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AP 1/2

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7

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(11)

Q

27/2

DRAFT OF REPORT  
FOR RC. Delivery  
to Econ Proj. April 15, 1966

14-00000  
Subject: Photo of one  
The unidentified individual in the  
Warren Commission Report: A Factual  
Chronological Survey

Reference: Memorandum by David W. Belin  
to Mr. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April  
1976. (Attachment A)

1. Reference memorandum suggests it would  
as appropriate to reconsider full disclosure  
of the circumstances and factual data relative  
to the subject. The purpose of this ~~the survey~~  
~~to be made~~  
is to permit an evaluation of the suggestion.  
by ~~obtaining~~ ~~relevant~~ ~~background~~ ~~and~~ ~~just~~  
~~what it is that would be.~~

2. Background. This examination and summary  
has  
of the records concerning <sup>cropped</sup> ~~the~~ ~~photographs~~  
~~introduced by the~~  
at the  
considered by the President's Commission  
on the assassination of President Kennedy  
(hereinafter cited as the Warren Commission)  
and introduced into evidence as

Admission Exhibit No. 1. The photographs  
Hearing before the President's Commission  
of the Assassination of President  
Kennedy (Frank  
1. See Vol. XX:3, page 691. ~~what is, introduction~~)

resulted ~~originated~~ <sup>highly sensitive</sup> ~~with~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~CIA~~

as must be seen,  
(together, with others of the same individual)  
these, and still,  
originated from a highly sensitive operation  
in October 1963  
being conducted by the CIA [redacted]

[redacted] against the Soviet and  
Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

On 14 October 1963 it was normally

~~Under~~ Under the press of the ~~latest~~ <sup>latest</sup> ~~extensive~~  
efforts to develop information on the  
assassin and the assassin's copies of  
the photographs were made available  
by CIA's Mexico Station Chief on the after-  
noon of 22 November, and later that day,  
with the concurrence of the ambassador

copies of ~~the~~ ~~photographs~~ of this ~~ambassador's~~ ~~individual~~  
were flown up to the Dallas office ~~of the~~  
by the US Naval Attache <sup>and conveyed</sup> ~~by the~~  
as a matter of possible use in the <sup>FBI</sup> ~~investigation~~  
of the ~~investigation~~  
are going investigators. ~~The~~ ~~one~~ ~~photographs~~  
are photographs

it had been  
after crossing ~~the~~ <sup>marginet</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>FBI</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in a</sup>  
agent, was shown to Mrs. ~~Lucy~~ <sup>Margaret</sup> Oswald  
~~in a~~ <sup>on the evening of 23 November</sup>  
~~spread~~ spread of photos of individuals  
whose names have been known to  
her and having been known or  
in contact with her son. Mrs. Margaret  
Oswald did not at the time recognize  
the

was shown to Mrs. Margaret Oswald  
in Dallas on the evening of November 23, 1963  
by FBI agent, Bradwell D. ODUM.

The Warren Commission's <sup>Report</sup> ~~report~~ describe  
the sequence of events ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> pp. 364-5  
and 667. (Attachment 8) <sup>The report of</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> ultimately  
~~the~~ resulted in Mrs. Margaret Oswald's ~~allegation~~  
<sup>she had been shown a</sup>  
allegations that ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~photos~~ <sup>photos</sup>  
~~was~~ <sup>of</sup> Jack Ruby ~~at~~ <sup>the</sup> day before

he mistakably her son. (A further con-  
cluding  
plication to this ~~obvious~~ conclusion  
had been the fact that when she had  
been shown <sup>a copy of the</sup> same photograph in  
her appearance before the Commission,  
it had been copied, <sup>by the FBI</sup> in a slightly  
different manner.) ~~that photo had been taken~~

No details in the Warren Commission's report  
so vividly ~~by~~ ~~illustrating~~ <sup>more vividly than</sup> illustrates (this one,  
that he set)  
~~the~~ difficulties ~~of~~ simple truths  
~~of~~ ~~power~~ ~~and~~ ~~self~~ ~~denial~~  
~~prepared~~

in the politicized, ~~rigidly~~ rigidly determined  
interpretive climate that has ~~prevailed~~ ~~in~~  
the ~~of~~ ~~flourished~~  
been nurtured by the media over the  
past decade. ~~What~~ ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~photograph~~

now acknowledged <sup>not</sup> to be Ruby, <sup>has</sup> now  
become a centerpiece in an alternate  
explanation that holds Oswald to have  
been "framed" by the use of a double in his  
~~the~~ <sup>other</sup> activity ~~as he purportedly~~  
in Mexico City. 3

3. This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and  
the Man who was Not Oswald" by Bernard  
Fensterwald and George O'Toole, in the  
New York Review of Books, (attached to reference,  
"a copy of which is")

~~W.A.~~  
Oswald's report

Report in all attempts in any way related to

3. LEE Harvey Oswald - Mexico City stay. Photographs

~~of the unidentified individual~~ ~~from the~~  
~~captions, a matter.~~ ~~that~~  
~~developed~~

Lee Harvey Oswald ~~from~~ <sup>the morning of</sup> his stay in Mexico

City from <sup>a</sup> 27 May to the morning of 2 October

1963, the photographs of the unidentified

man ~~was~~ originated during Oswald's

stay there, and ~~subsequently~~ ~~with~~

~~was~~ ~~that~~ ~~with~~ ~~throughout~~ ~~the~~ ~~stay~~ ~~was~~ ~~therefore~~ ~~clearly~~

~~by the Mexican Station to be of possible~~  
~~collateral interest~~

It is therefore important to ~~the~~ ~~an~~ ~~understanding~~  
~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~photograph~~  
of what was done by the Mexico City station

~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~clear~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~review~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~  
the facts about Oswald's ~~stay~~ ~~in~~ ~~Mexico~~  
~~City~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~status~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~investigation~~



(2)

did with Scott's information it developed  
about Oswald was Mexico City, together  
with his actions on this information before  
the assassination, 22 Nov 1963, and immedi-  
ately thereafter

4. From all credible evidence known to this  
Trust (none, incidentally, added since the  
exhaustively unique work of the Warren  
Commission), Lee Harvey Oswald spent  
4 full days and 2 partial days - about  
116 hours in all - in Mexico City from  
about 10:00 27 September 1963 to about  
09:00 2 October 1963. His ~~only~~ point of  
residence was a small commercial

Traveler's hotel, ~~by name~~ not frequented  
by "jugglers" - the Hotel Comodoro <sup>where he was registered under</sup> <sup>alias</sup>.  
Exhaustive and detailed satellite interviews

and interrogated by the Mexican authorities and  
the FBI established that in the recollections of  
all hotel personnel he left early and  
returned late each day of his stay.

Assuming, <sup>and allowing for the</sup> ~~that~~ fact of late arrival  
and ~~late~~ early departure, ~~that~~ that he  
spent  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the <sup>time</sup> ~~time~~ of his stay (28 or  
39 hours), there ~~is~~ remain some  
78 hours of activity to be accounted  
for. ~~The~~ <sup>Oswald</sup> on the basis  
of CIA's coverage can account solely  
for minutes during ~~the~~ 27, 28  
September and 1 October. All coverage  
by CIA during this period was technical,  
and the station had no <sup>other</sup> ~~other~~ source  
(human agent)  
~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> coverage either ~~from~~

or from



Oswald was

in no sense "under investigation." <sup>None</sup>  
 of the facts of his defection to the USSR <sup>and stay in</sup> and  
~~his~~ return to the U.S., 1959-1962 were  
 registered in Mexico Station files before  
 10 October 1963, when this information  
 was forwarded by Hqs. in response to  
 the Station report of 8 October forwarding  
 on a routine basis what was judged  
 to be an American contact for a visa  
 to Cuba in transit to the USSR on ~~the~~

indicated and deduced from ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> technical  
 on 1 October, <sup>which was the first and only occasion</sup>  
~~the~~ <sup>acquired</sup> information. <sup>by T-1</sup> (At no time ~~was~~)

during his stay in Mexico city did the CIA  
 facility acquire a photo of him. A careful  
 review of all coverage, <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ intercept, ~~and~~  
 photographic ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ both  
 Soviet and Cuban embassies was made  
 by the Station on the 22 and 23 November

1963 after the associations going back  
to materials from mid year. It is there-  
fore firm that there was no CIA photo  
coverage of Oswald at any time during

Mexico his Mexican trip ~~his~~ stay in Dallas  
Mexico, despite the report on 15 October  
City. The place it states had 80 photos of Oswald  
Hqs. before 22 Nov 1963.

