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HR70-14

Copy No.  
3 December 1963

BERLIN CHRONOLOGY

A Chronology of Reports Concerning the Berlin Situation Received  
During the Week Ending at 1200 EST 3 December 1963

This is a working paper prepared in the  
[redacted] Office  
of Current Intelligence, CIA.

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Excluded from automatic  
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24 Oct


[redacted] various roads surrounding an installation suspected to be a Soviet missile support facility were being improved or repaired. The Soviet installation, located near Jena/Isserstedt, has been suspected for a number of years of storing surface-to-surface missiles or nuclear warheads. An old stucco house located near what appears to be the only road offering vehicular access to the installation was also undergoing repairs by Soviet personnel. On the road a barrier was in a down position and an unidentified Soviet truck was parked to the rear of the barrier. Two signposts in several languages warned that the area was off-limits to military mission vehicles, but no such signs were observed at any point north of the installation. [redacted]

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25 Oct-  
14 Nov



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Nov

The US Embassy in Bonn reported that on 4 November a West German single-engined sports aircraft enroute from Rothenburg to Dinslaken crossed over the demarcation line and made an emergency landing in the vicinity of Stendal (near Magdeburg). For the first time, the Soviet Zone aviation authorities granted the pilots permission to fly back to Federal territory and notified the Federal Air Office of this special permission on 5 November. Previously, all aircraft crossing over the Soviet Zone boundary had been returned by surface transport. Delayed by weather, the two pilots started their return flight on 8 November, but shortly before reaching the demarcation line the plane reportedly lost power and crashed in a field. The aircraft was completely wrecked, but the pilots escaped with only minor bruises. In a TV interview on 11 November the pilots stated that they had both obtained their licenses some 8 weeks previously, and on their flight, using a gyro-compass, made an error and flew a course of 32° instead of 320°. The Embassy was informed by an aviation official of the Federal Ministry of Transport that the Soviet Zone authorities had invited the Federal Air Office to participate in the formal investigation. This offer was declined, however. The aviation official also appeared convinced that the whole incident and the accident were due to extreme carelessness and lack of navigational skill on the part of the pilots. [REDACTED]

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5 Nov

The Consulate in Stuttgart reported that Fritz Hanke, a former GDR border guard who defected in February 1963, had been convicted of attempted manslaughter for shooting and hitting a refugee attempting to flee across the interzonal border on 5 June 1962. The conviction was for attempted manslaughter because there was no proof that the unidentified refugee died as a result of the wound inflicted by Hanke. The defendant was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment, of which six had already been served, and was declared to be eligible for parole as early as January 1964. The Consulate commented that the case was noteworthy because it marked one of the few occasions on which a subordinate was found guilty of committing a crime while acting pursuant to the orders of a superior officer. The court went to great lengths to avoid establishing a precedent for future cases of this type, the report noted.

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Nov

The US Mission Berlin reported that on 6 November, a West Berliner, Hans Wendt, was refused access by East German border guards to the Wueste Mark exclave. Wendt farms the uninhabited exclave as a tenant. Earlier in the day his stepson had entered the exclave but had been temporarily refused permission to leave. On 7 November, Wendt made several additional unsuccessful attempts to gain access to the exclave and his stepson continued to be denied permission to leave it. On the evening of 7 November Wendt was informed by the East German border guards that starting the next day, both he and his stepson would be free to enter and leave the exclave but they would have to use a new route. Instead of going directly from Wueste Mark to the Babelsberg checkpoint and thence via the Autobahn to West Berlin, Wendt would have to follow a somewhat indirect route via Stahnsdorf to West Berlin. On 8 November, Wendt's stepson left Wueste Mark and entered West Berlin via the new route. There has been no difficulty in travelling to and from the exclave since that time. Wendt stated that he was told by East German border guards that the change in route was ordered by the Soviets and not by East German authorities. The Embassy commented that possibly additional measures are being taken either by the Soviets or the East Germans to increase further the security of the Babelsberg checkpoint area. Such measures could well include the elimination of secondary access roads leading into the checkpoint through an area in which the Soviets or East Germans might wish to assemble military forces during serious Autobahn incidents. [REDACTED]

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7 Nov

Minister Seleh of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest told a US Embassy officer that it was "very important" for the US to take a "calm" attitude toward "unimportant and peripheral matters." He said that President Kennedy was trying hard to resolve "important matters" but that some US officials were becoming "excited over unimportant things." After considerable sparring the US officer got the impression that Seleh was referring to the recent Autobahn incidents, and he replied that such matters were not "unimportant" but fundamental. Seleh then said that he wanted to state emphatically that the problem had arisen at a "local level" and did not reflect a policy of his government to "interfere with travel rights to Berlin, especially in view of the continued extended discussions being carried on." He claimed that the entire subject was under discussion between the US and the USSR and that the Soviets had no desire whatever to create interference. The US officer replied by expressing skepticism that the third incident in less than a month could have been the result of a "local decision," but he came away from the talk with the impression that Seleh was deliberately trying to "de-escalate" the Autobahn incidents and disassociate them from basic Soviet policy. [REDACTED]

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The US Embassy in Bonn reported that Khrushchev's comments make unmistakably clear that the Autobahn convoy harassments were receiving the highest level attention in Moscow. Khrushchev's direct involvement had quickly raised the level of political concern in Germany and was being viewed as confirmation of a widely held German belief that from the beginning the Autobahn incidents had been planned Soviet policy. In the case of the 10-12 October incident and the subsequent stoppage of the British convoy, the general reaction locally was satisfaction over the victory of Western firmness in face of Soviet "power tactics." No credence whatever was given to the Soviet contention that the US convoy conformed to Soviet requirements and was then allowed to pass. A new element in the reaction compared to 10-12 October, however, had been evidences of doubt as to whether firmness on the spot was sufficient to handle the threat implied by interference with the convoys. Die Welt concluded that "firmness in specific cases of intense harassment is not enough; freedom of Berlin access must henceforth be given a more central place the political strategy of the West." Deputy SPD Chairman Wehner feared that the Soviets would shortly make further difficulties, and wondered if, in the long run, it would not be better to settle the control procedures through a written agreement. The Embassy commented that the procedure which had been utilized successfully so far in handling convoy stoppages, was likely more and more in the future to convey the impression of Allied vulnerability to Soviet harassments. Local reaction, which was now almost entirely positive, could change rather quickly to concern that the US was unable to prevent the Soviets from interfering with convoy access. One thing that might be helpful would be to reach prior Allied agreement on the protest to be delivered jointly in Moscow as soon as any case of Soviet interference with convoy access occurred. To facilitate governmental coordination, the Bonn Embassy was recommending to CINCEUR and to USCOB that non-dismount convoys henceforth be despatched at mid-day rather than early morning so that if interference occurred, allowing for the time difference, four power consultations in Washington could be quickly arranged.

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9 Nov The State Department reported that a UK Embassy officer told Under-Secretary Tyler that he had been instructed to let the US know that the Foreign Office would like Trevelyan to deliver the Butler message to Gromyko sometime during the next week. He also said that while nothing would be added to the message, Trevelyan would use the occasion to express the hope that there would be no more incidents on the Autobahn. Tyler pointed out that the US would send a non-dismountable convoy to Berlin on 12 November so it might be well to hold the message until the convoy cleared. Furthermore, even if the convoy were detained only briefly, the US believed that it would be desirable to postpone delivery for a day or two following the incident.

