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Copy No.
23 October 1963

BERLIN CHRONOLOGY

A Chronology of Reports Concerning the Berlin Situation Received
During the Week Ending at 1200 EDT 23 October 1963

This is a working paper prepared in the [redacted]

[redacted] Office of Current Intelligence, CIA.

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1 Oct. The Berlin Mission reported that at a tripartite meeting, the French Embassy representative, Baeyens, noted that the British intended to reduce their guards at Spandau from 30 to 15. Baeyens expressed the opinion that this might be too sharp a reduction. In this connection he noted that the USSR retained 40 guards at the prison, whom they were prone to "parade around Berlin."

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3 Oct A US Provost Marshal officer protested to Lt. Col. Sergin, commander of the Soviet checkpoint at Babelsberg, the detention of a US traveler by GDR police on 28 September. The traveler, en route to Berlin on the autobahn was stopped and detained for approximately 85 minutes by Vopos who attempted to enter the vehicle and to tow it away. The traveler repeatedly demanded to see a Soviet officer. After about one hour, two Soviet officers arrived and, following conversation, permitted the US traveler to depart. On 3 October, Sergin listened to the oral protest, said he knew nothing about the incident and asked where the two Soviet officers had come from. He then declared that his responsibilities were only for the Babelsberg checkpoint and had nothing to do with the rest of the autobahn, adding that as far as the 20 September incident was concerned, it should be brought to the attention of GDR authorities. The PM officer who had delivered the protest replied that, as the Soviets were aware, US authorities did not recognize the GDR and had no intention of dealing with East German personnel on the autobahn. He added that it was very strange that Sergin said that he was only responsible for the Babelsberg checkpoint since in the past the checkpoint commander had handled all autobahn incidents. Sergin reiterated that his authority was limited to the checkpoint area only and that he had nothing to do with the rest of the autobahn. USBER points out, however, that the fact that two Soviet officers appeared on 28 September is an admission of Soviet competence on the autobahn. [redacted]

9 Oct The Mission reported that a Swiss charter airline company had approached the Senat with a plan for flights between Basel and Schoenefeld. The Senat replied that it would not regard favorably a Swiss airline's landing at Schoenefeld but would prefer that the Swiss continue to use West Berlin facilities. [redacted]

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11 Oct A Pravda editorial on peace claimed that another important contribution to the cause of strengthening peace would be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO member states and the Warsaw treaty member states, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, reduction of military budgets, and peaceful economic collaboration. "The Soviet Union has already announced its readiness to place its signature under the proposals which it has put forward," the article states. It is now up to the Western powers. "The whole of progressive mankind wants to see the realization of further measures aimed at the stabilization of peace." [redacted]

West Berlin Senator Schuetz conveyed to International Red Cross (IRC) President Boissier a letter "replying" to the 23 September GDR letter proposing immediate East German-West Berlin talks. The letter outlined three methods which the Senat considered acceptable for maintaining contacts: 1) technical-level discussions by authorized representatives of the East and West Berlin city administrations; 2) discussions in IZT channels; 3) discussions under IRC auspices. The note also supported the Red Cross suggestion that lawyers from each part of the city be permitted to practice in the other part. The communique concluded by stating that since "recent evidence justifies the assumption" that the GDR would not reject a Red Cross proposal for talks between jurists under IRC auspices, the IRC was requested to take the necessary steps to organize such talks.

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Deutschlandsender instituted a weekly broadcast for "GDR citizens" living in West Germany. The program, entitled "The Bridge," was scheduled to be broadcast every Monday at 2210 hours. Its obvious purpose was to induce refugees to return to the GDR. [redacted]

AP reported that East Germany's Communist rulers, irate over a rash of escapes, are stepping up the pressure on their border guards to shoot to kill. The reluctance of the guards to carry out orders and kill their fellow country men was believed to be a factor in the large number of successful defections from East Germany. The shoot-to-kill order has also been responsible for the defection of many border guards. The fact that a Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, Albert Norden, was sent to work on the border guards indicated the regime is worried about the failure of its young soldiers to obey orders to shoot. The official weekly magazine of the East German Army, "Volksarmee" reported Norden's visit to border guard units, and quoted him as telling the soldiers: "When you stop a border violator with your weapon, you do not shoot your brother and sister. How can he be your brother who betrays the Republic, who betrays the power of the people? He who defects to the enemy is not your brother." [redacted]

USCOB reported that a US patrol followed a Russian convoy from Muggelseedam/Furstenwalder to the Soviet Zone border. The convoy contained 24 trucks of which 7 were communications vans and three others were filled with large spools of estimated 1/2 inch rubber covered cable. There were an estimated 150-175 persons in the convoy. [redacted]

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15 Oct USCOB reported that a US observer in a helicopter over Berlin confirmed that the company of tanks that joined the 154th Independent Guards Battalion at Gross Glienicke almost a year ago was still present. [redacted]

East Berlin ADN noted the GDR television interview with former US Army Captain Svenson in which Svenson expressed the following predictable opinions: "I gained the conviction that the US Army does not serve the interests of the US people but the interests of certain finance groups." The people to whom he spoke on his tour of the GDR had again and again expressed the fact that they represented the state. In talks with students, he had been surprised by their intellectual and spiritual maturity. "They are politically interested and well informed about what is happening in the world." Svenson also said that it was difficult for many US officers who fought against fascist Germany in World War II to have contact with the fascist generals in the Bundeswehr, but that there were also many who favored West German aspirations to obtain important NATO positions because they considered the Bundeswehr to be suitable for doing the dirty work. [redacted]

Izvestia accused the US of trying to make "a mountain out of a molehill" in connection with the 10-12 October convoy incident. According to the Embassy in Moscow, the newspaper avoided blaming the incident directly on US authorities and merely charged the convoy commander with refusal to follow normal procedures. The Embassy interpreted the article as an attempt to show that the incident was caused by a misunderstanding and was not a Soviet move to weaken US access rights. [redacted]