Voice intercept data received by  
the monitor on the basis of the 1 October  
intercept (which had been reported to  
Hqs and disseminated to the interested  
members of the intelligence community -  
as a ex-clarium see Henry Oswald was  
a Navy and FBI case under the delimitation  
and, potentially, by interest to the Depart-  
ment of State - turned up matches  
based on content, not on <sup>assumed</sup> identity,  
with material intercepted on 27 and  
28 September 1963. Matches based on voice

comproison (except what could be recalled by the monitor - and this was not insignificant because of the <sup>uniquely</sup> precise discussion spoken by Oswald) could not be made, because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice, had been ~~destroyed~~ <sup>crossed</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>re-used.</sup>

~~Activity Report~~

It should be noted that Bowie's intercept and photo graphic coverage was not processed in "real time". <sup>and the volume of the information</sup> The nature of <sup>and the volume of the information</sup> acquisitions, precluded anything but the spot reporting of items ~~to~~ judged by the monitor of more than ordinary <sup>(ordinary)</sup> interest and therefore ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> notes in summary logs. Full text of selected items would require ~~reference to~~ consultation of the tapes and either a full transcription or full translation, or both. Photo coverage <sup>(includes processed)</sup>

to become available in quantity lists ~~etc~~  
 which requires scanning and collection  
 on a rapid and accelerated basis. One  
 of the "triggers" that normally operates  
 to focus and accelerate the processing  
 and reporting of this kind of raw  
 intelligence is the mention of ~~a~~ a name,  
 as will be seen,  
 This, was precisely what occurred  
 in the 2<sup>nd</sup> of two conversations Donald  
 had on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy,  
 to whom he said he was "Lee Coward";  
 and it was this information reported by  
 the Station ~~to~~ to ~~the~~ Hqs. on 8 October.

~~The Central has not developed that Oswald~~

~~was the CIA agent~~

According to ~~him~~ ~~himself~~ that the Station reported  
 had information on Oswald's identity  
 to Hqs. only the voice intercepted on October  
~~was the CIA agent~~

The Mexico City Station did not mention  
 in its report on Oswald <sup>has</sup> based on its  
 own October radio intercepts: it compared  
 this data with <sup>descriptions</sup> information it had  
 acquired from a collateral source  
 a photo graph ~~by the Mexico station~~  
~~did not state this was~~ <sup>an individual,</sup>  
 apparently <sup>American,</sup> a male <sup>who was observed</sup>  
 entering the Soviet Embassy ~~on~~  
 on 1 October.

The station reported these details as a  
 coincident detail. The station  
 did not ~~state~~ assert or suggest that  
 the data deduced from the photo was  
 in fact Oswald, or indeed, in any  
 way related to Oswald.

5. Lee Harvey Oswald <sup>CIA?</sup> - Coverage of his Mexico  
 City stay. One additional element of back-

ground must be stipulated [redacted] ~~now~~ on  
the final preconditions to understanding  
the ~~relevance or irrelevance of~~  
~~the [redacted]~~ and the ~~presence~~ ~~of~~

The photo of the unknown individual,  
placed in the chain of evidence on 23  
November in Dallas by the FBI agent,  
Burdwell Chum: ~~stated~~ <sup>with agent</sup> what  
was the totality of CIA coverage ~~present~~  
of Oswald's activity as of the afternoon  
of the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> when all available  
coverage had been re-checked?

6. The totality of ~~the~~ <sup>on</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>or reasonably inferable the</sup> ~~the~~  
coverage of Oswald, consisted of five (5)  
voice intercepts as follows:

A.

>



(Friday)

A. 27 Sept 1963 16:05 Mexico City train:

*(A Mexican national)*  
Silvia Duran, a local employee of the Cuban Embassy, consular section, a receptionist, speaks with an unknown male at the Soviet Embassy:

*Duran*  
Silvia tells ~~me~~ that the American citizen was there, the one who wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union and he wants to know with whom he was talking there because she (Silvia) had sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if they accepted him and gave him a visa then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him a visa without further paper work only advising Immigration in Cuba. ~~He~~ wants to know with whom he had talked there because ~~he~~ says he was told there would be no problem. ~~He~~ says to wait a moment. A different ~~person~~ and Silvia explains the same thing to him. This ~~person~~ says to leave name and telephone number and ~~he~~ will call back. Silvia gives telephone 11-28-47 (Cuban Consulate). Silvia takes advantage of the ~~person~~ and states she has moved and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy of her change of address so that she can receive the Bulletin. ~~He~~ says to call KOUKHARENKO to give her new address, then ~~he~~ asks the name of the Consul or Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa PROENZA and the telephone number is 14-16-26. ~~He~~ says thanks.

*(L. Duran)*

(Friday)

B. 27 Sept 1963 16:26 Mexico City train:

An unidentified male ~~tells~~ <sup>calls</sup> the Cuban consulate, only Silvia Duran



~~MI says~~ if the American had been there. Silvia says he is there now. MI says the American showed papers from the Consulate in Washington, that he wants to go to the Soviet Union and be there for a long time with his wife who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in respect to this problem, and according to this procedure it takes four or five months, but without having permission from the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot issue a visa here without asking Washington; however, according to this man MI showed a letter indicating he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa for the Soviet Union, and now MI does not know what to do with him (the American), because they have to wait for the answer from Washington. Silvia agrees this

PK

MI says that the problem exists with the Cubans, that the American (the American) is that he does not know anyone in Cuba and therefore if that is true it will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he was thinking of processing his visa (for Soviet Union), because he knew it would require waiting a long time for his visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba and from there go to the Soviet Union. MI said the thing is that if his wife right now were in Washington she would receive her visa right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to her country, she is going to receive her visa in Washington but having this visa, she could communicate to any place this permission, for example here or any place she could receive it (visa or permission) but right now they do not have them. (no las tienen). Silvia says certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. MI says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia says that she will put that on the list. MI says he cannot give a letter of recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and excuse me for bothering you. Silvia says that is alright and many thanks.

C. 28 Sept 1963 (Saturday), 11:51 Mexico City

Silvia says that in the Cuban Embassy is a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy. MI says wait a minute. Silvia speaks English with someone - and comments in Spanish that they gave APBICIO telephone 14-12-99 and to take the number down - Silvia says she saw the American citizen ~~MI~~ he is going to talk with you. (American) speaks Russian and speaks in English. They continue in English. American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and speak to your consul. Just a minute. MI takes phone and asks American in Spanish what does he want? American says, Please speak Russian. MI says what else do you want? American says I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address. MI says I know that. American, in hardly recognizable Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it. MI says why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it is not far from the Cuban Embassy. American says I'll be there right away.

C. the Soviet. The

D. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:31 Mexico City time. An unknown male (American) contacts the Soviet Embassy, the Military Attaché's residence, 15-69-07, and says to an unidentified Soviet respondent:

SECRET

The Soviet

~~No one~~ I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new? ~~He~~ says I'd like to ask you to call another phone number. Please write it down 15-60-55 and ask for a consul. Thank you.

E. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:45 Mexico City time.

NO (the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian) speaks to OBYEDKOV. He says: This is Lee OSWALD speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul. OBYEDKOV says: NOSTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin??). ~~OSWALD~~ says yes, my name is OSWALD. OBYEDKOV says, Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet. OSWALD says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. OSWALD says And what...? OBYEDKOV hangs up.

(A Soviet Embassy guard).

including the text of the now ~~refused~~  
7. All of these items, <sup>read</sup> were discussed with and  
examined by Warren Commission staffers in  
Mexico City and at the ~~State~~ <sup>State</sup> ~~Embassy~~ <sup>Embassy</sup> during  
~~their stay there~~ a stay of from 8 to 13 April  
1964. \*

\* The Warren Commission group that visited  
the Mexico City offices consisted of Mr. Callahan,  
Mr. Shawron and Mr. Willes. They examined  
not only the ~~intercepted~~ ~~intercept~~ intercepts  
A-E, above, but others, ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> the 27<sup>th</sup>  
and ~~admittedly~~ ~~late~~ ~~that~~ ~~appeared~~ ~~to~~  
that appeared to have  
relevance. These have been omitted from  
this summary because ~~they~~

that have been included in this summary because  
they appear, on review to be includable ~~on~~  
~~logical~~ ~~grounds~~ from the Oswald matter on  
logical or substantive grounds, or both,  
On the 27<sup>th</sup> at 10:37 the Soviet Embassy  
received a ~~call~~

Keeping in mind that the Soviet Embassy ~~etc~~  
received many calls pertaining to visa

visa matters.

