104-10169-10139

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO
BOGE-14334, 31 January 1962

IDENTITY A is Mr. James Brown, a security officer on TDY from Headquarters.

INBAT
SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: [redacted]

FROM: SA/DC

NO. [EGOT-14004]

DATE 31 Jan 62

TO. (Office designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AO/SR	14 FEB 1962	14/2/62		3-5: Please write back pointing out conflicting memos from [BENTHAM] Is this statement about Berlin true? G
2. SE/DCOP	2/5	2/15		
3. BK/COP	15/2/62			
4.				
5. C/SA/CI.	30 JAN 1962	30 JAN 1962		
6. ACSR/CI/P				
7.				
8. DC/SR 2 MAR 1962				5-6: It is not, and I have so informed Q.
9.				
10.				5-8: I suggest [ ] might appreciate a word from you, possibly to the effect that we [redacted] have been doing a good job but are even more impressed by the details.
11. CSR/CI				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 54 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956 O-416131

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: SA/DC

NO. EGOT-14004

DATE 31 Jan 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/SR	14 FEB 62	14/2/62		3-5: Please note last para of covering memo from Bentham. Is this statement about Berlin true? G
2. SR/DCOP	2/5	2/15		
3. DC/COP	15 Feb 62			
4.				
5. C/SA/C1	16 FEB 62	20 FEB 62		
6. ACSR/C1/P				5-6: It is not, and I have so informed Q.
7.				
8. DC/SR 2 MAR 1962				
9.				
10.				5-8: I suggest COS might appreciate a word from you, possibly to the effect that we
11. C/SR/C1				
12.				[redacted]
13.				knowledge, were doing a good job but are even more impressed by the details.
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956 O-476151

RETURN TO CI
Background Use
Do Not Reprod

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: AYBAT SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: EGOT-14604
TO: Chief, EE (ATTN: Matthew L. CARSON)		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO: Chief, SR (ATTN: Sherman G. CUSICK) Chief, KE (ATTN: Leonard F. SACKETT)		
FROM: Chief of Station, Germany		DATE: 31 January 1962
SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE Handling of a Soviet Defector		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: See below.		
REFERENCE(S):		

1. I suggest that the story of ARLADLE, from the moment he walked into the home of Martin A. HOODINE until he was safely under ALHAHA custody in the United States, deserves compiling, analysis, and publication in the form of an Operational Aid. It richly illustrates the many problems which must and can be surmounted, and could be highly instructive to Chiefs of Station in all countries where the next Soviet defector might appear.

2. Here is the Frankfurt contribution (written at my request) to such a compilation: a cliffhanger from start to finish, but also a commentary on the many types of problems which can arise, and the fact that it takes hard work and skillful improvisation to solve them. It was a cliffhanger both before and after the Frankfurt chapter (I nominate HOODINE for a medal for his part) and ought to make excellent reading.

3. The handling of defectors obviously is not a new responsibility to the German Station. The CARRZONE facility which exists primarily for the receipt, establishment of bona fides, debriefing, and resettlement of defectors has existed here for the last decade. Nor is the movement by black evacuation of operational personnel a unique task for us to perform. We have accomplished this many times by use of our own integrated COMMIT facility and also by the furnishing of alias documentation to the person of interest and accomplishing the transport via scheduled MATS flights. The significant points which made the ARLADLE case unique may never again in their entirety be duplicated but in part they may well be, and therefore should be enumerated:

a. A Soviet diplomat, and member of the MIS, stationed in a non-Satellite but politically sensitive country, which at the time of ARLADLE's defection was under considerable Soviet pressure.

b. The fact that the actual circumstances concerning his act of defection were such that an immediate decision by the man on the scene had to be made to take advantage of the opportunity.

c. The fact that little alternative could be given, under the facts as described in (a) above, except to believe the defector's statements and acquiesce in his demands, i.e., he possessed information of a significant and perishable nature and would disclose it completely only upon arrival in the United States.

d. The fact that once the commitments in (c) above were made every reasonable effort had to be made to accommodate the defector's demand.

e. In order to accomplish all this an untried method of evacuation, i.e., black evacuation via commercial aircraft had to be accomplished in order to successfully proceed with the undertaking.

