

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
	S-E-C-R-E-T	INDEXED	ACCOMPLISHED
TO:	Chief, Task Force W	MAPPED FOR INDEXING	
INFO:		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM:	Chief of Station, JNWAVE	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	Operation/GYROSE/KUCAGE/AMHINT	ABSTRACT	
	Report of Independent DRE Infiltration Operation	MICROFILM	

**ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES**

Action: FYI and files  
 Ref : A. WAVE 3851  
 B. WAVE 3911

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1. According to AMHINT-42, on 20 May 1962 at about 2200 hours, local, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) mounted an operation independent of JNWAVE support, infiltrating AMHINT-40 and AMHINT-53 [at Kawama, Varadero Beach (2313N-8116W)]. The two-man team was launched successfully and observed as they moved up the beach and across a field to a lighted dwelling which is an operational AMHINT safehouse. However, after the team were safehoused and during recovery of the launch dinghy by the parent craft JUANIN I, a 12-man militia patrol discovered them and challenged. During the brief fire-fight that ensued, the JUANIN I crew reported that two to four militia men were observed to drop under their fire. (According to reference B confirmation of this operation there were no milit's casualties, and the local militia post also reported they had inflicted two to three casualties "on the escapees".) The JUANIN I suffered no casualties or hits, retired from the beach at speeds up to 30 knots and returned to their base in Key Marathon without incident.

Distribution:  
 3 - C/TFW

19-120-19 *cc:DRS*

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	28 May 1962	MAY 31 1962
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-4186	
CLASSIFICATION	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
S-E-C-R-E-T	19-120-19/3	

VBR

CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T

UFGA-4186

2. At 1515 hours on 21 May, the DRE offices in Miami received a commercial cable in prearranged code indicating the team had arrived safely in Varadero. Later, at about 1620 hours, a telephone call indicated that the team were in safehouses in Havana since early morning 21 May. On 22 May, a legal traveler, [redacted] arrived in Miami and reported to DRE offices concerning this operation. (Subject of a following dispatch.) [redacted] is the safehouse owner who received the team, provided change of clothing, food, shelter, sent the cable confirming safe arrival and later transported them to Havana. Subject did not witness the beach encounter, but heard the fire-fight and overheard reports of the encounter during a visit to the Militia post the following morning.

3. The most significant operational factor of this mission is that the militia post has reported the incident as an "escape" and has not suspected that an infiltration operation has taken place. Therefore, no search or roadblocks were set up and it can be assumed that AMHINT safehousing in that area is still intact. It is also important to note that, although conjecture at this point, apparently the GOC has not given this clash the propaganda treatment given the patrol encounter of their CV-28 with the SUSAN ANN because it was reported as an "escape" and therefore any casualties inflicted on escapees would not make sympathetic propaganda. Also, there were reportedly no militia casualties to give this clash propaganda value.

4. This operation was mounted by orders of AMHINT-53 who was becoming understandably desperate about DRE internal conditions. Subject had been scheduled for infiltration three times over the past three months and cancelled for reasons ranging from mission reception hazards to reassessment and requirements for further training. This, coming after a long history of DRE internal support problems and obstacles, some of which resulted in costly operational losses and compromises, prompted AMHINT-53 to mount the infiltration at any cost. Subject's primary mission is to identify and confirm appointments within clandestine apparatus at national and provincial levels. Operational losses through arrest and KIA or execution during past four months has resulted in almost two complete turnovers in leadership at national levels. His secondary mission is to organize the National Reception Committee for materiel supply and infiltration of paramilitary instructors, radio operators and intelligence agents. For this purpose, AMHINT-40, who has operated as National Reception Committee Organizer for almost two years, formed the team with AMHINT-53. These preparations within PBRUNEN should be ready by the time their radio operator, AMHINT-52, completes his training.

5. Some of the pertinent operation details follow:

a. The JUANIN I is a new, 30-foot, BERTRAM built "Moppy", recently purchased by the DRE for their infiltration and supply operations. They have trained their crew and equipped their vessel with the idea of offering it to JMWAVE in return for W/T communications and armament support for their missions. Such a support agreement has been approved in principle by JMWAVE and details are being worked out by the Maritime Section, JMWAVE.

b. On this operation, the vessel crew was as follows:

AMHINT-42, Captain  
AMHINT-43, Navigator  
AMBOUY-2, regional intelligence and guide  
Bernabe PENA Ballate, gunner  
Manuel QUISA, gunner

## c. Vessel armament was procured by DRE and reported as:

1 ea SMG, M-3, Cal .45 (800 rds ammo)  
2 ea FAR, Belgian, (200 rds)  
2 ea Carbine, M1A1 Cal .30 (300 rds)  
1 ea Rifle, Garand M-1 (300 rds)  
1 ea Pistol, Cal .45 (100 rds)  
1 ea Pistol, 9mm (100 rds)

6. According to AMHINT-42 narrative of the mission, the JUANIN I departed Marathon base at 1430 hours local on 20 May with clear weather and about one foot seas. Proceeding on a course of 186 degrees at about 17 knots cruising, the JUANIN I arrived at a point approximately 20 miles north of their launch point, (2330N-8115W) at about 2030 hours. In order to reach their point at 2200 hours, and reduce daylight exposure in the sensitive north coast area, they reduced speed and killed time. Merchant vessels were observed and avoided since it was feared that JUANIN position and course might be reported to GOC. 10

7. Upon arriving at their launch point, beach conditions were as expected on this day of traditional festivity. The small park known as "Parque Infantil Inis", was illuminated and much of the local populace were dancing in the pavillion. AMHINT-42 selected a point about 500 yards north of the park and about 500 yards from their nearest safehouse. As he brought the JUANIN into about 200 yards of the beach, the moon was at about a 25 degree elevation and a fringe of pine shaded most of the deserted beach area where the team would land. The JUANIN is a dark blue camoufluge color and was apparently not readily visible from the beach. The team boarded the 12-foot, fiberglass dinghy with a 6 hp outboard and accompanied by AMBOUY-2 and Bernabe PENA for protective cover fire, proceeded to the beach. The landing was smooth and without incident but after the team had made their way up the beach, through the pines and across the field to the safehouse, a patrol of about 12 militia came down the beach, 10

8. The launch dinghy had just started from the beach when two of the militia ran forward and challenged them to stop and return to the beach. AMBOUY-2 and PENA opened fire at about 40 yards range, observing that both militia men dropped to the sand. The patrol then opened up with one burst of automatic fire as the dinghy got underway to the parent JUANIN. Meanwhile, the JUANIN came in to about 75 yards to recover the dinghy and retire from the beach at top speed. During recovery, the patrol kept up fire from one automatic weapon which was ineffective and did not score one hit on personnel or craft.

9. Upon return to base, the JUANIN crew were warned by AMHINT-42 of security implications and responsibilities of the operation, i.e. any leak in Miami could result in the compromise of AMHINT safe housing in that area as well as the death of the infiltrees. There was no contact with ODYOKE agencies upon departure or re-entry PBPRIIME.

END OF DISPATCH