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16 Oct The Bonn Embassy reported that the FRG Foreign Office had given the three Western Embassies the following proposed text for the Berlin clause for the test-ban treaty ratification bill: "This law is also applicable in Land Berlin insofar as Land Berlin provides for its applicability. To the extent that the treaty relates to nuclear explosions for military purposes, the pertinent provisions of BKG.L(55)3 of 5 May 1955 of the Allied Kommandatura, remain undisturbed." The Foreign Office representative said the language had been discussed with Senat representatives, who stated that they could live with it. [redacted]

The Soviet controller in BASC at 0911Z protested a USAF round robin flight which departed Berlin, flew out the south corridor, then returned to Berlin without landing in West Germany. During the return leg of the flight the Soviet controller wrote on the flight plan that flight safety was not guaranteed. The US controller made the standard reply. At 0935Z and 0941Z the Soviet controller made additional statements. USBER noted that the USAF aircraft was carrying the Tempelhof Base commander en route to Evreux. When the Autobahn situation developed, the commander's presence was required in Berlin and the deputy base commander had requested that he return. [redacted]

During the morning the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin requested an interview with the British Mission in Berlin on the subject of the Lietzenburgerstrasse property. The British refused on the grounds that they were busy with "Soviet-instigated foolishness at the Babelsberg checkpoints." [redacted]

Mayor Albertz informed a Mission officer that the Senat plan to run police checks on transit times of German privately owned vehicles traversing the Autobahn would be instituted on a three to four week trial basis without recourse to US communications facilities. The police officials thought their facilities would be adequate. [redacted]

The State Department cabled the Bonn Embassy that its present plan was to return the Long Thrust VII battle group, which had just been withdrawn from Berlin, to the US on empty Big Lift aircraft

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during the month of October. The Department believed that this would not be inconsistent with the President's assurances to Schroeder that no troop reductions would be made in the near future. The FRG had previously been notified of a reduction of the Berlin garrison by 600 men. During most of the period preceding Christmas holidays, the Second Armored Division will provide a substantially greater augmentation of US forces in West Germany. After a short recess period over the Christmas holidays, during which the augmentation would be reduced by 900 men, the US plans to start a new series of mobility exercises. This plan will involve a periodic rotation from the US to West Germany of battalions of approximately 900 men, thus restoring the augmentation level. Noting that it was not worth our while to announce a fait accompli and get only grudging acceptance of the plan from the Germans, the Department instructed the Embassy to explain this decision to the Germans as our present plan rather than a firm decision.

USCOB reported that a group of 30 border police in field equipment conducted an operational exercise on a cleared bombed premises on Fritz-Heckestrasse from 0800-0925Z.

UPI reported that the East Germans claimed their fifth US military defector in a week. The 22-year-old Private, Frank Barton, was the second defector from the 6th Missile Battalion, 517th Artillery Regiment. The other man, Private Gary Marzke, claimed political asylum in the GDR on 14 October. The two men were reportedly friends, and apparently went AWOL together.

Neues Deutschland reported that the Tiergarten borough executive board of the West Berlin SED had distributed many hundreds of pamphlets calling on the West Berlin Senat to put an end to cold war policy and negotiate reasonable agreements with the GDR.

East Berlin radio reported that according to an announcement at the latest meeting of the GDR election commission, about 1,900 GDR citizens living in West Germany had exercised their right to vote as of the past weekend.

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The Contingency Coordinating Sub-Group met in Washington to review the Autobahn situation, in case the Ambassadorial Group was convened to deal with the detention of the British convoy. The US representative stated that his government expected the UK to take "appropriate initial action" but that Britain could count on US support "in order to maintain Allied access." [redacted]

During the morning UKCOB informed USCOB that the British Mission's meeting with SERB "showed nothing." SERB as well informed and firm, and volunteered that the rules were well understood on processing the convoys. The Soviets added that they had been too kind in applying the rules in the past. UKCOB then called a commandants meeting for 1300Z to "exchange ideas on what we might do in the event that an ultimatum fails." He made it clear, however, that no ultimatum would be delivered until after the commandants meeting. [redacted]

At the 1300Z commandants meeting in Berlin, Gen. Peel Yates briefly reviewed developments concerning UK convoy #15, which was still being detained at Babelsberg. The only new element which emerged was the fact that the acting SERB chief had told the BRIXMIS chief that, for all future convoys of 2 or more vehicles, all the men except the drivers should dismount. UKCOB said that he personally was convinced that "unlike the case involving the US convoys on 10-12 October, the incident involving the UK convoy was carefully laid on by the Soviets at a high level from the very beginning." Gen. Polk voiced his belief that the action against the US convoys also had been carefully planned in advance. UKCOB reported that Lord Home was seeing the Soviet charge at 1500Z and that no decision regarding the presentation of an ultimatum to the Soviets would be made until the results of that meeting were known. UKCOB was not clear whether his government would want to take the matter up at the highest level in Moscow before presenting an ultimatum, in the event that Home's meeting with the charge was unsuccessful. UKCOB appeared to be searching for some intermediate step to postpone further, if not avoid entirely, the use of an ultimatum. He said he had wanted to recommend that CINC BAOR request a meeting between the British and GSFG chiefs of staff in order to clear up possible misunderstandings, as

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Gen. Freeman had done. USCOB pointed out that Gen. Yakubovsky had not even had the courtesy to reply to Gen. Freeman's request for a meeting between Gen. Baker and Gen. Ariko. USCOB therefore had serious doubts about the propriety and efficacy of a similar CINC BAOR approach to Yakubovsky. After further conversation and receipt of news that the Soviets had agreed to process convoy #15, the consensus was reached that the commandants would dispatch a message to LIVE OAK recommending that action be initiated immediately by the three headquarters in Berlin to draw up tripartitely-agreed rules of convoy procedure to be presented to the governments.