On the 27<sup>th</sup> of 1957, the Embassy received a call, from an unknown individual <sup>presumably in Odessa,</sup> who said he wanted to ~~need~~ to go to Odessa. He was told the consul was not in and to call back at 1130. Oswald is known to have arrived at the Fletcher Page Bus terminal on Prout 566 at c. 10:20 on the 27<sup>th</sup>. It was therefore ~~it is possible, to include the possibility of~~ ~~the call~~ for him to have made this call. Granting this, it ~~is~~ seems ~~unreasonable~~ to believe the call was awarded for the following reasons: (a) the caller wanted visas and specifically for Odessa. Oswald was seeking a visa and never in any other context did he specify Odessa or the Black Sea port of Odessa as his destination. (b) the call was directed to the correct <sup>consul</sup> number: 15-60-55. ~~Oswald seemed to have~~ ~~apparently~~

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of October -

Oswald first called the wrong number, 15-69-47 (the M's) number and had to be directed to ~~the correct number~~

and <sup>his</sup> call to the correct number, 15-60-55. It seems unlikely <sup>what would have been his</sup> he would have made ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~incorrect~~ <sup>incorrect</sup> call, on Friday the 27<sup>th</sup>, to the correct consular number and ~~made~~ <sup>called</sup> an incorrect number on 1 October. (c) There is every reason to believe from the context ~~of the above~~ that Oswald's first destination after arrival

and check in to the his hotel room on ~~the~~  
 visit to the Cuban Embassy. (1) The use of  
 the Spanish language ~~which would indicate Oswald~~  
 (unless he made use of an intermediary), which seems  
 unlikely, ~~is~~ (On 3 October at 15:39 an individual  
 of his M.O.) speaking broken Spanish then English, called  
 the Soviet Embassy and asked for a visa.  
 The Soviet respondent. The Soviet.

Oswald speaks in broken Spanish then in English to MI. He says  
 Hello. Visa for Russia. MI says: Call on the other phone.  
 He says: I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia. MI says: Please,  
 call on the telephone of the consul, 15-60-55. He says: One  
 moment please, I'll have to get a pencil to write the number  
 down. They issue the visa there? MI: That depends on your  
 conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call  
 the office of the consul and ask your question. He asks for the  
 number again. MI gives him the number and tells him to ask for  
 the Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. He says Thanks.

The request  
 The request  
 The request  
 The Soviet says:  
 The Soviet

The relevance of this intercept is eliminated  
 excludable on three grounds: (a) the use  
 of broken Spanish. Oswald throughout  
 used broken Russian or English. He had  
 no competence in Spanish. (b) the substance of  
 the request indicates that a visa request in  
 the first stages of initiation. Oswald had  
 not this matter to do with the Cubans and  
 Angolans.

The Soviets to a point well beyond the  
 substance of the call. (c) Oswald had  
 left Mexico city, based on all the credible  
 evidence before the early morning of  
 the previous day, and could not  
 have made this local call.

end foot note

from evidence  
8. Assuming up, we can state or reasonably  
infer the following with

Walter Oswald, head of the ~~Bo~~  
(made the following  
contacts with the Cuban and Soviet  
official establishments in Mexico city:

(Friday)

a. 27 Sept 1963. After arrival and check-in to  
his hotel Oswald went, at least  
to the Cuban Embassy ~~at least~~  
to the Cuban Embassy, where  
he talked with Silvia Roman. The  
time of his <sup>first Cuban Embassy</sup> visit is unknown. The  
time of his second <sup>Cuban Embassy</sup> visit was  
about 1600 (i.e. just before closing).

Sometime between the two ~~visits~~  
visits, he must have visited the  
Soviet Embassy. ~~(We have coverage~~  
(We have coverage

only on the second Cuban Embassy  
visit. ~~Walter Oswald presumably~~  
~~became involved in a person~~

(We have no indications who  
he talked with at the Soviet Embassy.  
There was no photographic coverage  
of Oswald's entries into either the  
Cuban or Soviet embassies on the 27<sup>th</sup>.

This lack of coverage on the  
~~visit~~ <sup>visit</sup> installation is explainable: the  
camera ~~used~~ <sup>based</sup> on the recollection of  
officer's ~~at~~ <sup>in</sup> service ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> the time, was down

on the 27<sup>th</sup> because of mechanical  
malfunction. Why Oswald was  
missed at the ~~Embassy~~ installation  
in his ~~own~~ <sup>own</sup> ~~entrance~~ <sup>entrance</sup> to the  
on

is not yet explained.

① (Saturday) 28 Sept 1963. Note: ~~the~~

~~was~~ ~~officially~~ a Holiday. ~~Embassy~~

~~Embassy~~  
Both Cuban and Soviet Embassies  
~~were closed on Saturday~~  
~~were~~ ~~temporarily~~ closed to the public  
and Saturdays. Photographic coverage  
was normally suspended Saturday  
and Sundays.

Oswald, notwithstanding the  
Saturday holiday schedule went  
to the ~~on Saturday~~ morning to the  
Soviet Embassy <sup>his second visit</sup> where he spoke to a  
council. He apparently could not  
recall his new ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Troop~~ address.  
~~He then~~ ~~went~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~Cuban~~ ~~Embassy~~ ~~where~~ ~~he~~  
to the Cuban Embassy <sup>his filing</sup> where he  
had registered it on his visa  
applications the day previously. He



summed the address from Mrs Bureau  
and she called the Soviet consulate  
presumably to permit him to give  
them the address over the phone. Instead  
the Soviet with whom Oswald spoke  
over Mrs Bureau's telephone invited  
to come back in person and he said  
he would. Presumably Oswald  
thereupon ~~went to the consulate~~  
I went back to the  
Soviet installation (his third entry) &  
give them his Texas address.

c. 29 Sept 1963 (Sunday). No activity  
registered

d. 30 Sept 1963 (Monday). No activity  
registered (It is known that Oswald  
rained upon this date on a Mexi-coly-  
karedo Bus, departing 2 October 1963 at  
6B:30.)

e. 1 Oct 1963 (Tuesday). Oswald made  
at least two calls to the Soviet Embassy  
at 1031 and 10:45 respectively.  
He identified him ~~himself~~ during the  
second call when he talked with  
OBYEDIKOV - a guard - and referred  
to his ~~brother~~ talk on Saturday  
~~with~~ probably with KOSTIKOV. There  
was no photo-graphic ~~of~~ coverage  
of Oswald on October. From the  
context of the two calls & moreover,  
they would have been no reason  
for him to go to the Embassy. His case

had clearly been placed ~~at~~ the  
the entrance of the USSR Embassy in  
Washington. His two calls on ~~the~~ 1 Oct  
~~first someone~~ were concerned with  
whether any reply had been received  
from Washington. Under these circum-  
stances, it is ~~unreasonable~~ <sup>in Washington</sup> to believe  
Oswald would have gone to the  
Soviet Embassy on this date. The  
camera was ~~working~~ <sup>broken</sup> at  
at about mid-day it registered ~~its~~

~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~entry~~ ~~into~~ ~~the~~ ~~Soviet~~ ~~Embassy~~ ~~of~~ ~~a~~  
white skinned individual, who ~~was~~ <sup>among</sup>  
~~among~~ ~~all~~ ~~the~~ ~~photographic~~ ~~coverage~~  
~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~only~~ ~~person~~ ~~who~~ ~~entered~~ ~~the~~  
~~who~~ ~~was~~ ~~seen~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~time~~  
could be

~~A~~ ~~man~~ ~~later~~ ~~was~~  
possibly American - who entered  
the Soviet installation that day. ~~He~~  
~~was~~ ~~seen~~ ~~on~~ ~~the~~ ~~photographic~~ ~~coverage~~  
~~who~~ ~~was~~ ~~seen~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~time~~  
~~who~~ ~~was~~ ~~seen~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~time~~

On the chance that there could be  
an association between the ~~above~~  
~~data~~ ~~derived~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~voice~~ ~~intercept~~.  
and the descriptive data derived  
from the photograph, the station ~~is~~



4. STATION SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE TO <sup>Embassy</sup> ~~the State, the Navy and I&NS~~ <sup>the State, the Navy and I&NS</sup> ~~INFO PARAS~~ <sup>INFO PARAS</sup> ~~STATE, ODBAW, ODBAWH, AND ODBAWH LOCALLY.~~ ~~INFO PARAS~~ <sup>to FBI</sup>  
TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH ~~GENERAL~~

5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED  
TO HQS OF ~~ODBWA, ODBAWH, ODBAWH, AND ODBAWH.~~ <sup>FBI, STATE, Navy and I&NS</sup> PLS KEEP  
I&NS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION  
OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

*[Large handwritten scribble]*

VI CRT: According to LIENVOY 1 Oct, an American male who  
spoke broken Russian said his name was Oswald  
(phonetic) stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when  
spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram  
to Washington. No local dissemination had been made.

