

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING

TO Chief, Task Force W

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE  
Review and Analysis of AMFAUNA Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	INDEXED	

## Action Required:

1. Traces on AMFAUNAs 2 through 23, identified in Attachment E. POAs on AMFAUNAs 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19.
2. Ascertain whether AMFAUNA-3 is of operational interest to ODIBEX (see paragraph 15b).
3. Forward evaluations of documentary intelligence provided by AMFAUNA-4 (see paragraph 56).

## Summary

4. AMFAUNA-1 is a Cuban national who was recruited and trained in the United States and returned legally to Cuba. Since then he has built a net and has sent back 140 S/W messages, from which upwards of fifty intelligence disseminations have been made. He is highly motivated for his work and under effective control by JMWAVE. The quality of his production is, for the most part, very good and improving although he is at times distracted by an understandable interest in para-military operations. Operationally he is very skillful; however, he has been known to take unnecessary risks. There is no reason to think that he is under hostile control nor that the operation is likely in the future to be turned against us. There is, however, the real risk that he may one day fall into a G-2 trap baited with the Escambray guerrillas. If so, this will be due to the fact that contact with the guerrillas was his first assignment and, although he has been re-directed to intelligence collection, he sometimes seems to feel that he has failed in his primary mission. This, plus the fact that he evidently believes that the end is now very close, is apt to make him vulnerable to an appeal from the "heroes of the Escambray".

## Present Status of the Operation - Modus Operandi:

5. There is considerable evidence that AMFAUNA-1 is extraordinarily

Attachments: A-D, Incl NSM attached  
Charts A,B,C,D h/w attached  
Attch. E - Identities ESC (AMFAUNAs 2-23)  
Attch. F - Identities attached  
Att. 1, 2 + 3 NSM  
Att. 4 NSM

## Distribution:

3-Headquarters

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SECRET

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skillful in the practice of security. He has built a false identity which he uses wherever possible in his operational contacts, he is usually selective and cautious in his choice of collaborators, he takes pains to check on the security of his sub-agents, and he uses a system of cutouts for much of his work.

6. Some of AMFAUNA-1's older collaborators know him by true name, but wherever possible he introduces himself to new contacts by the name of ("Julio" ROJO).<sup>07</sup> Evidently he is now living the part of (Julio ROJO) to such an extent that he has in effect a double identity. In one of his S/W messages he asked that the widow of AMCUSP-1 be warned not to reveal that ("Julio") is in Cuba. Since AMFAUNA-1 is in Cuba legally, and all his family<sup>07</sup> and friends know it, this can only mean that she should not reveal that AMFAUNA-1 and ("Julio ROJO") are<sup>07</sup> identical.

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7. In recruiting sub-agents, AMFAUNA-1 relies primarily on his own judgment and intuition. If he approves of a person, he will recruit him. However, he has shown himself to be very cautious in granting his approval. He has reported two persons whom he does not completely trust because, while otherwise well qualified, they drink too much and are indiscreet. For two other examples, AMBOA-1 and LITAU-5 approached him separately and revealed their relationship with KUBARK, hoping to collaborate with him; AMFAUNA-1 treated them both with reserve while he checked them out with JMWAVE. He has submitted<sup>04</sup> the names of other contacts for checking. In the case of AMFAUNA-4, (Gong) whom he recruited without prior checking because time did not permit it, he put his misgivings in writing: "Right away AMFAUNA-1 arranged for a personal interview, taking utmost precautions, since we have had sad previous experiences with members of CASTRO's armed forces."

8. Once he has recruited a sub-agent, AMFAUNA-1 manages to keep an independent eye on the former's security. On more than one occasion he has reported that one of his sub-agents is under G-2 surveillance, and that for the time being he is staying away from him.

9. In general AMFAUNA-1 seems to trust in the efficiency of his security precautions. On 25 February 1962 he reported that Identity 11 had been caught, but that he was in no danger because he had been compartmented from her.<sup>01</sup> This compartmentation is achieved by the use of five cutouts: AMFAUNA-2, AMFAUNA-3, AMFAUNA-4, AMBOA-1, and AMFAUNA-5, who maintain contact for AMFAUNA-1 with most if not all of his sub-agents. Chart A, which shows AMFAUNA-1 in direct contact with AMFAUNAs 7 through 13, may be in error on this point. It would be more in keeping with AMFAUNA-1's known modus operandi for him to have cutouts between himself and these sub-agents. If there is a cutout or cutouts here, their identity is not yet known. There may also be an unreported cutout between AMFAUNA-1 and AMFAUNA-4.

