (UNCLASSIFIED).

q. (U) USCINCEUR CONPLAN 0300, dated 15 Feb 80 (SECRET).

r. (U) USEUCOM Directive 55-37, subj: Peacetime Reconnaissance and Certain Sensitive Operations (U) (TOP SECRET).

s. (U) USEUCOM Directive 55-45, subj: Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn Operations (U) (CONFIDENTIAL).

t. (U) USEUCOM Directive 56-4, subj: Responsibilities Relating to the Federal Republic of Germany (UNCLASSIFIED).

u. (U) European Command Operational Reporting System (EUROPREP) (SECRET).

v. (U) Commander, LIVE OAK Memorandum, subj: LIVE OAK Terms of Reference, dated 3 Jul 79 (U) (TOP SECRET).

w. (U) LIVE OAK Staff Directive No. 1-2, subj: Terms of Reference for the LIVE OAK Liaison Officers in Bonn, Germany, dated 28 Jul 80 (U) (CONFIDENTIAL).

3. ~~(S)~~ General. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States tripartitely share responsibility for the Western Sectors of Berlin and maintenance of unrestricted access thereto. Any military action of consequence involving Berlin has major political implications; hence, close contact with political authorities must be maintained. The American Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany is also the Chief of the US Mission, Berlin. Except as otherwise provided in reference a (outlined herein, the Chief of Mission has supreme authority with respect to all responsibilities, duties, and governmental functions of the United States in Berlin. He, in turn, has appointed, in reference b, the United States Commander, Berlin as his Deputy Chief of Mission. (See para 6e (1).) This reflects a recognition that military operations relating to Berlin have a direct political basis. Further, our political, and hence our military, responsiblities in Berlin are shared with our Allies; in the first instance with France and the UK, and, in a supporting role, with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Berlin city government. Success in actions relating to Berlin almost always entails coordinated bilateral, tripartite, or quadripartite action. US unilateral actions are planned in the event multinational agreement is not forthcoming.

4. (U) Policy.

a. (U) This directive is concerned solely with United States military responsiblities and actions related to Berlin by elements of USEUCOM and by non-USEUCOM military elements assigned and deployed to Berlin.

b. ~~(c)~~ USCINCEUR, as the United States Military Commander having area responsibility, has authority per reference a with respect to all military operational responsibilities, duties, and functions of the United States in Berlin including the operational command, security and maintenance of United States forces in Berlin, the assertion and exercise by those forces of United States Government (USG) rights in Berlin and discharge of the obligations of the USG in Berlin, and emergency measures which he may consider essential for their protection or the accomplishment of his mission. If action by any USEUCOM military commander affects the foreign policy of the United States or involves

elations or negotiations with non-military British, French, r German authorities, such actions will be taken only after consultation with and agreement between USCINCEUR and the Chief f Mission, or pursuant to procedures previously agreed to etween the Chief of Mission and USCINCEUR or his epresentative.

c. (S) United States Commander, Berlin (USCOB) is herein harged with responsibility for the security and maintenance f United States forces assigned and deployed to Berlin, the ssertion and exercise of their rights and discharge of their bligations therein, and emergency measures which he may con- ider essential for their protection or the accomplishment of is mission. For the purpose of meeting this responsibility n a continuing basis, all US military elements assigned or ployed to Berlin are attached to USCOB in accordance with rovisions of reference g. (See para 7b for terms of attach- ent.)

. (U) Definitions.

a. (C) Washington Ambassadorial Group (WAG). A quadri- rtite diplomatic agency composed of the Ambassadors to the ited States from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and United Kingdom, chaired by a US Assistant Secretary of te, charged with responsibility as the principal collective ltinational political planning agency in the Berlin struc- e through which respective national political decisions are rdinated to form multinational policy.

b. (S) LIVE OAK. Reference v. A tripartite (France, ted Kingdom, and United States) planning and operations ff with Federal Republic of Germany liaison, collocated SHAPE Belgium, charged with responsibility for tripartite itary contingency plans to maintain continued ground and access to the Allied Sectors of Berlin. The officer pying the position of USCINCEUR is also Commander, LIVE In the event of the Commander's absence or incapacity, officer occupying the position of Deputy Commander in t, US European Command acts in behalf of Commander, LIVE

(S) JACK PINE Command Post (JPCP). A tripartite ce, United Kingdom, and United States) command post, cated with HQ USAFE, from which CINCUSAFE, as a LIVE OAK rtite field commander, exercises operational control definition) over committed tripartite air forces

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as directed by LIVE OAK. During tripartite Berlin air access contingency operations, JPCP also coordinates all air traffic operating in and through the Berlin Air Corridors.

d. (S) -Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). As agreed by France, the UK, US, and USSR in reference d, and reaffirmed in reference c the BASC is responsible for clearing and regulating Allied military and civil flights and such other flights as may be agreed to, into and out of Berlin and within the Berlin Control Zone.

e. (S) Berlin Airlift Committee (BEALCOM). A quadripartite committee composed of civil representatives from France, the FRG, UK, US, and Berlin Senat, and military representatives from France, the FRG, UK, and US, charged with overall responsibility for planning and coordinating a Quadripartite Berlin Airlift (QBAL). During a QBAL, BEALCOM finalizes overall priorities, types and quantities of materials to be airlifted to and from Berlin, in consonance with available Allied airlift capabilities. BEALCOM is chaired by the US Civil Air Attache, American Embassy, Bonn, FRG.

f. (U) Allied Kommandatura (AK). The four-power (FR, UK, US, and USSR) military government established in 1945 to govern greater Berlin pursuant to the provisions of the London Protocols agreed to between the UK, US, and USSR in 1944-45. Since withdrawal of the USSR from participation in 1948, the AK has evolved as a tripartite (FR, UK, US) organization through which the three Western powers exercise collectively their supreme authority in the Allied Sectors of Berlin. AK orders are published in the Berlin Statute Books and have the force of law in the Allied Sectors of Berlin. The personnel of the AK's working committees are Foreign Service officers assigned to the Berlin Missions of France, the UK, and US.

g. (U) Quadripartite. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

h. (U) Tripartite. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

i. (U) Operational Command/Operational Control. US definitions of terms "operational command" and "operational control" are separate and distinct from NATO definitions of the same terms. Care must be exercised in use of these terms to insure the appropriate degree of authority is accurately addressed. To facilitate making these

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istinctions, definitional suffixes are applied herein. See eference f for specific definitions.

j. (U) Status of Berlin. Berlin is the remaining portion of Germany where the supreme authority of the four victorious allies of World War II remains in effect. By virtue of this authority, the allies are responsible for the security of the city, public order, access to the city, and the general welfare of the population. Within West Berlin much of the civil responsibility and administration to accomplish these objectives has been delegated to the Berlin City Government and the FRG.

