

SECRET/KAPOK

Chief of Station, Mexico City

X

PH Division (Chief)

Review of LIFEAT and LIENVOY Projects by KUTUNE/OPS

1. Here is the KUTUNE draft paper prepared by Paul V. LEVISTER after his recent visit to your station. It has had the benefit of valuable suggestions from the desk. It has been read with interest by Senior KUBARK officers who think the paper illustrates the essentials of good tap operations. The stress of the paper is on intelligence collection, but some mention had to be made of operational leads and CI/CE information, otherwise we would have had only a partial picture of the operations. We will appreciate any comments or corrections you wish to make. We want to present the true facts and convey the right impression.

2. Having paid this tribute to honesty, we will admit having departed from the facts in a few instances, in the interest of simplification. One was the question of reels and transcripts, and reels alone (pages 17, 32 and 42); we did not wish to confuse the reader with this distinction. The other was the collection and distribution of reels and translations, which is somewhat more complex than the procedure described in the text; we preferred not to risk losing the reader and ourselves in those double and triple wingback formations executed by Robert B. RIGGS and Jeremy R. NIARCUS on their way to work in the morning and sometimes during the day.

3. There are a few points on which we were not sure, for instance the summary account of the station's strength given on pages 46-47. We felt that such an account was necessary since the reader had an idea of the size of the operations and the amount of work involved; without such an account he might have assumed that the station in question was one of our very largest. There is also the question of the exact composition of the intercept center--at the start, and now. If there is anything missing (or not accurately described) that would help other stations to improve their own operations at this key point, we would like very much to put it in.

(continued)

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4. Finally, there was the question of the Polish lines, on which the files are mystifying. The 1960 Project Renewal request mentions LITTENSOR's desire to cover those as well as the other two, but subsequent correspondence omits all mention of Polish lines. Did he really mention the Polish target? If so, how did we manage to get out of it?

5. The tough problem, of course, will be to sanitize the paper without downgrading the operations. The essence of the message is that so much can be done, and done well, by relatively few people, provided these few people have the right skills and sufficient drive. We might omit all references to Latin America, the Spanish language, and Cuban case officers; we might even throw in a few misleading phrases like "the far-away Cuban target." We certainly would not want the location to be recognized except by persons already familiar with the operations. We will be guided by your wishes in this and other aspects of the paper.

Oliver G. CALBOND

ZASOLO AND ZRJOINT

TWO TELEPHONE TAP OPERATIONS

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INTRODUCTION: TWO COMPLEMENTARY OPERATIONS

The station does not share the widespread belief that telephone taps are necessarily poor producers of positive intelligence. Whenever a station officer hears of a tap operation that produces little disseminable information, his inevitable comment is: "Too bad they're letting good information slip through their fingers." The station's experience with two tap operations explains its attitude. For 13 years it has had an independent tap operation that became a good producer of positive intelligence as well as operational leads and CI/CB information. During its period of maximum development this operation had 23 lines and produced some 140 disseminations per year. Five years ago the station set up a new tap operation [redacted]. This operation became oriented primarily towards intelligence production. During the past two years it has maintained 30 active lines and produced some 255 disseminations per year; its reporting has been evaluated as "detailed, and of high quality and substantial quantity." Several lines tapped by the [redacted] had been the most productive ones of the independent taps. The independent operation has been maintained, without the knowledge of the local government, but it has become oriented primarily towards targets of CI/CB interest; at the same time, its overall coverage has been reduced, and in recent years it has maintained between 12 and 18 lines. Under these circumstances, the intelligence production of the independent operation was bound to decrease; nevertheless, it has remained a respectable producer, with an average of 140 disseminations per year. The story of these two complementary

tap operations suggests that such operations can be directed primarily towards intelligence collection or toward the acquisition of CI/CB information and operational leads; it also shows that any good tap operation is bound to produce both positive and CI/CB information, in varying degrees according to the way the operation is slanted. The intelligence product is there, but it has to be recognized and extracted from the ore. The following account of the development and present workings of the station's two tap operations will bring out the principal factors that contribute to their productivity.

PART I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAP OPERATIONS

The basis for the independent operations, which we will call ZRSOLO, was laid in the fall of [] when two employees of the telephone company were recruited; one was a supervisor for repairs and maintenance, and the other was one of his subordinates, a lineman who did repair and maintenance work. In [] taps were placed on outside lines of the Soviet embassy and the Czech and Polish legations. By the middle of 1955 the operation's coverage had been extended to leaders of the local Communist Party and Communist-front organizations. These early years had been a difficult period of apprenticeship, for the station as well as for KUBARK as a whole, in overcoming the problems of telephone taps, and especially that of handling the raw take. But progress had been steady, and the productive years were just ahead. In [] ZRSOLO produced 19 positive and 6 CK disseminations, the Orbit country desks judged the operational information of this tap operation to be the best we had anywhere. In [] it produced 36 positive and 74 CK disseminations. And in [] it produced 181 positive intelligence disseminations. Its coverage had been expanded to include [] and PRC Communist expatriates, the latter at the request of ODEFT, whose Chief commended KUBARK for the excellent information transmitted to his organization. The station was also praised by Headquarters for its timely follow-up of operational leads. The target lines now numbered 23. There were seven listening

posts located near the intercept points, with a listening post operator and an assistant to each one to do the monitoring. The Soviet and Satellite take was translated by contract agents. The station had plans to add four or five more lines, but expansion came in the form of a new operation.

