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4 February 1964

BERLIN CHRONOLOGY

A Chronology of Reports Concerning the Berlin Situation Received
During the Week Ending at 1200 EST 4 February 1964

This is a working paper prepared in the
[redacted] Office
of Current Intelligence, CIA.


Prepared by [redacted]


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3-13
Jan



15 Jan At a Contengency Coordinating Sub-Group meeting the British proposed that a quadripartite effort be made to reconcile the different procedures followed by the Allies in BASC. Noting that the value of harmonized procedures had been demonstrated during the fall convoy incidents, the UK representative suggested that estimated beacon-crossing times be given for all flights. The British practice of giving the estimated flight time in the corridors then would be discontinued. No changes would be made in the practice of filing flight plans at different times before the commencement of the flights. He also wanted to work out uniform Allied responses to Soviet protests of flights within the Berlin Control Zone. The US representative supported the proposal in principle and agreed to examine it futher. Neither the French nor the West German representative made any comment. 

20 Jan The London Times published a letter from Willy Brandt defending the Senat's conduct of the pass negotiations. The letter asserted that approval was obtained in advance from the Commandants and the FRG and that the GDR was not permitted to exercise "any form of consular function" in West Berlin. 

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- 22 Jan FRG President Luebke arrived in West Berlin for a two-week visit which was to include the opening of the "Green Week" festival on 24 January. [REDACTED]
- 23 Jan The Mission reported that on 13 December and 17 January the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin had been given written notification of incidents involving Soviet vehicles in West Berlin. On both occasions the Soviets accepted the letters without comment. As of this date they had given no notice of incidents involving US vehicles in East Berlin, as promised by Abrasimov in his 4 December meeting with McGhee. [REDACTED]

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24 Jan The Berliner Zeitung carried an article stating that "a normalization of relations between the GDR and West Berlin also requires an end to currency speculation and racketeering." This comment allegedly was occasioned by a reader's letter which asserted that during the Christmas visiting period "West Berlin currency exchange offices flourished, thereby inflicting harm on the GDR." The article warned that those who do not exchange money at the GDR "note-issuing bank" at the 1:1 rate were "violating GDR laws and must expect confiscation of such money without compensation." It concluded by stating that "elimination of speculators would favorably influence further agreements" on the pass question.

Radio Moscow declared that President Luebke's presence at West Berlin's "Green Week" exhibition and his attempts to "perform...official duties" in the city was "an open provocation" designed to prevent any "peaceful settlement" of East-West "differences." The commentator reiterated the standard phrase that West Berlin is not and never has been part of the FRG.

The Soviet chief controller at BASC protested to his US counterpart that at about 1200Z a US T-39 aircraft bound from Berlin to Wiesbaden had strayed over the north border of the south corridor near Nordhausen, flown 15 kilometers into the GDR, then returned to the corridor near Muehlhausen. The protest demanded that such incidents be discontinued and warned that future violation of "the established regime of flights in the corridors" might lead to "hard undesirable consequences." The Mission commented that the flight actually had strayed from the corridor as charged and recommended that the US controller be instructed to admit the error and state that "appropriate measures" were being taken to prevent a recurrence.

The Embassy in Bonn instructed the Mission to continue notifying the Soviet Embassy of traffic violations committed by Soviet vehicles in West Berlin "as a reminder of Abrasimov's 4 December commitment." At the late-February notification the Mission was to ask Embassy protocol officer Panin how and when the Soviets intended to deal with the problem.