10. Except for AMFAUNA-4, all the above-mentioned cutouts are women. Two of his support agents, including his mail drop, are also women. AMFAUNA-1 has not been explicit on this point, but it is believed that he shares his favors between them. If so, he has the best of cover for his relations with them. It also clarifies the otherwise puzzling picture of a legal resident of Cuba sleeping in a different bed each night. This practice must certainly reduce the possibility that the G-2 will pick him up for routine questioning.

#### Communications:

11. The bulk of AMFAUNA-1's communications come via S/W. His messages to JMWAVE are sent to accommodation addresses serviced by AMPAN-2 and AMCUTLER-1. JMWAVE's messages to him are addressed to AMFAUNA-14. AMFAUNA-1 can also use [redacted] for sending documents and other material unsuitable for S/W. He has a personal contact with two of the officers [redacted] who either bring it to the JMWAVE area and mail it to AMCUTLER-1, or carry it [redacted] where it is turned over to the [redacted] which in turn

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second via AMFAUNA-14.

12. The courier system can also work in the other direction. AMFAUNA-1 has been supplied with S/W materials for his own use by way of the [redacted] and for the use of AMRIPE-1 and AMRAVEL-1 by way of the [redacted] 24

13. A third communications<sup>01</sup> channel<sup>06</sup> exists in the weekly telephone conversations<sup>04</sup> (between) AMCOG-1 and his wife AMFAUNA-2. It is useful for passing signals already prearranged by S/W, and for confirming that AMFAUNA-1 is still at liberty. If he is ever arrested, the news will probably come first by this means.

#### Finances:

14. Expenses of the operation are \$500 per month. The money is given monthly to Identity-3 or Identity-4 in the JMWAVE area. Identity-3, upon receipt of the dollars, notifies Identity-1 in Havana who in turn pays Cuban pesos to AMFAUNA-1. Identity-4 follows the same procedure with Identity-2. AMFAUNA-1 confirms receipt of this money by S/W.

#### Sub-agents:

15. Following is a description of the sub-agents in the AMFAUNA net, including AMCOG-2 and AMBOA-1 who, although they have their own independent connections to JMWAVE, have to some extent joined forces with AMFAUNA-1. For the identities of AMFAUNAs 2 through 23, see Attachment E, forwarded under separate cover.

a. AMFAUNA-2<sup>01</sup> AMFAUNA-1's sister-in-law, she formerly served as his contact to members of his net (in asylum in the<sup>06</sup> various embassies), and now serves as his cutout to at least the following:

(1) AMCOG-2: She first appears in AMFAUNA-1's correspondence in his S/W message No. 14 dated 19 May 1961, where he mentions that she was his link to a radio station operated by the [redacted] 29 organization. Nothing ever came of this proposed communications channel, but AMCOG-2 remained in contact with AMFAUNA-1, helping him arrange asylum for burned agents and passing some of his communications [redacted] 24 AMFAUNA-1 reported on 9 July 1961, in his S/W message No. 21, that AMCOG-2 knew him only by his alias (Julio ROJO).<sup>07</sup> In his message No. 118, dated June 1962, he reported that AMFAUNA-15 had accidentally blown his true name to AMCOG-2. For a further discussion of AMCOG-2, and her relation to the security of AMFAUNA-1 see paragraph 56 below.

(2) AMFAUNA-14<sup>01</sup>: She is the secretary of (AMCOG-2)<sup>01</sup> with whom she has done clandestine work. She now serves AMFAUNA-1 as an accommodation address and as a source of information. Message No. 112 dated 18 April 1962 included the name of a Communist nurse who has allegedly come to the United States with the mission of infiltrating a counter-revolutionary group. AMFAUNA-14<sup>01</sup> obtained this information from a doctor [redacted] 24 She also is AMFAUNA-1's [redacted] 01

(3) AMFAUNA-15: She is a relative of AMFAUNA-14<sup>01</sup> and a friend of AMCOG-2. She is also the wife of (AMFAUNA-17)<sup>01</sup> and a friend of AMFAUNA-16 who is now (imprisoned on the Isle of Pines) and sends her

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(1) AMFAUNA-20, her husband. AMFAUNA-1 has written that he has broken personal contact with this man.

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(2) AMPAV 12: A former (chief engineer of the <sup>08</sup> Office of Airports) he was recruited by Havana Station in 1960, and has been corresponding with JMWAVE by S/W.