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11 Nov The Berlin Programm announced that BEA and Pan-Am had scheduled 291 special flights into and out of Berlin during the Christmas holidays. BEA's special schedule was to run from 19 December until 6 January and to include 117 flights; Pan-Am's was to run from 20 December until 12 January and consist of 174 special flights.

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12 Nov

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in order to cope with some of the difficulties which surely would arise from another extremely cold winter, the East German Council of Ministers recently decided that the following emergency measures would be taken as required by the severity of the situation: (A) Street lighting, illuminated advertising and display windows, and private travel (Personenreiseverkehr) would be reduced up to 20%. (B) Up to 30% of the movie houses and large restaurants would be closed, up to 30% of private travel (sic) would be curtailed, and up to 300,000 metric tons of hard coal and 200,000 metric tons of hard coal coke would be released from state reserves. (C) On an and/or basis, the production at glass, ceramic, construction and ferrous and non-ferrous metal plants would be curtailed or halted as required; additional movie houses would be closed, as would schools (up to 20%) and theaters; lignite briquette exports would be decreased by amounts up to 10,000 metric tons; and the hard coal input of the gas plants would be reduced up to approximately 400,000 metric tons. According to the estimates of planning officials, if the harsh measures set forth under item (C) above were put into effect, the following industries could expect daily losses as indicated: ferrous metals, 675,000 DM (or 2,700 metric tons of steel); non-ferrous metals, 340,000 DM; and glass and ceramics, 280,000 DM. Furthermore, about 60,000 workers would be affected by these measures. [redacted]

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13 Nov

In a Berliner Zeitung article, E. R. Hartke (not further identified) charged that the Western powers were permitting West German "revanchist organizations" to function more and more openly in West Berlin "under the shelter of our magnanimous compromise offers for a demilitarized free city of West Berlin." He specifically cited the 11 November "handing over of part of the former Reichstag building to the Bonn state" as an "open, deliberate provocation...under the protection of the occupation troops of the Western powers." Hartke then outlined the USSR-GDR "magnanimous compromise solution for the peaceful settlement of the West Berlin question" --namely, "a demilitarized, peaceful, and neutral free city." But, Hartke continued, by failing to respond to this generous offer the Allies had indicated that they did not "wish the GDR to grant this part of its capital the right of independent development." "They would evidently like to pick from the compromise solution...the plums--that is, our concessions--while ignoring the conditions to which our concessions are tied," the article continued. It then stated: "If the forces at present in control in West Berlin do not want to have anything to do with our compromise proposal of a free city, they cannot of course have our concessions either. In that case, so I believe, we have no choice but to withdraw our compromise proposal." Hartke then went on to claim that West Berlin was situated on the territory of the "sovereign GDR," was "legally part of the GDR" and came "under its sovereignty," and was in fact part of the GDR capital "even if owing to the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin the GDR government should not be able for sometime longer to exercise its sovereign rights there." He concluded by praising the GDR's generosity for 1) "its willingness to grant this part of our capital the status of a politically, economically, and administratively independent structure /with/ the right to determine its own affairs," and 2) "its willingness to grant this free city of West Berlin the use of GDR routes of transportation in relevant contracts"--both under the condition that "West Berlin becomes a peaceful and neutral free city and no longer lets itself be misused as a disruption center."

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14 Nov

UPI noted that the US Army sent its third troop convoy in three days over the highway between West Germany and West Berlin. The convoy, consisting of 13 trucks and 26 men, cleared the Soviet checkpoints without trouble. [ ]

An East Berlin radio service reported that Friedrich Ebert stated in his speech to the Volkskammer the complete agreement of the SED Parliamentary Group to the statements of Nikita Khrushchev and Willi Stoph on the "fresh provocations" of the "imperialist circles" by the incidents on the Autobahn. Ebert explained that "it is international practice that in connection with transit, the state which accords transit or the representatives which it has authorized for this purpose lay down control procedures in agreement with its interests. In no case can anyone that uses these transit routes determine the regulations and arrangement of the transit traffic. It is high time the Western powers allow reason to prevail in this matter and respect international law. They should bear in mind that they are not traveling somewhere in space, if they want to go to Berlin, but that whether on land, on water, or in the air they are using the transit routes of the GDR. Earlier the GDR, as was stated in the declaration of the Council of Ministers this morning, reached an agreement with the USSR that the Soviet forces temporarily stationed in the GDR should for a time exercise

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control over Western military transports through the GDR to Berlin. This agreement was a concession, a concession to facilitate negotiations on a solution which corresponds to international law and the sovereignty of the GDR. The fact is that no agreement exist between the GDR and the Western powers on the use of the transport routes of the GDR. Consequently no one in the West can invoke an alleged right to use these transport routes. It is indispensable that a peace treaty be concluded, and that the West Berlin question and the question related to it are solved on its basis in order that disruptive maneuvers on our Autobahn are finally rendered impossible. Like other provocations of this sort, they are present day manifestations of West German revanchism. We want tranquility on the transport routes of the GDR and we cannot and will not permit the territory of our sovereign state to be misused by Western adventurers for actions hostile to peace." [redacted]

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15 Nov

Neues Deutschland reported that the US Ambassador in Bonn, George McGhee, stated in Mainz that his government regards the reunification of Germany as a principal part of its policy. Why then, the newspaper asked, did the US Government "contribute decisively to separating Germany and Berlin, to splitting off West Germany from the German national body, to including it in NATO, rearming it militarily and supporting its antidetente policy? Why does it want to include West Germany in the multilateral atomic force for NATO? Why does the Kennedy Administration obstruct the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the peaceful solution of the West Berlin problem? The West German press, on the other hand, stressed approvingly the enlightened self-interest and mutual confidence themes in McGhee's address and favorably reported the Ambassador's description of the German Problem as a major concern of US policy. [ ]

The Embassy in Bonn expected that any West German approaches on a Bundestag meeting in Berlin would be coupled with feelers designed to sound out Allied thinking on the holding of the 1964 Bundesversammlung in that city. The Embassy noted that the Bundesversammlung consists of all members of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, plus a certain number of representatives elected by the Land legislatures. It meets every four years for the sole purpose of electing the President of the Federal Republic. Its previous three sessions have all been held in West Berlin, and Ambassador McGhee felt that Allied efforts to prevent the 1964 meeting from convening there could have "adverse repercussions" in Berlin and the FRG and might be altogether unsuccessful. Moreover, he believed that if the Three Powers offered no objections to holding the next Bundesversammlung in Berlin, they probably would be far more successful in their efforts to head off a Berlin meeting of the Bundestag shortly after Christmas. He was seeking State Department approval of this plan before trying to sell it to the British and French. [ ]

UPI reported that NATO Secretary General Dirk U. Stikker warned that continued Soviet arrests of foreign tourists and incidents on the Berlin Autobahn could destroy the recent improvement in East-West relations. Stikker added that the recent "Big Lift" US military

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15 Nov operation "certainly was not a prelude to a decrease  
con't of US armed forces in Europe. [REDACTED]

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17 Nov

Neues Deutschland claimed that according to an announcement by the Berlin People's Police headquarters, members of the Western occupation forces coming from West Berlin by car had recently in several cases "again violated public security and order in the GDR capital." The charges included driving at an excessively high speed, driving through streets closed to all traffic, and illegal parking. License plates for French and American cars were recorded and noted in the alleged incidents.

