

DISPATCH

Name of Station:

Date

101-25152

Chief, SA via Chief,

REF ID: A1/PD5K17
AS/PD5K17/5

Return photos to AS/PD5K17/5

OPRA-1081

42 Oct 59

RECORDED AND INDEXED
SEARCHED AND SERIALIZED
SERIALIZED AND FILED
INDEXED AND FILED
FILED

1. Comments regarding the continued participation of AS/PD5K17/5 in your BNKML effort have been held pending further evaluations of her reporting. With these in hand, we felt a more equitable judgment on our part could be made of her potential as a second short-term mounted BNKML or as a long term resident asset in the USSR.

2. The CB implications of A/5's relationship with Grigory GOLOUB and an assessment of A/5 for utilization in a UK operation, have been summed up in CTP-2-15, and it is generally agreed here at Headquarters that A/5 would be unsuitable for this type of an operation. Depending on the end results desired of an operation, a relationship with Soviets outside by a prospective BNKML traveler, could be viewed either positively or negatively. If, for example, A/5 had been encouraged to further her liaison with GOLOUB, then a trip to the USSR at some future date might have been recommended for the purpose of gaining additional information on SIS policy, or, again on home ground. On the other hand a trip for SI or PR purposes could, we feel, be limited by those contacts in that A/5 would probably be subject to provocation once inside or inhibited in performing her given tasks by heavy surveillance. Her relationship with GOLOUB, however, is only one of the restraining factors in deciding on a repeat mounted trip for A/5.

3. The evaluation of A/5's PI production resulting from her first trip here provided some idea as to her potential as an observer and reporter of positive and operational intelligence. Her overall rating as an observer was "not statute". Customer evaluations of the one positive intelligence dissemination resulting from her trip are enclosed. CB found it to be of slight or no value. KUJNU gave a slightly higher evaluation: of value, of importance, but accuracy could not be judged. Vital details were notably lacking, the reporting was vague. A/5's comments and indications of basic observations which would have considerably enhanced the report (time of sighting, altitude of plane, area of air, etc., take-off time, etc.) indicate shortcomings of A/5's reports. In comparison with reports of other travelers with little or less operational briefing than A/5 had, her reports rating was low. The long report on education, written on A/5's part, although designed to represent a scholarly treatise on the subject was evaluated as fragmentary, general and based purely on A/5's own conclusions. It struck us as being naive to attempt to analyze such a broad field as Soviet education with so obviously little factual knowledge or intimate acquaintance with the subject. This report was not disseminated. The only portion of CTP-2-15 which is being considered for additional dissemination is paragraph 2 containing GOLOUB's statements regarding BNKML personnel which A/5 was "reluctant to put in her report," and which CTP-2-15 is included in this covering dispatch. A/5's reporting on her contacts was fair. All in all, we can say that A/5's production was not strikingly impressive, and justification for a repeat trip on this basis would be a little loose.

4. Making a full personal assessmt of A/5, it is difficult to state categorically whether or not A/5 should be considered for a trip on the basis of her qualifications. As a literature major, the possible cost of a operation, A/5 would have to have a considerable knowledge of the Russian language to cover both carrying it literature or distributing it. A/5 does not have this fluency. A question-answer test was done, as we have discovered this past month from operations of this type, a few, sharp individuals,

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extremely knowledgeable on Soviet and American history, economics, and politics in order to effectively analyze the well-trained Soviet agitators. Although apparently knowledgeable of current events and ongoing in power, no better method of which to rate A/S's articulation with the system would, her ability to hold her own in a debate with a trained propagandist, her potential for effectively presenting ideas or changing Soviet ways of thinking or her potential for swaying the masses. She has indicated that she has an ability to attract crowds, and that she was able to do so with a group of Soviets by giving American folk songs. This power as learned from experience that this techniques was more of an emotional liability than an asset. Singing and playing attracted the usual seated crowds, but also invited the militia with the end result being confinement of several. Pierced and application by the Soviets of stricter controls over all KGB travelers. Because of these incidents we have been re-evaluating our PR techniques and devising new ones for reaching our target groups. We hope to have a paper out for you in the near future, outlining some of our experiences in our PR efforts utilizing KGBIV travelers during the past year and suggestions for the future. Our impression at this point would be that A/S would be somewhat limited in her capabilities along PR lines, and we would hesitate to encourage a trip for PR utilization.

5. As to A/S's successfully getting herself into the University of Moscow for a year's study, we do not regard the possibility with much hope. In every past instance, without exception, where Americans have attempted to make individual arrangements with Soviet universities for prolonged study, the Soviets have allowed this to make all the preliminary arrangements up to the final step. Just before closing the deal, the Americans have been told that they must become part of the American exchange program. Usually, by then it is too late to apply or the individuals do not meet the qualifications. The agreement for the Academic Year 1960-61 is not yet signed and sealed because the Soviets are displaying their usual changeability. We do know, however, as of 12 October, the number of students to be exchanged was 35. There are no standard qualifications for applicants, but all applicants in the past have been 28 years or over, have been candidates for a doctorate degree and have been fluent in the Russian language. It is highly unlikely that the pattern of selection will change for the Academic Year 1960-61. A/S fits into none of the above-specified categories and it is doubtful she would be accepted. However, should she for her own interest wish to obtain information regarding the exchange, she may do so by directing a letter to:

Dr. David Mowford
Interuniversity Committee on Travel Grants
509 W. 117th St.
New York 27, New York

6. We have tried to view a return trip for A/S from all possible angles, based on information we have here at POGI writers and evaluations of her first performance, and, frankly, there just doesn't seem to be a positive hook to latch onto at the present moment. However, we are open to any further ideas and suggestions which the field feels may justify sending her back on another mission. It is possible that some new opening will appear between now and January, when, we understand, A/S will be leaving Bulgaria.

7. Enclosed are A/S's two color slides and the one black and white print which you requested be returned.

8. Trends on A/S's reported contacts, excluding the Informant guides, were negative. Although many of our travelers this summer ran into the same Soviets time after time, none of these folks had come up before.

2 Enclosures:

- A. 1 Photo
B. 1 valuation

AMERICAN INFORMATION

19 October 1959

FREDERICK F. CARRINGTON

Moscow Bureau
1 - 31 u/s slides.
2 - 36 u/s enclosed - 12 u/s slides.
3 - 38 u/s enclosed - 12 u/s slides.
4 - 38 u/s enclosed - 12 u/s slides.