T. H. BASSINER

ARMY  
ISSUING OFFICER

- SR/CI/A/ROLL (in draft)
- CI/Liaison/Roman (in draft)
- CI/SPG/Leertan (in draft)
- C/WH/S
- WH/COMS

201-261248

W. J. KING  
J.C. KING  
CWO  
AUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS  
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Developments from 8 Oct - 22 November

9. Mexico City station reported to Hqs on 8 Oct (and by 9 Oct) the following initial information on Oswald:

*Center (1.00)*

~~1. 192-115-100~~ OCT 23, AMERICAN MALE WHO SPOKE BROKEN RUSSIAN and  
SAID HIS NAME WAS OSWALD (PHONETIC), STATED HE AT SOVIETS ON 23  
SEPT WHEN SPOKE WITH CONSUL WHOM HE BELIEVED RE ~~VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH~~  
YOSTIKOV. SUPT ASKED SOV GUARD ~~IVAN~~ OBYEDKOV, WHO ANSWERED, IF THERE  
ANYTHING NEW RE TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON. OBYEDKOV UPON CHECKING SAID  
NOTHING RECEIVED YET. BUT REQUEST HAD BEEN SENT.  
~~WASH PHOTOS~~ ~~APPEARS RE AMERICAN ENTERING SOVIETS 1216~~  
HOURS, LEAVING 1202 ON 1 OCT. APPARENT AGE 35, ATHLETIC BUILD,  
CIRCA 6 FEET, RECEDING HAIRLINE, ~~SHED~~ ING TOP. WORE KHAKIS  
AND SPORT SHIRT.

3. NO LOCAL DISSEMINATION has been made by the  
Station.

10. On 10 October 1963 at 20:12 Z time  
the WH Division component responsible for  
acting on this report disseminates to  
the Department of State, the FBI and the  
Navy Dept by teletype  
Country electrical transmission  
the report received from Mexico Station together

14-00000  
Preliminary collateral details drawn from the  
a file review:

Context

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 A RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE  
IN MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, WHO IDENTIFIED  
HIMSELF AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN  
MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED  
ANY HINTS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO  
WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY  
35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL,  
WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE  
HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA,  
A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN  
OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED  
STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH  
HIS RUSSIAN BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSKOVNA, AND THEIR  
CHILD.

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATED  
TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATION  
RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATION  
IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION  
SERVICE. ~~END OF MESSAGE~~

11. Although the reactions of the headquarters desk  
was "by the book" and in good stead, there  
were a number of errors in this reporting,  
advising to the principal departments which  
on the record were concerned with the  
Oswald case!

14-00000  
C) Oswald's middle name was misspelled: "Henry" for Harvey.

D) His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "PUSAKOVA" for RKUSAKOVA.

Neither of these errors were significant.

More important was,

(C) Para 2 of the Mexico Station's report which had already ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~separated~~ <sup>separated</sup> (dealing with a concurrent phenomenon,

the description of an unidentified individual

observed going into and out of the Soviet

Embassy ~~was reported to~~ ~~be~~

had been locked out to <sup>alleged</sup> be Oswald as an <sup>alleged</sup> descriptive fact.

E. A comparison of the two cables was

Actually the

can be no  
There ~~is no~~ <sup>can be no</sup> question that this ~~misreading~~ <sup>misreading</sup> by the Mexico Station report

was an analyst error which escaped  
detection <sup>during the</sup> ~~in the~~ ~~line of~~ ~~coordinates~~  
~~given~~ before release: the descriptive  
details attributed to Oswald were  
so far off the mark <sup>as to be</sup> that they  
would ~~immediately~~ ~~instant~~

Immediately recognizable as such  
by the recipients. (In postal  
explanation, if not reculpatation, he it  
recalled that as of that moment  
CIA/NSA had no photograph  
of Oswald to refer to.)

12. Confirmation of this judgement ~~is~~  
is provided by the contents of the  
cable <sup>composed</sup> sent by the same analyst and  
sent 7 22 09 2 times  $\Sigma$  two hours



*Notes to Mexico Station:*  
*Continued*

1. LEE OSWALD WHO CALLED SOVEMB 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL  
LEE HENRY OSWALD <sup>(sic)</sup> ~~201-289219~~ BORN 13 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS,  
LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES  
WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN  
INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR,  
BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED  
STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW,  
INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB  
THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD  
POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1962 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED  
HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA  
IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING  
OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 3 JULY ON HIS OWN  
INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT  
HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER  
APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT 10 Oct 63

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80 0001

THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HDQS TRACES. HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING EFFECT ON OSWALD.

3. LATEST HDQS INFO WAS <sup>an FBI</sup> ~~ADACED~~ REPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYING <sup>FBI</sup> ~~OSWALD~~ HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.

(CONTINUED)

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13. The Headquarters ~~document~~ feed back  
of Oswald's correct description should  
have been sufficient ~~to~~ in view of  
the incongruity with the <sup>the</sup> photo of  
the unidentified male, to keep these  
two matters apart as investigative facts.

In any case Mexico Station, possibly ~~staff~~  
~~cannot~~

1  
on 15 October 1963,

in any case, please Hqs to 'Please  
provide a photo of Oswald.' Headquarters

electrically delivered to the Department of the

Worry the following message:

"Ree (Hqs) (sic) Oswald..."

"It is requested that you forward  
to this office as soon as possible  
two copies of the most recent  
photographs of your base of subject,  
Elie (Hqs) (sic) Oswald. (We will  
forward them to our representative  
in Mexico, who will attempt to  
determine if the Ree Oswald in  
Mexico City and subject are the same  
individual."

1. Reports had been received by CIG <sup>by</sup> ~~the~~  
~~the~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~  
22 Nov 1963. 2

14. Within its limitations and capabilities,  
Mexico City status had done all it could  
to comply with Headquarters instructions:

① Headquarters had been alerted and  
been thus aware with <sup>an</sup> investigators of police  
interest in Oswald had been alerted  
both in Reg Washington and in the field.

② Mexico City had no further contacts  
by Oswald to report become - as it was  
ultimately necessary - he had left

Mexico City on 2 October. ③ Oswald was  
not an agency investigative responsibility,  
in any case. Even with a photograph it

would have taken very special efforts triggered  
by the other interested U.S. agencies to have

(4)

makes a positive identification in view  
of Oswald's hotel registration under  
alias. This <sup>is</sup> matter noted at this point  
~~is~~ notes mid-day

22 November 1963.

The insertion of the photo of the unidentified  
individual into the chain of evidence.

15. On 22 November 1963 the Mexico City  
at 22:52 time  
station called <sup>to</sup> Wagon after learning of the  
arrest of Lee H. Oswald, <sup>Case 24 possibly</sup> in connection  
with the assassination and references  
and 18  
its earlier ~~letter~~ message of 9 Oct and  
Hqs. note of 10 October. The station

REQUEST PRIORITY POUCH PHOTO OSWALD SO THAT STATION  
CAN CHECK ALL RECENT ~~media~~ COVERAGE FOR <sup>Oswald</sup> IDENT. FORWARDING  
SOONEST COPIES OF ONLY VISITOR TO SOVEMB <sup>17</sup> OCT WHO COULD  
BE IDENTICAL WITH OSWALD.

Cent  
pi

16. It is clear that Mexico Station had lost

(24)

concludes that according to its own  
commentaries the unidentified male in  
the photo was "apparent age 35" and  
that the accurate description of Oswald  
furnished by Hqs. on the 10<sup>th</sup> precluded  
~~the possibility of~~ the possibility of ~~any other person they regarded as~~  
~~being identical to~~ (the only visitor to the  
Sweet Embassy on 1 October who could  
be identical", ~~was~~ <sup>could</sup> indeed be.


16. The Station had immediately begun an  
exploratory and accelerated review of all  
its technical and photographic intelligence  
As dispatch was prepared in accordance  
with the indications given in the Cable of  
22 November, cited in para 15 above. The  
dispatch noted that photo coverage of  
the unidentified individual had been <sup>turned</sup> ~~been~~  
~~discussed~~ <sup>up</sup> on 4 ~~October~~ and 15

October at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies,  
respectively. The text of the 22 Nov 1963  
journal dispatch was:

1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained  
on 4 October 1963, which appear to be an American. This same man visited  
the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1963.

2. Copies of these photographs were shown to The U. S. Ambassador  
on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to  
Chief of Mission Mexico, on that date.

