

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Form with fields: COUNTRY (Cuba/Chile), SUBJECT (Comments of Otto Boye...), DATE OF INFO (8 April 1965), PLACE & DATE ACQ (United States, Miami (12 April 1965)), REPORT NO. (CS DB-312/01320-65), DATE DISTR (1 June 1965), NO. PAGES (2), REFERENCES (201-286051), FIELD REPORT NO. (UFG-7175)

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SOURCE: A young Cuban exile who has been trained in information collection. His past reporting has been accurate but lacks depth. This information was obtained from a member of the MDC.

- 1. On 8 April 1965, Otto Boye, foreign relations secretary of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party, arrived in Miami, Florida, for a one-day interview with members of the national executive committee of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement). Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, leader of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students' Revolutionary Directorate), was present for the interview. Boye had just spent more than 30 days touring Central American countries in an effort to make direct contact with Christian Democratic Parties in that area.
2. After his introduction, Boye briefly described the history of the Chilean Party from the day it was founded 30 years ago until its rise to power in 1964 with the election to the presidency of Eduardo Frei.
3. During the course of the interview, Boye entertained polite but energetic questions from various members of the MDC. When he was asked why President Frei wanted to have commercial relations with the Communist countries, Boye attempted to explain that the decision was not based on ideology but on economics. He said that Chile has a great need for hard currency and that if the United States can maintain commercial relations with the Communist countries, why can Chile not do so also. One of the MDC members remarked that by going to such an extreme, the Chileans were behaving like "Englishmen," and that it was immoral to establish relations based on such excuses.
4. Boye was then asked if he believed in the solidarity of Christian democracy. He said that he did but added that to him the solidarity of Christian democracy in Latin America was

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more important. When he was asked when the MDC could expect weapons from Chile, Boyer explained that the Chilean Government could not give such aid because of international agreements with other nations, but that the Chilean Christian Democratic Party could provide this help. He said that this would be a matter to be discussed by the leaders of both the Chilean and Cuban Christian Democratic Parties.

5. Boyer concluded by proclaiming that the United States approved of all the social reforms undertaken by Chile, and that Chile in the end would help the Cuban exiles. Meanwhile, however, the most important thing to do was to establish intimate relations between the two parties. Boyer gave the impression that the Chilean Party was concerning itself deeply with the problems of the Cuban Party and wanted to cooperate in the liberation of Cuba.