A Neues Deutschland editorial stated that when Hitler wanted to declare war on Poland, he launched a hysterical propaganda about Danzig and the "ethnic Germans" in the Polish corridor. "What is Bonn's 'Danzig' today, which will serve to deceive other peoples and to overcome the common sense of the West Germans? West Berlin will undoubtedly serve this purpose. The provocation in the Reichstag ruins announced by (FRG Minister) Mende was proceeded by an appearance of (Bundestag President) Gerstenmaier at the same location. Erhard's first official action was a visit to West Berlin where a Bonn Chancellor has no business to be. Immediately after his appointment, Mende also made a pilgrimage to the wall, which is not situated at the border of the Federal Republic, but at the West Berlin border with the GDR." The editorial added that West Berlin could have its communication lines guaranteed by treaty very quickly and very easily. "The statement of the Council of Ministers to the People's Chamber again demonstrates our willingness to conclude treaties with the West Berlin Senat on transit traffic across the GDR...There is still a very serious reason for the warning that West Berlin may become the Sarajevo of a third World War unless the source of the fire is not extinguished."

Neues Deutschland reported that during the previous four weeks, 17 privates and NCO's of the West German Bundeswehr deserted to the GDR.

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18 Nov

AP reported that a 42-year-old West Berlin woman, accused of betraying at least 400 Western intelligence agents, including her own brother, to the East German secret police, was sentenced to nine years at hard labor. Margarete Kosa, convicted by the West Berlin court on charges of being an accessory to kidnaping and "maintaining treasonous relations," screamed and collapsed when sentence was passed. [REDACTED]

An East German television report claimed that from 25 October to 14 November, 756 resettlers from West Germany, including 411 returnees, reported to GDR reception camps. [REDACTED]

During the morning approximately 100 Soviet vehicles containing three generals, two probable generals, and at least 18 field-grade officers were observed traveling on the south ring of the Autobahn. USAREUR commented that the officers probably were going to a meeting at GSFG headquarters to discuss future training activities or critique recent exercises. Two days later RadioVolga reported that an assembly of the Party Aktiv of the GSFG had taken place on 18 November at the GSFG headquarters at Wunsdorf. The theme of the assembly was "Improve the Selection and Education of Military Cadres." A report was given by the CINC of GSFG, General Yakubovsky. Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky also present and addressed the meeting. [REDACTED]

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CINCUSAREUR reported that East German security officials made an attempt to recruit a US enlisted man, SP5 Jackie Boyd Lott, in East Berlin, on the occasion of the death of his wife's grandmother there. The approach was made through Lott's wife, who was contacted at her grandmother's home by two alleged police officials in civilian clothes. These men later offered her assistance in the funeral arrangements and an extension of her residence permit in East Berlin. She was invited to visit the local police station to discuss these matters further. The discussion at the police station (with the same two officials) covered the political situation in Berlin, Lott's military duties, his working relationships in his unit, and maneuver areas in West Germany. This was followed by an implied offer of supplemental income to Lott and a request that his wife bring him to the police station that evening for further discussion. When advised of this by his wife, Lott went immediately to Checkpoint Charlie and informed representatives of the Berlin Brigade. He was not contacted by any East German official. On 19 November, Lott, accompanied by a representative of the Provost Marshal Division, returned to East Berlin, attended the funeral, picked up his personal belongings at the grandmother's apartment, and proceeded to the border crossing point. The processing of Lott, his family, and personal vehicle through the border controls was accomplished without incident. [REDACTED]

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19 Nov At approximately 1130Z a US helicopter patrol over the French sector sighted two Soviet trucks, one APC, and five Soviet soldiers in the Soviet Zone between Dorfstrasse and the Havel River. The APC was in a white shed with a sliding door facing the river. The soldiers made no attempt to conceal themselves but instead waved at the helicopter. Noting that the Soviets patrol fairly heavily behind the East Germans along the north sector/zonal border, USCOB commented that this was the first sighting of what was probably a Soviet border patrol base.

Neues Deutschland reported that at a cocktail party at the USSR Embassy in East Berlin, P. A. Abrasimov, USSR Ambassador in the GDR, introduced the new head of the Novosty office in the GDR, Anatoly Morosov, and the new press attache of the USSR Embassy, Yuriy Sharov.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine reported that the Berlin Senat decided to discuss the problem of a federal loan for the Berlin budget in talks with Federal Chancellor Erhard and Finance Minister Dohlgruen. The Federal Chancellor will set the date for the talks in which Berlin will be represented by Governing Mayor Brandt and Senator for Financial Affairs Hoppe.

JCS and the State Department approved USCINCEUR's 16 November request to return the personnel and vehicles of US convoy 7 to Berlin on 26 November in their original configuration. /Note: US-7 was a non-dismount convoy consisting of 13 vehicles, 26 drivers and assistant drivers, and 28 passengers. It departed West Berlin on 12 November and encountered a slight delay at Babelsberg when the Soviet duty officer informally requested that the passengers dismount and that he be allowed to climb up on the rears of the trucks to count the personnel. /

USCOB reported that at approximately 0450Z a 20-year-old male refugee successfully escaped to the French sector of West Berlin. During his escape East German border guards fired 4 shots and 2 green flares. The refugee was not hit. Border guards searched the area until 0625Z and departed.

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The West German newspaper Deutsche Zeitung carried the report of an interview with French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in which he stated that the Autobahn incidents demonstrated the strong Soviet position in Berlin. "The Russians," he stated, "have never given up their intention to change the status quo of Berlin. They want to cement the status quo of the DDR. From time to time it appears useful to Moscow to remind the Western powers of these political objectives." Attempts at detente were also seen from this viewpoint.

USCINCEUR reported that in regard to the Soviet note on Autobahn procedures given to the Allies on 16 November, he believed that no useful purpose would be served by replying to the Soviets and recommended that no reply be made. He also felt that the US had now run all the test convoys that were required, and recommended that future convoys be organized, scheduled, and conducted by the military commanders involved. The convoys should be run strictly on the basis of military necessity and in accordance with agreed Allied procedures. In the event of a prolonged period where there was no military necessity for a convoy run, USCOB should run one or more convoys to demonstrate our continuous right of free and unrestricted access.