At 1325Z Col. Sergin told the UK Provost Marshal that processing of the convoy would begin if he would "just get your men out on the ground; it's not necessary to line them up." The British officer refused the invitation. At 1345Z a civilian car with diplomatic license plates and a civilian passenger, believed by the British to have come from the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, arrived at the Babelsberg checkpoint. At 1410Z Col. Sergin requested that the soldiers stand up in the trucks to be counted. The British again refused. At 1425Z Sergin stated he did not care what the troops did in the rear of the vehicles so long as the tailgates were lowered. Since lowering tailgates is normal British practice because their trucks are considerably higher than US vehicles, and since compliance would not represent a change in British procedure, the British OIC agreed to the Russian request. Immediately thereafter the Soviets started to clear the convoy with the passengers seated. It cleared Babelsberg at 1430Z and proceeded to Marienborn, where it was again detained briefly by Soviet refusal to begin processing until the troops dismounted. The convoy finally cleared Marienborn without dismounting at 1810Z, following a 50-minute delay.

At 1600Z the Bonn Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group was called together by British Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts, who said that his government assessed the detention of convoy 15 as a deliberate Soviet initiative and not a mistake, and therefore planned to take it to a high political level as soon as possible. A British official in Moscow was to see Zorin immediately and ask if Khrushchev knew of the incident. He would demand passage for the convoy,

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then express willingness to discuss the matter at a later date--an instruction which was later countermanded, according to the US Embassy in Bonn. Roberts said he felt that convoy 16 should be instructed to proceed to West Germany since it had submitted advance notice, the public was aware of its presence, and the Soviets would interpret its withdrawal as a sign that the British were unsure of themselves. However, he noted that CINC BAOR, the Ministry of Defense, and probably the Foreign Office favored returning the convoy to Berlin. The US and French ambassadors and the West German representative agreed that withdrawal of the convoy would give the appearance that the British were backing down. The French Ambassador mentioned that his government was considering dispatching a non-dismount "solidarity" convoy. All favored the US Ambassador's proposal that Moscow immediately be notified of each nation's individual Autobahn policies, but in such a way as to preclude negotiations on the subject. The French Ambassador favored harmonization of Allied procedures, but this was tacitly opposed by the British, although they agreed to study the matter. [redacted]

Hamburg DPA quoted Governing Mayor Willy Brandt as saying that the Western "protecting powers have shown that they take seriously their right of free access in individual instances also." DPA also reported that the British convoy halted at Babelsberg had arrived in Helmstedt but inaccurately said that the second convoy had been "cleared for the drive through the Soviet Zone." Actually the second convoy was ordered to return to West Berlin at 1945Z. [redacted]

During the evening a British Army spokesman announced that the bulk of a British regiment had cut short its training in West Germany and had arrived back in Berlin during the evening. The press report also quoted Berlin Mayor Brandt as warning that further "Soviet chicaneries" such as the convoy incidents could be expected. [redacted]

Mayor Albertz informed a Mission officer that the Senat plan to run police checks on transit times of German privately-owned vehicles traversing the Autobahn would be instituted on a three-to-four-week basis without recourse to US communications facilities. The police officials thought their facilities would be adequate. [redacted]

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In response to a LIVE OAK request for a position on joint Autobahn procedures by the morning of 17 October, the three Allied commandants met under British chairmanship and recommended that the following procedures be adopted by all three Allies and conveyed to the USSR "at a high level:" (1) That the Allies hold firm to their practice of giving advance notification only for convoys of eight vehicles or more, although this position might be "reconsidered" later. (2) That dismounting policy be modified as follows: (A) Buses and single vehicles would not dismount. (B) Convoys which contained no vehicle with ten or more passengers (exclusive of driver and assistant driver) would dismount only if its total number of passengers exceeded 30. (C) Any vehicle carrying ten or more passengers in a convoy of 30 personnel or fewer (exclusive of drivers and assistant drivers) would dismount. Dismounting would continue to be controlled by the Allied OIC, not by the Soviet officer. Troops would not be ordered to dismount in rain, snow, or extreme cold, or when they were being photographed or exposed to propaganda. The headcount would be expected to be completed within five minutes and in no case would be allowed to continue longer than ten minutes. (3) That the British and French continue to lower tailgates but that the Soviets be informed that US tailgates are much lower, can easily be seen over, and therefore will not be lowered. (4) That if joint procedures could be agreed upon quickly, individual national procedures not be communicated to the Soviets. The principal point of disagreement was the issue of advance notification. The British wanted agreement that notification would be given for convoys of five or more vehicles but settled for the compromise position in (1) above. The British also were acting on the assumption that the commandants were preparing points on which negotiations would be conducted with the Soviets, but the US argued strongly against such an outlook and against any negotiations with the Soviets on Allied Autobahn procedures.

The West German representative informed the Quadripartite Group that Leopold and Behrendt were scheduled to meet on 17 October to discuss, inter alia, the September Wartha incident in which Vopos forced a West German truck driver to place his vehicle across the road in order to block a would-be escapee. At their previous meeting Leopold had attempted to hand Behrendt a

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written protest of the incident, but Behrendt had refused to accept it. Leopold then warned that failure to accept the note could jeopardize interzonal trade. Behrendt replied by protesting the arrest of GDR publisher Hofe by West German police. Leopold agreed to relay the protest but observed that Hofe had been arrested for espionage and that his case therefore was not related to IZT.

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Hans Bahr, the president of the GDR Chamber of Foreign Trade, applied for a TTD in order to go to London to negotiate the 1964 GDR-UK trade agreement. Noting that similar past agreements had been negotiated without Bahr, the Mission expressed the opinion that his application fell into the political category and consequently should be disapproved. The British, on the other hand, were insisting that the application fell into the trade category and that it should be approved. The Mission reported that the British were very sensitive on this issue, and it requested instructions on whether to approve the application.



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The Berlin Mission reported that in a conversation with Austrian Counsel General Mueller, Soviet officials from the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin expressed regret over the fact that Adenauer was no longer Chancellor. In expressing preference for Adenauer over Brandt (looking ahead to the 1965 elections) they have told Mueller that with Adenauer they always knew where they stood and what they could expect. They described Brandt as a man of constantly shifting positions and someone who is too subject to the influence of the views of others. The Mission commented that the Soviet comments, though interesting, must be treated with reserve since the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin probably uses the Austrian Counsel General to pass on views they want circulated.

East Berlin ADN reported that John Penycate, a British soldier stationed with the Fifth Armored Regiment at Fallingbommel in West Germany, had asked for asylum in the GDR.