4. A retrospective analysis as to how this case commenced, and the unique factors connected with it as enumerated above, lead me to suggest for Headquarters study what I refer to as "findings" and "areas of study." What I have labeled as "findings" in effect represent facts which, if not present, quite probably would have deprived us in Germany of participating successfully in the movement of the ARLADLE family. The "areas of study," on the other hand, represent either answerable questions or matters in areas wherein operational discussions may well take place to see if some type of school-book solution can be devised.

5. I will elaborate below, where appropriate, on some of these "findings" but will first record them:

COPY ROUTING

w/att

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. KUT-1004, 31 January 1962

a. The wisdom of KUBARK maintaining in the European area at least one field installation having assigned to it personnel representing the many competencies necessary in the intelligence undertaking has been reconfirmed.

b. The wisdom of obtaining appropriate security clearances, and having Stations brief and make witting of at least an AIS contact, the resident senior United States citizen personnel of United States flag air carriers operating within any Station's area.

c. The fallacy of depending on marginal or obsolescent equipment to accomplish sensitive tasks of high priority. We here refer to 17-year C-54 aircraft.

d. A realization that a ratio exists between the number of people made aware of a given undertaking in relation to the obstacles encountered in successfully accomplishing that undertaking.

6. A few words of elaboration are in order on the four preceding points. Because the initial endeavor at black evacuation by KUBARK aircraft aborted, we were given an opportunity to see with great clarity the application of these points. If the attempt to evacuate by KUBARK-assigned aircraft had been successful, then knowledge of the defection could have been held to approximately six staff and assigned military personnel. Because that endeavor was unsuccessful, at least nine additional staff and military personnel became generally or specifically aware of the matter, plus the Consul General and one of his senior officers. Additionally one private United States citizen, the senior Pan American official in Frankfurt, became very much aware of this sensitive case. This increase in the number of individuals came about because of an immediate need late in the evening of Saturday, 16 December, to use two [redacted] staffers to assist in the safehousing function, a total of six HUTOPAX staffers (documentation, graphics, photographic) to prepare and issue fraudulent and alias passports, and an assigned enlisted man to act as a safehouse guard. The Consulate General had to affix visas to the fraudulent passports. The most crucial individual involved, however, was the Pan American official who to a certain degree put his position in jeopardy by being as cooperative on the matter as he was. Without previously having cleared and briefed this official (his counterpart in TWA is also so cleared and briefed) the whole undertaking would have been precluded. It would have been impossible to accomplish departure without documentation on a commercial aircraft without the connivance of the commercial airline involved. Indeed with such connivance it was difficult and risky enough. Finally, the point concerning obsolescent equipment speaks for itself. Headquarters is fully aware of the feelings of this Station concerning the inadequacy for our purposes of assigned aircraft. Suffice it to say that when defectors apparently of significant value refuse to ride such aircraft the matter merits thorough study.

7. The matter of "areas of study" appears to us to encompass at least the following:

a. <u>Average time differences in transmitting high precedence electrical communications between and among representative groupings of stations.</u> The German Station is extremely fortunate in having KW-26 circuits with Headquarters. It affords us a facility for instantaneous communication. We can make certain rough estimates as to how long it might take appropriate Headquarters officials to answer our queries and we can then approximate the arrival time of answers to high precedence traffic. Other Stations, however, do not have KW-26 equipment, all do not have the same type of cryptological equipment, and there is a different pattern as to the type of circuitry, i.e., direct leased lines, twx, straight commercial service, etc. We believe there is merit in the appropriate Headquarters unit endeavoring to group geographically Stations and then based on the type of communications and cryptological equipment and the channel of transmission to come up with predictions as to the average length of time the transmission of a priority or operational immediate cable would take between and among the various representative groupings. In the case under study, which represented a rather fast-breaking situation, it was not possible for us to estimate the length of time it took to transmit an operational immediate cable between [redacted] and Frankfurt. It would have been of value to us to have had some [illegible] this matter.