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24-27 Jan During this period a total of 274 flares were fired from the 46th Berlin Border Regiment's area of responsibility. USCOB commented that this was the first heavy flare activity noted in the western part of the area. [redacted]

25 Jan Two dog kennels and a cable-guided dog post were installed by border guards about 150 meters south of the Brandenburg Gate in the area of the Wall where a 16-year-old refugee successfully escaped on 19 January. During the evening automatic-weapon fire foiled an escape attempt by a man, woman, and child who were being assisted by a West Berliner who was cutting the barbed wire. Also during the evening a border guard from the 31st Berlin Border Regiment escaped undetected into the French sector--the first such defector since 17 December, according to USCOB. [redacted]

Mayor Brandt told a television audience that West Berlin police would help East German refugees "wherever and whenever possible." Denying that the recent incident in which West Berlin police rescued a 16-year-old escapee entangled in barbed wire on the Wall was a "provocation," Brandt stated that his "only regret" was that "it is not possible to help everyone who wants his freedom." [redacted]

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26 Jan In a telephone interview with the West Berlin Morgenpost, FDP leader Bucher, the Minister of Justice in the Erhard Cabinet, said that the "West Berlin side" could undertake to see that East Berliners who might obtain permission to visit West Berlin for a limited period of time would be barred from obtaining plane tickets for flights out of the city. He said that in order to gain this "advantage for many, we could undertake the obligation, as far as is possible, not to let them fly out." He admitted that such a restriction would present difficulties since the "airlines are independent" and it might be a violation of the FRG Basic Law. When asked whether he would agree to send East German visitors back to the GDR upon expiration of the visiting time limit, he replied, "no, of course not." Leaders of all three West German parties immediately denounced Bucher's proposal as a violation of the Federal Constitution. Chancellor Erhard said that "free movement of all Germans as guaranteed by the Constitution must not be questioned even in connection with easing travel restrictions from East Berlin or the Zone." [redacted]

27 Jan The US BASC controller replied to the Soviet protest of 24 January as recommended by the Mission (see item under that date.) [redacted]

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28 Jan Following the shoot-down of a US T-39 training plane near Erfurt at about 1400Z, the following actions were taken: At 1640Z the US BASC controller asked his Soviet counterpart for information on the missing aircraft. The Soviet requested a description of the aircraft and its last time and position. On instructions from USAFE, the US controller stated that it was a T-39 flying in the vicinity of Wiesbaden where it had been scheduled to land at 1530Z. At 1910Z the US officer stated that as a result of a communications failure, the aircraft apparently had inadvertently crossed into the Soviet Zone north of the south end of the southern corridor, where it had been intercepted by two other aircraft, according to radar tracking. Meanwhile, at 1650Z and 1900Z USMLM search teams were dispatched to Erfurt but were prevented by Soviet personnel from reaching the crash scene. At 1815Z the USMLM chief met with Col. Khortov at SERB, gave him minimal information concerning the missing aircraft, stated that a team had been dispatched to search and assist, and requested all possible assistance and information. Khortov appeared not to know of the incident and was non-committal on the possibility of extending assistance. At 2050Z the Soviet BASC controller stated that his chief had been away from the office but had received the US message and would pass it to his superiors.

Between 1500Z and 1700Z Soviet fighters circled or surveyed from a distance Allied aircraft flying in the south corridor. No harassment or violation of flight rules were involved, according to the Mission.

Senatkanzlei chief Spangenberg informed the Allied officials that the Senat would not provide Korber with any new instructions for his 30 January meeting with Wendt. Korber was to act primarily as a listener and to leave it up to Wendt to make the next move.

28-29
Jan

During the night 48 white flares were fired at various points along West Berlin's borders.

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29 Jan At about 1500Z a private car driven by two US enlisted men in East Berlin was struck by an East German private vehicle. The accident caused only minor damage, and after a 20-minute investigation Vopos allowed the US citizens to depart. [REDACTED]

The first USMLM team dispatched to the crash scene reported that the Soviets have used hild but firm force in preventing them from reaching the plane but that East German civilians in the area reported that all the crewmen had been killed. Soviet troops worked through the night hauling material from the scene, and by morning only the orange nose section and the two burnt engine pods remained. [REDACTED]