(3) AMFAUNA-21: A (chief inspector of mechanics <sup>08</sup> for Cubana Airlines). He has stated his willingness to (sabotage air traffic) <sup>24</sup> but his precise contribution to AMFAUNA-1's operations is not known.

(4) AMFAUNA-22: A chief (of electrical instruments <sup>08</sup> for Cubana Airlines). Nothing more is known about this man.

(5) AMFAUNA-23: Brother-in-law of (AMFAUNA-5) <sup>01</sup>

f. AMFAUNA-6: A support agent. AMFAUNA-1 has written that she has no access to information of interest, but is an intelligent and brave female whom he uses for cover and to secure overt information.

g. AMFAUNA-7: An old friend of AMFAUNA-1 and his brother AMCUTLER-1 <sup>01</sup>. He works closely with AMFAUNA-8 and formerly was AMFAUNA-1's cutout to [ ] <sup>24</sup>

h. AMFAUNA-8: An old friend of AMFAUNA-1 and his <sup>08</sup> brother AMCUTLER-1 <sup>01</sup>. He has a contact in the (Interior Ministry) and works closely with AMFAUNA-7.

i. AMFAUNA-9: A former [ ] <sup>08</sup> for a [ ] <sup>08</sup> he secures information of general interest from [ ] <sup>08</sup> travelling throughout Cuba.

j. AMFAUNA-10: (A widow of a bank employee, she has contacts in [ ] <sup>08</sup> and in the [ ] <sup>24</sup> She is also [ ] <sup>08</sup> and has provided information on [ ] <sup>24</sup> whereabouts and indoctrination.

k. AMFAUNA-11: An employee of the [ ] <sup>08</sup> and the wife of a Communist member of the [ ] <sup>08</sup> she has reported political intelligence. In March 1962 AMFAUNA-1 reported that she was under surveillance and that he was therefore avoiding her.

l. AMFAUNA-12: He obtains information from contacts within the [ ] <sup>08</sup>

m. AMFAUNA-13: An [ ] <sup>08</sup> company employee with contacts in the Cuban Government, he has reported information on G-2 activities in Cuba and the United States.

## Background and Motivation:

(16. AMFAUNA-1 is a (39-year-old) <sup>08</sup> Cuban male, born in Cuba of [ ] <sup>08</sup> parents. He has tried his hand at various kinds of work including the (import business, journalism (he was once editor of <sup>08</sup> Diario de la Marina) and insurance). He has also ventured into politics, (having been a candidate (of the Autentico Party in 1958) <sup>08</sup> During the Spanish Civil War he was a member of the [ ] <sup>24</sup> and during World War II, until the entry of the United States, he was an [ ] <sup>24</sup> The JMWAVE case officer who trained AMFAUNA-1 in tradecraft in March 1961 (see UFGA-1247 of 10 April 1961) observed that he already had a grounding in clandestine techniques. The case officer also characterized AMFAUNA-1 as "a pleasant, intelligent fellow" and "the most astute member of the team" comprising himself, AMCUTLER-1 <sup>01</sup> and AMCUTLER-1 <sup>01</sup>

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children, all still in Cuba (as of March 1961). However, it is noted that the two children have different matronymics, that neither of them is his wife's last name, and that all three dependents have different addresses. It is assumed that this is his third wife. Since AMFAUNA-1 has never mentioned her in any of his S/W correspondence, it is also assumed that she has gone the way of her two predecessors.

18. AM(CUTLER-1) who was questioned on this point, said that his brother is living in [redacted] with his present wife, that he has been married only once before, and has only one child from the first marriage. This information is not considered definitive, because the last point is directly contradicted by AMFAUNA-1's PRQ Part I which he wrote himself, but it is included here for what it may be worth. AM(CUTLER-1) added that his brother has no sexual relations with his sub-agents except what is considered normal and acceptable by Cuban standards.

19. The elements of AMFAUNA-1's motivation, then, include an adventurous spirit and a taste for clandestine work. Although "anti-Communism" may be an overworked expression, it would seem to apply in the case of AMFAUNA-1, if his former membership [ ] and the [ ] can be taken as indicators. Also included should be the loss of a (freight forwarding business) which started out promisingly in 1959 but folded up after a year of CASTRO's revolutionary government. Finally, although these factors did not yet exist in January 1961 when he was recruited, AMFAUNA-1 is certainly affected now by the death of AMCUSP-1 and the imprisonment [ ]

## Control

20. It is evident from his S/W messages that AMFAUNA-1 derives great personal satisfaction from his work against the CASTRO regime. His connection with KUBARK provides him with the means to do this work. This is believed to be a strong element of control. There have been many opportunities to test this control, by ordering AMFAUNA-1 to do something or to desist from doing something else, and the control is believed to be effective.