The Mission submitted figures showing that, for 18 non-dismount US convoys which traveled the Autobahn between 16 May and 9 October 1963, the number of passengers exclusive of drivers and assistant drivers averaged less than two men per vehicle on all but one occasion. On all occasions but one the number of passengers plus assistant drivers averaged less than three men per vehicle, and 7 of these convoys the average number of passengers plus assistant drivers was less than two per vehicle. The one convoy in which the average number of passengers exceeded three per vehicle transited the Autobahn on 14 June and consisted of 4 vehicles and 30 personnel. /Note: It is interesting to note that the 14 June convoy was delayed briefly when its passengers refused to dismount. On the other hand, a 19 May convoy whose passengers-per-vehicle average was only one (two, counting assistant drivers as passengers) also was delayed for two hours when its personnel were required to dismount. All three US

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convoys which have been detained recently had been detained for failure to dismount have had passenger-per-vehicle averages of less than two (three, counting assistant drivers as passengers.) [redacted]

LIVE OAK reported the following details on the processing of the two French convoys FR-6 (non-dismount) and FR-7 (dismount) which transited the Autobahn from Berlin to West Germany on this date. One vehicle in FR-6 broke down before the convoy arrived at Babelsberg and had to be dropped from the convoy. The actual composition of FR-6 was seven 1.5-ton trucks, each carrying a driver, an assistant driver, and three passengers, and two jeeps, each carrying a driver and two passengers. Total: 9 vehicles, 9 drivers, 7 assistant drivers, and 25 passengers. The convoy was processed through Babelsberg in 43 minutes and through Marienborn in 30 minutes. It encountered no demands for dismounting or the lowering of tailgates. FR-7 consisted of 15 vehicles, 28 drivers and assistant drivers, and 96 passengers. At Babelsberg its passengers dismounted in response to a request by checkpoint commander Lt. Col. Sergin. Sergin then asked that the drivers and assistant drivers dismount also. This request was refused by the French OIC, and a discussion ensued between the two officers. The convoy finally was cleared 46 minutes after its arrival. The drivers and assistant drivers did not dismount. FR-7 was processed through Marienborn in 26 minutes, encountering no "unusual requests" at that checkpoint. [redacted]

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East Berlin radio reported that in an interview, Admiral Waldemar Verner, the Deputy Minister of National Defense, disclosed that on the basis of Article 22 of the National Defense Act, men in some older age groups were being included in the present draft lists for the NVA. Article 22 states that "the conscript who has undergone mustering can be enlisted for basic military service from the completion of the 18th year of life to 31 December of the year in which he completes his 26th year of life." Concerning the reasons for the older age-groups call-up, Verner stated that "there are certain special


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functions in our National People's Army which call for a particularly high degree of technical ability and solid knowledge as well as extensive practical skills. This is an asset of citizens liable to conscription who already have several years of vocational experience. Another consideration is that it is extremely good and useful for the military teams if somewhat older soldiers are among the conscripts." 

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AP reports that East German authorities have agreed to return some 60 sailboats trapped in East Berlin after the construction of the Wall in mid-August, 1961. The agreement to return the yachts to their West Berlin owners follows negotiations conducted through international sailing organizations. [redacted]

Premier Khrushchev reportedly told Danish Foreign Minister Haekkerup that "many people in the West had underestimated the severity of the situation on the Autobahn," according to a 22 November New York Times report of the Foreign Minister's news conference in Moscow. Khrushchev allegedly added that the Soviet position on access to Berlin was "very firm" and that Moscow would reject any change in Autobahn procedures. He suggested that the 4 November incident might have been the result of a lack of communication between Washington and US military officers on the scene, rather than a consequence of a change in basic US policy, according to the Times account of the press conference. [redacted]

A West German television station announced that acting Berlin Mayor Willi Brandt arrived in Algeria, the last stop of his African tour. According to the report, Brandt while in Nigeria denied the existence of a secret arms delivery agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa. [redacted]

The US representative to NATO reported from Paris that the West Germans had obtained the following facts from replies received from 37 scientific societies in answer to FRG questions: 1) 36 to 37 societies still have members in the Soviet Zone, some holding important positions in these societies as presidents, vice-presidents or members of directorate. 2) All societies confirmed that until 13 August 1961, their members in the Soviet Zone normally had the possibility to participate in scientific meetings held by these institutions in the Federal Republic or other countries. 3) A definite change was noticed since 13 August 1961. An almost complete (GDR) travel ban prevented scientists living in the Soviet Zone from travelling abroad, and only in isolated cases have Soviet-Zone scientists been able to obtain travel permits from authorities concerned. [redacted]

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21 Nov

A Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs messenger delivered a note to the US Embassy in Moscow in reply to the Embassy's 6 November communication protesting the 4-6 November convoy detention. The British and French Embassies received shorter notes. The note to the US Embassy rejected the 6 November protest and blamed the detention on the "attempt by American military personnel to violate existing procedure for the transit of personnel through the Soviet control point." The note pointed out that in the summer of 1945 Allied commanders had agreed that the "protection, supervision, maintenance, and control" of access highways were to be carried out by the Soviet forces. The communique then insisted that "instructions issued by American military authorities for commanders of American convoys" were "in no degree valid for Soviet military authorities." It continued: "And in general completely unfounded are the claims of American authorities to establish at their own discretion the range of obligations and the manner of operation of the Soviet military authorities in processing American military personnel at control points. Naturally, if internal instructions for American troops have the aim of introducing proper order into the activities of American military personnel, then this could only be welcomed. But at the same time it is fully obvious that these instructions cannot serve such an end insofar as they violate one part or another of the existing procedure for checking military personnel of the three Western powers at the control points." The note went on to repeat the Soviet press contention that the British and French convoys were processed without difficulty on 5 November because the commanders "conducted themselves in accordance with existing procedures, presented their personnel for checking, and took measures in order that control could be accomplished without hindrance and quickly." However, the note continued, the US convoy "attempted to avoid going through the same control procedure even after the French and English convoys went through it in the presence of the Americans. Consequently, the convoy was not allowed to proceed until the Americans "announced their agreement to go through the same check." The communication then asked rhetorically whether the incidents were being caused by "insufficient discipline of American troops or conscious actions by those interested in

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maintaining international tensions, in conjunction with the lack of a German peace settlement and, as a result of this, the continuing abnormal situation in West Berlin." It contended that if the US wished to avoid future incidents, it need only "give proper instructions to its appropriate military representatives and not permit a situation in which some irresponsible American officer by his own actions could provoke dangerous incidents." In conclusion the note warned that "all responsibility for possible undesirable consequences of violation by American troops of control procedures at Soviet control points will lie wholly with the American side." [redacted]

The Berlin Mission reported that in accordance with the Allied practice of keeping the Governor-Mayor up to date on Autobahn matters, Mayor Albertz was to be confidentially informed about the Soviet communication of 16 November at the regular weekly meeting to be held on 22 November. Bearing in mind the Brandt leak on the 29 October message to the Soviet, however, the Mayor would be told only that oral communication was received from the Soviets on 16 November; that it seemed generally consistent with the Soviet public position on Autobahn access; and that the Soviet communication was not under study by the three Allied Governments.

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22 Nov

At 0830Z USCINCEUR announced that US convoy 7, redesignated US-17, would depart Friedberg at 0500Z 25 November, spend the night of 25-26 November at Helmstedt, and arrive at the Marienborn check-point at 1000Z 26 November. The Soviets were to be given ninety-minute advance notice of the convoy's arrival. [REDACTED]

US Under-Secretary of State Ball cabled authorization to the Bonn Embassy to explore, without commitment, with the British and French the question of possible German proposals regarding the Bundestag congress (Bundesversammlung) to elect a Federal President in Berlin in 1964. [REDACTED]

The US Ambassador to Algeria reported that Willy Brandt left Algiers after a brief visit which included talks with Ben Bella, Chief FLN organizer Ben Alla and Economy Minister Boumasa. Brandt's reception by the Algerian government was apparently correct but not enthusiastic. The Ambassador felt that neutralist Algeria, although wary of seeming to take sides in a major cold war problem, gave Brandt as warm a welcome as could be expected. Coming on the heels of a visit by West German Parliamentarians for the 1 November celebration (following which a delegate reportedly stated that Ben Bella had given assurances that Algeria did not intend to extend diplomatic recognition to the East German regime,) Brandt's visit should be of further help to the FRG in strengthening its position in Algeria vis-a-vis East German competitors. [REDACTED]