At 1 AM local time Ambassador McGhee directed CINCUSAREUR to communicate with the Soviet Military Liaison Mission and to stress the "great urgency" of obtaining some information about the downed T-39 aircraft. CINCUSAREUR was instructed to dispatch a letter to CINC GSFG outlining evidence which indicated that the plane had "crashed" in the vicinity of Erfurt and insisting that Yakubovsky initiate an immediate investigation. At 3:30 AM the USMLM team in Erfurt reported that it was still being prevented from reaching the crash scene and that it had been given no information on the downed aircraft or on the 3 officers aboard. Since the Soviets had not declared any temporary restricted area in the vicinity of the crash, the USMLM patrol was instructed to disregard the "training requirement restriction" imposed by the Soviets and to attempt to evade it in order to ascertain whether USAF personnel were still in the downed aircraft. Ambassador McGhee commented that the illegal Soviet actions vis-a-vis the patrol was grounds for protest. As of 7:30 AM the USMLM chief was still unable to get an appointment with CINC GSFG to deliver the letter from CINCUSAREUR. The letter finally was delivered at 11:40. A copy also was passed to the Soviet Military Mission in Frankfurt for immediate transmittal to GSFG. [REDACTED]

During the early afternoon Ambassador Kohler was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Gromyko handed him a note protesting the invasion of GDR airspace by a foreign military aircraft. The note stated that the aircraft had ignored the

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29 Jan "conventional signals ordering the intruder to
con't land" and the warning fire in the vicinity of
Weimar, whereupon a Soviet fighter "was forced to
take measures envisaged by instructions on the pro-
tection of airspace." It said that the aircraft
"fell" in the vicinity of Vogelsberg, 20 miles
northeast of Erfurt, and that three servicemen
had been killed. The note stated that the Soviet
government could not regard the incident as "other
than a gross provocation by American military
authorities aimed at aggravating the situation
in central Europe." [redacted]

During the afternoon Soviet DCM Kornienko was
summoned to the State Department--Ambassador
Dobrynin allegedly was sick--where Tyler protested
the shoot-down of the T-39 as a "callous and in-
excusably brutal act of violence against an unarmed
aircraft that accidentally strayed over the
demarcation line." Tyler also noted that Soviet
military authorities in Germany had failed to
cooperate with US authorities and that USMLM
personnel had been prevented from reaching the crash
scene. The protest emphasized that the shoot-down
would cause "serious public reaction in the US"
and could not help but "adversely affect US-Soviet
relations." It demanded punishment for "those
responsible" for the killing of these three officers"
and cooperation from Soviet officials in Germany.
Kornienko replied this was a "clear-cut" case of
gross provocation, that the plane had "failed to
react to conventional signals to land or to warn-
ing fire," and that the US had been warned that
any "intruder" would be shot. He said his govern-
ment viewed the incident as a regrettable loss of
human lives, but he refused to accept the protest.
[redacted]

During the afternoon the press office of the GDR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that on 28
January an "American combat aircraft" violated
"our airspace" near Eisenach and flew 90 kilometers
into the GDR. The announcement then stated:
"After it failed to comply with repeated requests
to land, the Soviet armed forces temporarily
stationed in the GDR took the necessary measures
in accordance with arrangements under the Warsaw
Pact concerning the joint defense and safeguarding
of the sovereignty of the GDR. The American combat

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aircraft crashed 20 kilometers northeast of Erfurt. The Soviet armed forces acted in agreement with the competent GDR authorities. The GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs most strongly protests the violation, contrary to international law, of the airspace of the GDR by the Air Force of the American occupying power in West Germany. This provocative action again beams out the need for and correctness of the proposal of the governments of the Soviet Union and the GDR to the governments of the western powers to withdraw their occupation troops from West Germany and West Berlin." [redacted]

29-30
Jan

A total of 36 flares were fired along West Berlin borders during the night, and at one point a burst of automatic-weapon fire and several individual shots were heard. [redacted]

30 Jan

The USMLM chief met with the acting SERB chief at 1140 and made arrangements for US personnel to recover the bodies of the three crewmen killed in the crash of the T-39. The two officers subsequently left Potsdam together for the crash scene. They were followed by a USAF recovery team bringing the equipment necessary to transport the bodies and the wreckage to Tempelhof airfield. [redacted]