b. <u>Coordination between U.S. Air Attaches and COS.</u> We believe it would be worthwhile to request each Chief of Station in a location where the Air

Force or Navy has an assigned attache plane to establish procedures whereby the Air or Naval Attache will advise COS of any absence of the attache plane, the point of designation of the aircraft, and the duration of the absence. There have been previous defections where attache planes were used as the initial vehicle of black evacuation. In the evacuation plan of [redacted] for ARLADLE they informed us by cable that they proposed to use the attache plane. We are of the opinion that when the statement was made [redacted] made the assumption the plane was immediately available. As was later discovered by us the particular plane in question was at Wiesbaden and not [redacted] This, however, was some six hours after [redacted] stated its intent to use that aircraft. While in this particular case matters eventually worked out successfully the story might be otherwise in a different set of facts.

e. Priority furnishing of traces. When a Station is alerted to a request to render operational support to the movement of a defector and simultaneously answers a request in the negative if it can furnish traces, the following procedure is worthy of study. If Headquarters possesses, and time permits, we believe it worthwhile to forward an immediate summary to the Station rendering support if the background of the defector is such that it would be a matter of local interest. This would have been the case in ARLADLE. As subsequent headquarters debriefing developed (and we assumed it would have been disclosed in Headquarters traces) ARLADLE had previously been stationed in Berlin. Had such facts been known here, and had time allowed, certain debriefing on the Berlin period designed to elicit any matter of immediate concern could have been undertaken.

JDB

JOEL D. BERNHAM

Attachment
Memo dated 18 Dec 1961 h/w
Identities tma/tmp

Distribution
2 - HE w/atts
1 - SR w/atts
1 - ME w/atts

4/90

18 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Handling at German Station 16 and 17 December of Soviet Defector from Russian Embassy at Helsinki

1. This memorandum is designed to record, soon after the event, all facts pertaining to the handling within the German Station of the evacuation of a Soviet Vice Consul (and member of the KGB) from the Russian Embassy at Helsinki. At the time of this writing there is still lacking certain information to complete the entire story. However, it is felt worthwhile to record all events while the memory is still fresh. In the following paragraphs the defector is referred to as "subject" and pseudonyms and identities are used in all other cases.

2. At approximately 0730 hours Saturday, 16 December, Arnold J. LYACK (Chief, CABEZONE) contacted me at my home and asked me to proceed immediately to the residence of Joel D. BENTHAM (Chief of Station). Upon arrival at BENTHAM's residence, BENTHAM and LYACK briefed me on the [redacted] cable which announced [redacted] intent to endeavor to fly subject and family "black" from [redacted] to Frankfurt aboard the Air Attache aircraft. Cable also requested Frankfurt to have an aircraft available to receive immediately subject and family and take off forthwith to the United States. LYACK also mentioned an IN cable from DIR which requested [redacted] to move family soonest to CABEZONE in Frankfurt for establishment of bona fides.

3. We then adjourned to the office and awaited more word from either [redacted] which would advise on the arrival time of the family at Frankfurt, or from Headquarters concurring in [redacted] request for immediate departure of the family for the United States upon arrival at Frankfurt. EAOB was immediately alerted and they made arrangements to have a C-54 with augmented crew prepared to depart for the United States by 1200 hours. A compartment for the subject's family was put in the C-54 and the regularly assigned tail number was removed and a false number put on the aircraft. Conrad V. LAPOLLA (Acting Chief, COS/KUSODA) was contacted and asked to come to the office immediately. Discussions were then held with LYACK and Carl T. UPDILL as to the availability of a KUDOVE case officer with Russian language capability to act as escort.