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In the fall of 1928 [redacted]
[redacted] setting up and running a telephone-tap operation against targets of interest to them and to KGBASH [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] There was an opportunity, not only to expand the station's telephone [redacted] with various intelligence levels [redacted]
[redacted] beneficial [redacted] and [redacted] The first taps were installed in 1929 [redacted]
[redacted] by arrangement of [redacted] [redacted] with a visiting company executive. The company [redacted] was to be used with an intercept center to intercept and route. The native staff of the intercept center consisted of one [redacted] in charge, a telephone operator, and [redacted] providing technical assistance and troubleshooting.
A station staff agent dealt with one [redacted] in charge as KGBASH's representative.

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In the fall of 1947 the Office of Strategic Services approached the chief of station for KABULIAW in setting up and running a telephone relay operation against targets of interest to KABULIAW & KURDISTAN. These off. take, however, did not end so well through their own security service; on the contrary, they distrusted the service and a few without its knowledge, and in fact, one of the target lines from the very beginning has been that of the chief of service. Here was an opportunity, not only to expand the station's telephone coverage with local help, but also to develop relationships beneficial to KABULIAW and QASIMI HIGH UP IN THE GOVERNMENT. The first taps were installed in 1948 within the main center of the telephone company, by arrangement of the local government officials with a visiting company executive. The company central was linked with an intercept center by underground cable. The native staff of the Intercept center consisted of one civilian in charge, a watched jailor, and eight junior army officers who did the monitoring and translating. A station agent dealt with the civilian in charge as KURDISTAN's representative.

A few months later another staff member arrived at the station to back up the original. He had both operational experience and good technical background. One year before he had helped install the ZAJOINT equipment and was well liked by the local people he had come to contact with. He was assigned to work full-time with the native staff at the intercept center, (see file). In addition to maintaining the equipment, ~~he also responsible for receiving information from~~ ~~DATA-TELEGRAMS, and sending messages to the intercept center.~~ ~~He~~ ~~also~~ ~~receives~~ ~~information~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~center~~, to prioritize and refine the intercept keeping of the center, and probably to teach the intercept center ~~the~~ ~~new~~ ~~techniques~~ ~~of~~ ~~intelligence~~. During his first 10 months of operation he had reason to do what he did, as prioritized and refine the work of the intercept. The operation produced 100% true intelligence information. And during its first and fourth years it produced 270 and 290 classifications.

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AMERICAN is a better initialized or more or less should ever be used
and harder to read than it ever could be. Many of our []
operations have been easier to set up and more difficult to
keep on until agreed routes than independent operations. However,
when [] operations are based on a genuine community of interest,
as this one is, the participation of the [] bases
every task easier. The [] should have demonstrated
all along the community of interest with RUEFO in their proposal
of target lines which is easy when combined with the strategic
and tactical information available. The [] have installed
in the spring of 1968 some additional telephone lines and identified
front targets, most of which had been targets of RUEFO. In June
[] was selected as command center for initiative. []
targets of the other units at the back layout. Address
[] were subsequently added whenever the Internet center
was fully capable of handling more traffic. At this point time,
three lines of lines of operation lines are on RUEFO's map. Three
lines on the Internet center, two on the Internet center, five
lines on the Internet center, and two on the Internet center. All
of the lines are now in use and are functional. And
the Internet center is now in operation. The unit of RUEFO
has also been told to ensure that the data should be used carefully
and efficiently.

segments off the "A" in the first three digits of the serial number
to be used to facilitate identification of losses to be submitted
damages information on the damage area of target number 22221
D-2. This has never been a disagreement between [redacted]
of the operation concerning the nature of target [redacted]

There is another aspect of our relationship with the [] [] in this operation that is a factor in its success. The local [] had been receiving reports derived from a telephone-tap operation run by the [] and they knew that this was not the product they wanted. Conversations were not recorded, and there could be no check on the live monitoring; in the hands of an inefficient and corrupt [] there was every chance that the substance of conversations was colored and distorted, unintentionally or by design. That is why these [] asked the Office of Station to help them set up and maintain a good intercept center, and [] To this [] operation we do not deal with a [] [] with a modus operandi and a modus non operandi, that ran counter to KIBARK and OTCIA objectives. We were spared the tug of war that sometimes occurs when the tap installation is in good working order and the [] We do not deal with a [] [] [] as far as we know, the only local people who are aware of the existence of the intercept center today are the [] [] []

[redacted]
[redacted] an operation that gives them, little by little and day by day, an insight into the intentions and plans of persons and groups hostile to them and to GTOKE. Every morning the [redacted] and the Chief of Station have on their desks a two to four-page copy of the highlights of the previous day's take. Occasionally [redacted] asks for a check of the tapes to see if there are other details to be had [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]
[redacted], that he had never been so well informed on any similar event. The Chief of Station daily marks his own copy of the previous day's highlights with brief instructions to reports and staff officers on points of special importance or on which he has special knowledge. His interest at the top, on both sides, gives added spark to the interest of all the others who are engaged in the operation.

In [] operations the preservation of KUBARK interests is not only a matter of original agreement but also, and sometimes more so, one of daily concern in the actual running of those operations.