The US Mission Berlin reported that the US Commandant (as Chairman) had proposed a Commandants meeting for 0900Z on 25 November to consider any necessary steps in connection with the US Autobahn convoy movement (US-17) on the following day. [REDACTED]

The US Embassy Bonn reported that the British and French Embassies had received instructions from their capitals which did not object to the proposed German legislation transferring certain administrative responsibilities from Berlin in emergencies. The Embassy noted that the British might raise separately the question as to whether the Germans had considered the unfortunate psychological implications of the move. [REDACTED]

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The US Embassy Bonn reported that it agreed with the Berlin Mission that if further incidents of harassment in the Berlin Air Corridors occurred, BASIC level protests (which the Embassy believed necessary in each case for the record) should be supplemented by a prompt, higher level demarche. However, before the issue was raised to the governmental level, the Embassy believed that the three Western Ambassadors should direct a protest to the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin; it therefore requested authorization to seek a tripartite agreement in Bonn on protests to be sent to Abrasimov immediately following any further incidents. If harassment of a similar nature occurred after these protests, the Embassy felt that a rapid tripartite (or even unilateral if necessary) protest on the governmental level was called for. The State Department then authorized the Bonn Embassy to seek agreement in Bonn, along the lines proposed, to the course of action to be taken if the Soviets or the GDR should again harass flights, but requested that the Embassy limit its discussion to the possible use of flares and/or search-lights.

The US Mission Berlin reported to Washington that the Soviet bloc organization for Radio Broadcasting and Television (OIRT) intended to send a delegation to the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) meeting in Rome 23 November to 14 December. Three low-level GDR government officials had applied for TTD's to travel as members of the OIRT delegation. The UN yearbook, according to the Mission report, indicates that CCITT is a standing committee of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) which is a UN specialized agency. The FRG but not the GDR belongs to the ITU. The Rome meeting apparently will lay plans for a full-scale CCITT conference in Moscow in 1964. The Mission noted that the ATO had generally approved applications for travel for GDR delegates to international conferences concerning transportation and/or communications where their presence seemed required, but it was inclined to doubt that GDR attendance at the CCITT meeting was required. The Mission foresaw GDR propaganda exploitation of such attendance as evidence of UN recognition. It added that the British and French representatives at ATO favor refusal of the TTD's, but are seeking higher level guidance. The State Department then cabled

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Berlin that the TTD's should not be issued. The Department pointed out that OIRT (bloc radio broadcasting organization) had nothing to do with the CCITT (telegraphy and telephony). "It would appear therefore that the East Germans intended to use OIRT as a cover to achieve other objectives, e.g. political advantage...or perhaps trade advantages....The East Germans did attend a VHF/UHF Broadcasting meeting in Stockholm (1962) as observers under OIRT cover. But in that case there was the advantage in their presence since decisions on regional radio matters were taken to which the tacit acceptance of the East Germans was required."

The US Embassy in Bonn reported that at a Quadripartite meeting, the German representative (Oncken) stated that the FRG recognized that the present disagreement on TTD's was creating harmful friction within NATO. The FRG was accordingly now studying a means by which some relaxation in the present policy could be implemented under acceptable conditions. Oncken stressed that in the FRG view this must be accomplished in such a way as to avoid the impression that by manipulating public opinion in the West. The Soviets and the East Germans had forced the Allies to back down. Oncken recalled that in March, July and August 1961, a NATO resolution was being considered on the prevention of political activity within NATO countries by East Germans. This discussion was never continued after the Wall was erected. If such a resolution were passed now, the FRG felt it would be possible to find some formula for TTD relaxation. The resolution should include, however, prohibitions against 1) the display of the East German flag, 2) playing of the East German anthem, and 3) the exploitation by East Germans of their presence in NATO countries for political (including propaganda) purposes. Oncken stated that the FRG recognized the need to settle the problem if possible prior to the December NAC meeting, but he stressed that the matter must be handled discreetly and should not interfere with the present German efforts to obtain through informal contacts a quid pro quo regarding travel to West Berlin. The Embassy noted that the general view of the other members of the quadripartite group was that the German approach was constructive and might permit a satisfactory solution of the TTD problem for the present. The British representative cautioned, however, that HMG and probably

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other governments would have no legal means to prohibit flag flying and anthem playing. He felt the inclusion of the prohibition in any resolution would be unacceptable to the UK. It was then agreed that the Quadripartite group would hold a special meeting early the following week to discuss the formula which the FRG would propose for TTD relaxation.

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Various Western news agencies reported the events in West Berlin following the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November. The President died from his wounds at approximately 8 o'clock Berlin time. Within four hours approximately 60-80,000 West Berliners had answered the call from Berlin student organizations for a march to Berlin's Schoeneberg city hall to mourn the death of the President. Some 15-25,000 West Berliners carried torches in the parade, as the Freedom Bell--a gift from the US to Berlin--tollled in mourning. Willi Brandt addressed the crowd and stated "Here above us on the balcony, President Kennedy stood last June and told us that he was one of us, that he was a Berliner. We regard his death as our own loss...America has lost its President and a tortured mankind has lost a man of whom so many people believed that he would show the road towards a just peace and a better life in the world." During the day on 23 November thousands of Berliners lined up to sign condolence lists in city hall and at the US Army headquarters. The American Army garrison in Berlin staged a mourning parade, and the Berlin city government announced that it would rename the square in front of the city hall John F. Kennedy Platz. At the US Army garrison one gun fired every 30-minutes from reveille until retreat. Reuters reported that flags would fly at half-mast at all US Army installations in Europe for the next 30 days. The flags of West Germany also flew at half-mast throughout the country, and all public events not appropriate to the period of mourning were cancelled. During the early evening a silent procession of about 40,000 Berliners, including a large number of school children, marched in the second torchlight parade in 18 hours to mourn the President's murder. The marchers went from the 1948 Airlift memorial at Tempelhof airfield again to Schoeneberg city hall. Millions of candles were also lighted in windows throughout West Berlin. UPI commented that Berliners felt closer to Kennedy, perhaps, than to any other world leader. Reuters reported that another massive demonstration was held at the city hall on 25 November during the evening, at the same time that the President's memorial services were being held in Washington. On 26 November, General James Polk, the American Commandant of Berlin, thanked the people of West Berlin for the sympathy they showed on the occasion

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of President Kennedy's assassination. Polk also  
assured Berlin Deputy Mayor Albertz that President  
Johnson felt no less committed to West Berlin  
than his predecessor. [REDACTED]

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23 Nov

East Berlin ADN reported that at a reception given by Walter Ulbricht for the newly elected FDGB central executive and representatives of the international trade union movement, Ulbricht had pointed out that the Bonn government had agreed in the Paris agreements to the occupation of West Germany by US, British, and French troops until the year 2005, and that "furthermore, the Bonn Government granted the Western powers the right to conduct talks on German unity, that is, it sold the national right of self-determination to the three imperialist Western powers." Ulbricht then added that "everyone will understand that the struggle for a peaceful Germany is very complicated and very long." [redacted]