East Berlin ADN complained that two officials of the GDR's Foreign Trade agencies who were returning from a business trip to West Germany were harrassed at the West German frontier checkpoint at Lauenburg by officers of the West German Office for the Protection of the Constitution. They were reportedly closely searched and the film in their cameras was destroyed. ADN stated that "this arbitrary action...constitutes a gross violation of the agreements concluded between the two German states on the unimpeded functioning of trade.

USCOB reported that a US Army tour (not a patrol) was stopped in the Soviet sector at 1905Z by five Vopo's, one of whom struck the car in the rear with his hand or foot as it started to leave the scene. The OIC directed the driver around the block back to where they had been previously stopped. Again, at approximately 1945Z, the same 5 Vopo's stopped the car with one standing in front of it. The Vopo cars then were placed bumper to bumper in front and to the rear of the US vehicle, preventing it from moving. Within ten minutes, eight Vopo cars and six motorcycles were at the scene, and 45-55 Vopo's present (including two officers), plus 25-30 civilians. The general attitude of the

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civilians was hostile and abusive toward the US personnel, although no physical acts were committed. At approximately 2000Z, three civilians arrived, who took action to remove the blocking sedans. On the return trip to the US sector, the US sedan was followed by a motorcycle, and by an additional motorcycle and a sedan for part of the trip. A motorcade of five sedans believed to be part of the welcome for the visiting Soviet astronauts was seen by the US personnel during their detention.

The US Embassy in Bonn reported that the tripartite experts met to discuss the German draft of the Berlin clause for the test-ban treaty ratification law. There was general agreement that the so-called Schroeder proposal was a political device which the FRG felt it needed for internal political reasons. All agreed that the Bonn Foreign Office proposals given to the Embassies were unsatisfactory. The experts agreed to submit the Berlin clause language to their governments for eventual submission to the Germans. This Berlin clause would be accompanied by an Allied statement to be made in Berlin at an appropriate time and in an appropriate form, incorporating the following ideas: (A) the Allies have no objection to the application of the peaceful aspects of the TBT as this is consistent with pertinent Allied legislation; (B) it is unnecessary to apply the military provisions of the TBT to Berlin as they are, in practice, being applied there.

The US Embassy in Moscow received an answer from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Sovereignty of the GDR as reflected in the 26 September US note to the Soviet government. The Soviets stated in their note that the "existence on the territory of the former Hitlerite Germany of the sovereign and independent state--the GDR, on a level with the Federal Republic, as well as of West Berlin, as an independent political entity, is an indisputable fact with which it is impossible not to reckon if one stands on the ground of reality.

The Bonn Embassy reported that a former British Corporal who defected to the GDR in 1959 recently turned up at the British Military Liaison Mission's

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quarters in Potsdam, expressed the desire to return to the UK, and was taken into the house. The British then requested Soviet permission to remove the man to West Berlin, but the Soviets replied that the matter fell within the jurisdiction of GDR authorities. The British have flatly stated that they have no intention of dealing with the East Germans on the matter, but they may be forced to do so if they cannot persuade the Soviets to intervene. [redacted]

East Berlin ADN reported that a GDR government statement on the debate on the principles of international law has been forwarded to the 111 UN delegations, together with a covering letter by GDR Foreign Minister Bolz. In connection with item 71 on the UN agenda, the statement draws attention to the need of applying peaceful co-existence to the relationship between the GDR and the German Federal Republic and West Berlin. The GDR government also drew attention to the fact that "the improvement in the friendly relations between states desired by the German Assembly dealing with the Special Situation in Germany can be successfully achieved only if the principle of the sovereign equality of all effectively existing states is strictly observed regarding their cooperation within international organizations." Further attention was drawn to the discrimination against GDR citizens practiced by the so-called Allied Travel Board in connection with visits to NATO countries. [redacted]

USCINCEUR reported that the following four British convoys transited the Autobahn from West Germany to West Berlin without incident: 1) BR 17, consisting of 16 vehicles and 58 men, arrived at Marienborn at 1112Z and cleared Babelsberg at 1510Z. Upon Soviet request at both checkpoints, personnel dismounted from two vehicles containing 14 and 15 men, respectively. 2) BR 18, consisting of 17 vehicles and 60 men, arrived at Marienborn at 1150Z and cleared Babelsberg at 1522Z. Personnel dismounted from one vehicle carrying ten passengers. 3) BR 19, consisting of 18 vehicles and 63 men, arrived at Marienborn at 1306Z and cleared Babelsberg at 1710Z. Personnel dismounted from one vehicle carrying 11 passengers. 4) BR 20, consisting of 20 vehicles and 69 men, arrived at Marienborn at 1417Z and cleared Babelsberg at 1845Z. Personnel dismounted

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from one vehicle containing 12 passengers. Processing times averaged 20 minutes for all convoys except BR 19, which spent 39 minutes at Marienborn because of a Soviet mistake in the headcount. The Soviets requested that only passengers dismount from the five vehicles which carried ten or more men in the rear; they made no mention of drivers and assistant drivers, nor did they request that other vehicles in the convoys dismount. No US or French convoys used the Autobahn on this date. [redacted]

Helicopter reconnaissance over West Berlin revealed 10 Soviet trucks, 40 East German trucks, and 8 East German water cannons in the Grossglienicke compound. Approximately 100 personnel were lined up beside the equipment--apparently for inspection--and the headquarters building was decorated with flags. [redacted]

The Embassy in London reported that the Foreign Office regarded the 16 October delay of a British convoy not as an act of "high-level Soviet pressure or calculated harassment" but as a manifestation of "local Soviet desire to 'tidy up the bird's nest' of disparate Allied convoy practices" by insisting that all convoys of more than five vehicles dismount regardless of the number of personnel per vehicle or the total number in the convoy. The Foreign Office reportedly felt that the delays of the British and US convoys resulted from failure of the Soviets to communicate this "new requirement" to the Allies. [redacted]

USCINCEUR recommended strongly that no unilateral release of US or Allied convoy procedures be made to the Soviets until he had been given a chance to standardize procedures. He reported that prospects of a standardization were good, and he expected to be able to submit a draft within 24-48 hours. [redacted]