KUBARK's interests in ZEJOINT have been well protected all along. Our case officer inside the installation, the staff agent who keeps the equipment in good working condition, makes sure that the operation stays on course. Apparently the local civilian in charge of the monitoring staff tried to find out at one time whether our man could be elbowed out; he told him that he was being surveilled and should stay away from the intercept center for a few weeks, but the case officer replied that he could not do ~~that~~ except on orders from the Chief of Station, and that was the end of the matter. The station performed the rare feat of cutting the native fat out of the operation; a surveillance and investigative unit had been created, when the first taps were installed, to follow up leads generated by the operation, but like other similar units manned by natives and subsidized by KUBARK it did not function, and it was terminated after one year. The station even succeeded in setting up a special preserve of its own within the [] operation. When the [] asked for coverage of the Soviet and Czech installations, the Chief of Station expressed interest but pointed out that he had no linguists capable of translating Russian and Czech; it was agreed that the Russian and Czech tapes would be sent to Headquarters for translation and that any items of interest would be passed back to the station, which would transmit them to our

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1. In most cases, the station will keep a copy of the intercept, transmitted by the station performing the actual task of intercept. This gives the station time to check which is the explicit operational ready by itself with its own surveillance and its negative means. If the station wishes to pass a certain item to the [redacted] it can do so after four or five days by coding a Bond, wire cable containing the substance of the intercept. If a certain case or event requires immediate transmission of the translated text to the [redacted] for an indefinite period, the explanation given is that a Headquarters situation has been sent up the [redacted] the situation for that purpose. By this arrangement the station can keep control of the following of operational leads derived from the Soviet Orbit lines, and with our [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] These arrangements will also enable us to make coverage of these lines by the independent intercepts if required without the termination.

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The establishment of the [] by installation did not have the harmful effect on DEDLOC that had been feared. By assuming coverage of the Soviet and other official installations and of some local Communist and Communist-front groups, DEDLOC ensured that much of the load from UNRULY. The independent operation was thus directed more exclusively towards contacts and operations which the station did not want to share with the local Government. Tape was placed on the telephone of several UNRULY installations off-shore, and tape was also placed on the telephone of a suspected hostile agent. This is to say that several individuals of this type of whom there are probably dozens of them. Their names are not being released at present. DEDLOC assumed that all of them were and of course it is not unusual for people to remain anonymous for long periods of time. In the independent operation, DEDLOC's own coverage has been maintained and active (there at the present time) but there are no plans to release due to the extensive coverage of the [] and its apparently extensive coverage due to the independently controlled [] which does not have security clearance. The control of the [] is not yet fully understood since the [] and its agents are normally the peak users of the lines at any time. The net result of the [] venture, therefore, was that to divide the station's telephone equipment,

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and the potential effect of such a system on the intercepting stations
and the communication and control systems of the intercept center. It is further
proposed that the [redacted] personnel can put aside a large segment
of burden upon the stations and the members of the station and work of
the national monitoring staff at the intercept center. This work will
be described in the course of the following description of the intercept
center installations of ERICINT and ERISOL.

PART II. THE OUTLINE INSTALLATION

"You can't expect much from the people of this country; they're careless, indolent, . . ." and so on. Such generalizations have been made by KUBARK officers concerning the people of many countries, including the one where ZRUJOINT is located. The station would probably not agree with the generalization, and certainly it would not apply it to the native monitoring staff. All station officers connected with the operation pay tribute to the remarkable skill developed by the monitors and to the high quality of their work. Their most valuable skill is their ability to remove most of the trivia from the tape at the very source, in replays of the tapes, without losing much if anything of the valuable substance. The major intelligence product of the intercept center is a daily report of the highlights of the take. The average length of this report is about three pages of single-spaced typing. Significant conversations appear in chronological order, with the time indicated in the margin. They are condensed, but the key phrases are given literally, between quotation marks. The most productive lines for this report are those on Spanish-speaking targets, but there are occasional items from Orbit lines when conversations are held in Spanish. The tapes of Spanish-speaking lines except the Cuban are kept at the intercept center a week or two, for possible checking of certain conversations, and then erased; the highlights report, therefore, is the only product received daily by the station from those lines. The take from the

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Soviet, Czech, Yugoslav, and Cuban lines is handled in the following manner. The Spanish portions are transcribed and calibrated to the reels; notations are made in the transcripts at points where conversations are in Russian (En ruso), Czech, or Serbian; and the reels and transcripts are transmitted every morning to the station case officer responsible for ZRJOINT. Even in these transcripts the monitors omit trivial conversations when they are in Spanish, merely noting "Sin importancia". The practice of having the monitors remove all the trivia they can recognize as such is essential to making the rest of the take manageable and therefore usable. We may lose an occasional item of value in this way, but we would lose much more if the flow of information got out of control, if backlogs of unread tapes accumulated and the product ~~just~~ left to rot away.

The consideration deservedly, the posture in sorting out the take-offs and landing times at the start or at any one time; they required it greatly as their increasing competence showed that they were ready for more. They received practical on-the-job training from KUBARK, and this training was especially effective after the first year, when the new officer/technician was assigned full-time to the intercept center. In the last few years they have handled little instruction as such, being suffice-ⁿly guided by station's rules in terms of operational, or validation of aviation interest in new telephone correspondents who showed up to the traffic. Our new officer at the center was greatly aided in his task of whipping the staff into shape by the superior aptitude of one monitor. One who proved to be the best of the lot--who showed a remarkable ability for isolating intelligence from the mass of the take-off. It is he who prepares the daily highlights report. He has become the chief monitoring office manager of the intercept center, directly subordinate to the station in charge. His knowledge of available bases will be the most valuable to us, because we depend largely on him to keep the other monitors alert to our interests and prizcd for their jobs. The monitors came because we are able to our needs best in the last few years there have been fewer and fewer occasions when it was necessary to make their renderings now, at the same and almost all the primitive data we do

detained there and released and he gave them the names of the
Soviet agents. They never contact any significant operational leads
which they subsequently owing to the assistance of the case officer at
the center, were able to turn colds the station.