The US Embassy Paris reported that following the De Gaulle-Erhard talks, West German Minister Knoke confirmed that the atmosphere of the talks had been cordial, that De Gaulle had made an obvious effort to receive Erhard well, and that the conversations were rather general in nature. The two men spent only three hours alone, of which a considerable portion was devoted to translation. In regard to East-West problems, Erhard and De Gaulle largely agreed as to the nature of the Soviet menace, although Erhard defended the German policy of movement in negotiations vis-a-vis the Soviets. [redacted]

East Berlin ADN carried the text of the GDR government declaration on total disarmament addressed to the 18th UN General Assembly. The declaration stated that the GDR government was in agreement with the proposal of the USSR government to summon in the first quarter or two of 1964 a conference of those states represented in the 18-nation disarmament committee, with the leading statesmen participating at the highest level. The ADN article added, "The GDR government in particular hopes that an understanding will be reached about a non-aggression pact between the NATO states and the states of the Warsaw pact." The GDR also believed it particularly important to lessen the danger of an atomic war, and therefore that nuclear weapons should not be disseminated to states which do not yet possess these weapons. "As further measures on the road to an international easing of tension and disarmament, the GDR government supports the proposals made by the USSR government for the installation of ground control stations at airfields, railroad junctions,

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long-distance roads, and in fair-sized ports in order to obtain greater security against surprise attacks, for the appointment of representatives of the Western powers with the forces of the Soviet Union stationed in the GDR and the appointment of Soviet representatives with the forces of the Western powers stationed in the West German Federal Republic, for the reduction of foreign forces on the territory of the GDR and of the West German Federal Republic, and for the freezing and reduction of armament budgets." The article continued that "at the borderline of the two opposing military groupings, and above all in view of the aggressive character of West German militarism, special security measures are necessary. Since two World Wars have started from German soil, everything must be done so that no third, and this time atomic, world catastrophe is unleashed from there. Therefore, special detente and security measures in both German states do not constitute discrimination. They rather coincide with the justified demand of the entire German people for peace and security and meet the demand of the Potsdam agreement for special security measures against repetition of an aggressive German policy." The GDR attached great importance to the accession of both German states to a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Europe, according to the article. "At the same time the GDR government is of the opinion that the effect of a nuclear weapon-free zone in central Europe would be heightened if, in accordance with the proposal with President Kekkonen of Finland, northern Europe is also declared a nuclear weapon-free territory." The article also protested a NATO atomic force, which would include West German forces, and claimed that this "would set up new obstacles to disarmament and to a detente." [redacted]

According to an AP report, the West German Ministry of Interior revealed that the East Germans have dug ditches along nearly half of the 850-mile East-West German border to prevent the flight of refugees in cars and trucks. The ditches, which are about 4 feet deep and 5 feet wide, are not found in swamps or other areas through which motor vehicles cannot pass. [redacted]

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A Neues Deutschland article stated that "the former American High Commissioner for West Germany and current Kennedy adviser for West Berlin, Clay, admitted in an interview of the West German television service on 21 November that the Western powers have neither any rights to Berlin or to the access routes: 'I doubt,' Clay said, 'that we could have conquered Berlin. When we reached the Elbe river and were about to cross it, the Soviets already stood in front of Berlin's gates. Apart from this fact, the Elbe river had been agreed on as the demarcation line anyway and Berlin had been promised to the Russians for political reasons.' Regarding access to West Berlin, which is now being used by the United States for provocations, Clay stated: 'We had hoped that the question of the access to (West)-Berlin (brackets as printed--ed) would also be clarified in Potsdam, along with other things. Unfortunately, instead of a proper agreement only the agreements previously concluded by the European consultative commission and in Yalta were signed. Nothing was changed, although we had demanded settlement of the access route problem at Potsdam.'" [redacted]

CINCUSAREUR reported that a source had reported that during a SED-West Berlin Party management meeting held at 1430Z, the responsible Party organs were strongly criticized for devoting only a small space in the newspaper instead of a full front page regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. The attending functionaries were then dismissed but were instructed to hold themselves available over the week-end. This however did not constitute an alert. After the close of the meeting some of the functionaries unofficially speculated on the possibility that the death of the President could have been arranged in order to have an excuse for action against Cuba. [redacted]

USCOB reported that in October 1963, a total of 2,240 US military vehicles and POV's traveled the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn; the only Communist instigated incident was that involving the well known detentions of the US convoy on 10-12 October. In October 1962, when 1,006 US vehicles used the Autobahn there were two VOPO instigated Autobahn incidents. [redacted]

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24 Nov USCOB noted that Tempelhof tower personnel reported flare activity in East Berlin, south and east of Tempelhof between 1648Z and 2030Z. A total of 23 flares were reported. Altitudes varied and the flares ascended and descended slowly. Tempelhof reported that at no time was the activity considered a safety hazard. There was no evidence that the flare activity was intentional harassment. West Berlin police reported that the flares were associated with the replacement of barbed wire by East Germans along the border fence. The flares were utilized to illuminate the work area. [ ]

CINCUSAREUR noted that following a trip to East Berlin, a source reported that at 1615Z the populace in East Berlin was silent and in deep mourning over President Kennedy's death. There appeared to be no indication of possible violence. [ ]

25 Nov The Berlin commandants met at 0800Z to discuss contingency plans in the event that US convoy 17 was detained on the Autobahn on 26 November. USCOB reported that if, approximately one hour after the convoy's arrival at Marienborn, it apparently was being detained, an oral protest would be made at the checkpoint. He envisaged that government-level protests would be made three hours later and that British and French supporting convoys would be dispatched at about that time, if necessary. UKCOB said that at 1500Z 26 November he would be prepared to present at Marienborn a British convoy of identical composition as US-17. All vehicles would have tailgates less than six feet high, and the convoy would be instructed to proceed to Berlin if cleared. FRCOB said that he would dispatch a similar convoy from Berlin at about the same time. If cleared, it would proceed to Helmstedt, spend the night there, then present itself at Marienborn on the morning of 27 November. It was agreed that any "ultimatum" would be handled in the light of existing circumstances and in coordination with the three governments. [ ]

26 Nov East Berlin radio claimed that from 15 to 21 November, 271 resettlers from West Germany had entered the GDR to take up residence. Among this total 145 persons had previously lived in East Germany at one time. The report added that a total of 810 people had come from West Germany to the GDR during the first three weeks of November. [ ]

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US Ambassador to the UN, Stevenson, reported on a general review of international problems that he had held with Ambassadors Spaak, Loridan, Plimpton, and Yost. In regard to an East-West detente, Spaak thought that Khrushchev had good reasons for desiring it and would continue to pursue it. He felt that the Autobahn incidents were intended by Khrushchev, first, to show his followers that he was still pursuing a strong line and, second, to remind the West that the Berlin problem must be solved if there was to be a permanent peace. Spaak stated that on his last visit to the Soviet Union Khrushchev had told him that he was going to create incidents from time to time regarding Berlin so as to keep the problem alive. When Spaak expressed alarm, Khrushchev said that he need not worry since none of the incidents would be grave; he only wanted to step on Kennedy's corns from time to time. Spaak stated that he was not overly reassured by his conversation with Khrushchev, but that he believed that Khrushchev genuinely wished to limit the character and scope of the incidents. [REDACTED]