RYBAT
SECRET

14-00000

4. Having heard nothing from either [redacted] or Headquarters by 0945 hours OPIM traffic was sent in both directions telling them Germany was prepared to receive and effect immediate black evacuation of the family to the United States. In the meantime, it had been determined that IDENTITY A would be used as the security escort and Russel K. MUCHANE (AD/PI Staff) would be on standby to serve as a KUDOVE escort. This was a contingency arrangement because we lacked knowledge whether or not a KUDOVE officer from either Helsinki or [redacted] was prepared to travel with subject all the way to Washington.

5. Around 1100 hours I asked Edward P. TOCHENSKY (Chief, EAOB) to establish contact with the Wiesbaden Air Base tower and lay on arrangements to monitor the flight of the [redacted] Air Attache plane. This was done because we have had previous instances of "black" arrivals at Wiesbaden where the aircraft actually arrived before the EFA cable from the Station dispatching the body. At about 1115 hours TOCHENSKY informed me by telephone that the [redacted] Air Attache aircraft, a C-45, was and had been at the Wiesbaden Air Base since 12 December. At about 1130 we cabled this information to [redacted] and DIR and also offered to dispatch an aircraft to Copenhagen to make the pickup if [redacted] could move the body there. Because of technical difficulties involving air clearances and lengths of runways, we could not immediately get into any field north of Copenhagen.

6. At approximately 1145 hours a cable was received from Headquarters concurring in the immediate evacuation from Wiesbaden by EAOB aircraft of subject's family upon arrival. If such could not be arranged we were then requested to hold subject and family at CABRZONE.

7. Having heard nothing from [redacted] by approximately 1600 hours we again sent them OPIM traffic asking that they inform us immediately of their intentions. I had previously left the office about 1430 hours in order to get some lunch and take care of one or two personal items. I had called Nelson H. POLIAKOFF (Deputy for Administration Staff) in to cover for me and had briefed him on the then current situation. When I returned at 1600 hours MUCHANE had come into the office prepared for the trip. We then sent the above-mentioned cable and suggested that MUCHANE return to his quarters and await further developments. I phoned TOCHENSKY and suggested that he and his communicator return to their quarters. LAPOLLA, in the meantime, had gone to Rhein/Main Airport to meet an incoming staffer carrying classified material and get him through Customs. He then returned to his home. I left word with the Signal Center Watch Officer that any incoming traffic on subject's trip should be telephoned immediately to LAPOLLA who would come in, review the traffic and contact me. The

Watch Officer was also asked to immediately phone the Wiesbaden Communicator who in turn would contact TOCHENSKY and both of them would go to their office.

8. At approximately 1900 hours LAPOLLA contacted me at home from the Signal Center and informed me that an ETA and other information was in from [redacted] I told him to stand by and I would immediately come in. Based on [redacted] abled statement that Martin K. ROODINE [redacted] was escorting subject to the United States, I told LAPOLLA not to alert MUCHANE. I arrived at the office at 1930 hours and immediately dispatched the Guard Sergeant to buy certain types of foods and magazines that [redacted] asked to be put aboard the United States-bound aircraft. We contacted TOCHENSKY and ascertained that EAOB was in a state of immediate readiness. David R. MULPALL (COS/KUSODA Office) then arrived with IDENTITY A. IDENTITY A was given a general briefing on the mission and his responsibility following which he and LAPOLLA took off immediately for Wiesbaden. They took with them the purchases of the Guard Sergeant.

9. I then proceeded to the home of Ronald M. CORBANE (COS Lawyer) where we were guests for dinner. At approximately 2200 hours I received a call from LAPOLLA that subject and family had arrived, the turnover was made, and that the EAOB aircraft was airborne at approximately 2150 hours. I telephoned this information to BENTHAM.