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In the course of time the monitors have acquired the special skills of professional eavesdroppers. They know the voices of the target persons and of their frequent correspondents. They identify in their reports the particular Latin-American accents of unknown callers. They grasp the different meanings of intonations and can visualize situations at the other end of the line. They record special moods of speakers, such as anger or anxiety, in parenthetical notes. They have a simple system of initials to present clearly the conversations of unidentified speakers--unknown callers or unidentified persons in large installations: MI (man inside installation), MO (man outside), WI (woman inside), and WO (woman outside). They maintain a simple but effective system of cross-filing excerpts of the take by names of target persons, by names of their principal contacts, and by telephone numbers called by target persons, in addition to the basic chronological file of the take for each target line. This handy reference system enables the monitors to identify people and supply their full names as well as to judge the probable value of conversations in the light of past conversations between correspondents. It also alleviates the need for the station to do this cross-filing. The highlight reports and the transcripts are evidence, by their appearance, of the monitors' pride in their work: the presentation is orderly and follows a certain format, which makes the reports

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eaier to pass the typewriter and cameras are very rare; the text seldom contains mistakes, and even they are often all this despite the pressure of early deadlines. And from young Army officers! Such meticulousness is not what makes them good monitors; but it is a symptom of the general care with which they discharge their essential functions. It took between one and two years to bring the monitoring staff to its present level of competence, and continuity on the job has been an important factor in the result. In five years only one of the original monitors has left; he was replaced and an extra monitor was added, but it took some six months, and good coaching from the others, for each of these two recruits to begin to match the performance of the charter members. The Chief of Station had, at the very start, impressed upon the local sponsors of the operation the need to have good monitors and to keep them on the job. One incentive was devised in the form of pay, the young officers receive their regular Army pay and in addition KUSIRX subsidies for each one a supplementary salary proportionate to the value of his work at the center. But another incentive that seems equally important is the satisfaction that the young officers apparently derive from their work, now that they have become experts at it. They are constantly being reminded of the importance of their jobs by the interest that the local government officials and the station show in the product of their work. Because of the outstanding work of these monitors and the excellent working relationship they have with our case officer at the center, the arrangement made with the local government officials is as reliable today as it was at the start.

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If, more so, because it is now firmly rooted in the local community.

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An indispensable man at the intercept center, as far as ALBANIA is concerned, is the staff agent who looks out after our interests and keeps the equipment in good working order. Maintaining our interests is a job that requires tact as well as firmness. Our man transmits station questions and comments through the civilian in charge or the chief monitor, in order to avoid the implication that the native staff is subject to his orders. His workday begins at 7:30 in the morning, when he picks up the previous day's highlights report, reels and transcripts, and hands them over to his station contact. Sometimes his day ends at 10 o'clock in the evening, the cutoff time for the monitoring of the lines, when the last items for the day are entered in the highlights report and the transcripts. The monitoring staff works in two overlapping shifts, 0100 to 1600 hours, and 1600 to 2300 hours; our men go in and out of the center throughout the day, checking and repairing equipment inside, or conferring with station officers outside. Now that the monitoring staff has become so competent, his principal single task by far is taking care of the monitoring equipment. The local sponsors of the operation could certainly find a technician of their own who could repair broken-down equipment, but they would have difficulty finding one willing to touch each unit thoroughly in a month in order to prevent breakdown. The equipment consists of 10 units, and 3 of these are in operation every day one on each target line. Each

unit is composed of a 5-10 3-1 recorder and an Ampex 401 tape recorder. The 32 units are mounted, two units side by side, on 16 racks 34 inches high and 10 inches wide. One man tries to do the two units of one rack each day that the workload seems to permit, checking all the parts, replacing weak tubes, and cleaning both units from top to bottom, a job that takes about three hours; he generally manages to do the 16 racks each month. In addition, he dusts and vacuums the exposed parts of the units once a week. The equipment has been used seven days a week for five years and although it is worn and will be replaced within the next year, it still gives good reception. There has never been a problem of poor reception in the course of this operation.

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The local citizen has the cover of a television, which is a client's identification. He is the only FOREIGN citizen who goes to the intercept center regularly. The Chief of Station occasionally drops in for a discreet look-see, as a reminder of PUMASK's interest and equity in the operation. At one time a Headquarters officer, a former station member who knew his way around, did some live monitoring at the center in support of an operation of great urgency. Except in these two cases of operational necessity, access to the premises has been denied. The station has not used the center as a showpiece to impress visiting firemen. The station's prudent attitude seems to have influenced the native people at the intercept center to keep their knowledge to themselves. The fact that translators were not placed alongside the students, for the sake of convenience, may also have helped; the language and garbs of foreign-looking persons would probably have aroused curiosity in the neighborhood, and their absence within the center would have tempted the students to talk about them at home and with their friends. There have been no security incidents, but the least indications of danger have been taken into account. The intercept center was moved after the first year of operation because it was located near the office of one of the local sponsors of the operation. Twice this year two men were observed watching the present site from across the street. Plans were made immediately for another move, but by the time a new site was found, the prospect of national elections put the

future status of the operation in doubt, and the station is awaiting the outcome before deciding what step to take. As far as the target persons are concerned, they probably suspect that they are being overheard, on general principles, but their suspicions are probably directed at the local service, which has [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] In case of grave emergency, the chief of the native monitors could ward off exposure by the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]
One of the most serious consequences of exposure, that is, the apprehension of KUBARK employees or agents in the [redacted]