The Mission cabled that the 16 October delay of the British convoy showed that the Soviets had three purposes in mind: 1) To continue pressure designed to impose new, more restrictive Autobahn procedures on the Allies; 2) To test British firmness and possibly to compare British and US implementation of contingency plans; 3) To make it clear that the Soviet formulae for Autobahn traffic would be applied uniformly to all three Allies. The Mission noted that the appearance

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at the Babelsberg checkpoint of a vehicle believed to belong to the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin indicated that Soviet diplomatic personnel were at least monitoring, if not directing, the Autobahn incidents. [redacted]

The Austrian Consul General in West Berlin informed the Mission that, at an 11 October reception given by the Polish Military Mission in East Berlin, he and his Swiss and Greek colleagues had pressed Soviet officers for an explanation of the convoy incidents. The Soviets invariably replied that the matter was not within their sphere of competence. However, one Soviet officer did state, when questioned about the convoy delays in the context of the apparent detente, that "after a while the smiling brilliance of the sunflower fades and becomes very unsightly." [redacted]

Ambassador McGhee informed the Department and US military commanders in Europe that he concurred with the Commandants' recommendations regarding Allied Autobahn procedure. He reported that the Bonn Quadripartite Group was meeting to consider the recommendations. [redacted]

French convoy #8 (westbound), consisting of one vehicle and two men and originally scheduled to arrive at Babelsberg at this time at 1330Z, was cancelled. [redacted]

An editorial in the London Times called for a clear-cut agreement on convoy procedures on the Berlin Autobahn. The paper said the vagueness of inspection arrangements was an "invitation to trouble" and could lead to genuine misunderstanding between the East and West. "It is as difficult for the Russians to know whether something new is being tried out on them as it is for the Western powers to know whether they are being subjected to deliberate harassment," the editorial contended. The Russians could repair the damage done by the incidents by reaching a "sensible agreement" on procedures, the paper said. [redacted]

In a special assessment of the recent convoy delays, JIC's western heads of sections decided that the first incident arose "either from genuine confusion over dismounting procedures or a local military

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initiative." They then deduced that the second incident arose "from a consequent Soviet decision to establish a clearly defined procedure for the dismounting of all convoys." They concluded that the Soviets were not "prepared for serious trouble with the Allies over these issues." [redacted]

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USCOB reported that an East German border guard defected to the French sector by driving a tractor through the border fence in the vicinity of Klemkestrasse without incident. The tractor ended up two thirds in the French sector. Twenty-five West Berlin police, four East German APC's and probably a platoon of GDR border guards were on the scene as the East Germans attempted to remove the tractor. [redacted]

East Berlin ADN reported that Reymond Herzet, a member of the Belgian Army stationed at Siegen in West Germany defected to the GDR and asked for political asylum. [redacted]

East Berlin ADN reported that three members of the West German Bundeswehr, a private of a parachute battalion, an NCO candidate of a maintenance company, and a private of a training company, defected into the GDR. [redacted]

Reuters reported that two East Germans were captured by East German border police during the evening when they tried to escape into West Berlin at two different points. West Berlin police heard a man scream for help after a shot and four red alarm rockets had been fired. Another man was taken away in an East German APC. [redacted]

The US Ambassador in Paris reported that the Danish delegation confirmed that it will raise the question of the East German travel ban at the 23 October NAC meeting under any other business. The Danes evidently feel it is important for them to be able to say at home that the matter had been raised in the NAE, and they will expect the Council to return to the subject if it is not prepared for a substantive discussion at the next meeting. We should hope to have the matter referred to POLADS, which is already planning to review the policy regarding East German travel. Under the circumstances, we hope not to take up the subject in detail in the NAE until a

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later time, but would appreciate a best estimate on when preparatory work at Bonn on the review of the trial easing of travel restrictions will be completed, the Ambassador stated. [redacted]

The US Embassy Bonn reported that in a two hour speech to the Bundestag, Erhard set forth the policy lines of his new government. The FRG believes that contacts and talks between the US and the Soviet Union can be useful, and that they should be continued with the view to examining whether there exists possibilities of relaxing tensions...if they do not shift the balance of power between the East and West to our disadvantage and do not result in discrimination against us. In no event should the FRG be prepared to accept any measure which, instead of improving, would worsen the unsatisfactory state of affairs relating to the German problem--whether the unnatural division of our country would be sanctioned or consolidated, or whether the regime of the Soviet-occupied zone would be recognized or its international status raised as a result of such a measure. The four powers are faced with particular tasks in connection with the settlement of German and security problems, which could be met by forming a body of the four powers which would exercise its functions until such time as a final peace settlement is reached. The FRG is convinced that there must be a peace treaty freely negotiated and concluded by a freely elected all-German government. The FRG must not slacken its efforts to establish personal contacts between people who live in the two parts of the country. In regard to FRG policy on Berlin, Berlin belongs to the free part of Germany. The close political, legal, and economic interlocking of Berlin with the FRG which was accomplished in the last few years with the approval of the protecting powers is the bedrock of the viability of the city. [redacted]

USCOB reported that an EGA border guard who defected to West Berlin during the evening of 16 October had revealed that leave and pass restrictions had been in effect on 16 October between the hours of 0500Z --15 minutes before the first British convoy arrived at Babelsberg--and 2000Z--fifteen minutes after the second British convoy turned back to West Berlin. [redacted]

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The Embassy in Moscow reported that Lord Home had prepared a "talking paper" which asserted that the detention of the British convoy was a violation of procedures "informally agreed in 1962 between our /i.e. British/ military police in Berlin and Soviet checkpoint officers," to the effect that a convoy, in order to be dismountable, must contain 40 or more personnel and at least one vehicle carrying ten or more passengers. The paper also stated that Home intended to call for a "detailed clarification of Autobahn procedures at a suitably high level." The British Embassy in Moscow reportedly was unaware of the alleged agreement or of any 1962 discussion between British MPs and Soviet checkpoint officers. [redacted]