10. At approximately 2245 hours I received a call from the Signal Center Watch Officer who relayed to me the following message from the Wiesbaden Communicator. That message stated the EAOB aircraft was immediately returning to Wiesbaden because of a sick passenger. Immediately thereafter I received a call from LAPOLLA who was at the quarters of Arthur G. DREIBELBIS (EAOB) in Wiesbaden. LAPOLLA stated that he had gotten hold of the Air Base Flight Surgeon and was proceeding to the Air Base. He knew at that time no other details. I told him Chester E. FAGERLUND (COS Medical Officer) and myself would leave immediately for Wiesbaden Air Base.

11. FAGERLUND was in attendance at the same dinner party and we departed immediately for the Air Base. Upon arrival at approximately 2300 hours the EAOB aircraft had already landed and maximum security provisions were observed in the area. Air Police had the "Hangar 34 Area" blocked off two blocks in either direction.

12. TOCHENSKY met me outside the building and informed me that immediately after take-off subject's six-year-old daughter had become extremely airsick and suffered respiratory difficulties. She was administered oxygen. The mother became hysterical and the father demanded that the aircraft immediately be returned to its point of

4/80

departure. He further stated he would not agree to further travel to the United States except by commercial jet. We then entered the Operations Office of the 7405th Flight Squadron where I was introduced to ROODINE, who recited basically the same story as told by TOCHENSKY. We also ascertained that the Flight Surgeon had looked at the daughter and had found nothing organically wrong. We then asked ROODINE to bring FAGERLUND into the room where subject's family was staying and introduce him as an "American Intelligence Service Medical Officer" and have FAGERLUND examine the child. FAGERLUND's results were the same as the Flight Surgeon and no medication was given the child. A discussion of some fifteen minutes then took place as to how best to proceed with onward transportation arrangements. ROODINE took me aside and strenuously impressed me with the fact that subject was of the opinion that certain of his information on the matter of Soviet/Finnish relations was of great perishability and that subject deeply felt his necessity to arrive in Washington and state this information within the next 48 hours. ROODINE also stated he concurred in subject's feelings. All KUBARK representatives then on the scene again got together and the undersigned made the decision to abort the mission, arrange immediate safe-housing overnight for subject and his family, and attempt commercial transportation on Sunday.

13. Earlier in the day LYACK informed me that he had cleared out their Eschborn safe-house in case we should need it. I immediately tried to contact LYACK by phone but there was no answer. I then phoned Henry R. GAMLINGAY (Deputy for Administration Staff) and asked him to do for me the following things:

a. Contact Stephen R. LACKLEN (CABEZONE) and tell him we had an immediate need to house a family of three, plus two KUBARK officers at Eschborn. To further tell LACKLEN to be standing by at Opel Circle opposite the Minneapolis Honeywell Building at 0100 hours and be prepared to escort another vehicle to Eschborn.

b. Phone BENTHAM and tell him we would drop by his house later that evening to brief him on any developments.

c. Phone LYACK and tell him we were using Eschborn.

14. All concerned departed Wiesbaden Air Base at approximately 0020 hours on 17 December and arrived at the meeting point at Opel Circle at exactly 0100 hours. Subject's family plus MULFALL, who had also gone immediately to Wiesbaden, followed LACKLEN's car to Eschborn. FAGERLUND, LAPOLLA, ROODINE, and myself went immediately to BENTHAM's house.

15. BENTHAM was then fully briefed on developments and HOODINE gave certain operational information of a sensitive nature from subject to BENTHAM. After necessary analysis and discussion the following decisions were reached:

a. We would endeavor to remove the family out of Frankfurt by commercial aircraft that day, i.e., Sunday, 17 December.

b. In the absence of the ability to accomplish this, we would endeavor to remove them on an Air Force Medical Evacuation Flight on Monday, 18 December.

c. Joseph Q. KLEMACK (Chief, COS/KURIOT) was contacted by phone from BENTHAM's residence and said he believed that his people could affix in the subject's passports a Federal Republic entry stamp. This was considered necessary in order to prevent embarrassing questions by German Immigration Authorities on Sunday when the family would depart by commercial air. The family had entered the Federal Republic "black" and accordingly there was no entry permit in their Soviet Diplomatic passports.

d. We would return LAPOLLA and HOODINE to the safe-house and I would also send out one enlisted guard with sidearm.