[redacted] The security problem
is quite different with independent operations like ZIGGLE, in which we are on our own, and whose taps on cut-off lines are exposed to detection. The extra wires can be traced to the listening post by telephone company linemen, and when the taps happen to be closer to the target installation, they can be detected by visiting technicians on inspection tours. Security alerts often cause the station to remove the taps and to re-install them weeks or months later when it appears safe to do so. There are several ways in which the station may be alerted to danger. The company supervisor responsible at the start of the operation is sometimes able to provide advance notice of company work to be done near the intercept points on the lines. In addition, there is a standing procedure whereby the operators of the various stations, who patrol by their target areas every day, to see if there are any telephone company men working on or near the hot lines. The visiting technicians for security teams at target installations may be encouraged to advise by telephone taps or be advised at the time of arrival by station's security officer of their information

Source: National Security Agency

Despite all these problems, of course, close collaboration happened. In May 1945, it was agreed, through several uneasy days when it learned that a delegation had already arrived for a copy of Soviet cipher and codes. The keys were left on for fear that any message or message would be analyzed by the technicians, but after a violent storm had damaged much of the city's telephone service, they were removed, and were put on Spain, after the departure of the technicians. The telephone at the embassy was on spare lines and a two day power outage. In January [] a telephone line was disconnected from the switchboard in the Swiss legation. All code on all targets were deactivated immediately. After the arrival of [] [] took a spectrum of amplitude and repeats, and while he gave instructions to the Swiss to turn their code on, he informed [] [] that they were troubled and by the end of the summer the connection was restored and regular. In fact in the beginning of the summer, while the Swiss targets were still inactive, the Swiss informed [] that the telephone company was failing to do extensive cable renovation and restoration, which had been agreed to by the Swiss and the Americans.

At the present time the telephone company is engaged in a modernization program, part of which consists in replacing the old overhead telephone wires with new underground cables; concurrently the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works is trying to find ways of providing telephone service to new customers, and to this end it is looking into the question of recovering dead pairs of wires left in place over the years when the lines of former users were deactivated. In the last few years a few ZASGIC taps were placed in telephone centrals; This method will be our only choice in parts of the city serviced by underground cables, and it will probably be our best choice where overhead lines are cleaned and kept clear of superfluous wires. Even then, the general tidying-up will leave the lines running to the listening posts more exposed than before. All these security problems, past and present, have been reported candidly and in detail by the station. KUBIK remarked at the last review of ZASGIC that "the station is to be congratulated for the fine job of coping with these problems as they come up and for keeping this operation as productive and secure as it is."

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The operators of the listening posts have been trained to meet various situations that could result in exposure. Not long ago two company people came to a listening post that had one tap running into it; they wanted to check the telephone lines on the roof. The operator of the post, a dignified lady with an air of authority, told the men to come back the next morning; her husband was away and she could not let men into the house in his absence. The company men came back the next morning. The husband was sleeping, had come home late the night before--the lady was not married, incidentally--but they could come in . . . " and don't make any noise . . . wipe your boots . . . don't knock over this old vase . . ." She gave them a hard time throughout; they got to the roof, saw pieces of wire with the ends oxidized, which the lady ordered them to remove from the premises, and they quickly left the house, probably glad that it was all over. The tap was put on again, but the listening post was moved to another house. Of course, no lack of ingenuity will help if the listening post looks suspect in the first place. The lady just mentioned lives with her sister, the wife of a prominent local figure. Three listening posts are in the homes of well-to-do people, with small children around the house; the monitoring and in one case grandma acts as alternate. It is in the apartment of an old couple whose age puts them above suspicion, their advanced

age is beginning to worry the station, but their son and daughter-in-law are being cleared and are due to move in with them and gradually take over. One listening post is in the home of the company supervisor who has supported ZFSOLO from the start; his job includes the [redacted]

[redacted] who want free telephone service, and he has always had [redacted] for this investigative purpose.

The seventh listening post is in an apartment building, and it needs no cover because it has concealment; the lines were run through the masonry along the floors and walls when the building was going up, and cable pairs were run off in different directions here and there for deception; one would have to tear down much of the building to find out where the tap wires lead to. The dispersion of the operation's seven listening posts contributes to its security; the exposure of one listening post would not necessarily endanger the others. Furthermore, its dispersion almost insures its compartmentation, and the operators of a listening post know only about a small part of the operation, except in a few cases where the operator of one post is aware of the existence of another because he or she translates its product.

Despite its physical dispersion, ZPSOLO has been run tightly and smoothly over the years. The most obvious factor is the acquired competence of some key persons and their continuity on the job. The telephone company supervisor and the lineman recruited in [] and a second lineman recruited in [] still support the operation today. A contract agent who began operating one of the listening posts in [] became the principal outside case officer for the whole operation in []; a position he still holds; he has a shop at home where he repairs and tunes up the equipment, but he has trained most of the listening-post operators to do minor repairs; in addition, he speaks Spanish and Polish and can substitute for regular monitors and translators. The Czech translator has been on the job since the installation of the first Czech line in []. Two contract agents who operate listening posts and do translations have been with the operation since []. There were also three field agents connected with the operation at the present time; they were hired between [] and [] and their average time on the job is almost seven years. The productivity of a telephone-tap operation depends in large part on our ability to keep in place those persons who have developed the required skills and a certain feel for their jobs. This point was made in connection with the monitors at the intercept center, but it applies even more to the dispersed participants of an operation like ZPSOLO, who cannot be placed under one roof and learn the business one from another. Fortunately, there is plenty of longevity in ZPSOLO.

