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Manuel Varona

2 February 1961

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Guillermo Alonso Fajal, 18 January 1961, at the Hotel Pierre, New York City

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1. Mr. [redacted] using the alias Roberto, accompanied me to the meeting. Fajal had brought along a young chap, Corbell.
2. Fajal started the meeting with a direct question: Will Sender continue in view of the change in administrations? My answer was in the affirmative: As a private American citizen, changes in the administration would not affect me in any case, but there is no indication that even under the new administration there would be any change in our work.
3. Fajal then asked how long it would take before the invasion of Cuba would be launched. I answered to this that I did not know at this moment but even if I did, such information, as Fajal well understood, would have to be treated with absolute secrecy.
4. Fajal then said that he would first talk about the crisis facing the FED and then would give me his proposal as to how to solve it. Concerning the crisis within the FED, Fajal reiterated the factors of which we are already quite familiar:
  - a. Fajal deplored the Executive Committee of the FED and the fact that its representatives are not representing the Cuban people.
  - b. He spoke of the internal squabbles within the Executive Committee such as Curille conspiring together with Miro, Mestre, Canvado, Emilio Hernandez and Col. Baranda against Varona and other members; Basso and Artines conspiring against the others, and Fajal felt that their Agrarian Reform Program was too leftist to suit anybody's taste.
  - c. Fajal spoke of the political skisms within the camp: Martin Klein was not accepted by the FED Executive Committee nor would he accept it; a special Cuban team sent from Guatemala to Miami had been undercutting Klein's authority; the exiled Navy had revolted.
  - d. Fajal spoke about the terrible Basso program and the need to curb the Communist editorial policy of the New York Times and the Fair Play Committee for Cuba.
  - e. Fajal said that the 60-man FED Commission continues to imply that the FED considers itself to be the future political government of Cuba.

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5. How can this crisis be solved Mr. Pajol asked.

6. Mr. Pajol informed me that on or about the 25th of January Carlos Prío would issue a statement in Miami announcing his break with Castro. Mr. Pajol said that he had written this statement for Prío and that it had been cleared with President Franklin.

7. The importance of Mr. Prío as an asset in the anti-Castro fight should not be underestimated. There are two big anti-Castro forces in Cuba, one is the IIP and the other is the Authentico; Prío's open break with Castro will give tremendous importance to the Authentico's activities in Cuba. Thus, Mr. Pajol proposed that the Executive Committee of the IIP be organized in a manner designed to incorporate into the group talented people who were nationally and internationally known: Prío, Pajol, José Manuel Cortina (President of the 1940 Constitutional Committee) Alvarez Diaz, Carbo, Miro Carmona and Guillermo Belt. The function of this IIP Executive Committee would be to implement U.S. policy which is given to it by the Bender Group, to front for the military effort necessary to overthrow Castro and to select the provisional government. Regarding the latter Pajol felt that: members of this provisional government should not be eligible for election, the government should be based clearly on the 1940 constitution, the restoration of Cuban equality before the law, moral purification of the country, repeal all Castro laws which conflict with the 1940 constitution, and take such measures that should be necessary for an orderly transition from a provisional government to a freely-elected constitutional government. Economic, social, political and cultural reforms should be submitted to the freely-elected constitutional government and should not be handled by the provisional government. Throughout all this Mr. Pajol made it clear that this scheme would work only if the American Government and the Bender Group make it clear that they are running the show.

8. Pajol continued to say that after the committee had been organized as outlined above, the commissions of the IIP should be reorganized also. The Planning Commission should be reduced to four men which would act as an advisory board, the General Staff should be given clear responsibility, the Bureaucracy should be reduced at least 60 percent, and IIP delegations to Latin American countries should be decided up to get local support for eventual recognition of the provisional government.

9. Pajol said that the newly-constituted Executive Committee would appoint three Cubans to be the "coordinators" of other political groups in Miami and would be charged with a simple set of basic provisions on the basis of which the majority of anti-Castro groups could unite. Pajol said that all of these groups should be told that this is what they wanted and that they are "either with us or against us."

10. The sum total was, in the opinion of the undersigned, for all purposes to re-activate the Authentico party in exile and to let it be known in Cuban circles that the Authentico party has support in the U.S. I thanked Mr. Pajol for his presentation and added that I would not sit on his proposals but would pass them on to the appropriate people.

GERALD DROGHER