**Previous History of the Operation - January to May 1961:**

21. AMFAUNA-1 was engaged in some form of clandestine work against the CASTRO regime as early as (December 1960).<sup>9</sup> As with so much else in this operation, details are lacking, but it is known that he already had an understanding with Identity-29 whom he had known for twenty years.<sup>10</sup> In December 1960, Identity-29 introduced AMFAUNA-1 to Identity-27, (an MAR coordinator from Matanzas) who had been introduced to Identity-29 by one of the members of her group, Identity-28. Identity-27 in turn brought in Identity-26, (a fellow MAR coordinator).<sup>11</sup>

22. In January<sup>1</sup> 1961, AMFAUNA-1<sup>1</sup> came legally to the United States together with AMCUSP-1<sup>1</sup> and AMCUTLER-1<sup>1</sup> and looked up their old friend AMJAG-4, who at that time was heavily engaged in work with the resistance groups. AMJAG-4 introduced them to a JMWAVE case officer who instructed them to return to Cuba, to form contacts with as many resistance groups as possible, and to report their progress through AMRUNG-1<sup>1</sup> who was JMWAVE's principal agent in the paramilitary field. Also in the JMWAVE area at this time were Identity-19 and Identity-23 whom they met and with whom they were later to work.

23. AMFAUNA-1, AM(CUTLER-1), and AM(CUSP-1) returned to Cuba in January 1961. They dispatched Identity-16 ( ) Identity-17 ( ), Identity-18 ( ), and Identity-37 to . An unidentified courier was put into touch with the guerrilla leader Identity-15, and AM(CUSP-1) and AM(CUTLER-1) went to Cienfuegos with Identity-19 to make contacts with insurgent groups there.

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time, as did AMRUNG-1) ol

25. ol To support the activities of AMFAUNA-1, AM(CUTLER-1) ol and AM(CUSP-1) ol, it was agreed that JMWAVE would deposit \$1,000 monthly into the local bank account of AM(CUSP-1) ol and the latter would provide the equivalent in Cuban pesos from his own resources inside Cuba.

26. AM(CUSP-1) ol and AM(CUTLER-1) ol continued to busy themselves with preparations for supporting the April invasion. They contacted Identity-21 who, at their request, provided cover as (travelling drug salesmen) ol for Identity-19 and also for Identity-20 who was intended to be a radio operator for Identity-23. Although AMFAUNA-1 knew all these people, he was compartmented from these operations to some extent, so that after the arrest of AM(CUSP-1) ol and the escape of AM(CUTLER-1) ol he had some difficulty in reestablishing contact with them.

27. AM(CUTLER-1) ol and AMFAUNA-1, working together, held meetings with Identity-33, a Cuban Army officer stationed at the ( ) ol base, and discussed plans for supporting the invasion. AMFAUNA-1 also contacted Identity-35, the ( ) ol base, and arranged for its surrender, using Identity-34, head of the ( ) ol as a cutout. He had another agent on the base, Identity 36, and had already recruited AMFAUNA-11, an employee of the ( ) ol

28. (On 18 March 1961) ol AM(CUSP-1) ol and AMRUNG-1) ol were arrested by the G-2 while holding a clandestine meeting. At first this was not regarded as too serious a matter. The G-2 had broken into the meeting only after having been alerted by the suspicious behavior of a woman ol lookout, and it was believed that they had no real evidence. AM(CUTLER-1) ol came to the JMWAVE area on (3 April 1961) ol and returned ol again to Cuba on (10 April) ol still optimistic that AM(CUSP-1) ol and AMRUNG-1) ol would either be released or could be helped to escape. ol However, one of the other ol prisoners apparently confessed and implicated AM(CUSP-1) ol and AMRUNG-1) ol who were executed (on 20 April) ol. With the wave of arrests accompanying the April 17 invasion, AM(CUTLER-1) ol took asylum in the ( ) ol Embassy and AMFAUNA-1 went temporarily ol into hiding. (l

29. On 27 April 1961 AMFAUNA-1 resumed operations by sending Identities 24, 25, 26 and 27 to collect order of battle information in Matanzas. Identities 26 and 27 returned to Havana to report. Identity-25 remained in Matanzas, and Identity-24 was caught by the G-2.