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PART III. STATION'S USE OF TAP INFORMATION.

Examining the product of the two tap operations is the first order of the day at the station, but several station officers have some early work to do in order to make it available when the station opens for business. The case officer assigned to the intercept sector picks up the center's product of the previous day--the highlights report, and the tapes of the Cuban, Soviet, Czech, and Yugoslav lines, with transcripts of the Spanish portions. These tapes are separately packaged for easy distribution to the translators. The outside case officer turns the whole lot over, in a car pickup, to the case officer in the station proper who is responsible for EQUINT. This case officer, in turn, exchanges the tapes to be translated, in two successive car pickups, for the tapes passed the previous day and their translations. At the same time, one station case officer responsible for EQUINT places before Germany's principal outside case officer and his assistant the content of the seven intercept reports, that is, the previous day's news from the Spanish, the two little, and the translated news of the day before that for the Soviet, French, and Czech lines. This is the general procedure for collecting and distributing the raw take from the two operations, but variations are likely to be required from time to time. Some of the translators are multilingual, and although their regular work is generally limited to translation from a single language, they sometimes have to shift to another language because the regular translator

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intelligence. The station's analysts have no difficulty accepting their morning chores to the needs of the day because of the constant practice they and their outside contacts have had in meeting each other on the job. When the workday begins, all the pieces are in place; the highlights report, the transcripts, and the translations are in the station, and the reels to be translated are in the hands of the translators. This early-morning job of collection and distribution is only a first step, but an important one, in the station's continuous effort to transmit promptly the intelligence product of the tape and to make timely use of operational leads.

The station's speed in preparing information reports for transmission to Headquarters is made possible, in the first place, by the quality of the highlights report prepared by the monitors at the intercept center. Most of our disseminable information appears in this daily report. Extra copies of it are made each morning for simultaneous distribution to the Chief of Station and the two reports officers; the transcripts and translations are distributed to operations officers according to their specialties. Thus, work on the early-morning harvest goes on in different parts of the station at the same time. The reports officers first go over the highlights report for cabled information reports to Headquarters. After that they examine the Cuban transcripts for additional details or items. Any disseminable information that appears in the transcripts or translations of Soviet, Czech, Polish, and Yugoslav lines is brought to their attention by the operations officers. And at any time, they may receive a note or a personal visit from the Chief of Station, calling their attention to an item of special importance or urgency. The major preoccupation is the immediate transmission of reportable information, so that its value will not be lost or lessened by handling delays. The reports officers state that most

information is now being transmitted

But there are accumulated bits and pieces of information that are too fragmentary for immediate reporting and are set aside for the time being. They can be combined with other substantial information later on. Many disseminated reports are made up of several consecutive heard on the same or successive days; they may also be based on the product of different lines from several Wright persons, such as the principal leaders of a Communist-front organization, and may disclose their next move. To recognize the significance of each fragment of information and to put the various fragments together, and to do this are based upon the know-how aside from the fact that they must all appear to be derived from intercepts, but in a report that will make sense to the reader, these are the special skills of reporter, officers who work on the product of telephone tape. He has question an agent for details he may have overlooked in his recording. If he may direct him to acquire additional information in order to add to the scope of previous reports, and telephone calls or wire communications, messages, the like, he can just be compelled to be authority for another agent to transcribe. There is no reason that one need go to guess the significance of what has come over the wires, in order to get a accurate and pertinent report for the reader. A good example is on a new line which hardly goes little to for best qualified reporter officer, but a

series of conversations between the same correspondents begins to tell a story, each new conversation adding to what is already known and taking on meaning itself from previous ones. Like the monitors, the reports officers must reach the point where they feel that the target persons are old acquaintances. They need, in addition, like other good reports officers, an intimate knowledge of the local scene and of local personalities, and they must keep up to date on local events by extensive reading of the local press. Of the two reports officers who work on the product of ZESOLC and ZAVINT, one has been on her present job four and one-half years, and the other over two years. Like the native monitors, they have developed the extra sense required by their jobs.

The relative productivity of the various lines of ZRJOINT, and to a lesser extent those of ZRSOLO, offers several targeting hints. The most productive line of ZRJOINT, as determined from an examination of one year's production, is that of the internationally known president of a labor confederation, a leader in local and regional Communist-front activities; the tap on his office phone produced almost one fifth of the operation's disseminated reports. The most prolific target installation was the Cuban embassy, whose three lines accounted for one-quarter of ZRJOINT's production. The two lines of the Cuban press service, on the other hand, were poor producers. There is an interesting combination of office and home lines that shows an interesting production record. It consists of one line in the headquarters of an anti-COFOKE, pro-Cuban organization that has extensive support in political and intellectual circles; two lines in the home of its guiding spirit, a former [redacted] of the country; one line in the home of the titular head of the organization; and one line in the home of a prominent intellectual who is very active in the organization's affairs. These five lines produced over 35% of ZRJOINT's disseminated reports. The composition of these reports reflects the fact that it is the nature of the cumulative nature of telephone-tap reporting. When an event occurs or is due to occur in which the principal members of the organization are interested, it will be reported in fragments / on different lines on the same or successive days, but the complete picture gives a fairly complete idea of what

