104-10187-10103

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

WH/SH # 64 .749

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MEMORANDUM .		
CUBAN DEFECTOR	24	•
SUBJECT: Operation		——————————————————————————————————————
Briellig in Oct		
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	11 1	4 to 12 to 1
1. The bricking was held in a su government conference room on the afters	CALL MANAGEMENT	
6 October 1964. Lasting about 2 1/2 hours.	Am Ca Friday	رمجر ، 06,0
A Actorate with Topotriff arouse with a store a.	-	,
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		• •
TWO CIA OFFICERS WERE PRESENT		
A proper some some source and the second sec	IA OFFICER	
2. At the request of the		
prefaced the operational briefing with a bri		•
of how the U.S. Intelligence community ope		
role of CIA. of the need for compartmental		
and specifically of how the foregoing consid		
	security pre-	
cautions which will easure that the information		
and the joint operations we undortake are each		
within the government (and, in		
by the government exclusively	villa our re- 24	
presentatives in the flaid).)	,	
We will be a second of the sec		
3. Following the introductory re-		
above, I brisled the group on the DGI struct		
operational techniques, and specifically on		
	t close attention	
throughout the briefling and examined the ext		
including the DGI intelligence requirements	ior)	1/
and the	Г	
4. After the foregoing expecttion		
our aims in emploiting the intermation		
	and the second s	
in this connection! asked for close		
and coordination of activities, promising the		
do our autmost and maiting reference to our	traval lists	
and watch list.		

h. The effectiveness of his own actions against guerrillao La)and his determination to 'meet violence with violence; " L. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the bristing and of the exploitation; J. Reference to the case of the icl galdrow R. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present. T. In replying to the remarks of I said that we appropriate the cooperation of In the Control of the Exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Coverament are based on careful study of enotine in the contraction testimized and interest to the little contraction and interest to the contraction and interest to t and capabilities. 8. At the copeniation of the mosting, asked for a copy of the OG requirements (which he already had seno over closely) and took the copy with him to study Aurther.

BESTHER With relarence to DED CASO: Necause banisique 1 of the developments, and plans tall Pand the possibility briefly the status of the DII (This was to line of his being translerged to with the discussion in hich included our will CASE CASE and th advisor, Colonel MEDRANO) I as sed that the government take no action unless requested by لا العدا المدم لطبة **CT** on beadie bushaply would take to 06,08 A The made a rather

a. His own long experience in the OAS, in Cuba and in Central America;

impassioned specch in which he covered the following points:

- b. life early warnings about Castro--which were disregarded;
- e. The extent to which as lived to its obligations in the CAS; to which it has cooperated in efforts against Castro; and to which it has looked toward U.S. leadership;
- d. The failure of the U.S. to take aggressive action against Caba and the need for taking a hard line, including the use of force in support of military activity by the free Cubans and the other American countries;
- e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;
- f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with Cuba, for failure to acide by her obligations in the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to operate out of Mexico against other American countries;
- g. The need for action against Mexico;

SEGRET