

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	Nicaragua/Costa Rica	REPORT NO.	CS -1/LV, 42
SUBJECT	1. Increasing Support for Inde-leftist PASTORAL in Cuba (including opportunities L.D.) 2. Persons in Cuba involved in Nicaraguan Revolutionary Affairs	DATE DSTR. NO. PAGES	4 April 1960 5
		APPENDICES	RD
DATE OF INFO	February 1960	16-15	
PLACE & DATE ACTD	[redacted]	FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted] 2-102	

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS PENTATIVE

SOURCE: A person associated with Nicaraguan revolutionary activities (7).
Approval of Content: b.

1. In February 1960 Inde-leftist PASTORAL Molina, Nicaraguan opposition leader who left Costa Rica about 20 February 1960 after leading guerrilla attacks against the regime from the Costa Rican border area for several months, was winning increasing support among Cubans who favored the overthrow of Nicaraguan President Luis SERRA Encarnación. If PASTORAL initiated a campaign against the Nicaraguan Government he could count on immediate and substantial aid in arms and men from Cuba. The Cubans would arrange public demonstrations to seek aid for PASTORAL, ostensibly spontaneous, but in reality pre-organized with governmental penetration of the revolutionary movement, following the guidance of Ernesto GUEVARA Serpa and Abel CASTRO Muñoz, high-level officials in the government of Fidel CASTRO and Fidel CASTRO, Prime Minister, was not disposed to support foreign revolutions because he feared an invasion of Cuba and wanted to be in a position to defend his country. GUEVARA of Cuba and wanted to be in a position to defend his country. GUEVARA and Abel CASTRO supported the Communist factions, seeing a possibility for infiltration and an opportunity to take advantage of the chaos that they believed would follow a successful revolution, since no political leader had the ability to govern Nicaragua after the fall of SERRA.

2. Francisco FRIZICIO Saravia, Nicaraguan revolutionary leader in Cuba, had hoped to attend a meeting of opposition leaders in Maracalito the last week of February 1960 but was unable to obtain a visa in time for the trip. FRIZICIO and Enrique LACATO Farfán, opposition leader in Costa Rica, were quarreling and no longer co-operated in plans and activities. Francisco IBARRA Mayorga, also involved in a quarrel with FRIZICIO, did attend the Maracalito meeting. In February 1960 FRIZICIO made a trip, traveling free of charge, to Oriente Province, Cuba, to raise funds for the revolution.

3. The fifth floor of the Sevilla-Biltmore Hotel in Estelí, as well as rooms in International House, operated in conjunction with the hotel, housed persons associated with Nicaraguan revolutionary activities free of charge. The following paragraphs list persons in Cuba in

S E C R E T
SOURCE CONTINUED ON VOLUME

DATE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
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21 GR

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-2-

CS-3742, 532

February 1960 who were participating in or supporting Nicaraguan revolutionary plans and gives known details of their activities.