is added to the completeness of lines, therefore, helps to make up for the fragmentary nature of telephone-tap information. That is, provided the individual lines do produce the fragments; the lines of two other prominent members of the organization are tapped, but they have produced very little. Altogether the nine target lines mentioned above produced about 80% of ZRJOINT's disseminated reports. The five lines of the Soviet embassy accounted for 10% of the operation's production, and the other lines produced only a few scattered reports each. The production of the three most productive lines was also noted for steadiness; there were peak months and relatively quiet months, but those lines produced continuously throughout the year. This continuity helps the monitors and reports officers to see the meaning of unfolding events, as we already noted.
have seen but it seems to run through the whole intelligence cycle. and our customers have often expressed the need for a continuing flow of information on a given target. ZRJOINT has been giving them this kind of information. The intelligence production of ZRJOINT, being more later, offers few opportunities for useful comparison. The productivity of this operation in recent years has been characterized by general lulls, with occasional bursts of activity on some line or other. During the past year, the plans and actions of a Latin American exile who was trying to attain control of the government of his country were the subject of 60% of ZRJOINT's disseminated reports. When the lineage and activities of journals and groups heightened the interest we have in certain lines, the station's surveillance

teams and support agents often collect intelligence, or information, information. The analysis of all the various intercept reports, despite ~~commercial~~ disgracing, makes it clear to the initiators, that each part of a report was received so that it is a simple matter to review the production of KGBINT and KGBCOM and to estimate the intelligence productivity of each line or group of lines - the probable advantages of tapping office lines or home lines, or the volume of production we can normally expect from targets of this or that nationality. Without this ability to trace the origin of the product, it is impossible for the station to base its targeting on anything more than mere hope, and in a wider sense it is impossible for KGBARK as a whole to study patterns of productivity of similar targets in different areas, and to estimate the probable productivity of projected operations.

There is one qualification which the Chief of Station expects in his reports officers, and in most of his case officers as well, and that is a good working knowledge of Spanish. The transmission of the Spanish-language tape from the EMBINT intercept center and the ZPSOLO listening posts is not delayed by translation, like the product of the Soviet, Czech, Yugoslav, and Polish lines, which stays one day with the various translators. Material in Spanish is not translated unless and until it is used in information or operational reports, or in the supply of name-check information to other agencies in the embassy. This eliminates the translation of items that will never be used; it also keeps in its original state, free from distortion or interpretation, the text of tapes items that will be used later. The station's officers prefer to have it this way: they have the assurance that their information has not been subject to misinterpretation by translators who, however expert and conscientious they may be, are not familiar with the background situations that give telephone conversations their true meaning. The possibility of translating the Russian, Czech, Polish, and certain parts of the tapes cannot be avoided. But in order to reduce this possibility the translators are not allowed the discretion of re-writing at the intercept center. They are required to translate exactly as it sounds in those languages. And inasmuch as these target lines have considerable experience and skill, an

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I see that this appears related to a core center, will we also
need to note that the fact of contact between a core type
located over a metal suspension, may cause it to have abnormal
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Every morning the station's three case officers go over the transcripts from the Cuban lines of both operations; the SR case officer examines the transcripts and translations from the Soviet lines; and the EE case officer goes over the transcripts and translations from the Polish lines of ZHOSOC, the Yugoslav lines of ZHJCINT, and the Czech lines of both. The case officers look primarily for new operational leads, but they also do at this stage the sorting out of what will be retained and what will be thrown away. The SR case officer estimates that about 30% of the take is kept and goes into case files; the rest is thrown away. The main object of this collation of information, drawn from all sources and not only from the telephone taps, is to uncover means of access to target persons and indications of possible susceptibility to development and recruitment. The case files identify various acquaintances of each target person, the nature, frequency, and degree of intimacy of their relationship with him, and their general predispositions towards him and towards QUTMOZ. In some instances the station is in touch with these acquaintances, and the telephone taps sometimes provide evidence of the truth or falsehood of what these individuals tell us. The case files give an idea of the target person's place in the embassy or legation, personality, his relatives with his superiors and colleagues.

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and sometimes his emotional weaknesses and problems. "Above all," remarks the SF officer, the information derived from the telephone taps give you a feel for the kind of man the target person is, although you have never met him." All information considered useful is shown to the Chief of Station before it goes into the case files, and he often returns it to the case officer concerned with his own comments or directions. In this way he keeps abreast every day of the details of operations and can give his case officers the benefit of his guidance at every step.