FBI



P.S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing  
of dispatch. These were taken as person entered the Cuban  
Embassy.

Attached were eight photographs: 4 (of which two marked  
1 Oct on reverse) showing the individual in a white shirt and  
4 (unmarked on reverse) showing the individual in a black shirt.  
It would seem to be logical that the word "sets" was  
probably omitted in the second line of para 2, between "two" and  
"photographs".

17. That the Station was working under journal

draft is apparent from the text of the dispatch, which  
contains a material fact <sup>inserted</sup> ~~that~~ as a postscript.

That fact was ~~that~~ reported simultaneously  
by cable to Hqs, at 00:53 2 time 23 November:  
centamps

1. MEXI<sup>3</sup> STATION HAS PHOTOS SAME UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN  
TYPE WHO IS POSSIBLY OSWALD ENTERING CUBAN EMBASSY ON 15  
OCTOBER. SEARCHING FOR POSSIBILITY PHOTO-DOCUMENTED ENTRY  
CUBAN EMBASSY OTHER DAYS.

2. ALSO ATTEMPTING ESTABLISH OSWALD ENTRY AND DEPARTURE  
MEXICO.

all photographs - all to be kept in the most available file.

18. Simultaneously with the foregoing cables to HQ, ~~the Chief of Station Mexico City~~

the Chief of Station Mexico City spoke directly by double talk telephone with the Western Hemisphere Chief of Station, J.L. King of the ~~fact of what the former period is covered in a personal note to HQ. The Chief of Station Mexico City, Mexico, made a personal note to HQ from Dallas to HQ.~~

and secured permission to give copies of the ~~of this unidentified individual~~ photographs to the legal Attaches and to ~~the Ambassador.~~ ~~What happened~~

The next development is clearly reflected in a personal note by the Chief of Station to the WH Division Chief, ~~to the latter~~ mailed from Dallas together with copies of the photographs by the FBI representatives



by cable (82:44 2 time, 23 Nov):

FBI agent left here 2000 local time with two copies each of six photos of a person suspected to be Oswald, or, special flights for Dallas. He is carrying envelope with one copy each photo for airmail agency from Dallas to JC King at home or per telephone conversations with Scott. 1 copy of each of the three photos plus a copy of each of two photos showing the same person sitting the Cuban Embassy forwarded by memorandum leaving by regular pouch tonight. In view of above does Hqs still want a Staffer to carry additional photo(s)?

20. Hqs responded 0422 2 time, 23 Nov (1963), cancelling its ~~own~~ immediately preceding request:

1. NO NEED SEND STAFFER WITH PHOTOS. WE HAVE ASKED NAVY FOR PHOTOS AGAIN, BUT MEXI CAN SEE OSWALD'S PICTURE SOONER ON THE PRESS WIRE.
2. HAVE JUST RE-EMPHASIZED TO ODENVY HQRS THE SENSITIVITY OF PHOTOS YOU ARE SENDING AND ALSO RELAYED NAMES OF TRAVELERS WITH SIMILAR NAMES. NOTE RADIO SAYS OSWALD LIVED UNDER ALIAS OF O.H. LEE.

who delivered them to the FBI for that act.

22 November 1963

1  
Clear, this is

Dear J. C. KING

Reference is made to our conversation of 22 November in which I requested permission to give the Legal Attache copies of photographs of a certain person who is known to you.

Attached are copies of each of the photographs we have with the dates of the visits stamped on the back.

At 6 p. m. Mexico time on 22 November, The Ambassador decided that this was important enough to have a member of the Legal Attache's office take copies of these pictures to Dallas, Texas. The Naval Attache is making a special flight from Mexico City for this purpose. The Legal Attache's officer who is going to Dallas has promised to mail this material to you for me.

Copies of these photographs are also being sent by pouch which will leave Mexico City on the night of 22 November 1963.

Best wishes,

Win [Scott]

According to the side lined comment on this letter, the legal attache's officer was Eldon Rudd. ~~The photographs were already sent to the FBI.~~  
~~The Ambassador had made the decision to forward the photographs to the Dallas FBI.~~

19. The decision to remit the photographs to the ~~FBI~~ FBI in Dallas had been made by the Ambassador, according to the Chief of Station who arrived ~~meeting~~ with the FBI agents' departure reported to the

21. On the 23rd, at 17:29 2 times, Headquarters

Mexico City:

The FBI says that the photos of the man entering the Soviet Embassy which Mexico station sent to Dallas were not of Lee Oswald. Presumably Mexico station has double checked date of these photos and is also checking all pertinent other photos for possible shots of Oswald.

22. And at this point, <sup>NW</sup> Mexico City station <sup>22:48 2 times, 23 Nov 1</sup> agreed ~~to~~

Saw photo of Lee Oswald on television night of 22 Nov and it obvious photo sent to Dallas were not identical with Lee Oswald held in Dallas. Dates are as given on photos. <sup>is</sup> Mexico station <sup>is</sup> reviewing all available photos of persons entering Soviet and Cuban embassies.

24. Two hours later, the station reported the results of ~~the~~ <sup>its</sup> effort to review all available

Coverage:

Complete review of photos of all  
 visits to Labour Embassy from  
 August through first half of  
 November against good press  
 photo shows no evidence of  
 Oswald visit. Similar blank  
 against all Soviet Embassy photos  
 from 1 September. Note, only  
 visit we know he made was  
 to Labour Embassy 28 September,  
 Saturday on which Embassy  
 closed and we have not had  
 coverage... ~~the by photos not with~~  
~~against at least half day~~

36. With this communication the matter of the  
"Unidentified Individual" reaches the  
end of Phase I, the key element of  
which is the conviction <sup>at first</sup> latent, then  
expressed, that the photographed  
individual <sup>might</sup> be identical with  
Oswald. The detail, in this applied  
especially to the Section, through  
at a certain point even Hqs. missed  
no detail but <sup>(the word)</sup> kept the facts  
~~that~~ of ~~the~~ of quite  
disparate description.

37. This review has attempted to  
deal even handedly with all items  
in the case record that have a  
bearing on what happened. The  
operational goal, in summarizing and

the high commitment of all involved,  
especially in Mexico City, speaks for itself.  
Equally apparent - because of this,  
the 20-20 advantages of handsopt -  
is the evidence of non performance.  
and, perhaps, the limited gain

It was a critical factor, for example,  
that no photo of Oswald was  
made available - though it was  
repeatedly requested both at headquarters  
and by the field - or that it was  
not more aggressively sought by CIA,  
before the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November. A photo-  
graph of Oswald would have obviated -  
in a way the mere possession of a  
correct physical identity could not -  
the whole successive deteriorations

of what began as an impressionistic ~~tract~~<sup>22</sup> (selection of the photograph on  
1 October 1963, ~~to~~ into a course  
celebre ~~today~~ today.

38. It should be clear) ~~above all~~  
from this factual survey that issue  
~~was~~ <sup>has</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> there a course celebre with less  
intrinsic merit. Equally clear,  
should be the demonstration of  
the fact themselves that there was  
nothing contrived, or contrived  
about ~~what~~ in what happened;  
unless ~~we~~ ... we have now  
descended to that point in ~~our~~  
human values ~~which~~ <sup>achieved</sup> ~~reached~~ during  
Stalinism & ~~under~~ <sup>achieved</sup> under  
Stalin in the USSR and under Hitler  
in Germany, where just a plain  
~~mistake~~ <sup>mistake</sup> is ~~per se~~ ~~unavoidable~~

evidence of conspiracy.

and Development

38. The Genesis of ODUM Exhibit No 1 and  
Commission Exhibit 287

Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell

Walter D. Odum, on 23 November

1963, ~~which~~ ~~after~~ ~~a~~ ~~unsuccessful~~

showed one of the six photos  
of flown up from Mexico City the  
previous day to Oswald's mother,  
Marguerite Oswald. ODUM himself  
had trimmed the off the background  
by straight cut. Mrs Oswald ~~could~~  
had no recognition of the image in  
the photograph. Bardwell's own details

account may be found <sup>among</sup> ~~in~~ ~~the~~

Hearings Exhibits, ~~Vol XX~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~

Hearings, op cit, Vol XX: p. 268

~~and will thus form~~



39. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It is one of the 5 photos taken of him in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after Oswald had left the city.

40. At this point for the record the total available <sup>photo</sup> coverage of the unidentified individual numbers

12 photographs:

- (a) 5 taken ~~later~~ on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a light <sup>with a high neckline under- shirt showing,</sup> colored ~~shirt~~ and light ~~trousers~~ <sup>trousers</sup>.
- (b) 5 taken on 4 October 1963 in front of the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a dark, open button-down dark shirt and dark trousers.
- (c) 2 taken on 15 October 1963 in front of the Cuban Embassy

14-00000

②

a history of mental instability, and was removed  
recalled from the home,  
for reportedly for reasons related to that fact,  
in April 1966.)