30. In May 1961, Identity-30 informed AMFAUNA-1 that some kind of conspiratorial activity was going on in the home of AMCOG-2. He arranged to meet her through Identity-30 whom he thereafter used as a cutout to her.

31. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart B. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and execution:

- (1) AM(CUSP-1) ol
- (2) AMRUNG-1) ol

b. By arrest and detention:

- (1) Identity-24
- (2) Identity-28

c. By asylum or escape to the U.S.:

- (1) AM(CUTLER-1) ol
- (2) Identity-23

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Previous History of the Operation - June to November 1961:

32. In the period beginning June 1961, AMFAUNA-1 first began making regular use of AMFAUNA-2. He needed contact with his collaborators who were in asylum in various Western embassies, and with AMFAUNA-2 (openly visiting her husband) AMOUTLER-1 (she) was a natural choice for the job. With the departure of Identities 29 and 30, AMFAUNA-1 began using AMFAUNA-2 as cutout to AMCOG-2 who was useful to him for her ability to obtain the help of [redacted] 4. In August 1961 he used this channel to send out some order of battle information obtained by Identity-21.

33. Identity-21 continued to help Identities 19 and 20 until they took asylum in [redacted]. He also served as AMFAUNA-1's cutout to Identity-50 who was a close friend of the [redacted] 06, 06. For cutouts to Identity-21, AMFAUNA-1 first used Identity-51 and then AMFAUNA-8. AMFAUNA-8 also served as cutout to Identity-45 about whom nothing more is known than his name. 06

34. AMFAUNA-1 developed another contact to [redacted] during this period in the person of Identity-52, a [redacted] 06 and a (former lieutenant) in the Rebel Army. Identity-52 met AMFAUNA-1 and Identity-21 on 27 October 1961, and then remained in touch through Identity-51. A few weeks later Identity-52 was arrested.

35. At some time during the period June to November 1961, AMFAUNA-1 began collaborating with AMBOA-1. The origin of this collaboration is not known, but it appears that the initiative was taken by AMBOA-1. AMFAUNA-1 reported that she had revealed to him the fact that she has a channel of S/W communication to KUBARK, and that she had claimed to be a friend of the widow of AMCUSP-1. AMFAUNA-1 asked JMWAVE to confirm her bona fides, and this was done. AMBOA-1 then began working as AMFAUNA-1's cutout to Identity-14, a (Cubana Airlines pilot) who in turn was receiving information from Identity 40, an employee (of Cubana). At some time prior to November 1961, Identity-40 was fired from her job and held for interrogation by the G-2. 06

36. During the same period AMFAUNA-1 added the following new agents:

- a. AMFAUNA-23 (for description see paragraph 15e5 above).
- b. AMFAUNA-5 (for description see paragraph 15e above).
- c. Identity-41, a person who allegedly was collaborating with several other clandestine groups. He had two sub-agents in the (Ministry of Public Works), Identities 42 and 43. No production has been attributable to these people. 08

d. Identity-46, a [redacted] who allegedly was able to obtain [redacted] between [redacted] 11. [redacted] Nothing ever came of this contact. 08

e. Identity-47, [redacted] 08. AMFAUNA-1 obtained some order of battle information from her, apparently on an unwitting basis. In August 1961 he reported that he was dropping her because she was a strong Communist and had given him information which he considered of doubtful reliability.

f. Identity-48, a foreman [redacted] who provided some order of battle information. 08

g. Identity-49, [redacted] 08. Although his recruitment was reported, AMFAUNA-1 never mentioned him again.

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and AMFAUNA-1 hid him in Havana until he was able to get asylum for him in (the Ecuadorian Embassy) <sup>06</sup>

38. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart C. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and detention:

(1) Identity 19 (subsequently escaped and took asylum in the (Argentine Embassy) <sup>06</sup>

(2) Identity 20 (subsequently escaped and took asylum in the (Argentine Embassy) <sup>06</sup>

(3) Identity 40 (interrogated by G-2, but the duration of her detention is not known).

(4) Identity 52.

b. By asylum:

(1) Identity 21

(2) Identity 37.