(U) Responsibilities.

a. (U) USCINCEUR retains responsibility for:

(1) (U) Establishing policy and acting on military matters affecting foreign policy, except for those matters which have been delegated to USCOB.

(2) (S) Implementing, on a unilateral basis, contingency plans in relation to Berlin, except as otherwise delegated in USCINCEUR plans.

(3) (C) Commitment or employment of US military elements except as otherwise delegated herein.

(4) (S) Release of US military elements to operational command or operational control (NATO definitions) of allied commanders during multinational operations.

(5) (S) Exercising operational command (US definition) directly of US military elements of the US Command, Berlin United States Task Force/United States Joint Task Force (USTF/USJTF) Berlin) during periods of tension or confrontation in Berlin, or in connection with access rights to, Berlin. (See 7a.)

(6) (S) Approving following actions by US military forces either unilaterally or nationally as part of a multinational effort:

(a) (S) Scheduling convoys or trains on the ground access routes during periods of harassment by USSR/GDR forces.

(b) (S) Scheduling convoys or trains configured in a manner to create a confrontation with USSR/GDR forces.

(c) (S) Permitting changes in autobahn, rail, or air procedures established by tripartite agreements, USCINCEUR, or higher authority. (CINCUSAREUR is authorized to approve changes in procedures to provide prompt and flexible US response to minor traffic problems at Soviet checkpoints. This authority may be further delegated to USCOB.)

(d) (S) Scheduling unusually heavy convoy or air traffic that might be misinterpreted by the USSR/GDR as harassment or a test of access principles.

(e) (S) Scheduling of USAF aircraft into the corridors or control zone during periods of air harassment by USSR/GDR forces.

(f) (S) Scheduling of fighters or unusually-configured aircraft into the corridors or Berlin Control Zone.

(g) (S) Use of corridor airspace above 10,000 feet except under declared emergency conditions or as agreed upon by four-power control in the BASC.

(h) (S) US helicopter overflights of Soviet Sector of Berlin (East Berlin) and/or GDR territory.

(i) (S) Implementation of any electronic warfare measures which might be construed by USSR/GDR as harassment.

b. (U) CINCUSAREUR is responsible for:

(1) (U) Other than as noted in para 6a(5) above, command, to include operational control (US definition), of all US military elements assigned to Berlin except:

(a) (U) USAF elements assigned to Berlin under CINCUSAFE command.

(b) (S) Non-USAREUR intelligence elements.

(2) (S) Command, less operational control (organization training, logistical support, administration, and routine public affairs activities) of US Army, Berlin, when direct operational command of US military forces is exercised by USCINCEUR during periods of tension or confrontation.

(3) (S) Field coordination of US military intelligence activities in Berlin in accordance with reference 1.

(4) (U) Liaison with Commander-in-Chief, Group Soviet Forces Germany (CINCGSFG) on behalf of USCINCEUR through United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in accordance with reference o.

(5) (U) Operation of US portion of Allied Autobahn checkpoints and regulation of US traffic on Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn in accordance with provisions of reference s.

(6) (S) Unilateral and national Berlin contingency planning in support of USCINCEUR plans.

(7) (U) Reporting in accordance with references h and u.

c. (S) CINCUSNAVEUR is responsible for naval air, surface, and submarine planning and operations in the USEUCOM area as directed by USCINCEUR in support of Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures (NAVCONs).

d. (U) CINCUSAFE is responsible for:

(1) (U) Other than as noted in para 6a(5) above, command to include operational control (US definition) of USAF elements assigned to Berlin except:

(a) (S) Non-USAFE intelligence elements.

(b) (S) Under terms of attachment of USAF elements to USCOB for maintenance of status and security as specified therein. (See para 7b.)

(2) (S) Command less operational control (organization training, logisitical support, administration, and routine public affairs activities) of USAFE elements in Berlin when direct operational command or control of USAFE forces is exercised by USCINCEUR or USCOB during periods of tension or confrontation.

(3) (S) US military air operations in and through the Berlin Air Corridors, including safety of flight, installation and maintenance of specified corridor navigation aids, routine control of military air traffic, control of tactical aircraft during contingency operations, and continued operations in an ECM environment.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Planning and conducting Berlin air access operations as a LIVE OAK tripartite field commander (see para 7e).

(5) ~~(S)~~ QBAL contingency planning in support of BEALCOM.

(6) ~~(S)~~ Unilateral Berlin air access and US national air access and airlift contingency planning in support of USCINCEUR plans.

(7) (U) Reporting in accordance with references h and u.

e. (U) USCOB is responsible:

(1) ~~(S)~~ As Deputy Chief, US Mission, Berlin, to act as personal representative and in behalf of Chief, US Mission, Berlin, by virtue of authority delegated by the Chief, US Mission, Berlin. The Chief of Mission has requested the USCOB, as Deputy Chief, US Mission, Berlin, to perform the following functions:

(a) (U) Exercise, on behalf of Chief of Mission and in accordance with his policies, all of the governmental functions of the United States in the United States Sector of Berlin. In so doing, the Deputy Chief, US Mission, Berlin will safeguard the interests of the United States in Berlin and coordinate all United States agencies within the city. The Deputy Chief, US Mission, Berlin will afford advice and assistance within the capacity of his resources to stimulate progress in the economic, political, and cultural fields, and to improve the general welfare of the city.