Intercepted Conversation of Cuban Embassy  
Employee Inisa CAJERON, afternoon of  
22 November, 1963. At 1730 Mexico City, Texas

Some about 5 hours after the Kennedy assassination in Dallas, ~~Miss~~ a Cuban Embassy employee named "Inisa" subsequently identified as Inisa CAJERON received a telephone call from an unidentified male ~~subject~~. The caller instructed her if she had heard the latest news. Inisa Calderon jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I hear it almost before Kennedy.... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs), what barbarians!...."

R. Galt, speaker agreed on the circumstances of the assassination. Inisa also states that party at Silvia Duran's had been called off as it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincided with burial. Inisa also might she planned to move that night into the home of a doctor (a woman) friend.

What hypothesis? Completely or not post-~~script~~ ~~from~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~document~~ ~~is~~ ~~the~~ ~~only~~ ~~item~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~included~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~document~~ ~~after~~ ~~the~~ ~~discovery~~ ~~that~~ ~~pages~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~document~~ ~~of~~ ~~subject~~ ~~was~~ ~~part~~ ~~of~~ ~~this~~ ~~document~~

conversations ~~from~~ ~~address~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~document~~ ~~is~~ ~~the~~ ~~only~~ ~~item~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~included~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~document~~ ~~after~~ ~~the~~ ~~discovery~~ ~~that~~ ~~pages~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~document~~ ~~of~~ ~~subject~~ ~~was~~ ~~part~~ ~~of~~ ~~this~~ ~~document~~

by the following post:

(A) "Luisa" is probably identical with  
 Luisa Lopez, a Cuban worker at the  
 Cuban Institute, Council of the Americas  
 (W-91). ~~in this city~~ She was chief in  
 Mexico City at ~~the time~~ She returned to  
 Cuba in 1954 and was reported to be working in  
 the ~~labor~~ ~~movement~~

(B) The first strike element in this city  
 in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo  
 MIRABEL ~~the secretary~~  
 1963, ~~for~~ ~~long~~ who had arrived on 2 Sept  
 1963, in the replacement of  
 the Cuban teacher Lopez (deposed 19 Nov  
 1963). The Deputy 1st chief (and as of June  
 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel  
 Enrique VEGA Perez.

(C) ~~The~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~name~~ ~~as~~ ~~the~~ ~~one~~ ~~in~~  
 Luisa's conversation was the receptionist,  
~~and~~ a Mexican national, who handled  
 LHO's ~~the~~ ~~learning~~ ~~his~~ ~~visit~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~  
 Cuban ~~over~~ ~~relations~~ ~~in~~ ~~1963~~  
 on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban  
 installation ~~previously~~ in connection  
 with a ~~visa~~ ~~application~~ ~~for~~ ~~entry~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~  
~~country~~ ~~of~~ ~~Cuba~~ ~~in~~ ~~1963~~.  
 Since ~~there~~ ~~is~~ ~~the~~ ~~only~~ ~~link~~  
 between ~~both~~ ~~regarding~~ ~~LHO's~~ ~~activity~~ ~~in~~  
 this city. For testimony, however, in its  
 entirety was taken and presented ~~only~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~  
 Mexican government ~~and~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~  
~~country~~ ~~of~~ ~~Cuba~~

(A brief conversation with ~~her~~ ~~by~~)  
 The woman ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~time~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~request~~ ~~for~~

regarded in the Mexican authorities). This  
from Silvia Alvarez's ~~former~~ statement that  
it was known that Llo had been engaged  
in an altercation on 27 September with  
Luis Manuel.

Enrique Azcar

D. Manuel Eugenio VEGA, ~~son of~~ Alvarez  
and his wife, assistant. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ  
Lopez, were positively identified ~~as~~ by  
Feb. 1964 by two independent sources as  
engaged in the active development and  
facilitation of the training <sup>of agents</sup> for  
the purpose of assassination General  
Carrasco in SONORA. VEGA ~~is~~ it is  
established, was ~~located~~ in Mexico  
(support)

City during ~~the period of the~~ ~~the~~  
Consul's stay there

27 Sept. 23rd 1963. ~~VEGA's principal~~  
operation ~~was~~ ~~performed~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~VEGA's~~

He left Mexico City (for Havana) on 3 Nov  
1963 ~~and~~ ~~was~~ ~~relocated~~ ~~until~~ ~~16~~  
April 1964. It was reliably report about  
VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba,  
legally or illegally, must pass through  
him first with the necessary  
data and sent it to Cuba for  
some checking, a procedure which

numerous took to days.

~~Physiological~~  
Examination of the body

There is no evidence in the Bowdler case  
file that Maria Burton was subjected  
to a systematic distortion interrogations  
that distorted her answers.

It would have related her admittedly  
dealings with Bowdler with — confidential  
to Burton and

confirmed by intercept — with the

~~data~~

data should also see file on the

~~Walter~~ Carlson West — in its <sup>personnel</sup> ~~personnel~~ and

methods — in Project City. Was it unusual

for a case like Bowdler's application — application

to pass he allegedly made with Reeve — application

for the application to be made solely

by a trust employee Wright and a brother

Access,  
and ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~information~~ <sup>information</sup>  
whose plot had been taken earlier by

WJ chief? ~~What was the answer~~

to this question, thus raising the more  
fundamental question: Which ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> accepting  
the Bureau story on its face, could it  
have happened without the WJ elements  
above cited knowledge and participation?

~~That reply seems~~ It is doubtful that

the reply could be other than a solid negative

and in that case, it is palpable that Coster's

<sup>wisdom</sup> intelligence and security services <sup>could</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~

~~was~~ more in its file than has been suspected

in the Bureau's statements. ~~Was~~ <sup>Was</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~then,~~

this suggests that

Coming back to the beginning: "Wise" —  
(member of the WJ unit) therefore  
Lester Collier — as a <sup>with the WJ</sup> ~~WJ~~ <sup>could</sup>  
very well have had ~~implications~~ <sup>implications</sup> that  
~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~some~~ <sup>some</sup> ~~thing~~ <sup>thing</sup>

would make what she said to her uninteresting

(call her a case of)

(call her a matter of)

more substantial than a most full self indulgence

that is, a most full self indulgence

she was assumed at the time.



Silvia Duran, substantial investigation of  
high administration of Consular Relations with  
Mexico, 1967. Almond

The defects <sup>mentioned</sup> ~~pointed out~~ reviewed in hindsight of  
the Silvia Duran testimony <sup>already</sup> have been suggested  
above. (In that context of criticism it should  
be also pertinent to reconsider the implications  
of the intercepted telephone conversation  
on 26 November, 1963.)

(Witnesses to the Cuban incident, ORTIZ  
and Campanada in Mexico, Joaquin  
demanded, Amos, because the thrust of  
the conversation dealt with the matter of  
question whether Silvia Duran had <sup>been</sup> asked  
~~she had been forced to make~~, any admission  
about money payments by the Mexican  
interrogators.)

As of September 1967 Silvia Duran ~~had~~  
graduated from Urban Education Inst. in the Spring

1967 Silvia Bujan was reported by a  
and sensitive  
likely source to have broken out all  
relations with Cuban. ~~She stated that she~~  
~~travels with [unclear]~~  
described the

After a search of [unclear]  
[unclear] that she had been taken into custody  
but had been interrogated after the assassination  
without [unclear]

[unclear]  
did not [unclear] but [unclear] what was already  
known. <sup>she</sup> She added, ~~under the~~  
under circumstances  
[unclear]

That did not permit the source to challenge  
or limit [unclear] corroborative detail, that she  
gone out with [unclear] during his stay in [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] claimed only [unclear] sexual  
relations with [unclear]

in HQ

He is wearing a dark, collared T-shirt or light sweater.

The negatives of all of them are extant and are now held as integral parts of the Oswald <sup>and related</sup> ~~and related~~ file holdings.