Previous History of the Operation - December 1961 to April 1962:

39. During the period from December 1961 to April 1962, AMFAUNA-1 continued to use AMFAUNA-2 as a cutout to AMCOG-2. The latter was <sup>24</sup> given a lead in March 1962 from Identity-13, one of her [ ] contacts, to a disaffected Cuban Army officer, AMFAUNA-4. She turned this lead over to AMFAUNA-1, and the latter held his first meeting with AMFAUNA-4 in AMFAUNA-2's automobile.

40. AMFAUNA-2 was also used as alternate cutout to Identity-11, a woman with contacts (in the Cuban Navy) <sup>06</sup>. The other alternate cutout was AMFAUNA-8. Identity-11 was arrested (in February 1962) <sup>09</sup>. According to AMFAUNA-1's account of the incident in his message No. 89 of 25 February 1962, Identity-11 had been meeting [ ] <sup>4</sup>. AMFAUNA-1 had warned her not to trust the man, but she met him again on the following day and was caught with him. AMFAUNA-1 commented that some of his other agents were not compartmented from her, and he had ordered them to go into hiding. He did not identify these other agents. Presumably they included AMFAUNA-2 <sup>01</sup> and AMFAUNA-8.

41. AMFAUNA-3 was recruited during this period and used as a cutout to Identity-12 <sup>06</sup>, the (Havana representative) of the insurgent leader [ ]. According to an official announcement by the Cuban Government, [ ] action on (16 April) 1962. Other sources have contradicted this report, and the matter still remains in some doubt. However, according to information obtained by AMFAUNA-1, Identity-12 was arrested in his home in Havana in late April. For a further discussion of the possible security implications of this connection, see paragraph 59 below.

42. Identity-51, who during the period June <sup>24</sup> to November 1961, had been serving as a link to [ ] now established a contact with Identity-54, a resident of [ ] who claimed to be a disillusioned counter-revolutionary. As a cutout to Identity-54, she used Identity-53. As far as the records show, no results were ever obtained from this connection.

43. Identity-14 defected during this period, as did Identity-57, [ ] whom AMFAUNA-1 had recruited and was [ ]

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paragraph 15e above, AMFAUNA-1 seems to have an excellent network within Cuban (aviation) but how it works remains a matter for conjecture. It is supposed that AMROA-1 is handling the two (new pilots). 06

44. AMFAUNA-21 and AMFAUNA-22, both employees at [redacted] first made their appearance during this period, and AMPAN-12 (who has and continues to use his own S/W communications to JMWAVE) found his way into the AMFAUNA operation. All three are known to AMFAUNA-5, and it is believed that she is probably the cutout to them. 06

45. Identity-55 and Identity-56 were mentioned briefly as active during the period from December 1961 to April 1962. The former had been a contact of AMRUNG-10 and seems to have gone into hiding; in any case, nothing more has been reported on him. The latter was an agent of AMFAUNA-1 in [redacted] in January 1962 he was in hiding and awaiting a chance to go into asylum.

46. AMFAUNA-11 remained active during this period, and AMFAUNA-9, 10, and 12 were added to the operation. For descriptions of these agents, see paragraph 15 above.

47. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart D. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and detention:

- (1) Identity-11
- (2) Identity-12.

b. By asylum or defection:

- (1) Identity-14
- (2) Identity-55
- (3) Identity-56
- (4) Identity-57.

Production:

48. JMWAVE records do not show the total number of AMFAUNA reports disseminated since January 1961. The figure is at least fifty, and is believed to be nearer one hundred, if the present frequency of dissemination can be a criterion. In content they have leaned heavily toward the activities of insurgent groups, militia movements, location of artillery, and aviation matters. There has been a more recent tendency toward political and economic information, which is being encouraged by JMWAVE. Evaluations of his production are lacking.

Security Analysis:

49. The possibility that AMFAUNA-1 is a double agent is considered remote. His successful LCFLUTTER, the fact (or what is believed to be the fact) that his close friend and fellow agent AMCUSP-1 was executed, and AMFAUNA-1's own character and background, all argue against the proposition that he was originally dispatched by the G-2. However, it must be admitted that the LCFLUTTER can be beaten. Also that there is no proof, other than the fact that AMCUSP-1's wife is in the JMWAVE area and behaving like a widow, that AMCUSP-1 was really executed. There is documentary evidence, in the form of a letter written by a fellow prisoner to AMCUSP-1's widow, that he was held in prison in March and April 1961. However, the person who identified and buried the body was AMFAUNA-1's father, who was subsequently 06

