

8/56-6/69 COS Winston M. Scott (deceased)

DCOS 7/56 - 7/58 Alfonso Rodriguez (retired)  
10/58 - 12/62 [redacted] (retired)  
6/63 - 9/65 Alan White (retired) -  
10/65 - 1969 Stanley Watson (retired in Mexico)

COVERT ACTION

Prior to 1954 Howard Hunt (retired)  
12/54 - 7/58 Williard Hill (resigned)  
12/56 - 9/61 Stannard Short (retired)  
Chief  
9/61 - 3/64 David Phillips C/(retired) -  
8/62 - 9/64 Gunnar Beckman Asst -  
2/64 - 6/65 James Flannery C/(retired) -  
9/64 - 11/66 Harold Dalghren Asst  
10/65 - 1967 Stanley Watson C/(retired)  
66 - 68 [redacted]  
68 - 71 [redacted]

CUBA OPERATIONS

56 - 4/62 Thomas Hazlitt Chief  
2/60 - 4/62 [redacted]  
4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief -  
9/63 - 7/65 [redacted] - (retired) -  
10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Mackay (retired) -  
8/63 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (retired) -  
9/65 - 10/68 Joseph Piccolo  
10/65 - 12/67 [redacted]

SOVIET TARGET

6/57 - 10/59 Louise Lyon (retired?) 6/62 - 1/67 Prentice Marheine (ps)  
9/59 - 8/65 [redacted] (retired ?)  
9/59 - 8/65 [redacted] Outside CO  
5/64 - 7/66 William Bright  
4/65 - 11/67 Cynthia Hausmann  
6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger  
7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief

SOVIET TRANSCRIBERS

6/56 - 8/58 Morris Gordon (resigned)  
6/58 - 6/63 George Misko -  
6/63 - 70 Boris Tarasoff (retired in Mexico) -

SUPPORT ASSETS

[ ] phono taps

1949 - 1961	Charles Anderson III Chief	49-71 ? Outside CO
4/55 - 4/60	[ ] Asst	David WILSTED (ps)
4/56 - 1/62	Frank Estancona Chief	retired in Mexico
2/60 - 10/64	Thomas Keenan -	
9/64 - 12/67	Michael Farmer	

[ ] photo Cubans

6/59 - 4/64	Robert Zambarnardi (resigned Mexico)
7/59 - 6/62	[ ] (retired)

[ ] photo Soviets

3/54 - 4/59	Harry T. Mahoney (retired Chicago)	56 - 68 Outside Agent
5/57 - 8/64	A. Goodpasture (alternate CO - and internal routing)	[ ]
6/58 - 6/63	Louis D. Puckett (retired)	
6/63 - 10/64	Thomas Keenan -	
65 - 66	William Bright	

*Robert H. Feldmann  
8(?) 63 - 6/68*

*↓  
Cubana - opl reporting  
Travel - LA*

EA

[ ] phone taps

1959 - 1969	Winston Scott (deceased)
1959 - 1960	Alfonso Spera (retired)
1959 - 1960	[ ] (outside, now retired)
1959 - 1960	John (Training rept resigned)
1960 - 1961	John Brady (retired)
1962 - 1968	A. Goodpasture -
1961 - 1971	Charles Flick (outside TSD Staff Agent - retired) -

[ ] - surveillance

Prior 1954	[ ] (retired)
3/54 - 4/59	Harry Mahoney (retired)
4/59 - 1961	Thomas Hazlitt
12/62 - 9/67	Robert Feldmann

TSD Outside unit

4/58 - 12/63	Glen Widden (retired) -
6/59 - 4/64	Joseph M. Resigno (ps) Unit blown and closed down

About mid 1962 (check date) LIENVOY [redacted] asked

for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban, and Satellite Embassies.

[redacted] LIFEAT [redacted] was [redacted] However,

[redacted] connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech, 2 Polish, and 1 Yugoslav line. The basehouse listening post had a live monitor who made short summaries of interesting conversations for a daily resume which was received each day around 8 a.m. (passed by Flick to Goodpasture to get to Scott before 9 a.m.) Later (when the reel was completely recorded) full transcripts were typed and passed to the station in the same way, however, there was usually a time lag of a day or so. Those transcripts which had Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening post the day after the transcript (of other conversations on the reel) was typed. These reels were taken to another location where they were translated and typed. In the case of the Russian translations, Boris Tarasoff usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation because of the volume of Russian conversations among the members of the Soviet Embassy. During this period (fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station and carried to Boris by one of the people from the Soviet Section or they may have been carried to him by Flick but I think I brought the reel in and gave it to [redacted] to take to Boris. [redacted] handled all of the processing of Soviet transcripts. My job involved screening the photographs as soon as we learned that the man calling himself Oswald was probably an American. However, here again there was a backlog because the photos were picked up three times a week but the ones picked up were usually for dates a few days previously because [redacted] processed the film on a night time basis. Photographs were made usually until one roll was used but later we got it changed to one day coverage on each roll - in other words the operators <sup>after</sup> cleared the camera each day whether there was ~~any film exposed~~ a full roll of film exposed. Instructions were to cover office hours, photograph each

new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment (a pulse camera) but it frequently developed mechanical difficulties. Bob Zambarnardi and  (I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. Lorna MacKay screened the film inside the station.

I am certain that the Oswald call came to our attention from the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Boris for a translation because the caller was trying to speak Russian. Any delay was caused by waiting to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. There were no copies of transcripts ever made in languages other than Spanish or English because Win Scott could read only those two languages and he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads he wanted pursued.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)

1. [ ] Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in [ ] 1947 until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in 1955, the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multiline phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by [ ] [ ] who was handled by a Station case officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then developed and printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was originally processed in the Station but in early 1959, due to the resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a [redacted] mail intercept operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. [redacted]

[redacted] obtained selected letters from a subagent [redacted]

2. [redacted] Coverage:

[redacted] coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the [redacted] at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), [redacted] was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their agents were ~~very~~<sup>by UTAL</sup> ~~insecure~~, and corrupt. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by [redacted]

[redacted] In 1961, [redacted] [redacted] the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, [redacted]

[redacted]

post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Embassies [redacted]. The Station immediately

[redacted]

[redacted] soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian



SECRET/SENSITIVE

or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian translations but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads.

SECRET/SENSITIVE