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(b) (U) Be responsible for coordinating relations between the United States Mission and the United States Military establishment in Berlin.

(c) (U) Represent the Chief of Mission in relations with senior Allied and German officials, representatives of the press, and distinguished visitors.

(d) (U) Interpret to the Chief of Mission the condition and needs of the United States Sector of Berlin and their relationship to the accomplishment of the occupation mission.

(e) ~~(S)~~ Exercise, on behalf of the Chief of Mission, the authority of coordinating overt intelligence collection in Berlin, but without effecting any change in coordination of Foreign Service reporting.

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(f) (U) Perform such other duties as may from time time be required by the Chief of Mission.

(2) (U) As United States Commandant, to represent the ited States on the Allied Kommandatura.

(3) (S) As a LIVE OAK tripartite field commander, to an and conduct Berlin access operations as directed by mander, LIVE OAK through Allied Staff Berlin (see para 7d).

(4) (U) As United States Commander, Berlin:

(a) (C) For maintaining status and security of the US tor, Berlin (area responsibility).

(b) (U) To represent the United States European and in dealings with French and United Kingdom Commanders, lin and on the Allied Staff Berlin.

(c) (U) For exercising coordinating authority (US nition) over all US military elements assigned and deployed erlin during peacetime.

(d) (S) For exercising operational control (US nition) over designated US military elements during periods ension or confrontation in accordance with the attachment cted herein. (See para 7b.)

(e) (U) Reporting in accordance with references h .

(5) (S) As COMUSTF/USJTF, Berlin, for performing ions assigned by USCINCEUR when direct operational nd (US definition) is exercised by USCINCEUR. para 7a.)

(6) (S) For QBAL contingency planning in support LCOM.

(7) (S) For unilateral and national Berlin contingency ng in support of USCINCEUR plans to include plans for of Berlin and for maintenance of law and order.

(C) Chief, US Element LIVE OAK is responsible for coordination of LIVE OAK activities as they pertain to with USCINCEUR.

(U) USCINCEUR Contact Officer (USCCO), American Embassy, responsible:

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(1) (U) As principal representative of USCINCEUR for dealings with the American Embassy, Bonn for coordination of USCINCEUR positions with American Ambassador to FRG in military actions related to Berlin which may affect US foreign policy in accordance with provisions of reference t.

(2) ~~(C)~~ As LIVE OAK Liaison Officer in Bonn, to serve as local representative of LIVE OAK for dealing with members of the Bonn Group in multinational matters relating to military contingency plans and operations designed to maintain Allied access to Berlin in accordance with provisions of reference w as approved by USCINCEUR.

h. (U) Chief, US Element, BASC by virtue of authority in references d and j is responsible for:

(1) (U) Clearing Allied military and civil flights, as tripartitely agreed, into and out of Berlin, and within the Berlin Control Zone.

(2) (U) Providing flight information to the Soviet Element on flights cleared by the US Element.

(3) (U) Informing designated diplomatic and military authorities of incidents, protests, and statements made by the Allied and Soviet Elements.

7. (U) Procedures.

a. ~~(S)~~ USCINCEUR will exercise direct operational command (US definition) of designated military elements of the US Command, Berlin, for executing United States unilateral contingency plans and US actions within bilateral, tripartite and quadripartite plans for the employment of US military elements during periods of tension or confrontation within, or in connection with access rights to, Berlin. Assumption of direct operational command will constitute establishment of USTF/USJTF, Berlin. USCINCEUR will exercise direct operational command (US definition) through USCOB (COMUSTF/USJTF), who in turn will exercise operational control (US definition) over elements designated. The many specific events or situations which would necessitate this change in command relationships are difficult to define; therefore, USCINCEUR will announce to all headquarters concerned when he has assumed direct operational command and designate units affected. Under these circumstances, USCOB(COMUSTF/USJTF) will report directly to

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SCINCEUR, keeping the American Ambassador, CINCUSAREUR, INCUSAFE and other service parent commands (e.g. US Army ntelligence and Security Command, USAF Electronic Security ommand) informed. USCINCEUR will keep the American mbassador, JCS, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, other service arent commands, and US Element, LIVE OAK informed.

b. (S) For the purpose of maintaining the status and ecurity of Berlin, all US military elements assigned and ployed to Berlin are attached to USCOB. This attachment ll not affect routine exercise of operational control (US finition) by component commanders over component forces signed and deployed to Berlin except as noted herein. Terms attachment are:

(1) (U) USCOB will routinely exercise coordinating thority (US definition) over all US military elements in lin.

(2) (U) USCOB will specify alert states/stages for US itary elements in Berlin during times of tension and when tinely exercising coordinating authority.

(3) (S) USCOB will exercise operational control (US nition) over US military elements designated by USCINCEUR USCINCEUR assumes direct operational command (US nition) of US Command, Berlin. (see par 7a.)

(4) (S) During periods of tension or confrontation n or in connection with access rights to Berlin, USCOB when deemed essential to maintain the status and security rlin, assume operational control (US definition) of US ary elements assigned or deployed to Berlin. signation of USCOB to direct or obtain support from SEUCOM assigned US military forces is based upon rity included in reference i. USCOB will announce to all arters concerned when he has assumed operational control ich units are affected.