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<p>50. Similarly, all that is known about AMFAUNA-1's background comes from AMFAUNA-1's own statements embodied in his PRQ Part I. No confirmation of this information has ever been obtained. From this point of view there is no guarantee that AMFAUNA-1 is what he claims to be. For all the proof to the contrary available to JMWAVE, he could as easily have been a [redacted] Communist as a member of the [redacted] <sup>29</sup></p>		
<p>51. These points are listed for the sake of completeness, but little importance is attached to them. The known fact that (QUANTUM-51) and (QUANTUM-52) consider AMFAUNA-1 reliable suggests that he at least was not a [redacted] Communist. And an unusually extensive independent view has been obtained of AMFAUNA-1's operations through the reports and debriefings of eight of his agents who have either escaped to or are in communication with the United States. The defection of Identity-14, and the escape and debriefings of Identity-19, Identity-23, Identity-26, and Identity-29, have all confirmed parts of AMFAUNA-1's story. Finally, AMCOG-3 has reported by S/W that AMCOG-2 is in contact with AMFAUNA-1, and AMFAUNA-2's telephone conversations with AM(CUTLER-1) provide a continuing check on the safety and whereabouts of AMFAUNA-1. <sup>01</sup></p>		
<p>52. For the same reasons, the possibility is heavily discounted that AMFAUNA-1 has been caught and doubled by the G-2 since his arrival in Cuba. Additional indications that all is still well are the fact that he never omits the safety signal that was given him for use in his S/W, that his operational activities are consistent with his character and background, and that the reporting of his agents is consistent with their access to information.</p>		
<p>53. Whether AMFAUNA-1 is now in danger of being detected, and whether the G-2 could double him if they do catch him, are two questions remaining to be considered. Taking the second question first, it is believed that the chances of the G-2 running a successful CI operation against KUBARK through AMFAUNA-1 are extremely slim. To be sure, the G-2 has certain weapons that they could use against AMFAUNA-1. His father is already in prison, serving a fifteen-year sentence, and his mother and two children are still in Cuba as potential hostages. <sup>06</sup> It is also conceivable that the G-2 could use AMFAUNA-1's own interest in paramilitary operations as a lever by persuading him that KUBARK, by neglecting to support the insurgent leader Oswaldo RAMIREZ, was responsible for the latter's death and has demonstrated its indifference to the fate of the Cuban people. This would all take time, however, because AMFAUNA-1's reaction to arrest, at least initially, would probably be an attempt to emulate his two heroes, AM(CUSP-1) and AM(RUNG-1). In the time that it would take the G-2 to break down this resistance, AM(CUTLER-1) would almost certainly have learned, either through his phone conversations with AMFAUNA-2 or by the interruption of the same, that something is wrong with AMFAUNA-1.</p>		
<p>54. The risks that AMFAUNA-1 is now running are believed to be considerable. For one thing, at least ten persons with varying degrees of knowledge of his clandestine operations, have been held temporarily or permanently by the G-2, which is believed to be increasing in competence as a security force. For another, AMFAUNA-1 takes unnecessary chances, as by interrogating a new and untested agent (AMFAUNA-4) in the personal automobile of his sister-in-law, or by personally trying to penetrate a restricted area. And for a third, he has some contacts which can be dangerous to him.</p>		
<p>55. AMCOG-2 knows too much about AMFAUNA-1 for the latter's good. It is believed that AMFAUNA-1 himself is aware that this is a potentially serious security weakness, because he took the trouble to report it (see paragraph 15a1 above). The AMCOG operation is itself a fairly complex one, and will be analyzed in a separate dispatch. The aspects of it which bear on the AMFAUNA operation are that AMCOG-2 and (her <sup>06</sup> brother) AM(COG-3) are close relatives of a very prominent anti-Communist Cuban politician, and that they are widely known, both in Cuba and in</p>		

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prosecution for acts against it, is a matter for wonder. It has been rumored that (the old politician) has a blackmail hold over Fidel CASTRO by virtue of his possession of very damaging information about CASTRO. There may be some substance to this rumor. As a young student, CASTRO is believed to have committed criminal acts, and the (old politician) would have been in the best possible position at the time to obtain proof of them. This might well explain why the family enjoys immunity today.