41. The result of ODUM's display of the photograph — to repeat, a cropped version of one of those notes under para 40 (b), above — was Mrs Marguerite Oswald's allegation that she had been shown a picture of her son's killer, Jack Ruby, a day before he perpetrated the deed! Again, the Warren Commission Report, ~~and Warren~~

(pp. 364-5, 367) exhaustively disposes of this erroneous charge ~~and~~ will not be repeated here.

and requires no repetition here. ~~The~~  
A complicating fact, ~~which developed along~~ developed along the way was Mrs Oswald's (correct)

14-00000  
Observation when she finally admitted  
before the Commission that the Odium  
photograph ~~was~~ was not Rusty, was that the  
photo had been cropped differently  
from the one she had been shown  
in Dallas. <sup>(Inspector Malley's cropped version</sup>  
<sup>of the Odium photo-</sup>  
graphic because Commission Exhibit 237 (see  
Hennings; vol. XVI, p. 638).  
42. The net effect of these developments

in the opinion of the Commission was to require  
the admission of the <sup>cropped</sup> photograph into  
evidence in a ~~chain~~ <sup>chain</sup> of deposition

beginning with Odium, including  
the FBI Lab Inspector, James R. Malley  
(who had ~~been the originator of the photograph~~  
<sup>trimmed the photograph used</sup>  
~~in the photograph~~  
by the Commission in Washington) and  
Mr Helms, ~~who had the photograph~~  
~~had original~~ who deposed for the  
originator. These documents speak

for themselves and will be found  
in the Hearings, Vol. XI pp. 468-70.

#3. Mexico City Station and other senior  
agency officers strongly ~~advised~~ advised  
~~that~~ against the publication of the ~~photos~~  
photograph in any form on the grounds  
that the Soviets ~~would~~ would  
be immediately alerted to the existence  
of a useful and still continuing U.S.  
intelligence operation and the operation  
would go down the drain. ~~It is felt~~  
~~that the above is~~

~~Despite repeated cable exchanges  
and consultations with the  
the US~~  
There were repeated cables <sup>exchanged</sup> on this point  
between Headquarters and Mexico City

station press during the summer of 1964 and in particular from 23 September to 15 October 1964 when the Station ~~had~~ had plans underway to abandon the operation.

By The ~~State~~ needs of the Warren Commission prevailed.

44. In accordance to the ~~State~~ Commission's request for a deposition Mr Helms, then the Deputy Director for <sup>operations</sup> Plans replied to Mr Roubin by memorandum on 25 June 1964 which press included the following additional observation:

"The Central Intelligence Agency

recommends that this photograph  
not be reproduced in the  
Commission's report because  
it would jeopardize a most  
confidential and productive  
operation. In addition, it could  
be embarrassing to the  
individuals involved who as  
far as this Agency is aware, had  
no connection with Lee Harvey  
Oswald or the assassination  
of President Kennedy.

In this instance

45. The needs of the Commission  
prevailed over the ~~Department's~~ <sup>Department's</sup>  
statutory obligation to protect sources  
and methods. The "Unidentified  
Individual" remains to this day  
unidentified and there is no  
credible evidence <sup>up to this time</sup> to rebut the  
assertions made by Mr. Helms in  
the concluding sentence of his  
memorandum to Mr. Ransby on  
23 June 1964, ... And the photo opera-

ations did, as predicted, go down  
the drain. Within a few weeks of  
the public appearance of <sup>the</sup> Odium  
Exhibit 237 No 1 and Commission  
Exhibit 237, members of the Soviet  
Embassy began systematic efforts to  
survey <sup>the surrounding</sup> buildings, ~~there~~ potentially  
for rental space, but clearly these  
inquiries were directed to spotting possible  
camera sites. The operation was contained  
in any case. Within a year it had  
~~been~~ become almost totally  
unproductive in coverage on American  
in contrast with the Embassy - a  
clear sign that this category of  
visitors ~~had~~ been was being  
worned away by the Soviets themselves



INDEX OF CONTENTS SELECTED  
DOCUMENTATION BEARING  
ON THE UNIDENTIFIED  
PHOTOGRAPH OF THE  
INDIVIDUAL

1. Mexico Station telegram 6453  
(IN-36017) 9 October 1963. 1 page

2. CIA Headquarters <sup>electrical</sup> telegraphical  
dissemination to Department  
of State, FBI and <sup>the</sup> Department  
of the Navy. (DIR-74673), 10  
October 1963, (2 pages.  
20:22 twice.)

3. CIA Headquarters cable to Mexico  
Station (Oct 74830), 10 October 1963,  
22:09 2 times. 3 pages.

②

4. Mexico Station telegram 6534  
(IN-40357), 15 October 1963, 1  
page; and, USA Headquarters  
electrical dissemination to  
the Department of the Navy, 23  
October 1963, 1 page.

5. Mexico Station telegram 7014  
(IN-66781), 22 November 1963, (1 page  
22:29 2 times.)

6. Priority Dispatch from Mexico  
City Station (HMMA-22533),  
22 November 1963. [Encloses copies  
of photo of the unidentified individual  
taken 1, 4 and 15 October 1963.]  
1 page with attachment.

7. Mexico Station telegram 7019  
(IN 66846), 22 November 1963,  
(1 page. 00:53 2 times)

8. Private letter by Chief of Station,  
Mexico, Mr. Win Scott to Chief  
of WH Division, Mr. JC King,

22 November 1963.

9. Mexico Station telegram 7021  
(IN - 66896), 23 November 1963. 1  
page. 02:44 2 times

~~10. Mexico Station telegram -~~

10. CIA Hqs. telegram to Mexico  
Station, DIR - 84822, 23 Nov  
1963. (1 page. 04:22 2 times.)

11. Mexico Station telegram,  
7027 (In - 67189), 23 Nov 1963.  
20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram  
7025 (In 67186, 23 Nov 1963  
20:34 2 times) and 7033 (In -  
67232, 23 Nov 1963, 22:46 2 times).  
[Forward transcript texts.]

100000  
1009

1. Mexico Station telegram of 7020 (In-66891),  
23 Nov 1963, 02 31 - 2 times

11. CMA Nyp. telegrams to Mexico Station,  
DIR - 84821 and 84822, 23 Nov 1963,  
01:36 - 2 times and 04:22 - 2 times, respectively.  
1 page, each.

Mexico Station telegram, 7027 (In - 67189),  
23 Nov 1963, 2043 - 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram 7025, 23 November  
1963. 16:55 - 2 times. [Forward transcript  
informator] 2 page

~~At Mexico Station~~

13. Nyp. telegram to Mexico Station, ~~DIR~~  
(DIR - 84888), 23 Nov 1963, 17:29 - 2 times.  
1 page

New  
item 14. [This is Mexico 7025 & 7033, which you  
already have.]

15. ~~Mexico Station telegram 7020~~  
(In-67189)

16. Mexico Station telegram 7029, (23 Nov 1963,  
20:48 - 2 times.

17. Mexico Station 7035 (Inv 69233),  
23 Nov 1963, 2254 2 hrs.

18. Memorandum for the Record by Chief of Station, Mexico, 11 April 1964. Subject: Visit by Three Staff Representatives of Warren Commission. 3 pages and covering dispatch (HMAA 23249, 14 April 1964)

~~19-23~~ Text 2  
19-23. ~~Text 1~~ Intercept 27, 28 September, and 1, 3 October 1963. (For 27 and 28 texts in both Spanish and English, for 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>, in English translation only).

24-26. Five photographs of unidentified individuals entering and leaving Soviet Embassy, (1 October 1963.  
Mexico City, Graham)

27-29. Five photographs of unidentified individuals in front of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 4 October 1963.  
Graham

30. Two photographs of unidentified individuals, taken in front of Cuban Embassy, 15 October 1963.

31-34. Mexico Station - CIA Hqs correspondence, 18 pages 3

18, 29 May and 26 June and

3 July 1967 relatives to negatives of photographs noted at 29-30, above.

35. letter by D.A. Deputy Director for Plans, Mr Helms to Mr. J. Lee Rankin, 23 July 1967. 1 page.

36-7. Texts of affidavits by Bradwell D.

ODUM, James R. MALLEY and Richard

Helms. Hearings, vol. XI, pp. 468-70.

UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproductions of Odum Exhibit No 1

and C (Hearings, vol XX, p. 691) and

Commissioner Exhibit 237 (Hearings

vol XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED

39. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, pages 364-5 and 667, dealing with the photographs of the unidentified individual. UNCLASSIFIED

40. A Selection of Postment, Documents reflecting <sup>CIA</sup> Hqs and Mexico Stations Reaction to and Handling of the Warren Commission Publications of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual, September - October 1964

41. Letter by CIA General Counsel, Lawrence R. Houston to the Honorable Bernard J. Bagert, United District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, 16 May 1967. 2 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Correspondence with <sup>Hq.</sup> Emory L. Brown 4, 17 April, 1970. 3 pages. UNclassified



43. Correspondence with Mr. Paul L. HOCH, 1 and 15 November 1971 and 24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 8 pages. UNCLAS-SIFIED

44. Correspondence ~~with~~ <sup>with and related to</sup> ~~and related to~~ <sup>Requests by</sup> ~~Mr. Bernard Finsterwald Jr.~~ <sup>Mr. Bernard Finsterwald Jr.</sup> March 22 1971; 8 April (2 HORS); 9-18 February 1972; 24 Feb - 6 March 1972; 11-13 April 1972; 26 and 29 June 1972; 28 July and 17 August 1972; and <sup>memorandum</sup> ~~by~~ <sup>by</sup> Mr. Houston <sup>to</sup> Director, FBI on <sup>interest,</sup> 11 October 72 - together with two supporting pages, a Cable from Mexico Station dated 3 October 1972 and the minutes of interview, dated 11 October, 1972. 43 pages.