A US administrative convoy consisting of 12 vehicles and 24 men transited the Autobahn from West Germany to West Berlin without incident. It was cleared through the Marienborn checkpoint in only eight minutes, according to Reuters. [redacted]

The Embassy in Moscow reported that Izvestiya observer Melor Sturua had given the impression of being "genuinely puzzled" by the Autobahn incidents. He speculated that the Soviet officer had been in a "sticky mood, perhaps for personal reasons;" and he expressed the belief that the incidents did not reflect a "leadership policy designed to alter existing procedures." [redacted]

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Leopold told Mission officials that the outlook for a compromise settlement of the GDR-FRG oil-products controversy was not good. The FRG was sticking by its offer to pay into the IZT account DM 82 per ton of gasoline and diesel fuel delivered by the GDR in 1964. Leopold estimated that this would total DM 53 million if 1964 deliveries approximated 1962 deliveries. The GDR, on the other hand, was demanding that it suffer no revenue loss from the FRG tax law. This position, if accepted, would commit the FRG to payments totaling approximately DM 133 million. Leopold also reported that Behrendt had "clearly implied" that if his demands were not met, the GDR would compensate itself for lost oil revenues by raising tolls on Autobahn traffic to Berlin. In order to recover the entire revenue loss, according to Leopold, the GDR would have to quadruple present tolls, which are expected to bring in DM 43 million in 1963.

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Neues Deutschland published excerpts from a speech by Ulbricht to workers of the Elektroapparate-Werke in Trepow in which he dealt with the situation in West Berlin. Among other things, Ulbricht stated that "it is indeed an effrontery when Bonn politicians demand free access to West Berlin but at the same time obstruct the free travel of GDR sportsmen, socialists, and trade unionists to Western countries through the Bonn Government's influence on NATO's West Berlin travel Bureau. How can anyone make such demands for which a factual reason does not even exist when he at the same time prohibits exchanges between West German and GDR sportsmen and between trade unionists and scientists"

UPI reported that the former chief translator for US intelligence at the refugee center in Berlin was arrested on suspicion of being a Communist agent. The 30-year-old woman, identified only as Renate I., was taken into custody on 17 October, according to police. They gave no further details. American military intelligence in Berlin "knows nothing about it," a spokesman said. The newspaper Bild Zeitung said the woman had been arrested two years ago on drunkenness charges while visiting East Berlin and had been given a long sentence on political grounds. She was deported by the Communists to West Berlin a few weeks ago after two years in prison. She had not returned to work at the Marienfeld refugee camp. According to the UPI report, she told West Berlin police she had disclosed to Communists secret service interrogators details of US intelligence questioning of refugees.

TASS noted that since the beginning of the year, a total of 10 American and British officers and men--6 during the last month--had asked for political asylum in the GDR. The number of Bundeswehr men finding asylum in the GDR was also growing. Between 15 July and 15 October, over 120 men and noncoms from the West German Army went over to the GDR. In addition, during the last 14 days alone, 481 people, including 68 Bundeswehr men left West Germany for the GDR.

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Neues Deutschland reported that in a letter signed by Secretary General Baur, the Association of German Democratic Jurists in the GDR proposed the establishment of a Joint Commission for problems of law and legal aid to the West German Judges' Conference presently convening in Kassel. In their letter, the GDR jurists referred to the more than 800 former Nazi judges still holding judicial positions in West Germany, expressed their opposition to the government draft of the new West German criminal code, and criticized West German official measures against such publications as Der Spiegel and Blickfeuer, against correspondents, and even against GDR citizens, such as publishing director Guenter Hofe. [redacted]

In retaliation for the detention of the US vehicle in the Soviet sector, a Soviet vehicle was detained by US personnel in West Berlin between 1015-1035Z. After the detention, the US LNO explained to the Soviets the reason for the detention. The Soviet Lt. Col. "refused to listen" and afterwards claimed he would not pass the information to his headquarters. He stated he could not understand the US position, as the Soviets had not detained the US car. The East Germans had. UPI reported that an American MP sedan caught the Russian automobile about one-half mile from checkpoint Charlie in the American sector after what eyewitnesses described as a wild chase. The American sedan cut off the Russian automobile, forced it to the curb, and blocked its passage. The eyewitnesses reported that two American MP's jumped from the patrol car and stood in front of the Russian car to prevent a Russian Lt. Col. from leaving it. UPI noted that the Western Allies regularly send military automobiles into East Berlin through the Friedrichstrasse crossing point for foreigners as a demonstration of the western right of freedom of movement in East Berlin. [redacted]

Reuters reported that a big scaffold, mounted on a 235-foot high building, blazing news headlines in 13-foot high illuminated lettering across the Berlin Wall into East Berlin went into operation near the Friedrichstrasse border crossing point. The sign, which will run news headlines from all over the world every night, can be clearly seen from the Alexanderplatz shopping center of East Berlin. [redacted]

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Neues Deutschland front paged the 18 October meeting between Gromyko and Ulbricht. The paper stated that the principal subjects discussed were "disarmament, the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the Berlin question on its basis." An ADN release, as summarized by West Berlin papers, reported that Gromyko emphasized that the Soviets would continue to press for a free city of West Berlin, "the importance of which problem is obviously underestimated by some Western statesmen." Neues Deutschland also carried excerpts from Ulbricht's electoral speech, which reiterates the call for an FRG-GDR "treaty of reason" and for the West Berlin Senat to negotiate and reach an understanding with the government of the GDR "in whose center West Berlin lies." [redacted]

TASS charged that during the past week US and British "occupation authorities" had staged "more military demonstrations" by moving units along the Autobahn "which crosses GDR territory." The dispatch asserted that Mayor Brandt and other "frontline city" leaders were actively supporting "these demonstrative measures." [redacted]

The Bonn Tripartite Group recommended that uniform Autobahn procedures, once agreed upon, should be communicated to the Soviets without delay. The Group agreed with most of the commandants' recommendations on procedures but advised that the figure of eight vehicles be firmly adopted as the minimum size convoy for which advance notice would be given and that the Allies stop avoiding convoys of from five to ten vehicles. The Group also recommended that the Soviets be told that the uniform terms would be imparted to them solely for their convenience and that the Allies reserved the right to change them at any time. [redacted]

The Mission expressed the belief that, as a result of sensational press coverage, a misunderstanding had arisen in some quarters to the effect that junior US and British convoy commanders were dealing directly with Soviet checkpoint commanders on dis-
procedural matters. The Mission explained that all discussion with Soviet checkpoint personnel is handled by experienced Provost Marshal officers who have been carefully briefed and are acting under the close supervision of USCOB and UKCOB.