(S) Provisions of paras 7a and 7b are not intended iate responsibilities and missions performed through chains of command but to provide unity of command and of force during crises in and around Berlin. Bearing n mind, commanders will make every effort to perform s assigned through routine chains of command when ine assumptions of operational command or operational are made. Any conflict in guidance or direction which is not resolvable between USCOB, Berlin- elements and respective parent commands will imme- report to USCINCEUR for resolution.

d. (C) In the event instructions received directly by USCOB/US Mission Berlin (USBER) in joint Defense/State messages require military action, USCOB will make plans for immediate implementation, assuring that USCINCEUR and the American Ambassador are fully aware of such instructions, plans for their implementation, and implementing actions.

e. (S) LIVE OAK has been charged with responsibility for tripartite planning and direction of military operations concerning tripartite ground and air access to Berlin. LIVE OAK has delegated detailed planning for tripartite operations to LIVE OAK tripartite field commanders as follows:

Commander in Chief, British Army of the Rhine (CINCBAOR)	- Eastbound autobahn access
CINCBAOR	- Rail access
CINCUSAFE	- Air access
USCOB (Through Allied Staff Berlin)	- Westbound autobahn access

Upon multinational agreement by governments, the WAG authorizes LIVE OAK to conduct tripartite ground/air access operations. Concurrently, national military authorities provide forces to LIVE OAK to conduct these operations. LIVE OAK, in turn, directs operations through the respective LIVE OAK tripartite field commander. To insure properly coordinated and approved US military activity, the following procedures apply:

(1) (S) Chop of forces. When directed or as authorized by JCS, USCINCEUR will release CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE forces to operational command or operational control (NATO definitions), as appropriate, of LIVE OAK during Berlin access contingency operations and exercises. This will be accomplished as an internal US transaction without LIVE OAK involvement. Chop should occur prior to receipt of executions from LIVE OAK. In the event a LIVE OAK execution is received prior to receipt of a chop directive, USEUCOM components will contact HQ USEUCOM. Upon confirmation of National Command Authority (NCA) approval, USCINCEUR will release forces.

(2) (C) Planning: LIVE OAK may request tripartite planning support by CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, and USCOB (through Allied Staff Berlin). Supporting OPLANs will conform to JCS and USEUCOM planning guidance. CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, and USCOB OPLANs for tripartite operations will be forwarded to HQ USEUCOM for review and approval, then returned to originator for submission to LIVE OAK or other non-US headquarters.

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SCINCEUR Berlin contingency OPLANs prepared in response to SCP taskings will require preparation of CINCUSAREUR, INCUSAFE and USCOB OPLANs in support of LIVE OAK.

(3) (S) Warning, alert and deployment: JCS/USCINCEUR reparatory/alert measures within USEUCOM will be accomplished s US transactions without LIVE OAK involvement. Upon receipt f LIVE OAK warning, alert, or deployment orders in conflict ith above, component headquarters will contact HQ USEUCOM for ppropriate guidance.

(4) (C) Exercises: LIVE OAK taskings received directly CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE for participation in or plannning exercises will be passed to HQ USEUCOM with appropriate commendations. HQ USEUCOM will coordinate/support component sitions, will deal with LIVE OAK in resolution of any nflicts, and will normally authorize direct coordination and mmunication between LIVE OAK and USEUCOM components for par- cipation in each exercise.

(5) (C) All LIVE OAK matters: US national positions, inputs regarding LIVE OAK will be coordinated and warded through USCINCEUR to LIVE OAK (or US Element LIVE OAK, appropriate). The HQ USEUCOM Director of Operations, J-3, the focal point for LIVE OAK matters. Responsibility for tional planning and operations in connection with LIVE OAK tivities will remain with HQ USEUCOM. US Element, LIVE OAK ll serve as an essential bridge between national and partite planning.

f. (S) In QBAL planning, USCINCEUR is represented on the LCOM. BEALCOM has assigned QBAL Plan maintenance respon- ility to the BEALCOM Steering Committee (BSC). CINCUSAFE l represent USCINCEUR on the BSC. The channel for record unications between BEALCOM and the US Department of nse will be through USCINCEUR.

g. (S) Provisions of paras 7e and 7f are intended to re US national military coordination and approval for ons affecting US military forces which are directed within national channels. Any conflict in guidance or direction ved between multinational and US national military rity will be immediately reported to next higher US nal military headquarters in chain of operational com-

(U) Chief, US Element BASC:

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(1) (U) Routinely operates under instructions from the US Civil Air Attache, American Embassy, Bonn, FRG for matters concerning civil flight operations.

(2) (U) Routinely operates under instructions from USCINCEUR, through CINCUSAFE, for matters concerning military flight operations.

(3) (U) Will provide initial telephone report to inform USCINCEUR and LIVE OAK through CINCUSAFE, and USCOB through US Mission, Berlin of all significant incidents, protests, and statements made by the Allied and Soviet elements.

(4) (S) During periods of imminent or actual harassment of air access operates under.

(a) (S) Operational control (US definition) of CINCUSAFE until LIVE OAK assumes control over air corridor traffic.

(b) (S) Operational control (NATO definition) of CINCUSAFE through the JACK PINE CP subsequent to LIVE OAK assumption of control over air corridor traffic.

i. (C) Policy and procedural guidance for the disclosure of classified military information to representatives of foreign governments and international organizations (LIVE OAK, BEALCOM, Allied Staff Berlin, etc) is included in reference k. Disclosure of classified information by elements of USEUCOM under circumstances associated with unique nature of Berlin activities for which provision is not made in reference k will be accomplished only upon USCINCEUR approval.

j. (U) Policy and procedures for collection and dissemination of Berlin related intelligence by USEUCOM activities are included in references l, m, n, and o.

k. (C) Policy and procedures for handling requests by foreign nationals for political asylum or temporary refuge at USEUCOM activities within Berlin or aboard US military conveyances on the access routes to Berlin are included in reference p.

l. (S) Policy and procedures for employing the Berlin-based USEUCOM Anti-Terrorist Force outside of Berlin are included in reference q.

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m. (S) Policy and procedures for Berlin related reconnaissance activities are included in reference r.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HOWARD F. STONE
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

George L. Wray III

GEORGE L. WRAY, III
LTC, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
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22 AUG 1986

ALLIED COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS, BERLIN (ACAB)

INTRODUCTION

1. There is a need for an authority to coordinate activities relating to Berlin if it is threatened or attacked by Warsaw Pact Forces.

COMMAND ARRANGEMENT

2. The governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed that Commander LIVE OAK will become the Coordinating Authority with responsibility to coordinate all Berlin-related military activities outside Berlin during a transition from a Period of Normality up to appointment of the Single Commander, Berlin, and both inside and outside the city after the Single Commander has been appointed.

