



**SECRET**

**2**

difficult a problem when military personnel are clearly involved, but there is a requirement for systematically screening exfiltration operator activities for evidence of non-official American involvement. When this is found, there may also be a requirement for some follow up.

USERR and intelligence agency representatives have not to discuss this problem. On the basis of these discussions, it seemed desirable to recommend that present surveillance capabilities be utilized to acquire the needed information at a level which it is possible to maintain without undue diversion of resources. When information about non-official U.S. citizen involvement is developed, it should be turned over to USERR/PO. USERR in turn will consult with the intelligence people if there is an apparent need for follow up.

I recommend that you approve such a program. In our discussions with intelligence representatives it was suggested, as a useful way of getting a stepped-up and coordinated effort under way, that the request for such an effort be made to the ICSS at an early meeting. I recommend that be done.

**Attachments:**

**U.S. Policy Statement.**

cc: B. B. de - Gen. Hay

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**SUBJECT: Policy Concerning U.S. Citizen Involvement in Refugee Exfiltration Activity**

We recognize the general desirability of successful exfiltration from the East, but we are aware that the involvement of U.S. citizens in this activity is likely to result either in prejudicing the Allied position in Berlin or in the arrest and imprisonment of the U.S. citizen concerned. For this reason, it is policy in Berlin to attempt to prevent both official and private U.S. citizens from becoming involved in exfiltration. There are two general categories which are of particular interests:

1. When the activity itself damages national policy objectives. The most obvious example of this has been when U.S. official personnel and vehicles have been used to exfiltrate refugees. The U.S. has a major interest in maintaining its right of free access into and circulation within East Berlin. An important commitment is made to maintain these rights and U.S. authorities must attempt to prevent activities which offer the Soviets/East Germans grounds on which they might attempt to impose controls on U.S. access.

2. When there is risk to U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens run a very real risk of being caught and imprisoned when they become involved in exfiltration operations. The State Department has a certain responsibility for the welfare and protection of U.S. citizens abroad. When U.S. citizens have been arrested in such cases in East Germany, U.S. authorities have been unable to offer them normal protection. When it has been possible to effect their release at all, this has only been accomplished with the expenditure of a great deal of time and energy.

**Distribution:**

- Cy No. 1 - General Franklin
- 2 - " ! - Gen May
- 3 - IO/USCOB
- 4 - ASAG
- 5 - Lt. Col. Price
- 6 - EAS
- 7 - Minister Calhoun
- 8 - POL subject copy
- 9 - POL chron (DGleysteen)
- 10 - Central files

COOR: IO/USCOB - Col. Yeager  
513th - Lt. Col. Price  
ASAG - Mr. Shackley

~~DX~~  
POL:DGleysteen/af

**SECRET**