The testimony of EGIL KROGH, JR., was presented to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GERALD GOLDMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

LAWRENCE IASON, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice
Q That means that the President's advisors as well as Mr. Dean?

A That's right. That was the second part of your question, I assumed that.

Q And, further, he indicated to you that he did not believe that Mr. Hunt's threats could be met at that time?

A That's correct. I should also say that Mr. Dean, in that meeting, was extremely unhappy -- seemed to be very, very agitated. He told me that he had been under excruciating pressure for months; that his wife was very concerned about him because he couldn't sleep at night; and that he felt terrible. And I should also add that Mr. Dean and I had been very close friends when he was the Associate Deputy Attorney General for Legislation in the Department of Justice.

And, also, I had been partly responsible -- I would say probably primarily responsible -- for recruiting him to the White House staff. We had talked on a number of occasions.

Q Now, when Mr. Dean said, in substance, that the President did not know what was going on, did you interpret -- did that statement lend itself to an interpretation that the President did not understand what the significance was of what was going on?

A Yes. It would lend itself to that interpretation.

Q Now, following your meeting with Mr. Dean, did you have a telephone conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman on the
20th of March as well?

A Yes, I did. I returned to the Department of Transportation. I'm not sure of the precise time. It must have been about 4:30, 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, and Mr. Ehrlichman had been trying to call me, I understood, at the time that I had been with Mr. Dean in the Old Executive Office Building.

He told me, when we made contact on the telephone, that Mr. Hunt had been asking for a great deal of money. I don't remember if he precisely stated a figure on the telephone.

Q Did you indicate to Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. Dean had filled you in on the details?

A I don't believe I did tell him that.

Q And what else did Mr. Ehrlichman say?

A I told him -- I asked him what condition Mr. Hunt was in and he said he did not know; that John Mitchell was responsible for the care and feeding of Howard Hunt.

Q I'm not sure that the reporter got that -- the punctuation there. Did he say, in substance, that Mr. Ehrlichman told you that Mr. Ehrlichman did not know personally about Mr. Hunt's situation but that Mr. Mitchell was responsible for the care and feeding of Mr. Hunt?

A That's correct. That is the gist of it, yes, sir.

Q I'm sorry. I was distracted for a moment when you began your narration of this conversation.
Did you say that Mr. Ehrlichman told you that Mr. Hunt was asking for a great deal of money and that he might, in effect, blow the lid off?

A That's right. That is correct, yes.

Q And did he indicate that -- did you say that, if the money was not paid, according to Mr. Ehrlichman, that Mr. Hunt would, in essence, tell all he knew?

A In essence, that's correct.

Q And what occurred after this part of the conversa-
tion?

A I asked for a meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman to dis-
cuss this situation. He agreed, and I met with him the next afternoon in his office, March 21st, in the West Wing of the White House, second floor.

Q Now, were you waiting for him for some time in his outer office?

A I waited there, I think, probably for an hour and a half. I'm not sure exactly what time the meeting had been set for -- 2:00, 3:00, 4:00, somewhere in there. But, in any event, I had to wait quite a while before I was able to get in, or he came in and we were able to go in his office to-
gether.

Q And did you know where Mr. Ehrlichman had been prior to his meeting with you?

A I didn't know for certain. I assumed that he had
been in a meeting either with the President and some other staff people or with just other staff people who had been discussing this situation.

Q Now, what was the conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman at that time?

A He brought up the point again about Mr. Hunt asking for a great deal of money. He also said that there had been some suggestion that -- I believe he said that Mr. Dean had raised -- whereby the Attorney General was vested with authority to grant limited immunity to individuals and that it had been suggested that perhaps -- and I should stress that "perhaps" -- Mr. Young and I could go to the Department of Justice under such a grant of limited immunity to tell everything that we knew about the events, and I assumed that meant the events of 1971.

My response to that was that I did not feel that that would be feasible; that it would, in all probability, be unacceptable to the Department of Justice. I based that not so much on my knowledge of immunity and how it's used, but the circumstances, at the time, plus my friendship with Mr. Kleindienst, and I said I just didn't think it would work out.

And he said, "However, but we must be practical about this."

Q You were referring to whether or not you would get
immunity, but not whether or not it might be advisable for you to go to the Prosecutors or to the Department of Justice and tell what you knew?

A  Right. We were just talking about immunity at that point.

Q  Is it fair to say that this was in the context that if Mr. Hunt was, in fact, going to tell all he knew, that it would make sense, from a strategic standpoint, from your situation, to appear at the Department of Justice to tell your story prior to the time that Mr. Hunt might effectuate his threat?

A  That's the most reasonable implication from that, yes.

Q  And that was in the same context of his explaining to you Mr. Hunt's threat, again -- reiterating it?

A  I believe so, yes.

Q  And do you recall whether Mr. Ehrlichman mentioned something about Mr. Mitchell, in the context of Mr. Hunt's most recent demands?

A  I believe he mentioned, at this point, that we could make no determination on what I should do with respect to going to the Justice Department or any other action until after they had met with Mr. Mitchell who, as I remember, I was told was coming to Washington, D. C., the next day to meet with him, with the President and, I assume, Bob Haldeman,
but I was not told this specifically as to who would be involved in those meetings.

Q So what you’re saying is that you would not do anything with respect to going over to the Justice Department or to the Prosecutors until at least Mr. Mitchell arrived in Washington and it was learned how this Hunt demand would be handled or how it had been handled?

A That’s correct.

Q Now, did there come a time thereafter when you spoke to Mr. Ehrlichman again?

A Yes, sir. After that discussion with him on Wednesday, the 21st, I went home. I stayed away from the Department of Transportation all day on Thursday the 22nd.

Q At that time, you were Under Secretary of the Department of Transportation?

A I was Under Secretary of the Department of Transportation, and I called in and said that I was not feeling well, which was true, and was literally awaiting the outcome of those meetings on Thursday.

And did you then have a telephone conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman on the 22nd?

A Yes, sir, I did. It was in the late afternoon some time. I received a call from him and he indicated to me that Mr. Hunt was, apparently, stable or more stable and that his recommendation would be 'just to hang tough' -- that’s it.