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The Soviets are acquainted with these senior officers and are fully aware that they "know the score" on matters of both principle and procedure, the Mission reported. Since the French usually move only single vehicles over the Autobahn, their procedures are not well defined but are handled on more of an ad hoc basis, the cable concluded. [redacted]

USCINCEUR recommended to JCS that the US attempt to obtain a standard Allied position on Autobahn procedure but that the standard procedure under no circumstances be communicated to the Soviets either orally or in writing. [redacted]

19-20
Oct

In a speech over the weekend Chancellor Erhard announced that he would visit Berlin during the period 28-29 October, according to the Embassy in Bonn. [redacted]

20 Oct

UPI reported that two East German boys aged 13 and 14 fled to West Berlin by cutting their way through barbed wire on the East-West Berlin border. The boys were sent to a youth home while West Berlin welfare officials decided what to do with them. In the past, children who fled to West Berlin were sent home to their parents. The report also noted that East German border guards in their hunt for refugees are even opening coffins. Border guards hired a plumber to open a zinc coffin being shipped from West Berlin to West Germany for burial. [redacted]

Ambassador Kohler reported from Moscow that he and his British, French, and West German colleagues were "generally agreed" that the Soviets should be informed of Allied Autobahn procedures in "sufficient detail" as soon as possible. However, he reported that the French Foreign Office favored implementing and crystallizing new joint procedures through practice, without given prior notification to the Soviets. If notification was considered an absolute necessity, the Quai reportedly favored conveying it at a low level in order to minimize the risk of discussion. Kohler felt that such a course of action would lead only to increased confusion on the part of the Soviets. He recommended that notice of joint procedures be passed by Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. [redacted]

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21 Oct The East German news service reported that it was officially announced by the Central Election Commission of the GDR that of the 11,604,626 citizens entitled to vote in the Volkskammer elections, 11,517,241 had done so. A total of 0.04% of the ballot papers were declared invalid; of the valid votes, 99.95% had supported the election proposals of the National Front. Only 0.05% of the valid votes had been cast against the regime. [redacted]

UPI reported that a US Army convoy rolled over the East German Autobahn while troops of the American garrison in West Berlin were called out on a dawn alert. The small convoy of 8 men and 4 trucks drove from Berlin to West Germany and passed the Soviet Checkpoint at the West Berlin end of the Autobahn in 20 minutes, according to an Army spokesman. Troops of the Berlin garrison were called out of barracks in full combat kit at 0400Z. Troops of one battalion manned posts they would defend in case the Communists used armed force on the city. An Army spokesman said the three-hour alert was "designed to evaluate the units ability to react to various situations." [redacted]

21-22 Oct Reuters reported that Robert Mann, the American student imprisoned by the GDR for attempting to smuggle an East German into West Berlin in January 1962, would not be released as scheduled on 21 October due to a "technical error in Mann's dossier," but, according to "authoritive sources," he would finally be freed on 30 October. A later news release, however, stated that GDR authorities had again changed their minds and would release Mann on 23 October. [redacted]

22 Oct The Associated Press reported that the British Army began a little airlift across the North Sea to relieve a Battalion of its Berlin Brigade. The airlift will continue until 25 October, when about 1,400 men and their dependents will have been exchanged. [redacted]

The Embassy in Bern reported that the Swiss Federal Air Office had not been approached by any charter airline desiring to institute air service between Basel and East Berlin. A Swiss official stated that, while the Air Office could not block the company's plans, it would express opposition to them when the opportunity arose. [redacted]

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Neues Deutschland reported that upon the invitation of the GDR Interparliamentary group, British Labor M.P.'s Walter Monslow and Ernest Fernyhough arrived at Berlin-Schoenefeld airport for a fact-finding visit to the GDR. []

The East Berlin Berliner Zeitung reported that Parson Werner Arnold of Berlin Mitte was arrested for serious violation of the law. Arnold was "suspected of continuous traffic in human beings" since he gave support to an agent of the American "P-9" intelligence center in West Berlin. "This American intelligence center," the newspaper claimed, "had become known through several instances in the past when it organized attacks against the GDR state border with the aid of West Berlin terrorist gangs." []

East Berlin radio commentator Guenther Seidel stated in a broadcast that the "arrogant talk" in the West about a troop reduction in the sense of a detente was "nothing more than a large-scale bluff." Only simpletons can believe that a reduction in the US Armed Forces in West Europe by several thousand men, let us say a Division, and, on the other hand, an increase in the number of atomic warheads and carriers stored in West Germany as well as the building of a multilateral nuclear force with a leading West German participation will serve peace. On the contrary, this would undoubtedly entail an intensification of the situation and make more difficult new steps of detente." He then promises that the GDR will follow these developments closely, and will take necessary security steps. []

The Embassy in Bonn reported that a problem was arising with respect to crowd control in the Brandenburg Gate-Soviet War Memorial area of West Berlin. Mayor Albertz reportedly had informed the British Mission that the completion of the Reichstag building's new wing at the end of October would make restricted areas around the Soviet War Memorial "more unsuitable than ever." Albertz contended that West Berlin police would have no difficulties in controlling crowds and preventing incidents in the area. The British, therefore, reportedly were considering the possibility of withdrawing their guards and removing the barbed-wire barriers from around the War Memorial, on 7 November, on the

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condition that West Berlin police barriers were erected in their place. [redacted]