3. It is further agreed that the Single Commander will be the U.S. Commandant of Berlin. In the event of the U.S. Commandant becoming a casualty, or is otherwise not available, succession of Single Commander will be to the British Commandant, then to the French Commandant, and then further down to the Berlin Brigade Commanders in the same national order.

COORDINATING AUTHORITY

4. For the purposes of this agreement, Commander LIVE OAK's status as Coordinating Authority will authorize him to coordinate specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States through the Washington Ambassadorial Group (WAG) which is the appointing authority.

EXECUTION

5. The command arrangement for Berlin will be executed as follows:

a. Period of Normality: In normal times the Berlin Commandants-in-Committee, using the Allied Staff Berlin (ASB), will keep Commander LIVE OAK informed of all matters regarding the security of Berlin and the preparation of the Berlin defense plans.

(1) The Commandants-in-Committee, through ASB, will keep Commander LIVE OAK informed by submitting an annual report, or more often if required, on the preparation of the defense of Berlin. The LIVE OAK Staff will be kept informed.

(2) All decisions relating to the defense of Berlin will be made by the Commandants-in-Committee.

b. Period of Transition: The Period of Transition covers the time from a Period of Normality up to the appointment of the Single Commander. When there are indications that Warsaw Pact forces intend to conduct an attack on Berlin or the Central Region:

(1) Commander LIVE OAK will coordinate all military Allied activities, actions or operations taking place outside Berlin relating to the crisis.

(2) Initially, the Commandants will maintain national command of their forces.

(3) The Allied Commandants-in-Committee will decide when to assume command of Allied Operations.

(4) While the three Commandants are reporting to their national authorities and national Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs), the Chairman Commandant will keep Commander LIVE OAK informed of developments within Berlin.

(5) Commander LIVE OAK will keep the Chairman Commandant informed of developments outside Berlin.

(6) Depending on the situation, the Commandants will consult and submit a recommendation to their national authorities to appoint a Single Commander. If lack of time or communications prevents transmission of this recommendation, implementation is to be automatic and national authorities are to be informed as soon as practicable.

(7) Concurrently, the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States will authorize the WAG to appoint Commander LIVE OAK as the Coordinating Authority. In an emergency or when time does not permit contact with the WAG, this appointment will be automatic upon appointment of the Single Commander Berlin.

(8) Commander LIVE OAK, through the LIVE OAK Staff, will establish communications with Headquarters Allied Forces (HQAF)* in its operational location.

(9) In Case of an Emergency:

(a) In the event of an emergency, the Chairman Commandant, on his own initiative or at the request of any Commandant, may start necessary preliminary measures, to include deploying all or part of the Allied garrisons so that there will be no delay later on when the designated Single Commander assumes operational control. Furthermore, in an emergency or when lack of time or communications prevents contact with Governments, each

*HQAF - A Tripartite staff in Berlin that becomes the Headquarters for the Single Commander during an emergency.

Commandant is authorized at his discretion, and with the approval of the Chairman Commandant, to place forces from his command under the operational control of another Commandant to meet the requirements of an emergency or of a deployment plan. Any forces provided in these ways will not be committed until the Single Commander has been established.

(b) If the Chairman Commandant for Berlin acts in an emergency to alert and deploy the Allied garrisons, he will keep Commander LIVE OAK completely informed using ASB. Commander LIVE OAK, using his LIVE OAK staff, will, in turn, keep informed the three Embassies in Bonn, the military authorities of the four Allied nations, the WAG, CinCs BAOR, USAREUR, FFA, RAF G, USAFE and Deputy USCINCEUR. This does not preclude normal reporting of the Commandants to their national authorities.

c. Period After the Appointment of the Single Commander: In the event Berlin is attacked by Warsaw Pact Forces in isolation or as part of an attack on the Central Region, Allied Forces Berlin will defend Berlin.

(1) After approval from national authorities the Single Commander Berlin will become Commander Allied Forces and will take operational control of the Allied Forces using HQAF as his staff.

(2) The Allied Governments, through the WAG, will appoint Commander LIVE OAK as Coordinating Authority for all the operations and actions conducted by the Allied Forces Berlin as well as all related military activities taking place outside the city. The Single Commander will be directly responsible to the Coordinating Authority.

(3) The Coordinating Authority will report to the WAG and, using his LIVE OAK staff will keep informed the three embassies at Bonn, the military authorities of the four Allied nations, CinCs USAREUR, BAOR, FFA, RAF G, USAFE and Deputy USCINCEUR of all related events and developments inside and outside Berlin.

(4) The Channel of Command between the three Governments and the Single Commander Berlin will be through the Coordinating Authority using the LIVE OAK Staff.

COMMUNICATIONS

6. Secure communications will be established, maintained and exercised between the Single Commander Berlin and Commander LIVE OAK, as the Coordinating Authority.

LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION

7. Administration and Logistics will remain a national responsibility.

SUPERSESSION

8. This agreement supersedes the Norstad Agreement, SHLO 9-00052, dated 13 January 1962 sent by General Norstad to MODUK, MODFR and JCS, and SHLO 9-0081, dated 8 Mar 1962, sent by General Norstad to USCOB Berlin.

BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, U.S. Army
Commander


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
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BERLIN OCCUPATION COST AND MANDATORY EXPENDITURES BUDGET - - GFY 1987 EXPENDITURE SUMMARY - DM (000)
FINAL SUBMISSION GFY 1987