Eastbound non-dismount US convoy 17 (formerly US-7), consisting of 13 vehicles, 26 drivers and assistant drivers, and 28 passengers, transited the Autobahn without difficulty. The Soviets were given ninety-minute advance notice, and the convoy arrived at Marienborn at 1000Z. The Soviets started clearance procedures at 1017Z, and the convoy departed for Berlin at 1100Z. It arrived at Babelsberg at 1423Z, processing began at 1433Z, and the convoy departed at 1504Z. The attitude of the Soviet officers at both checkpoints was correct throughout the processing, and no mention was made of dismounting or other procedures. One 2 1/2-ton truck carried six passengers, two other vehicles carried four passengers, and the rest of the vehicles carried three, two, or no passengers. [REDACTED]

The Russian TASS news service reported that First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Mikoyan met with US President Lyndon Johnson, and also with Secretary of State Rusk. After the meeting with Johnson, which lasted for about an hour, Mikoyan told US reporters: "We had a pleasant talk with President Johnson, and we were satisfied with this talk, which touched on questions of mutual

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concern for the two sides." The question of a meeting in the near future between Khrushchev and Johnson was not discussed, according to Mikoyan. In regard to his meeting with Rusk, which lasted about one and a half hours, Mikoyan stated: "We discussed questions often touched on in talks between representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. We discussed questions of the international situation, and in particular the disarmament problem. We tried to find methods of futhering the cause of disarmament, which is making little or no progress. We have found ways for the continuation of disarmament negotiations." Mikoyan also added that European questions were discussed with Rusk. [ ]

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Between 1645Z 26 November and 0500Z 27 November a single white flare was fired every hour in the Gross Ziethen area along the southern West Berlin border, according to USCINCEUR. USCOB commented that occasional flare activity at different points along the border was not unusual but that recent heavy flare activity, which commenced during the night of 21 November and was concentrated in the Gross Ziethen area, was unusual in that 1) the flares had not been followed by searches, 2) the area was not well lit, 3) the area was flat, 4) the flares were used only during periods of poor visibility, 5) the flares were of mixed colors and types. USCOB concluded that the East Germans were very concerned over the security of the area, possibly because they had information of planned escape attempts there. [ ]

The Bundestag's Committee for All-German and Berlin Affairs met in the Reichstag building and decided "in principle" that East German scientists and artists should be permitted to attend meetings in the FRG "even if communists are among them," according to an announcement by committee chairman Wehner, as reported in the Frankfurter Rundschau. Wehner reportedly noted that the matter fell "within the jurisdiction of the Laender" and "had not been treated uniformly." [ ]

During this period an unusual number of East German border guards were observed in groups at the sector/sector and sector/zonal borders. At 1345Z 26 November, four officers and 60 enlisted men were sighted at Potsdamer Platz, at 1130Z 27 November

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30 officers and 200 border guards were observed in trucks moving east and north along the border opposite Kirchhainer Damm (the southernmost point in West Berlin proper), and at 1230Z 27 November 30 officers and 50 enlisted men were observed at the same point, in the company of two Soviets. USCOB commented that the personnel involved probably were trainees or late replacements involved in border orientation. [ ]

27 Nov

The Contingency Coordinating Sub-Group tentatively decided to make a short reply to the Soviet note of 21 November. The reply would state that the procedures communicated to the Soviets on 29 October were "intended to facilitate the orderly and safe flow of traffic" and that such procedures had been followed by the Allied convoys of 4-5 November and by all subsequent convoys. In closing it would assert that "the right of free and unrestricted access to Berlin is in no way limited by procedures deriving from the summer of 1945, which are intended solely to insure orderly and safe Autobahn traffic." The French and British representatives then stated that their governments favored sending no more non-dismount convoys for a while, without specifying how long a pause they had in mind. The US representative said that his government planned to return to normal convoy scheduling, based on the requirements of the Berlin garrison. He added, however, that since no significant troop movements were planned until after 1 January, USCOB intended to send a few non-dismount convoys in the interim. The US representative promised that these would be coordinated with UKCOB and FRCOB and that "everyone concerned would be kept informed." [ ]

East Berlin radio reported that in response to an urgent message from Herbert Warnke, Chairman of the FDGB central executive, Ludwig Rosenberg, the Chairman of the West German DGB (German trade union federation), stated in a telegram that he was prepared to try to secure the release of the two delegates of the FDGB congress, who were being "illegally detained" in Duesseldorf, provided that the GDR would release from custody two persons whose names Rosenberg was unable to give. The report stated that the DGB Chairman's attempt to introduce the system of hostages in the relations between the citizens and the trade unions of the two German

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states, "which strikes one as downright medieval," could only cause amazement. According to the report, "This would be at least a severe blow to all efforts to normalize travel between the two German states." It also pointed out that never had West German trade unionists or other persons been arrested in the GDR who come there to deliver messages of greetings or to have discussions with trade-unionists. Meanwhile, the FRG newspaper Die Welt reported that the two FDGB representatives had been arrested at Duesseldorf on 21 November after attempting to distribute Communist propaganda at the West German DGB Congress. Rosenberg's reply to Warnke pointed out that the two men had been refused admission to the Congress. Rosenberg undertook to intercede with GDR authorities in return for the release of Heinz Brandt and other political prisoners in the GDR. The US Embassy in Bonn reported that Rosenberg informed the Embassy's Labor Attache that he expected that the functionaries would be expelled from the FRG. The Embassy commented that arrests of this nature arouse GDR resentment and have lead to threats of retaliation. Some West Berliners have tended to see a direct connection between such detentions of East Germans and the harassment of civilian traffic on the Autobahn. The Embassy planned to raise this question with the FRG Foreign Office at the next opportunity, although past inquiries on such cases had revealed that the Federal Government has little or no competence in arrests made by local authorities. [redacted]

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The Moscow TASS news service stated that the Bonn authorities were continuing to organize various meetings and gatherings in West Berlin "with a view to reaffirming their nonexistent rights" there. A two-day meeting of the Commission of the West German Bundestag on All-German and Berlin Questions ended on 27 November in the rebuilt part of the Reichstag. The meeting was attended by Vice Chancellor and Minister for All-German Questions Mende, and by West Berlin Mayor Albrecht. TASS stated that "this meeting was of a clearly provocative nature with regard to the GDR, since the Bonn officials, only a score of meters away from the GDR frontier, discussed questions pertaining to the sovereign rights of the GDR and made slanderous statements against the German Socialist state." [redacted]

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28 Nov Mayor Brandt returned to Berlin after attending President Kennedy's funeral and announced that President Johnson had agreed to visit Berlin at a date to be determined later. Brandt also stated that "Berlin could trust the new President completely," according to Die Welt. [ ]

USCINCEUR reported that "during the past few days" approximately two-thirds of all US tour vehicles in East Berlin were tailed. He noted that retaliatory tailing of Soviet vehicles in West Berlin began on 26 November. [ ]

Neues Deutschland again complained that the Allied occupation forces stationed in West Berlin were endangering traffic in East Berlin by driving their vehicles in a provocative manner. The party organ claimed that since 22 November there had been a series of "gross violations," including use of incorrect traffic signals, drunken driving, parking in no-parking zones, and driving in the wrong direction on one-way streets. [ ]

According to a Reuters report, West Berlin Deputy Mayor Heinrich Albertz stated that between 20 and 40 Jews who emigrated during the Nazi period, are returning every month to live in West Berlin. Mayor Albertz urged Berliners to do everything they could to make the Jews feel at home again. [ ]