The Mission cabled its feeling that notifying the Soviets of harmonized Allied Autobahn procedures was desirable but that if done at a low level it would "almost certainly result either in immediate discussion of the issue or in a statement by the Soviet officer that the Allied position was unacceptable and would not be passed to higher authority." The Mission disagreed, however, with the statement of the Embassy in Moscow that the West should choose talks rather than further confrontations on the Autobahn. The cable noted that talks "in whatever forum at whatever time" could only dissipate the position that Autobahn procedures are to be determined by the Allies alone, not by the Soviets. Talks also would give the Soviets a chance to play one ally off against another, inasmuch as the British "would almost certainly wish to bargain," the Mission contended. [redacted]

The Mission cabled that Berlin Economics Senator Schiller would be in the US from 29 October until 5 November, during which time he wanted to meet with Rostow, Heller, and Creel. [redacted]

23 Oct

A US convoy consisting of 12 vehicles and 24 men transited the Autobahn from West Berlin to West Germany without incident. Soviet checkpoint personnel made no demands that the US troops dismount, according to UPI. [redacted]

The East Germans release US citizen Robert Mann at 1715Z. [redacted]


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BERLIN CHRONOLOGY




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
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


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~~SECRET~~BACKGROUND-USE-ONLY SUPPLEMENT TO BERLIN CHRONOLOGY

16 Oct Acting on instructions from Paris, a French Embassy official called at the Department to inquire whether Ambassador Thompson had discussed actual figures and other dismounting procedures with Ambassador Dobrynin. He was told that Thompson had: 1) given Dobrynin an itemized list of US non-dismount convoys which had transited the Autobahn since 1 May; 2) explained the US procedure of not dismounting a convoy which contains 30 or fewer personnel exclusive of drivers and assistant drivers, and 3) accused the Soviets of trying to change established procedures.

At 1500Z Lord Home summoned Soviet charge Romanov, who arrived shortly after receipt of news that the convoy had been cleared without dismounting. Home told Romanov he was glad that the incident had been resolved satisfactorily but declared that he wanted to make two points: (1) This sort of situation could become very dangerous very quickly. Such incidents disturbed the atmosphere of East-West relations which the two governments were trying hard to improve. Both sides must eliminate the possibility of situations arising in which junior officers on the Autobahn engage the responsibility and prestige of their respective governments. (2) If there were any genuine misunderstandings about British convoy procedures, the UK and the Soviets should discuss them and clear them up.

17 Oct The UK Ambassador in Moscow called at the Soviet Foreign Ministry with instructions to tell Zorin the same thing that Lord Home had told the Soviet Charge in London on 16 October. When informed that Zorin would not be available until 18 October, the Ambassador gave the message to Foreign Ministry Charge Sobolev. Sobolev said that his government agreed such incidents were dangerous; however, he maintained that the altercation had not been occasioned by Soviet personnel but by British departure from established rules, which the Soviets had not changed and which they were not thinking of changing. Sobolev then contended that after the Soviet officer was allowed "to inspect the number of men

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in the English convoy," the convoy had been permitted to proceed. He said that as long as established procedures were observed there would be no incidents and no risk of incidents but he observed that such altercations "emphasized the need of a radical solution of the question of West Berlin." [redacted]

18 Oct

The Department informed the Embassy in Bonn that a new Soviet challenge on the Autobahn was a possibility and that planning should proceed on this assumption. It also noted that the Ambassadorial Group in Washington was scheduled to discuss the following questions: 1) Whether the Allies should again attempt to agree on joint Autobahn procedures; 2) Whether the Allies should inform the Soviets of their present national procedures or of new joint procedures, should the latter be worked out; 3) If so, in what form and where. The Department expressed the view that serious efforts should be made to harmonize procedures and that the Soviets should be informed of them. [redacted]

Inasmuch as on 17 October the Soviets requested only that trucks containing ten or more passengers dismount (although all four British categories were, in fact, of dismount size), the British suggested that the recommendations for joint procedures be altered to eliminate the figure of 30 and to provide simply that only vehicles carrying ten or more passengers would dismount. The suggestion was generally opposed by the Quadripartite meeting because the US had already informed the Soviets of the 30 figure, according to the Embassy in Bonn. [redacted]

19 Oct

At the Contingency Coordinating Group meeting the British presented a paper calling for the Allies to harmonize Autobahn procedures and present them to the Soviets, then to allow "some time thereafter" before dispatching controversial convoys. The British representative stated that the purpose of "some time" clause was to assure that Soviet checkpoint personnel had received proper instructions before they were forced to deal with a controversial convoy. He then recommended that the procedures be communicated to the Soviets at a high level and in writing, in order to make it difficult for Moscow to charge the Allies with departing from the rules, should further incidents occur. He felt that until procedures had been harmonized and communicated to the Soviets, the Allies should refrain from sending nondismountable convoys along the Autobahn. The French

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representative cautioned against informing the Soviets in a manner which might prompt discussion. He suggested that notice might better be given at a lower level, e.g. to a Soviet checkpoint commander or to SERB in Potsdam. The West German representative said that Bonn was of the opinion that the incidents had been cleared by political authorities in Moscow and were part of an attempt to impose limitations on Allied access rights and possibly even to introduce Autobahn fees for Allied traffic. [redacted]

21 Oct Chancellor Erhard told Ambassador McGhee that he was planning to visit De Gaulle in Paris on 21-22 November and that he would be "delighted to accept" the President's invitation to come to Washington on 25-27 November. The Chancellor said that Berlin and German reunification "probably" should be included in his talks with the President, although he didn't place great emphasis on these topics, according to the Ambassador. [redacted]

22 Oct At the Ambassadorial Group meeting the French supported efforts to harmonize Allied Autobahn procedures but expressed the feeling that the Soviets should not be notified of the harmonized procedures. Ambassador Thompson agreed with LIVE OAK's proposals for harmonized procedures, which he would then prefer to communicate orally to Dobrynin. He stressed the need for reaching prompt agreement so that the next non-dismount convoy would not be "unduly delayed." The British took the position that the principle of notification should be settled before proceeding with harmonization and that dismounting should be limited to vehicles containing ten or more men. The West Germans opposed any notification by letter on the grounds that this might lead to negotiations. It was eventually agreed that the British and French Ambassadors would seek further instructions from their governments. [redacted]

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