The station intercepts approximately 1000 messages per month, which are sorted by priority. The station's own operations include intercepts of personnel messages from other CIA/CIAK agencies in the embassy, copy will, DIA/INT and COMINT. It, in addition to spot information passed orally, the station transmits on the average 150 messages to COMINT and DIA in COMINT each year. Occasionally some of the information from DIA/INT requires immediate action, and our man at the intercept center immediately passes the information to the station. Some of these urgent cases have involved FBPRIM citizens who got in touch with officials of socialist countries. One FBPRIM soldier of Chinese extraction tried to make his way to Communist China with the help of the Paris embassy; his call was intercepted, the COMINT and COMINT representatives were notified, and he was returned to FBPRIM. None of these cases require immediate surveillance of the individual. There is no 24 hour bug or mobile or foot surveillance, so the size of our team, the surveillance are efficient, and very personal like the joint surveillance team which was organized when COMINT came into being, and is now to be discontinued after one year. The existing 8 competent surveillance teams, have especially this winter, the past year in determining the real plots and actions with American, Italy, already as typed, was was trying to cast discredit of his country. He obviously suspected that he

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REBILIA - ESTABLISHED AND OPERATING AND IS HIGHLY DEVELOPED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
THERE IS FOCUSED AN INDUSTRY WHICH IS HIGHLY DEVELOPED ON THE MEDITERRANEAN.
SUBSIDIARY OF THE CORPORATION. NAME FOR THE DATE AND PLACE OF PRODUCTION WHICH
ARE IDENTIFIED AFTER THE CORPORATION. THIS CAN BE A SET OF CONDITIONS
WHICH ARE TO ADD VALUE OF THE PRODUCT AND ACTIVITIES.

The reader will probably have remarked long ago, and quite properly, that such extensive telephone-tap coverage as 46 lines is not desirable for many stations. There is the question of the station's strength and of its ability to exploit effectively the mass of intelligence and operational information acquired from the tape. There is also the question of target availability; a large station would waste its strength if it extended its tap coverage--a common and natural urge--to targets of slight interest or productivity. The foregoing discussion of ZBGOLO and IRJOINT has given intimations of the variety and importance of the targets. There are local Communist and Communist-front leaders who are trying to replace the present government by one hostile to COINTEL. There are Latin American exiles who are plotting to overthrow the pro-COINTEL governments of their own countries. There is the all-important Cuban target, which has turned out to be very productive. There are the PRPRIDE Communist expatriates, a target of great interest to COINTEL. Finally, there are the representatives of the USSR and the European Satellites, who are working for the subversion of all Latin America, and not only the country where they are stationed. Thus, the station's 46 target lines are directed at a wide variety of local, regional and global KUBARK targets. The station is one of medium size. In addition to the Chief of Station and his deputy, there

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are clever case officers, including three KANGOL officers, two reports officers, two intelligence analysts, and one photographer. The other members of the station give administrative or clerical support. The tap operations and the related surveillance and investigative projects require the full time of two case officers in the station. The product of the taps is examined in part each day by all the other station case officers, to whose operations it makes a substantial contribution. ZRSOLO and ZRJOINT, therefore, are not operations apart from the others, but are interwoven into most of the station's work.

The excellence of the station's two tap operations is reflected in their operational reporting. The progress of ZRJCINT for the past three and one-half years is succinctly told in monthly activities reports, begun in May [redacted]. These reports are dispatches of about three pages; arranged in the following sequence of eight headings: 1. the lines in operation during the month; 2. the outstanding ^{intelligence} items in the product; 3. significant follow-ups of leads; 4. liaison developments; 5. security; 6. technically; 7. personnel; 8. production, a list of the information reports sent by cable or dispatch to Headquarters. The same headings always appear, in the same order, so that there is little likelihood that an important matter has been overlooked. The regular reporting of ZRJCIO cannot be put into such a tidy package. It covers in great detail the two subjects that are of greatest importance in an independent operation intended primarily to produce CI, CZ information and operational leads: first, the security problems, present or anticipated, and the measures planned or taken by the station; second, the follow-up of operational leads by station officers, and the use made of significant items of CI/CZ information. This reporting of the operational progress of the two operations keeps the desk officers well informed on matters of detail and enables them to present an accurate account of those operations when required to do so by the appropriate authorities. And of course, these authorities are satisfied with the conduct and progress of ZRJCIO and ZRJCINT.

CONCLUSIONS

The many factors that enter into the success of a telephone-tap operation should be apparent from the foregoing account of KANSAS and ERICINT. The main ones will be briefly noted below.

1. Experience. To extract a valuable intelligence product from the mass of talk requires special skills. The two most important are the skill of the monitors, who must separate the wheat from the chaff, and the skill of the reports officers who must put together fragmentary conversations into meaningful reports. The experience of individual key members of an operation depends on continuity on the job; a major turnover or too-rapid rotation is disastrous.

2. Staying on Top. The value of the product depends on quick handling and transmission, from monitors to case officers, to reports officers, to Headquarters. If there is a bottleneck anywhere, the whole process bogs down. Staying on top is essential; backlog are fatal. It takes that extra ounce of effort to stay on top, but without it telephone-tap operations lose much of their value, and an already considerable effort is largely wasted.

3. Joint tap operations based on a genuine community of operational interest have a chance of success. This community of interest can be gauged by the choice of target lines, by ERICINT's access to the premises (however restricted for valid operational use), and best of all by the nature and quality of the product.

Tap operation should not degenerate into a battle of wits, or both sides oblivious of the equity of the other, in the upper hand.

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4. Direction Telephone-tap depend for their productivity on the teamwork of several people and for the effective use of their product, on the work of several others. There are many jobs involved, and it is not enough to do them all; it is necessary to do them all well. The teamwork of all the participants must be directed by one person and woven into the station's work as a whole. When telephone-tap operations are sizable, like CECOLD and ZEJCIINT, the active participation of the station chief or one of his principal subordinates is indispensable. When the operation is a [] one, it takes all the station chief's skill and prestige to establish Adalah's equity in it at the start and to maintain it intact throughout the course of the operation.