16. A cable to Headquarters was drafted on the basis of all this information and everyone departed the BENTHAM residence for their respective missions. I proceeded to the Signal Center and released the drafted cable.

17. I arrived back at my quarters about 0330 hours. At about 0410 hours I received a call from KLEMACK, wanting to get in touch with LAPOLLA on matters pertaining to the documentation work he was trying to accomplish. I gave him the telephone number of the Eschborn safe-house. It turned out that the cold weather had affected telephone communications to Eschborn and the phone was dead. KLEMACK then went out to Eschborn and discussed his problem with LAPOLLA and HOODINE. I am informed, but as yet do not know the technical reason why, that KURIOT could not put in the subject's passport the required German entry stamp. It was decided at the meeting at the Eschborn safe-house that KURIOT would try to make and have ready by the next morning [redacted] passports for subject and his family.

18. At about 0600 hours I received a call from the Signal Center Watch Officer informing me that Headquarters "approved your plan." I immediately tried to contact the Eschborn safe-house by phone but to no avail. Around 0630 I contacted KLEMACK at the KURIOT installation and was then informed by him of his earlier visit to Eschborn around 0400. He told me during his phone conversation that LAPOLLA was going to get up about 0700 hours. I surmised that LAPOLLA would proceed immediately to the office and then did so myself.

19. LAPOLLA arrived at the office sometime shortly after 0800. We then discussed what our possibilities were, based on the situation as we then saw it. We had no guarantee that the [redacted] passports would be finished by AURIOT in time to be used by an early afternoon United States flag commercial jet. We discussed again, as we had the previous evening, contacting Mr. William Naylor, the Pan American Senior Officer in Germany and a cleared and witting contact, as to whether or not he could arrange to board passengers without going through German Immigration, i.e., Passport Control. The question of the availability of seats was also involved. LAPOLLA suggested that we phone Naylor in his residence in Bad Homburg and explain to him we had a matter of serious urgency and ask him to come immediately to the I.G. Farben Building and discuss the matter with us. The phone call was made and Naylor agreed to do this. LAPOLLA then contacted the MATS Office at Rhein/Main to ascertain if MATS had any commercial jets chartered for departure that day. He discovered that they had no commercial jet chartered flights that day but at midnight on Sunday they were dispatching a C-135 configured to carry 66 passengers. He was further informed that 36 of these seats had been given to the Air Force and 30 to the Army to be used only by single military personnel departing to the States on Christmas leave. No families could be sent on the flight. Inasmuch as a C-135 is the military cargo version of a Boeing 707, LAPOLLA and myself discussed seriously the advisability of endeavoring to get military authority to fly this family out. We decided against such course of action for several reasons. We anticipated that there would be too much conversation among the single military personnel aboard the flight when they observed five civilians, three of whom were obviously a family, flying on the same plane. The fact that the six-year-old daughter spoke no English also contributed to the adverse situation we anticipated. Secondly, subject and family had already been aboard one cargo type aircraft and were reported by ROODINE to have made a series of uncomplimentary remarks of the type transportation that they were being afforded.

