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OLC#76-3484

1 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

LEAKS

FROM:

John H. Waller Inspector General 77-0020/3

SUBJECT:

Oswald Documents -- Action Taken


1. Attached herewith is an edited version of the memorandum on Kessler's article in the <u>Washington Post</u> forwarded to you on 27 November 1976.

- 2. In an effort to obtain all the information that is available on this matter, the Office of Security, at the behest of the Inspector General, has initiated a formal security investigation into the reported leaks. This is to be confined to an analysis of Agency files and records and to present and former Agency employees, including the translator formerly assigned to the Mexico City Station, the typist at the Station at that time and Mr. David Phillips. They state that it is virtually impossible to estimate the length of time it will take to conduct these investigations.
- 3. The Office of the General Counsel has been engaged since April 1976 in perusing the Oswald 201 files, page by page, for FOIA purposes. It is estimated that 75 percent of that material containing Agency information will be sanitized, if needed, and declassified by mid-December 1976. The information relating to telephone taps in Mexico City, however, has been deleted. The Oswald 201 files consist of 11 1/2 safe drawers of material. Other files with possible relevance to the assassination of President Kennedy include the following: 12 safe drawers of Cuban Operations material that is being reviewed in connection with the Schweiker report; 2 1/2 safe drawers of material in the Office of Security; varying amounts of related material in the Mexico City Station files; soft files; Rocca files; CI/SIG files; OGC files and DCI files.

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- 4. The Inspector General has also recommended that the Mexico Branch of LA Division send a cable to the Mexico Station inquiring as to what records may still be there relating to the period of Oswald's visit to Mexico and afterwards. As of this date, we have not located the original transcripts of the telephone intercepts of Oswald's 1963 telephone conversations in Mexico City. We are hoping that the present intensive search will unearth them.
- 5. The kinds of information currently being deleted by the Office of General Counsel from Oswald documents under Freedom of Information are as follows:
 - a. Information confirming the existence of an Agency station in a named city (country) abroad.
 - b. Cryptonyms and pseudonyms.
 - c. Identities of Agency staff employees.
 - d. Identities of agents (foreign intelligence sources).
 - e. Revelations concerning the Agency's use of identifiable operational tactics, techniques or equipment.



h. In a number of instances the kind of information cited above, if subject to public disclosure, would still (thirteen years later) have a damaging effect on U.S. foreign affairs, national security interests and/or intelligence operations and classification is still justifiable under Executive Order 11652.

- i. Identities of Agency components and internal Agency filing instructions.
- j. Information concerning activities or behavior patterns of people not even incidentally involved in the assassination whose personal privacy would be unjustifiably invaded should the information be released.
 - k. Identities of U.S. law enforcement officials.
- 6. I cannot guarantee that the OGC sterilizations, following guidelines described in the attached memorandum, are generally as minimal as you may want. As you can see, this process has been going on since last April, thus it would be a major undertaking to begin all over again. I will look further into this, but if you ultimately conclude that there should be a different standard for FOIA releases on this subject than on others, we may have a very large job ahead of us. DDO, OGC and the FOIA office should be heard from.
- 7. With regard to the Sprague investigation, our intention would be to let Sprague or his investigators have generally unfettered access to our relevant files here in this building. Those documents he wishes to take out would be given a minimal sterilization. Those documents which he wishes to have taken out and declassified would be sterilized for that purpose. I anticipate that the problems will occur as we disagree over what may be declassified. His instincts will be to want to put as much as possible in the public domain. But, we will have to face those bridges when we come to them. Much will depend upon the kind of agreement OLC will be able to negotiate in advance on security matters.

Z (signa. Zolin H. Mar

John H. Waller

Attachment - a/s

cc: OGC w/att
OLC w/att

Assistant to DDCI w/att