23-May-86

ELEMENT U.S. ARMY, BERLIN CATEGORY FINAL SUMMARY SUBCAT FILECODE BSUMF	ACTUAL GFY 1985 (U.S)	CONSULTED GFY 1986	CHANGES IN DM	CHANGES IN %	GOING RATE GFY 1987	RECOMMENDED RATE GFY 1987	CHANGES FROM 1986 DM	CHANGES FROM 1986 %
Exchange Rates Used Against U.S. Dollar 1.00 =	2.90	3.00		2.60	2.60	2.60		
I/A 001 - Directly Employed Local Labor Salaries	147,998.3	147,998.3	0.0	0.0	147,998.3	161,889.1	13,890.8	9.4
001 - Employer's Share of Social Security	24,122.6	24,122.6	0.0	0.0	24,122.6	27,100.1	2,977.5	12.3
001 - Travel Expenses (Per Diem)	301.5	301.5	0.0	0.0	301.5	250.0	(51.5)	(17.1)
001 - All Other Allowances	3,755.5	3,755.5	0.0	0.0	3,755.5	5,044.8	1,289.3	34.3
Sub-total 001	176,177.9	176,177.9	0.0	0.0	176,177.9	194,284.0	18,106.1	10.3
002 - DM Pay to Allied Personnel (CIV-DMA)	14,066.6	14,066.6	0.0	0.0	14,066.6	14,427.7	361.1	2.6
002 - DM Pay to Allied Personnel (CIV-DOD)	10,725.4	10,725.4	0.0	0.0	10,725.4	10,730.9	5.5	0.1
002 - Cost of Living Allowance (COLA)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
002 - Quarters Allowance	8,771.5	8,771.5	0.0	0.0	8,771.5	8,775.6	4.1	.0
002 - Education Allowance	3,200.6	3,200.6	0.0	0.0	3,200.6	4,425.4	1,224.8	38.3
002 - Travel Expenses (Per Diem)	1,482.7	1,482.7	0.0	0.0	1,482.7	1,794.6	311.9	21.0
Sub-total 002	38,246.8	38,246.8	0.0	0.0	38,246.8	40,154.2	1,907.4	5.0
I/A SUB-TOTAL	214,424.7	214,424.7	0.0	0.0	214,424.7	234,438.2	20,013.5	9.3
I/B 003 - Rents	2,742.1	5,767.4	1,236.3	21.4	7,003.7	7,003.7	1,236.3	21.4
003 - Utilities	28,290.2	34,490.0	4,617.8	13.4	39,107.8	39,107.8	4,617.8	13.4
004 - Heating Fuels	9,584.3	10,210.0	(2,036.5)	(19.9)	8,173.5	8,173.5	(2,036.5)	(19.9)
005 - Maintenance & Repair of Real Estate	49,645.8	59,739.3	8,357.3	14.0	68,096.6	68,696.6	8,957.3	15.0
006 - Furniture & Furnishings	12,162.9	10,469.4	1,081.1	10.3	11,550.5	15,343.9	4,874.5	46.6
I/B SUBTOTAL	102,425.3	120,676.1	13,256.0	11.0	133,932.1	138,325.5	17,649.4	14.6

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BERLIN OCCUPATION COST AND MANDATORY EXPENDITURES BUDGET - - GFY 1987 EXPENDITURE SUMMARY - DM (000)
FINAL SUBMISSION GFY 1987

23-May-86

ELEMENT U.S. ARMY, BERLIN CATEGORY FINAL SUMMARY SUBCAT FILECODE BSUMF	ACTUAL GFY 1985 (U.S)	CONSULTED GFY 1986	CHANGES IN DM	CHANGES IN %	GOING RATE GFY 1987	RECOMMENDED RATE GFY 1987	CHANGES FROM 1986 DM	CHANGES FROM 1986 %
Exchange Rates Used Against U.S. Dollar 1.00 =	2.90	3.00		2.60	2.60	2.60		
I/C 007 - Purchase, M&R of Commun. Equipment	13,021.8	10,004.8	(2,548.4)	(25.5)	7,456.4	11,871.4	1,866.6	18.7
007 - Payments to the Deutsche Bundespost	2,561.6	2,476.1	300.0	12.1	2,776.1	2,776.1	300.0	12.1
007 - Other Payments	1,092.1	1,225.0	(241.0)	(19.7)	984.0	1,654.0	429.0	35.0
I/C SUBTOTAL	16,675.5	13,705.9	(2,489.4)	(18.2)	11,216.5	16,301.5	2,595.6	18.9
I/D 008 - Transp. Costs incl. BVG	564.3	2,258.6	(1,214.5)	(53.8)	1,044.1	1,044.1	(1,214.5)	(53.8)
008 - Shipping Charges (OMA)	1,639.3	116.8	1,790.5	1,533.0	1,907.3	1,907.3	1,790.5	1,533.0
008 - Shipping Charges (MPA)	2,331.4	1,830.6	249.4	13.6	2,080.0	2,080.0	249.4	13.6
008 - Payments to the Deutsche Bundesbahn	31,400.6	36,814.0	(3,672.2)	(10.0)	33,141.8	33,141.8	(3,672.2)	(10.0)
008 - Air Traffic	1,734.9	1,264.7	352.6	27.9	1,617.3	1,617.3	352.6	27.9
I/D SUBTOTAL	37,670.5	42,284.7	(2,494.2)	(5.9)	39,790.5	39,790.5	(2,494.2)	(5.9)
I/E 009 - Purchase of All Kinds of Vehicles	5,652.4	4,978.4	(1,463.2)	(29.4)	3,515.2	5,753.3	774.9	15.6
009- Maintenance & Repair of Vehicles	2,914.5	3,381.7	(165.3)	(4.9)	3,216.4	3,216.4	(165.3)	(4.9)
009 - P O L	564.2	684.0	(213.5)	(31.2)	470.5	470.5	(213.5)	(31.2)
010 - Office Supply & Equipment	7,788.3	6,126.4	565.3	9.2	6,691.7	6,691.7	565.3	9.2
011 - Stock Fund Supplies	12,971.3	14,999.4	(681.5)	(4.5)	14,317.9	14,317.9	(681.5)	(4.5)
011 - Training Ammunition	185.4	223.9	(89.0)	(39.7)	134.9	134.9	(89.0)	(39.7)
011 - Contractual Services	1,029.7	1,030.0	(13.5)	(1.3)	1,016.5	1,016.5	(13.5)	(1.3)
011 - Medical Supplies & Services	7,245.7	9,118.1	(1,787.2)	(19.6)	7,330.9	7,694.9	(1,423.2)	(15.6)
011 - All Other	6,399.6	5,799.2	2,841.4	49.0	8,640.6	8,640.6	2,841.4	49.0
I/E SUBTOTAL	44,751.1	46,341.1	(1,006.5)	(2.2)	45,334.6	47,936.7	1,595.6	3.4
OCCUPATION COSTS I/A THRU I/E	415,947.1	437,432.5	7,265.9	1.7	444,698.4	476,792.4	39,359.9	9.0