20. Naylor arrived at the office at about 1000 hours and was made generally aware of our problem. He was informed that the principal traveler involved was a defecting Russian diplomat, plus wife and child, and that we were under obligation to expeditiously and securely return them to the United States by jet aircraft. He was further informed that we lacked the proper documentation to board them on the commercial aircraft through normal clearance procedures and we had no guarantee that we would have the documentation by flight departure time of PAA No. 73 at 1315 hours. We then asked him what he considered to be the possibilities of working out a procedure to board the party "black" and to prevent any divulgence of their existence to the German Immigration Authorities. After considerable discussion it appeared that there

SECRET

SECRET

existed a very good possibility to get the passengers aboard the aircraft and successfully circumvent German passport controls. Naylor contacted his own assistant and the PAA Operations Officer assigned to Rhein/Main, both of whom are United States citizens, and asked that they proceed to the airport and stand by to assist him in the handling of some very important personages who were departing on PAA No. 73. He then ascertained that only three first class seats were available on this flight. He told his assistant to seat two passengers in the aircraft lounge and he would accept full responsibility for it. This is somewhat touchy in the airlines business as lounge seats have no safety belts. He also knew additional first class seats were available out of London.

21. In the meantime, KLEMACK and one of his men working on the documentation had returned to Eschborn to take pictures of subject and his family that would be necessary for the [redacted] passports. The best reading we could get from the KURIOT people working on the documents was that they would not be ready on time. Inasmuch as decisions had been made, we decided to set the wheels in motion and started the family to the airport. LAPOLLA accordingly took off for Eschborn and a plan was agreed upon where he would arrive with the family in front of the Rhein/Main Departure Building at 1230 hours. Naylor would be standing by the entrance and take the family via a circuitous airport building route to the PAA Operations Office which is located on the second floor of the building beyond Passport Control. Naylor departed at about the same time as LAPOLLA and went directly to the airport.

22. Earlier in the morning I had asked BENTHAM if he could effect arrangements at the Consulate to have a Visa Officer standing by to put United States visitors' visas for subject's family in the [redacted] passports. BENTHAM accomplished this and, at Naylor's suggestion, we asked if the Consulate Officer could go to the PAA Operations Office at Rhein/Main and stand by there to accomplish his visa work. By so doing we could save approximately 30 minutes time. I contacted Mr. Rollie White of the Consulate office and he agreed to meet us at the airport at 1245 hours.

23. I next phoned BENTHAM and made him aware of our situation. It did not look as if we would have any usable documentation to pass the family and would have to take the chance of circumventing the Passport Control. Our principal concern was that a German Immigration Officer would be standing by the aircraft departure area and would ask to see subject's passport. We could not get subject's family aboard the regular bus that goes from the departure building to the aircraft because there was no way we could get them to the bus loading area without going through Passport Control. BENTHAM asked how we evaluated an ability to withdraw gracefully at plane side if challenged by German

SECRET

authorities. I told him the chances were better than even and that we would appeal to the fact that this was a VIP party being handled out of the regular airport procedures and that the passports had been left in the PAA office. We would then put the party back in the vehicle that took them out and just keep going. KENTHAM authorized us to proceed with the "black" evacuation.

24. I then made one last call to KLRIOT and told them if they could not complete their work and get the passports to the airport by 1315 hours to forget it. With that MULFALL and myself left for Rhein/Main.

25. We arrived at Rhein/Main exactly at 1230 hours as subject's party was drawing up. The group was then taken by a circuitous route to the PAA Operations Office. It was ascertained that PAA No. 73 would arrive at 1245 hours, approximately thirty minutes late.

26. During our wait at the PAA Operations Office, ROODINE got me aside three or four times and kept me continuously aware of subject's fear that an attempt would be made to sabotage his plane. He had evidenced this concern ever since his arrival in Frankfurt. Subject told ROODINE he felt sure that Soviet agents would be found among some of the employees of the commercial airlines and the management of Rhein/Main Airport. He mentioned the section of the RIS that works specifically on assassinations and sabotage. He was fearful of any baggage being loaded very late or any "spare baggage" that might be found aboard the aircraft. I told ROODINE we were very sympathetic but we were not about to ask Naylor, who had now gone much further than one could be reasonably expected to on our behalf, to off-load the baggage of 184 passengers and search it.