28-29 Nov Reuters reported that during the night two East German refugees, aged 18 and 24, swam the icy waters of a border canal and escaped unnoticed into the American sector of West Berlin. West Berlin police also reported sub-machine gun fire at two spots along the border Wall during the night. In the first incident it was not known if the gunfire killed the would-be refugee. After the second shooting, truckloads of border guards drove up to the Wall and searched the area with dogs. [ ]

29 Nov An East Berlin radio service reported a recent article in the Hungarian newspaper Nepszabadsag which quoted at some length the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Puya, who gave the attitude of the Hungarian government on the recent agreement between Hungary and West Germany on an extension of mutual trade and the exchange of trade missions. "No matter how the West may interpret the trade

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agreement, it is also a first, though modest, step toward the establishment of diplomatic relations," Puya stated. The article added that Puya emphasized that Bonn's contacts with Hungary proved the futility of Bonn's Hallstein doctrine. "The final collapse of the Hallstein doctrine is only a question of time," Puya stated. The trade agreement between Hungary and West Germany undoubtedly would contribute to the downfall of this doctrine. Puya concluded that "We are of the opinion that the German question must be settled and a peace treaty must be concluded with the two German states," and added that the status of West Berlin must also be settled. He condemned Bonn's attempt to incorporate West Berlin. [redacted]

Hamburg DPA reported that upon his return from the United States, West Berlin Mayor Willi Brandt stated that US President Lyndon Johnson would again come to Berlin. Brandt, however, could give no date for the President's visit. Berliners could have full confidence in President Johnson, who would continue the Kennedy policies, Brandt stated. He also noted that Mrs. Kennedy had expressed her appreciation for the sympathy demonstrated by Berliners at the time of her husband's death. [redacted]

UPI reported that East Berlin Police have resumed evictions of residents along the East-West Berlin border to prevent the flight of refugees to the West. Tenants in a five-story apartment house on Sebastian Strasse, near the Heinrich Heine Strasse crossing point, were moved to other flats in the interior of the city. An armored car stood by while the evictions were being carried out. Other residents in the area have also been notified that they are to be evicted before Christmas, but the total number or evictions to be carried out was not known. [redacted]

According to a UPI report, West Berlin Mayor Willi Brandt stated that a special book of condolences on the death of President Kennedy, bearing the signatures of thousands of East Germans and West Berliners, would be forwarded to Washington. The West Berlin city government decided that a special book should be used for the East Berliners and East Germans, rather than adding their signatures to those of the Westerners. Brandt said that the city government was making up the book from notes and letters sent from the Soviet Zone residents to

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29 Nov friends and relatives in West Berlin asking that  
con't their names be signed to the Western condolence books.

30 Nov The AP reported that the West German government renewed an offer of financial credit for the Communist regime of East Germany in return for more freedom of travel for Germans through the Berlin Wall. Vice Chancellor Mende revived the offer, first made a year ago, in a speech at a convention of the "Indivisible Germany" Institute, an all-party group working for reunification. Mende did not mention any figures, but it was unofficially reported that the offer was for 200 million DM to be used in the framework of the trade agreement between the two parts of Germany and spent on either investment or consumer goods. Mende said there would be no strings attached to the credit except that the GDR would be expected to show some "signs of good will." He suggested that this could be demonstrated in the following ways: 1) ease conditions for political prisoners in East Germany; 2) allow West Berliners to visit their friends and relatives on the other side of the Wall in East Berlin; 3) stop shooting refugees trying to escape through the Wall; and 4) give East Germans more opportunities to travel West. On 2 December, Neues Deutschland described Vice-Chancellor Mende's conditions for granting credits to East Germany as "unthinkable."

30 Nov Over the weekend six East Germans, including a border  
-2 Dec guard second lieutenant, escaped across the inter-zonal border to West Germany, according to AP. The officer reportedly exchanged gunshots with a border patrol which detected him while he was attempting to flee.

1 Dec A French dismount convoy consisting of 30 vehicles and 192 personnel transited the Autobahn from West Germany to West Berlin without difficulty, according to wire service dispatches. The convoy's passengers dismounted upon request at both Soviet checkpoints.

Three young East Germans escaped in a group to West Berlin, according to UPI. East German border guards reportedly opened fire as the three reached the last barbed wire fence between East and West Berlin, but apparently none were hit.

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2 Dec

The US Berlin Mission reported that a US helicopter made a routine over-flight of East Berlin, entering at 1307Z and exiting at 1327Z. At 1319Z the Soviets made a routine controller-level protest in BASC to which the US Controller made the standard reply. The last such flight took place on 24 October.

A US administrative convoy consisting of 12 vehicles and 24 drivers and assistant drivers transited the Autobahn without difficulty, according to UPI.

The Soviets imposed the year's eighth temporary restricted area on Allied Military Liaison Mission patrols. The restriction, which was to continue through midnight on 11 December, encompassed a small area adjacent to the interzonal border in Erfurt district. No exercise activity was immediately observed in the area.

According to an East Berlin ADN report, Neues Deutschland stated: "The new Bonn Minister for All-German Affairs apparently does not yet know the ropes of his new office. On Saturday he stated that Bonn would grant the GDR some sort of Credits if the GDR were willing to dismantle the security measures on its frontiers...The question of our time is the easing of tension and further strengthening of peace. But this can only be achieved if the ultras are further bridled. If Mende does not yet understand this, it is high time for him to wake up... When he made his illusionary purchasing offer, he spoke of an 'expansion' of credits for the GDR. Now this is completely fantastic. Probably Mende is simply being misinformed by his colleagues...(ADN ellipsis) everybody knows that at present there is no such thing as West German credits for the GDR. The simple, logical conclusion, therefore, is that they cannot be expanded."

According to UPI, West Berlin Mayor Willi Brandt, in replying to a recent suggestion by former President Eisenhower that it was time for the US to withdraw most of its troops from Germany, stated that any unilateral US disengagement in Germany could result in "really unpleasant developments." "I have great respect for General Eisenhower," Brandt said, "but I must say I do not agree with this proposal...I think it would be most unfortunate if any unilateral

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steps were taken by the United States." [redacted]

UPI announced that US Berlin Garrison troops opened four days of military training maneuvers in Grunewald Forest. About 1,200 troops began the exercise, and another 1,200 will take part in the last two days of the training. The East Germans promptly denounced the exercises as "war maneuvers." ADN said that the use of tanks and artillery units in the forest meant that "West Berliners can once again look forward to the destruction of this favorite recreation area." [redacted]

3 Dec

CJCS reported that in regard to the resumption of normal convoy scheduling, a comparison of announced Soviet procedures with announced Allied procedures indicated that a controversial convoy was likely to be one with fewer than thirty-one passengers but averaging more than three passengers per vehicle. CJCS then ordered that such convoys were to be avoided unless otherwise instructed. It was also mentioned that the desirability and method of replying to the Soviets were currently subjects of interdepartmental and inter-Allied discussions in Washington. [redacted]

Reuters reported that West Berlin Mayor Willi Brandt told an international news conference in West Berlin that there was "no reason" for anxiety about the future of Berlin. Brandt said he gained this conviction during talks the previous week with President Johnson in Washington. "I am certain that the new President will continue the strategy of peace which President Kennedy has begun," Brandt stated. He also added that the attack launched by the Russians in 1958 on Berlin's freedom had failed. [redacted]

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BERLIN CHRONOLOGY

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
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


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
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


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