At approximately 0830Z the GDR ice-breaker Onko lost a screw and became inoperative on the West Berlin side of the Griebnitzsee. A West Berlin police boat was dispatched to furnish assistance. The Onko later was towed by a tugboat into the Soviet Zone. [redacted]

Neues Deutschland resumed its campaign against the US patrols by charging them with 28 traffic violations during the previous week. The article, which was the first of its kind since 13 January, cited four specific "violations," all of which proved to be complete fabrications. [redacted]

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At approximately 0215Z a drunk climbed up the West Berlin side of the Wall at the Schoenholz S-Bahn station and attempted to tear the barbed wire off the top. East German border guards observed his conduct but took no action. West Berlin police quickly pulled the man down and took him to a police station.

The Mission reported that during the month of February the US Army planned to dispatch two non-dismountable convoys from West Berlin to West Germany. These were to be advance parties for the two Berlin Garrison battalions, which will conduct training exercises at Wildflecken during February and March. The first non-dismountable convoy was to consist of 24 vehicles, 48 drivers and assistant drivers, and 28 passengers and to depart on 5 February. The second, consisting of 26 vehicles, 52 drivers and assistant drivers, and 27 passengers, was scheduled for 24 February. No single vehicle was to carry more than six passengers. The main contingents were to travel in large, clearly-dismountable convoys; and the advance parties were to be integrated into these convoys on the return trips.

Radio Moscow claimed that the T-39 pilot was warned that he was violating the GDR frontier but did not react "either to signals to land or to the warning shots of the Soviet fighter plane," thus leaving the MiG pilot with "no alternative but to take measures in accordance with instructions for the defense of the airspace." The commentary charged that US military authorities had "gotten involved in a provocation and decided to sacrifice even the

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lives of their airmen." Another commentator ridiculed the claim that the plane had lost its way, asserting that this was impossible with "modern means of communication, navigation, and a multitude of landmarks." A third, recalling the 1960 U-2 flight, remarked that "it is not difficult to see the familiar hand of the Pentagon and the CIA" in the incident. [redacted]

30-31
Jan

The West Berlin press commented at length on the "senselessness" of the T-39 shoot-down, pointing out that the act was indicative of the true nature of the Soviet system. The Berliner Morgenpost denounced a "suggestion by State Department officials that subordinate Soviet quarters were responsible for the incident" as an attitude revealing "dangerous ignorance of the Soviet mentality." Other newspapers declared it to be a "calculated provocation," although most agreed that it would have no lasting impact of East-West relations. Die Welt, on the other hand, said it reflected the Soviets' "pathological and grotesque fear of espionage" and should "dampen the hopes and expectations of American statesmen who believe that 'militancy' is no longer as great in the USSR as in China." [redacted]

During the night 31 variously colored flares were fired from points along West Berlin's borders. At about 1230Z 30 January an East German male was arrested as he tried to escape across the sector/zonal border near Osdorf. [redacted]

31 Jan

The bodies of the three USAF officers aboard the downed T-39 (Lt. Col. Gerald K. Hannaford, Capt. John Lorraine, and Capt Donald Millar) arrived in West Berlin in the Army ambulance which had been dispatched to recover them. A brief honor-guard ceremony was held at Tempelhof field, following which the bodies were flown to Wiesbaden for burial. Ambassador McGhee, who arrived at Tempelhof just as the ceremony was beginning, later told the press that the shoot-down was a "horrible affair." [redacted]

While outbound in the south corridor the C-130 carrying the remains was approached by a Soviet MiG on two occasions. During the first approach the MiG-19 appeared off the C-130's right wing,

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then passed down under, up in front, above, and finally took up a position about 1000 yards off the aircraft's left wing, where it flew for a few minutes before disappearing. A few minutes later another Soviet aircraft appeared briefly off the C-130's right wing. The US BASC controller reported no unusual occurrences during preparations for the flight's departure. However, the Soviet controller did ask if the plane would carry the three bodies, and the US controller replied affirmatively. The Mission commented that, in view of the distances involved, the approaches could not be regarded as "harassment." However, it recommended that the US controller advise his Soviet counterpart "on a personal basis" that the approaches involved "possible danger," hoping to elicit a response which would clarify Soviet motivation with regard to the MiG flights. [redacted]