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BERLIN OCCUPATION COST AND MANDATORY EXPENDITURES BUDGET - - GFY 1987 EXPENDITURE SUMMARY - DM (000)
FINAL SUBMISSION GFY 1987

23-May-86

ELEMENT U.S. ARMY, BERLIN CATEGORY FINAL SUMMARY SUBCAT FILECODE BSUMF	ACTUAL GFY 1985 (U.S)	CONSULTED GFY 1986	CHANGES IN DM	CHANGES IN %	GOING RATE GFY 1987	RECOMMENDED RATE GFY 1987	CHANGES FROM 1986 DM	CHANGES FROM 1986 %
Exchange Rates Used Against U.S. Dollar 1.00 =	2.90	3.00		2.60	2.60	2.60		
105 - Occupation Damages	441.1	300.0	100.0	33.3	400.0	400.0	100.0	33.3
203 - Capital Expenditures								
M&R and Modernizing Real Estate	30,775.6	20,450.0	2,567.0	12.6	23,017.0	26,717.0	6,267.0	30.6
Constructions	13,960.2	17,200.0	(1,750.0)	(10.2)	15,450.0	15,450.0	(1,750.0)	(10.2)
Additions & Reconstructions	1,594.8	9,900.0	566.0	5.7	10,466.0	13,618.5	3,718.5	37.6
Demolitions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
203 - Sub-Total	46,330.6	47,550.0	1,383.0	2.9	48,933.0	55,785.5	8,235.5	17.3
MANDATORY EXPENDITURES	46,771.7	47,850.0	1,483.0	3.1	49,333.0	56,185.5	8,335.5	17.4
GRAND TOTAL	462,718.8	485,282.5	8,748.9	1.8	494,031.4	532,977.9	47,695.4	9.8
O/C w/o I/A	201,522.4	223,007.8	7,265.9	3.3	230,273.7	242,354.2	19,346.4	8.7
G/T w/o I/A excl. BTL	248,294.1	270,857.8	8,748.9	3.2	279,606.7	298,539.7	27,681.9	10.2
ASSOCIATED OBLIGATIONS	526,747.7	570,623.9			595,956.3	621,870.3		
U.S.DOLLAR COSTS INCLUDED	22,245.6	22,865.4			23,886.6	26,366.3		

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BERLIN OCCUPATION COST AND MANDATORY EXPENDITURES BUDGET - GFY 1988 EXPENDITURE SUMMARY- DM (000)
FINAL SUBMISSION

13-Apr-87

ELEMENT U.S. ARMY, BERLIN CATEGORY FINAL SUMMARY SUBCAT FILECODE BSUMF	ACTUAL GFY 1986	ALLOCATED GFY 1987	CHANGES IN DM	CHANGES IN %	GOING RATE GFY 1988	RECOMMENDED RATE GFY 1988	CHANGES FROM 1987 DM	CHANGES FROM 1987 %
Exchange Rates Used Against US Dollar 1.00 =	2.13	2.00			2.25	2.25		
I/A 001 - Directly Employed Local Labor Salaries	152,054.4	162,168.4	6,875.8	4.2	169,044.2	169,044.2	6,875.8	4.2
001 - Employer's Share of Social Security	25,727.2	27,000.1	1,224.4	4.5	28,224.5	28,224.5	1,224.4	4.5
001 - Travel Expenses (Per Diem)	229.2	250.0	54.1	21.6	304.1	304.1	54.1	21.6
001 - All Other Allowances	3,997.9	4,440.6	200.5	4.5	4,641.1	4,641.1	200.5	4.5
Sub-total 001	182,008.7	193,859.1	8,354.8	4.3	202,213.9	202,213.9	8,354.8	4.3
002 - DM Pay to Allied Personnel (CIV-DMA)	11,109.2	10,448.3	2,408.7	23.1	12,857.0	12,857.0	2,408.7	23.1
002 - DM Pay to Allied Personnel (CIV-DOD)	8,666.3	8,254.5	1,876.4	22.7	10,130.9	10,130.9	1,876.4	22.7
002 - Cost of Living Allowance (COLA)	2,559.0	0.0	2,115.0	0.0	2,115.0	2,115.0	2,115.0	0.0
002 - Quarters Allowance	7,658.5	6,751.1	(2,699.3)	(40.0)	4,051.8	4,051.8	(2,699.3)	(40.0)
002 - Education Allowance	2,701.7	3,404.2	540.4	15.9	3,944.6	3,944.6	540.4	15.9
002 - Travel Expenses (Per Diem)	1,315.2	1,380.4	469.6	34.0	1,850.0	1,850.0	469.6	34.0
Sub-total 002	34,009.9	30,238.5	4,710.8	15.6	34,949.3	34,949.3	4,710.8	15.6
I/A SUB-TOTAL	216,018.6	224,097.6	13,065.6	5.8	237,163.2	237,163.2	13,065.6	5.8
I/B 003 - Rents	3,586.4	7,653.7	4,965.9	64.9	12,619.6	12,619.6	4,965.9	64.9
003 - Utilities	31,302.3	39,107.8	702.0	1.8	39,809.8	39,809.8	702.0	1.8
004 - Heating Fuels	8,177.8	8,173.5	(3,442.4)	(42.1)	4,731.1	4,731.1	(3,442.4)	(42.1)
005 - Maintenance & Repair of Real Estate	65,632.1	68,096.6	(212.7)	(0.3)	67,883.9	77,500.7	9,404.1	13.8
006 - Furniture & Furnishings	14,735.0	11,550.5	9,564.0	82.8	21,114.5	21,463.4	9,912.9	85.8
I/B SUBTOTAL	123,433.6	134,582.1	11,576.8	8.6	146,158.9	156,124.6	21,542.5	16.0