- a. Herminio CONEX, a Cuban about thirty years old, had experience in sabotage. He quit his university studies before writing a thesis for a law degree to join the fight against Fulgencio BATISTA, former President of Cuba. Fidel CASTRO offered him a position in the Cuban Government, but he refused, preferring to participate in Nicaraguan efforts to overthrow SOMOCIA. For Nicaragua he favored social and political reforms similar to those instituted by Fidel CASTRO. He gave Francisco FRILIOME Saravia, Nicaraguan Revolutionary leader in Cuba, his full support. CONEX' twin, Luis, also had offered to fight with FRILIOME, but he did not support FRILIOME as wholeheartedly as Herminio CONEX.
- b. Luis Miguel GARCIA, a Cuban, performed sabotage operations in Havana against BATISTA.¹ He was in Honduras when Pedro Joaquin CHAMORRO Cardenal invaded Nicaragua in early 1959, going afterward to Cuba. He claimed to have access to a small airport near the Honduran/Nicaraguan frontier, which would be usable after some repairs.
- c. Miguel Ernesto VIGIL Leiva, an engineer about twenty-two years old, appeared to be important in FRILIOME's organization. He claimed that FRILIOME intended to send him to Washington, D.C., and then to Nicaragua to assist in revolutionary preparations. He also was in Honduras when CHAMORRO invaded Nicaragua.
- d. Toto BANDERA, a friend of Camilo CHIQUIEROS, was highly esteemed by FRILIOME and had helped much in preparing for a revolution.
- e. Aristides RUIZ, from Leon, Nicaragua, also was a member of FRILIOME's group.
- f. Donald CASTILLO, a Nicaraguan eighteen years old, had become disillusioned with FRILIOME and wanted to join PASTORA. He and two other young Nicaraguans, Ronald MALASPINA and Ivana YACA, were among a group of Nicaraguans at the air base at San Julian, in Pinar del Rio Province, some in training and others employed by the Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (FAR—Cuban Air Force). An officer at the base, Remiro VALDES, had captured nineteen arms, but the purpose of these arms had not been established.
- g. Octavio CUTIKARSKI, called "Mariano," was a civil employee of FAR. He entered Cuba from Honduras as an exile in August 1960 under the name Godofredo SANCHEZ Uriarte.
- i. One Pedro GONZALES had trained saboteurs in Nicaragua after entering Nicaragua illegally from the Costa Rican frontier. While in Nicaragua he talked with Armando CRUZ Reyes, who had arranged to send dynamite into Nicaragua. CALDERA (fum), head of the Leon branch of the National Bank of Nicaragua, who was one of the leading Nicaraguan saboteurs and had dynamite and other tools of sabotage in his possession; and Jose Luis AMCHILLO,

SECRET
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S E C R E T
REFUGEE/CONTINUED CONTROL

-3- CS-1/MAR 53

1. Carlos HILDA, called "Billo," was a former officer in the Nicaraguan Air Force. Since being in Cuba he has a PNR pilot at San Julian. He was a FREEDOM partisan.
2. Pedro SANTANDER, a sergeant in the PNR at the Santa Clara base, had talked with FREEDOM about obtaining aid from Manuel NIAS forces, a member of the service company of the fourth regiment of the rural revolutionary police. NIAS apparently had seventy-five men, armed with rifles and Thompson submachine-guns, who were willing to fight in Nicaragua under his command. Apparently NIAS' group was identical with a group of Indians who wanted to go by boat to Nicaragua, before being persuaded that they should wait for a better opportunity.
3. Laurinio (fma), a Cuban medical student, had furnished chemicals to Nicaraguan revolutionists. Explosives, as well as arms, had been sent to Nicaragua by plane.
4. ENRIK RID (fma), a captain in charge of the base at San Julian, was generous in offering to help FREEDOM's revolutionary group in any way possible.
5. Pepito ABUTAY, second in command of Pinar del Rio, furnished Nicaraguan revolutionists with arms and gave any assistance he could; however, Maria ESCALONA tried to hinder ABUTAY's activities.
6. Mariano CHAVEZ, chief of the Bahia municipal police, was willing to furnish rifles as requested.
7. Amoroso MARIA, a sergeant at the military airport in Bahia, was furnishing arms to FREEDOM.
8. Porfirio CLAUDIO, a first lieutenant with the secret service, claimed that he had one hundred men in Company ready to fight in Nicaragua. CLAUDIO personally wanted to fight with FREEDOM.
9. Alberto RICO Giron, already connected with Nicaraguan revolutionary affairs, and Angel GARCIA, a Cuban, apparently had two hundred fully-trained men to add to FREEDOM's forces. RICO had great influence with Fidel CASTRO, whom he trained in Mexico, and had offered assistance of assistance to any revolutionary movement when it obtained the approval of Fidel CASTRO.
10. Luis PIRES, chief of the judicial police, promised to supply arms when needed.
11. Estela LORENZO, financial secretary of the Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos (CTC - Cuban labor organization), has signed money to FREEDOM.
12. Others associated with revolutionary activities were Chester Simpson, a Nicaraguan; Julio GARCIA, a Puerto Rican; Mario ALBARELLI (fma); and GASTAMALIA (fma).

S E C R E T
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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

- 5 -

08-3/b32,532

6. Johnny Hitchman, United States citizen, about forty years old, claimed that he was going to head Cuba's secret service.
7. It is also possible that in November 1959 Honduran delegates to a convention of the Asociacion de Transportes Aereos carried arms back with them to Honduras.

