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Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

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Draft: new  
13 Nov, 1962

OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

**I. SITUATION:**

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:

a. Isolate Castro/Communist from other Western Hemisphere nations.

b. <sup>Further</sup> Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.

d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split

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on Cuban-Bloc relationships.

**II. MISSION:**

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national objectives with respect to Cuba.

**III. TASKS:**

**A. Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence**

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
  - a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
  - b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
  - c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
  - d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
  - e. Military and militia order of battle.
  - f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain within the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
  - g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.
  - h. Economic.

**B. Political:**

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

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1. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
2. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
3. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

**C. Economic:**

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.
3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.

**D. Psychological:**

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.
3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.

**E. Resistance:**

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel and logistical support for any significant internal

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is primarily a political problem.

13. Expansion of communications intelligence operations  
who have potential access to significant information

14. Spotting/rectifying/creating of legal errors  
national residents in Cuba.

15. Spotting/rectifying/creating of third country  
state controls increase.

16. Communications will become more critical as political  
establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure

17. Spotting/rectifying/creating of legally acceptable  
Cubans in Cuba - ~~intelligence operations~~

18. Will be maintained, intensified and expanded. The following types of work  
The past build-up of intelligence assets must be

A. Intelligence (CIA/CIAA) Intelligence

19. To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required  
to develop the following program

IV. POLYMERIZATION

against Cuba.

2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military  
resistance group or uprising.

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limited number

1. Maintain the

The following pro

implementation of

event of a significant

maintaining a minimum

The program will

6. ~~Intelligence~~

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which have

professional,

3. Continue propo

the open walls,

operations and

2. Continue and ex

balloon launch

appropriate

1. A program be

where activities are

reach the Cuban people

The program must pri

7. Maximize utilization

4. Maintain regular

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amounts of equipment.

3. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

**V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:**

None

**VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:**

- A. Personnel
- B. Estimated Budget

FY - 63  
FY - 64

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27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with ICI and approved generally in principle by ICI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Director of Central Intelligence  
**THROUGH:** Deputy Director (Plans)  
**SUBJECT:** Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. **Action:** This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

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B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two", course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions prramilitary, command and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

## II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commands and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.
5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.
6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.
8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

R. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

### III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. <sup>24</sup> [redacted] We will continue to press the [redacted] who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The <sup>24</sup> [redacted] most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

Direct approaches to several of these <sup>24</sup> [redacted] either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the <sup>24</sup> [redacted] underlined above would be useful.

In addition, we will re-survey all other <sup>24</sup> [redacted] with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem.

In connection with the <sup>24</sup> [redacted] problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the <sup>24</sup> [redacted] to make greater use of their <sup>24</sup> [redacted] assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the <sup>24</sup> [redacted]

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through <sup>24</sup> [redacted] we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

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particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through 24 operations and where appropriate in conjunction with 24

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in 24

No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.



8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in [ ]<sup>10</sup> at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are being individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further exploitation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:

Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:  
In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

11. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cubans, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendation will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY  
Chief, Task Force W