BERLIN OCCUPATION COST AND MANDATORY EXPENDITURES BUDGET - GFY 1988 EXPENDITURE SUMMARY- DM (000)
FINAL SUBMISSION

13-Apr-87

ELEMENT U.S. ARMY, BERLIN CATEGORY FINAL SUMMARY SUBCAT FILECODE BSUMF	ACTUAL GFY 1986	ALLOCATED GFY 1987	CHANGES IN DM	CHANGES IN %	GOING RATE GFY 1988	RECOMMENDED RATE GFY 1988	CHANGES FROM 1987 DM	CHANGES FROM 1987 %
Exchange Rates Used Against US Dollar 1.00 =	2.13	2.00			2.25	2.25		
I/C 007 - Purchase, M&R of Commun. Equipment	9,351.3	7,243.4	(1,476.9)	(20.4)	5,766.5	13,205.1	5,961.7	82.3
007 - Payments to the Deutsche Bundespost	2,701.2	2,776.1	742.9	26.8	3,519.0	3,519.0	742.9	26.8
007 - Other Payments	709.7	780.0	85.0	10.9	865.0	865.0	85.0	10.9
I/C SUBTOTAL	12,762.2	10,799.5	(649.0)	(6.0)	10,150.5	17,589.1	6,789.6	62.9
I/D 008 - Transp. Costs incl. BVG	1,471.3	1,044.1	725.8	69.5	1,769.9	1,769.9	725.8	69.5
008 - Shipping Charges (OMA)	1,614.7	1,907.3	172.8	9.1	2,080.1	2,080.1	172.8	9.1
008 - Shipping Charges (MPA)	1,322.2	2,080.0	(2,080.0)	(100.0)	0.0	0.0	(2,080.0)	(100.0)
008 - Payments to the Deutsche Bundesbahn	34,571.5	33,141.8	(472.1)	(1.4)	32,669.7	32,669.7	(472.1)	(1.4)
008 - Air Traffic	1,296.8	1,383.8	119.7	8.7	1,503.5	1,503.5	119.7	8.7
I/D SUBTOTAL	40,276.5	39,557.0	(1,533.8)	(3.9)	38,023.2	38,023.2	(1,533.8)	(3.9)
I/E 009 - Purchase of All Kinds of Vehicles	5,289.5	3,515.2	1,905.4	54.2	5,420.6	5,420.6	1,905.4	54.2
009- Maintenance & Repair of Vehicles	3,061.3	3,130.7	172.9	5.5	3,303.6	3,303.6	172.9	5.5
009 - P O L	478.5	470.5	(107.3)	(22.8)	363.2	363.2	(107.3)	(22.8)
010 - Office Supply & Equipment	7,769.2	6,691.7	(2,420.0)	(36.2)	4,271.7	8,150.7	1,459.0	21.8
011 - Stock Fund Supplies	10,315.5	11,413.8	1,412.3	12.4	12,826.1	12,826.1	1,412.3	12.4
011 - Training Ammunition	5.7	134.9	(134.9)	(100.0)	0.0	0.0	(134.9)	(100.0)
011 - Contractual Services	896.2	1,016.5	17.0	1.7	1,033.5	1,033.5	17.0	1.7
011 - Medical Supplies & Services	8,160.5	6,684.1	698.6	10.5	7,382.7	8,673.2	1,989.1	29.8
011 - All Other	7,366.5	9,247.4	(1,431.5)	(15.5)	7,815.9	8,685.9	(561.5)	(6.1)
I/E SUBTOTAL	43,342.9	42,304.8	112.5	0.3	42,417.3	48,456.8	6,152.0	14.5
OCCUPATION COSTS I/A THRU I/E	435,833.8	451,341.0	22,572.1	5.0	473,913.1	497,356.9	46,015.9	10.2

BERLIN OCCUPATION COST AND MANDATORY EXPENDITURES BUDGET - GFY 1988 EXPENDITURE SUMMARY- DM (000)
FINAL SUBMISSION

13-Apr-87

ELEMENT U.S. ARMY, BERLIN CATEGORY FINAL SUMMARY SUBCAT FILECODE BSUMF	ACTUAL GFY 1986	ALLOCATED GFY 1987	CHANGES IN DM	CHANGES IN %	GOING RATE GFY 1988	RECOMMENDED RATE GFY 1988	CHANGES FROM 1987 DM	CHANGES FROM 1987 %
Exchange Rates Used Against US Dollar 1.00 =	2.13	2.00			2.25	2.25		
105 - Occupation Damages	328.2	400.0	(128.1)	(32.0)	271.9	271.9	(128.1)	(32.0)
203 - Capital Expenditures								
M&R and Modernizing Real Estate	24,541.2	22,017.0	(5,283.0)	(24.0)	16,734.0	16,734.0	(5,283.0)	(24.0)
Constructions	12,720.5	15,450.0	116.0	0.8	15,566.0	20,400.0	4,950.0	32.0
Additions & Reconstructions	13,042.6	9,466.0	5,034.0	53.2	14,500.0	14,500.0	5,034.0	53.2
Demolitions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
203 - Sub-Total	50,304.3	46,933.0	(133.0)	(0.3)	46,800.0	51,634.0	4,701.0	10.0
MANDATORY EXPENDITURES	50,632.5	47,333.0	(261.1)	(0.6)	47,071.9	51,905.9	4,572.9	9.7
GRAND TOTAL	486,466.3	498,674.0	22,311.0	4.5	520,985.0	549,262.8	50,588.8	10.1
O/C w/o I/A	219,815.2	227,243.4	9,506.5	4.2	236,749.9	260,193.7	32,950.3	14.5
G/T w/o I/A	270,447.7	274,576.4	9,245.4	3.4	283,821.8	312,099.6	37,523.2	13.7
ASSOCIATED OBLIGATIONS	521,032.2	615,590.2			597,337.6	630,095.7		
U.S. DOLLAR COSTS INCLUDED	24,693.2	23,627.9			25,459.7	26,802.0		