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Hicks file

23 November 1960

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Marmel Bay and Ward Chiles in the latter's apartment (113 West 72nd Street, New York City) on 22 November, 1960.

PART ONE OF THREE

1. Notes: This meeting was held earlier in order to discuss the possibility of re-establishing our future relationship with the PAF. (See Memorandum From the Record dated 21 November 1960, TIR 42502, OUT 4596, and C/W/M/L memorandum to C/M/L, 9 November, 1960; also See TIR 1774, 16-408 & which states that Hunt obtained Verona's concurrence on 21 November to discuss him and the PAF's controllers.)

2. The meeting was started by me telling Bay that I had received a somewhat garbled message concerning a certain general on the Isle of Pines. He made an undertaking, we then and there, privately, not involve [redacted] (otherwise, this question was passed over to be handled by C/W/M/L and in line with C/W/M/L's correspondence to me.) Bay informed me as follows:

(a) There are two garrisons stationed at the Isle of Pines with whom his organization has contact. One garrison is commanded by a [redacted] who could squat no approximately 10 men to follow him down, and if [redacted] comes to trace anyone from Oaxaca. [redacted] also has approximately 50 temporarily officials under his command (whether these officers were military or civilian Bay did not know) which were ready to assist in anti-dictator activities—the second garrison was located at the Punta Del Este and was primarily a coast artillery installation. Bay did not give the name of its commanding officer.

(b) Quite separately from the above, Bay's people are in contact with a (now) [redacted] who is the commandant of the prison where Huber Haces is incarcerated. According to reliable information, [redacted] says, [redacted] may be of help in arranging the escape of Haces. A small council who arranges [redacted] on 21 November said that Haces seems to trust [redacted] and has given him his wife who can visit him at the prison—the plan to utilize [redacted] in efforts designed to liberate Haces from prison.

(c) In considering the situation outlined in (a) and (b) above, Marmel Bay's military planners felt that the single garrison would be large enough to dominate Oaxaca, so that it would be freed and if the two garrisons in the area were to be taken over, it will suffice, then other troops and a good part of the population of the Isle of Pines, known by the name of Verona, is inclined to do the same. On the other hand, the two garrisons at the Isle of Pines are not

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should be probably not be difficult to do. It would be certain objectives of Castro's air force to defend his air bases or during the coup. Therefore one of the main targets will Castro's ground forces proceeding as they move along three roads or passing leaving into the file of Pinar del Rio area last. Thus far, the KMPs feel, can be easily furnish information to them. As additional plan seems, the general object of the operation should be for [redacted] to capture and destroy the plane. That [redacted] will form a convoy of approximately 100 km. a drive to the left from the road to neutralize the anti-aircraft gun and destroy surface and surface, also strategic locations.

(d) The sources that 27 November must set as the target date but that both [redacted] and [redacted] are for rotation in the very next month. Furthermore, the KMP planners think, a Sunday is the best day to begin the operation.

3. After the above explanation they asked for the following information:

(a) Our support to end/or advice on how to neutralize Castro's air force,

(b) Intelligence concerning coastal mining and air fields,

(c) Delivery of anti-air craft artillery and continuing re-supply for anti-aircraft vehicles after the operation has begun, and

(d) Maps prepared by the Aerial Service Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (1)

4. Without noting my comments on the above request I asked whether or not they had prior communication facilities at his disposal and whether or not his people would be able to receive, handle, and use any supplies which might come their way. I also asked what specific types of weapons the KMP planners were thinking of and what kind of ammunition re-supply would be needed for arms not already in the hands of anti-Castro fighters in the area. It does not appear that the discuss here the answers to these questions which he said should be referred for further discussion to the "technical level," i.e., Colonel Barrios and the rest.

5. At this point of the conversation I began with the implementation of the Headquarters decisions reached in regard to the Berlin group's support of the KMPs. I said that I wanted to repeat comments I had made previously to Chirib, Betancur, Barrios, and Aguirre namely, that the Berlin group could not afford any complication of anti-aircraft efforts, that no administrative and supply machinery had been established for anti-aircraft units, and that this machinery, i.e., the Brooks administrative organization, would have to be utilized to the fullest in operating at this unit. They

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undoubtedly know that Smith was also the military advisor to the FID; any migrants would undoubtedly carry the FID label and in all likelihood if required, anti-Castro literature would accompany such shipments; planes and pilots utilized in such an undertaking were FID assets and identified as such.

5. Per's reply to this was somewhat as follows: while the FID thinks it controls these pilots I, Bender, should at least realize that the pilots who were working formerly for Cuban Air Lines really belonged to the MCP. In my case he, Ray, and the MCP would accept the proposed arrangement because it would not imply that the MCP is politically beholden to the FID; it would simply indicate to the people inside Cuba that the MCP were utilizing all resources to obtain the equipment necessary to overthrow the regime. Naturally he was not enthusiastic about this formula but he could live and cope with it.

6. I told Ray that I would have to get in touch with our military people in order to find out whether or not we now had sufficient data on hand on which to base a decision. (Comment: C/HB/4 was briefed telephonically by me on the foregoing and on additional aspects of this meeting which are reported in part two of this Contact Report. C/HB/4 and I felt that we did not have as yet sufficient data to make any commitment; C/HB/4 instructed me to advise Ray that:

(a) Whether the MCP should submit a detailed plan which we would consider on the basis of which we would then decide whether to be of assistance or not; or;

(b) The MCP could go it alone, and ask us for some assistance after the operation has been launched and we would make our decision then on the basis of existing circumstances.

Above was transmitted to Ray who indicated that the MCP did not desire to go it alone and that he would instruct Bergman to immediately contact Smith in Miami to work out a coordinated operational plan.)

8. At this point at the meeting I felt too, the time was ripe to make the \$7500 proposal (by Bender check) and so advised Ray that another \$7500 would be made available to him via Juan Banks, an FBI controller. Requested what I had said previously about duplication and followed the approved lines contained in my 19 November 1960 memorandum to C/HB/4. Ray's and Chibas' reactions were not unexpected; they rejected this particular funding proposal. (Comment: for additional details and other items covering this meeting see parts two and three, "Contact Report, 2 November, Meeting with Ray and Chibas.")

CERBERUS PROJECT
C/HB/4/1

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