27. Two events happened while we were waiting in the office to board the parties that were of some disturbance. The airplane Captain reported to the PAA Operations Officer that a gun was found aboard the plane. Upon investigation it was determined that this gun belonged to an Armed Forces courier who had carried classified material on the aircraft to Frankfurt. The airplane captain, upon being asked by Naylor if there had been any unusual activities on the part of the passengers, then described one party flying in the first-class compartment. This flight had originated in San Francisco and was flying around the world westbound. At New Delhi a United States citizen, a correspondent for an unknown newspaper, boarded the plane with his wife and a female nurse. The flight crew had been informed that he was an alcoholic and was being returned to the United States at the request of the United States Embassy at New Delhi. For part of the trip he had acted in somewhat of an obnoxious fashion and had insulted some of the other passengers. The Captain had investigated the situation and was of the opinion that the correspondent was now sufficiently drunk and lacked sufficient stamina

NOFORN
SECRET

to insult anybody. I asked the Captain if there was a purser or a male attendant assigned to the first-class section. He stated on this particular flight all cabin service personnel were female. He stated, however, that another PAA Captain was flying dead-head on the trip, was a big burly sort of fellow, and if need be, could spend most of the trip in the lounge to watch the correspondent. IDENTITY A expressed grave reservation about now going forward with the trip because of the correspondent. It was my opinion, however, that between IDENTITY A, ROODINE, and the extra PAA Captain that if the correspondent again got obnoxious they could sufficiently cope with him. The regular Captain left the definite impression with me that the correspondent was sufficiently drunk, that he would either soon pass out or in any event would not represent a threat to subject's making the trip. It was, therefore, decided that the trip would proceed. IDENTITY A informed the Captain that he was a United States Government representative escorting a family aboard the plane and requested the Captain to keep the door of the flight deck locked from the inside during the length of the trip. To this the Captain agreed.

28. Subject's party, accompanied by Naylor and the PAA Operations Officer departed the office at 1325 hours, entered a PAA crew bus, drove immediately to the first-class ramp and successfully boarded the aircraft. At about 1335 KLEMACK arrived with subject's two original Russian passports. These were then put in a brown manila envelope and one of Naylor's United States citizen employees was asked to proceed immediately to the aircraft and give these to ROODINE.

29. At about 1300 hours we had phoned to KURIOT and told Ralph G. NASSBOCK that he had another thirty minutes to get the [redacted] passports to the airport because of the aircraft's delayed departure. The [redacted] passports arrived at approximately 1345 hours. Hollie White immediately started to enter in those passports the United States visitor's visas. At approximately 1355 the PAA Ground Crew Chief notified PAA Operations that Flight No. 73 was mechanically cleared for departure and completely loaded. At that time a PAA representative started to run from the Departure Building to the plane with a little piece of luggage. Naylor was coming back from the plane in the crew bus. He intercepted the PAA employee and took the bag and drove it back to the plane. He later told us he opened the bag, one of the flight bag variety, and on his own initiative examined the contents. It contained items of apparel used by ladies that will not be further identified.

30. At 1400 the Ground Crew Chief stated again the plane was ready for departure and asked why the plane was being held up. It was being held up because White had not finished all the entries on the passports. However, the PAA Operations Officer informed the Ground Crew Chief that

SECRET

the weight of the loaded plane had been questioned and they were recomputing total weight. At about 1405 the [redacted] passports with United States visas were carried in a brown envelope by a PAA United States citizen employee and given to ROODIKE. The plane was then cleared for departure and rolled out at 1414 hours.

[redacted] The only other information known at the time of this writing is that the aircraft was diverted to Bermuda because of bad weather conditions in New York. Naylor telephoned me that information about 1000 hours on Monday morning, 18 December.

ROGER I. MCKEE

SECRET

23 FEB 1962

S/C ATT B TO ZOOT-14004, 11 Jan 62

TO: Chief, SR

ATTN: Sherman G. CUBICK

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

RYBAT

RYDAR

SECRET