Headquarters Comment: Miguel Angel de la A. MUÑOZ Betancourt, Cuban national, was reported in January 1960 to be going to Miami on an unidentified mission for the Cuban Government.

8. Source Comment. Concerning travel, Heming said he would like to go to Costa Rica to co-ordinate activities between Cuban and Costa Rican groups. He also hoped to go to the United States, traveling on a false name and Cuban passport. He had spoken to William Morgan and believed that Morgan could obtain the passport for him. In the United States Heming wanted to sell liberty bonds in California and obtain arms and planes from a ranch in Texas. He claimed he could do this by using connections he used to obtain similar material when he was aiding Fidel CASTRO. He also claimed that he had gone to Havana to talk with PRIJONIE about the trip and supplying arms to PASTORA. He had a wild scheme to steal two small planes from an Air Force base in Texas, possibly Brownsville, and said he had friends in the Marine Corps who would obtain arms from corps arsenals. Another scheme was to hold up a truck carrying clothing and arms from Virginia to Indianapolis on a regular bimonthly trip.

Heming cited an example of arms procurement: Captain SECULIA (fma) Chileno, was sent by the Chilean Government to Miami to obtain six B-26 aircraft which were sent to the Dominican Government. He claimed he could use the same system by using two friends well connected in the Guatemalan Government.

According to Heming, when Fidel CASTRO and Anastas Mikoyan visited San Julian they discussed Soviet aid to Cuba, including secret aid in men and arms.

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

S-E-O-B-B-T
REFERENCE/CONTINUED CONTROL

-4-

CG-3/L23, 12

- IV. Miguel MENDOZA Batamourt, employed in the Cuban Ministry of Education, contributed to the arms supply of Nicaraguan revolutionaries, and assisted in sending arms to Honduras addressed to the Ministry of Education as books.⁷
- V. Sam Goldberg, a United States citizen thirty-three years old, associated with the Nicaraguans. His ideas were absurd, and he appeared to be completely Communist, dangerous, and unscrupulous.
- VI. Gerald P. Manning, a twenty-three-year-old United States citizen born in Los Angeles, California, was employed by PAA at San Julian as a paramedic. Manning was engaged in training Nicaraguans, and said that there were only twenty-five revolutionaries in Cuba, located in Baracoa, Cope Larga, Oriente, and San Antonio. All were willing to fight in Nicaragua, and would go well armed. Manning, also a flyer, was a Marine in Korea and at the Guantanamo Naval Base, and had been warned when he was fighting with CASTRO that he could lose his citizenship, but this was not important to him. He said that the base at San Julian could be used as a location from which to fly food and arms to rebels fighting within Nicaragua. He knew of a number of 7.62-caliber Belgian automatic rifles that could be made available to Nicaraguan rebels. According to Manning, a Mexican Island one hundred and fifty miles from Cuba might be used as a base of operations for sending a plane or boat to Nicaragua, since it was poorly policed. He said he would furnish a C-47 or C-46 aircraft when it was needed. Those associated with the revolutionary activities practiced discretion to avoid having rumors reach Fidel CASTRO, who did not favor the entire opposition movement, having become disengaged with the disagreements and lost faith among Nicaraguan rebel leaders. The Cuban Minister of Government was aware of these activities and was sympathetic to the cause.⁸

Field Commands

- I. PASTORA left Costa Rica with twenty-five men, going to San Salvador.
- II. PRIDIOME brought several arms to Costa Rica in late December 1959 but PASTORA and IACAYO disagreed on their use, and PRIDIOME took them back to Cuba with the intention of sending them to Honduras. (CG-3/L23, 020)
- III. IRUARIA, traveling on special passport No. A/CU 13, issued in Havana, entered Costa Rica from Panama on 9 March 1960, according to official immigration lists.
- IV. One DR. JANCIA Asencio, a Cuban, was reported to be in Costa Rica in late December 1959 to participate in revolutionary activities.

Source Commands

- 1. One Enrique ARQUIMANIS, a Honduran, had a small field on a farm near the Honduran/Nicaraguan border, which could be used by Nicaraguan rebels, with whom he sympathized.

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REFERENCE/CONTINUED CONTROL