[redacted]

Neues Deutschland editorialized that the "US occupiers" should have known that their "rude provocation...in the GDR airspace" could not possibly end otherwise than in "senseless death." It asserted that when an "alien military aircraft penetrates the sovereign territory of the GDR," the protective apparatus of the Warsaw Pact is "put into action." Claiming that if the plane had had "no evil intentions" it would have landed "on orders of the Soviet chaser plane," the editorial concluded by stating that such incidents could be avoided if the US would accept the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany. [redacted]

Neues Deutschland reported that the "Press Office of the GDR Premier" had announced that Korber and Wendt met for five hours on 30 January in the GDR House of Ministries, that they discussed the GDR proposals of 17 January, that Wendt made "an official statement" on the state of the negotiations, and that further talks were scheduled for "next week." [redacted]

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1 Feb

In response to a question following a 40-minute lecture at Oxford on "the cold war and the future," Soviet Ambassador to London Soldatov stated: "All our troops are given an order to fight any plane crossing our frontiers unless an order not to fight has been given beforehand." He insisted that US aircraft had been "repeatedly warned" not to cross the frontier, according to AP. [redacted]

An unidentified East German air force "expert," writing in Neues Deutschland, charged that the T-39 did not lose its way but "was engaged in a planned military operational flight." As evidence for this assertion he cited the fact that the plane "refused to comply with the optically transmitted signals of the air defense." Compliance with the signal to "follow" would have guaranteed a safe landing "if the plane had actually lost its bearings," he contended. Further evidence of the flight's "provocative" nature was said to be the fact that NATO ADIZ installations failed to initiate "active steps" to prevent the T-39 from crossing the frontier. He also asserted that, if actually lost, the plane would have turned immediately on a westward course or flown in triangles to alert radar posts. The article concluded with the charge: "The T-39...can fly on radar and radio reconnaissance and can effect infrared and telemetric pictures of strategically important objects through clouds. One type carries a set of radar interference instruments." [redacted]

In response to the Neues Deutschland charges of this date, a USAFE spokesman said that the T-39 carried no arms or photographic equipment and was incapable of any kind of reconnaissance. He stated that if signals to land had been given, the US pilot would have complied because he had standing orders to do so. He also noted that numerous attempts were made to contact the plane by radio and radar. [redacted]

US BASC controllers reported that since the 28 January shoot-down, their Soviet counterparts had been "reserved in their relations with US controllers" and their attitude had been "uncomfortable or embarrassed." A US controller remarked that the two approaches by Soviet MiGs on 31 January had been not only dangerous but "especially unfortunate and inappropriate," inasmuch as the aircraft

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approached had been carrying the remains of the three USAF officers killed in the shoot-down. The Soviet controller listened to these remarks but made no comment. [REDACTED]

The wreckage of the T-39 arrived in West Berlin on the beds of two large US Army trucks. The USAF officer in charge of the recovery operation said that the largest pieces of wreckage were the plane's wings, one of which was found 1.2 miles from the crash scene and was delivered to him by Soviet troops and East German Vopos. The rest of the wreckage was scattered over a 200x300-foot area. The fuselage was burned completely, according to AP. [REDACTED]

4 Feb

During the morning the Soviet BASC controller protested the scheduled flight of a US T-39 from Berlin to Wiesbaden on the grounds that the T-39 is a "multipurpose military aircraft." However, the plane made the flight as scheduled and arrived in Wiesbaden at 1105Z. During the afternoon a Soviet MiG approached to within 100 yards of a BEA flight inbound in the south corridor and did "acrobatics" around the plane. The British BASC controller immediately lodged a strong protest with his Soviet counterpart. [REDACTED]

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
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
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BACKGROUND-USE-ONLY SUPPLEMENT BERLIN CHRONOLOGY



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