56. It would seem, though, that an alert and competent security service, which the G-2 shows signs of becoming, if it is enjoined from arresting and prosecuting an espionage suspect, would at least try to control and monitor his operations by penetrating them. It is therefore a cause for speculation that, in February 1962, an important officer of the Cuban Army (AMFAUNA-4), allegedly desirous of defecting, was introduced by Identity-13 to AMCOG-2, and a matter for deep concern that AMCOG-2 passed the lead along to AMFAUNA-1 who accepted it without any prior checking and actually held his first meeting with the would-be defector in an automobile traceable to AMFAUNA-2. Since then, it has been observed that reports and sub-sources offered by AMFAUNA-4 are absorbing an increasing amount of AMFAUNA-1's time. The military manuals and documents turned over by AMFAUNA-4, and sent to Headquarters via the (QUANTUMS) and the ( ), have not yet been seen by JMWAVE, so it is not yet known whether AMFAUNA-4's production can be given a sufficiently high evaluation to allay the doubts raised by the manner of his recruitment. Headquarters is asked to advise on this as soon as possible, and to provide traces on AMFAUNA-4.

57. The other potentially dangerous contacts are, as might be expected, in the field of para-military activities. In November 1961, AMFAUNA-1 was in touch with Identity-52, a ( ) through Identity-51, a resident of ( ), Identity-52 was arrested late in the year. AMFAUNA-1 then developed another contact to the ( ) through Identity-12, ( ) representative, whose cutout to AMFAUNA-1 was AMFAUNA-3, a woman from ( ) now resident in Havana. Identity-12 was arrested in (April) presumably as an aftermath of the 16 April battle in which RAMIREZ was reportedly killed.

58. In late May or early June 1962, Identity-8, a person from Sancti Spiritus known to AMFAUNA-3, called on her in the company of a certain ( ) who claimed to have had a meeting on 28 May near Trinidad with one ( ) who gave ( ) a letter for delivery to Identity-12. Unable to find Identity-12 because of the latter's arrest, ( ) approached Identity-8 who introduced him to AMFAUNA-3 to whom he handed over the letter. The letter reads as follows:

"Dear Brother-in-Arms:

"I greet you and officially report to you, as our representative to the Military Junta of the FND, the sad news of the death of our commander-in-chief, Oswaldo RAMIREZ, on 16 April last at 9 a.m. He fell in battle together with other brothers. The certificate to this effect, containing the testimony of Captain BORGE, chief of the personal guard, and of other members of his escort, is in my possession, and I will hand it over to you or to anyone designated by the Military Junta of the FND.

"The disorganization caused by the above-mentioned events prevented our reporting this news to you right away, and only now have we been able to make contact with the bearer, a man who has been working for some time as messenger and enjoying the complete confidence of Oswaldo RAMIREZ and of ourselves in particular.

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"Although the National Liberation Army has continued working and acting according to the norms laid down by you and by our late chief, you will understand the urgency of this interview which the bearer will tell you how to arrange. In anticipation of your decisions I sign myself respectfully,

60. It is difficult if not impossible to give an operation of this complexity the support and direction it needs, when the only communication with the principal agent is by secret writing. There is never enough room in an S/W message for both the positive intelligence reporting and the supporting operational details, and it is the latter that suffer. S/W communication also inevitably involves a time lag which, in the case of this operation, has sometimes run as high as three weeks because of the frequent absences from town of AM CUTLER-1

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61. As a first step toward speeding up communications, it is planned to find another accommodation address in the JMWAVE area for AMFAUNA-1's use which can be expected to function without the delays that have been experienced recently. Because of the importance and urgency of some of AMFAUNA-1's intelligence reports, consideration is also being given to assigning a radio operator to him, probably AMGLEN-9 who is awaiting only his signal plan to become active and who will probably not be needed in the AMWPEN net as originally planned.

62. AMFAUNA-1 will be instructed to break off contact with AMCOG-2, and to cease interesting himself in the affairs of the Escambray. As for AMFAUNA-4, it is feared that AMFAUNA-1 is already so deeply involved with him that, if he was not a bona fide defector, the damage has already been done. Nevertheless, AMFAUNA-1 will be warned of the potentialities of this situation so that he can be prepared to go into hiding if it should develop badly. Specific military requirements will be sent to AMFAUNA-1 for AMFAUNA-4 to help in establishing his value as a source. Also for the improvement of the security of the operation, AMFAUNA-1 will be told to stop taking personal and unnecessary risks such as his penetration of a restricted beach.

63. For the continued improvement of production, political and economic requirements will be sent to him. AMFAUNA-1 is very responsive to requirements, and has already developed sources and informants in the political and economic areas in response to instructions from JMWAVE. It is believed that an increased output of higher-priority intelligence can be expected from this operation.

END OF DISPATCH



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Identity 31

Identity 32

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