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3 January 1962 SR/CI 12 Report #11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Statement Prepared by AFLADLE

The following statement was dictated by AEIADLE on 27 December 1961. Due to technical difficulties, the transcription of his statement is incomplete.

"As it is known to you, my decision to go over to the West was made by me practically since back in 1955. Therefore, since that time I have studied the entire activity of all the Soviet (intelligence) organs, life in the Soviet Union from this standpoint or from this angle. I try to think of how, in the future, when I would go over to the West, how I could help the West in the organizing of the cold war against the Soviet Union, against the regime that exists in the Soviet Union and the other countries behind the Iron Curtain. Therefore all these questions were thought out by me very carefully in a historical plane, a political plane, an intelligence plane, and a counterintelligence plane. that this step has already been taken by me, I have been expecting that your important people, people of authority in your authoritative organizations, the most authoritative in the country, will give due consideration to my proposals and myself. I have been expecting that right from the beginning this whole thing will be considered political haste. The leaders of your country, after they become convinced that I made this step on the basis of most sincere convictions and this I have proven by, for example, by giving all the information concerning Finland, -- I thought that after that it will be of great interest to leaders of your country to hear me out on the basic questions concerning things that are taking place in the Soviet Union, on questions which represent the threat to the Western countries from the Soviet Union and other countries behind the Iron Curtain. On these subjects which I personally may be of help in the future, I thought that this case would be of great interest to the President.

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LZ Report #11 Continued

thought that the most serious attention will be given to this whole affair. I thought that right after the step that I took, they would hold a meeting of the National Security Council, during which I would be able to report to the members of this Council on all the political and other activities. I expected that I would be given the possibility of appearing before the Mational Security Council, and to report to the organ which is concerned with the security of the U. S. A., what is being done along the line of intelligence, at least of intelligence against the United States and other democratic countries, in order that the people responsible for the security of the United States would at last understand what a great danger the Soviet Union represents; the great danger that the Soviet Union represents to the United States and to the West as a whole because I am certain, that what I know, what I could report is of great interest as far as the organization, the measures that have to be taken and the struggle against this danger are concerned. Secondly, I thought that my defection to the West, my plans concerning my help to the West in organizing a struggle agains: the Soviet system, against Soviet Intelligence, against the Soviet Police, would be of great interest to other democratic countries such as England, France, West Germany and Others. I thought that the President would find it possible to invite for a short counsel, the heads of governments of other democratic countries, so that I would also be able to report to all of them on what is being done by the Soviet Union against these countries, as well as against the West as a whole, because I know that on the basis of my report, it would be posaible to take more effective and important counter-measures

> EDWARD W. KNOWLES C/SR/CI

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REPORT BASED ON: AEIADLE Tape #6, Part II, 27 December 1961.

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