AC/Agg

Subject: Review of Selected Items in the  
Lee Harvey Oswald File re  
Allegations of the Castro Cuban  
Involvement in the John  
F. Kennedy Assassination.

~~Reference~~

The attached <sup>review and summary</sup> was written at  
the express request of Mr David W. Belin,  
as a follow up to questions #3  
of his letter to the Agency of 15 April  
1975.

The results - as I have already told  
him - add nuance, not evidence, to  
what the Warren Committee and its  
staff had laid before them in 1964, on  
~~the subject of~~ <sup>the subject of</sup>  
~~the assassination~~

The results of the review are stipulated  
at the outset at para 8 of the attach-

ment.

~~to be~~ <sup>file</sup>  
~~the documentation~~ ~~del~~ ~~book~~  
~~the~~ ~~with~~ ~~instead~~ -

~~This is a comparison piece to the~~  
~~source of the~~ ~~the~~ ~~Photograph~~ - ~~the~~ -  
Unidentified individual, submitted  
a few weeks ago.

~~all of the case data~~

There seemed to be no reason to  
attach ~~the~~ copies of the <sup>case</sup> ~~file~~ reports  
from the file to this summary. These  
can be made <sup>promptly</sup> ~~available~~ ~~however~~, ~~with~~ on  
request.

I:

①

Background

→ Saturday evening,  
On 7 September 1963, Fidel Castro, in  
an act unusual for him, appeared at  
the Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana.  
Even more unusual Castro submitted  
to an informal interview by the  
Associated Press correspondent Daniel  
HARKER'S.

HARKER'S interview ~~was~~ <sup>reached</sup> New York  
on Sunday, September 8<sup>th</sup>, and was  
in print throughout the country on  
Monday, September 9<sup>th</sup>. There can be  
no question from the facts surrounding  
the Castro appearance, <sup>which had not been expected,</sup> and his agreement  
to the interview, that this was a  
precedented or more-than-ordinary  
attempt to get a message ~~through~~  
~~registered~~ on the record in the

Castro's statements  
United States. The ~~Harber~~ interview  
~~concerned~~  
to HARBER covered a range of topics  
but dealt principally  
~~about~~, (with ~~Castro~~ American  
political leadership, ~~with~~ in particu-  
lar President Kennedy whom he  
excoriated in extraordinarily provocative  
fashion ("... Kennedy is a cretin; ... the  
Batista of his times ... the most opportunist  
American President of all time."). ~~There~~  
~~was~~ ~~reference~~ ~~to~~ ~~Senator~~ ~~Goldwater~~,

The interview had other content -  
~~rich~~ uncomplimentary reference  
to Senator Goldwater and Cuban delay  
in signing the limited nuclear test  
ban - and <sup>there were significant differences</sup>  
~~was~~ <sup>in the</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>per</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>played</sup> by  
US newspapers; <sup>like the</sup> New York Times and  
Washington, ~~where this~~ with a result

that Castro's "message" ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> significantly  
modulated.

In New Orleans, where he ~~had~~ <sup>was</sup> residing until the middle of September  
1968, the HARKER story appeared in  
the principal morning newspaper,  
the TIMES-PICAYUNE on Monday, Sept  
8, page seven under a three  
column headline: "Castro Blasts  
Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leader  
Impeded by Aid to Rebels." ~~The~~  
The story then followed under the Harker  
by-line:

The New York Times, in its coverage on  
Sept 9<sup>th</sup> used a UPI wire service report which  
omitted any reference to the warning and threat

on the Kennedy assassination that this  
Costa interview was considered, <sup>by the Agency</sup> in

following my leads, or in dealings  
with the the Warren Commission and  
its staff, ~~otherwise~~ ~~except for a~~

although Mexico States  
specifically directed Ag's attention

to the AP story <sup>very shortly</sup> ~~in spirit~~ after the  
There is no evidence <sup>in spirit</sup> that the Warren Commission  
Dallas ~~letter~~ <sup>staff, itself</sup> ~~calling~~ <sup>permeated</sup> this ~~page~~ <sup>implication</sup>  
of this Costa interview in dealing with the  
conspiracy hypothesis.

The purpose of this review is to  
reconsider Lee Harvey Oswald's activity

~~that Ag's in its light~~ on the assumption

that (avid newspaper reader ~~that~~  
that as an ~~top~~ ~~was~~ which we know from

Marius Oswald's (testimony) and others -  
he read the ~~that~~ Costa warning  
and threat as reported above.

The results of the review - admittedly  
bearing <sup>utilizing</sup> ~~the~~ the 20-20  
quality of hindsight - may be  
stipulated in summary:

(a) There is no increment of <sup>credible</sup> evidence ~~of~~  
of ~~any~~ Soviet <sup>and</sup> or Cuban political,  
intelligence or security service involvement  
~~with~~ to what was developed and  
considered by the Warren Commission  
and its staff. ~~THE~~ The Commission's  
~~to the effect that the report~~ ~~was~~ ~~based~~ ~~on~~ ~~the~~ ~~finding~~ ~~thereof~~ ~~that~~ ~~LEO~~ ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~killer~~  
<sup>on the basis of credible evidence</sup>  
of JFK and officer Tippett and did  
~~and~~ ~~of~~ ~~his~~ ~~own~~ ~~determinations~~  
~~that~~ them in alone, must stand.

(b) "credible evidence" that would <sup>upset</sup> ~~change~~  
<sup>significantly</sup>  
as modifies this judge's ~~and~~ ~~does~~  
not exist in Washington ~~of~~ ~~Mexico~~  
) but it  
~~is clear that~~ such evidence could



exist in Moscow and Havana,  
where voluntary inputs to the Warren  
Commission, ~~are not~~  
were minimal in  
quantity and to facilitate, ~~design~~

~~design~~  
the design, ~~designing~~ cover  
up any ~~with~~ connection by ~~with~~  
Oswald which might be connected  
directly or indirectly with the  
assassination. The ~~with~~ ~~admittedly~~

~~at the time of the~~

~~judgment~~ ~~as a belief~~  
judgment) ~~is not~~ ~~the~~  
part of reasonable doubt, ~~which~~  
that there was ~~indeed~~ a KGB ~~link~~  
or a ~~link~~

Soviet and or Cuban (KGB and/or  
DGI) connection will persist,  
and grow with time, until there  
has been a full disclosure by  
the governments of all ~~operating~~  
elements of Oswald's ~~contacts~~  
with the Soviet Union, ~~handing~~ and

stay

and his  
contacts in Mexico City are  
made available by these two  
governments. The Warren Commission  
Report should have left a wider  
"window" for ~~the~~ ~~Portuguese~~

of this kind and that indeed was the  
opinion at the working level, particu-  
larly in the Committee Intelligence  
component in 1964.

© In the absence of additional, <sup>or new</sup> "credible"  
evidence there are "meaning"  
elements in the record that ~~are~~  
~~no longer~~ <sup>from this review</sup> ~~are~~  
~~relevant~~.

As noteworthy, in the light of <sup>the</sup>  
~~the~~ conclusions ~~of~~ ~~the~~

*W. Bush*

other

There are, however, and

below, items by item.

(d) Castro's warning and threat of "Sputnik"  
in 1963 ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~context~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~1963~~  
indeed ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~context~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~1963~~  
became ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~context~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~1963~~  
a ~~con~~ ~~clusion~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~1963~~

of great potential significance

of great potential significance ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~context~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~1963~~

important ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~context~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~1963~~  
of ~~the~~ ~~1963~~ pathological ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~context~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~1963~~

pathological protection of Oswald  
possible progressive syndromes are  
his identifications with Fidel Castro  
and the Cuban.  
Ede

Looking back.

<sup>this</sup>  
and Cuban revolution which is directly  
traceable as far back as his Marine  
Corp service in El Toro, California.

Of Oswald and Castro threat and  
warning?

At issue

Over several steps  
warning and threat.

Castro's statements to AF correspondents  
Hoshea - irrespective of the extent  
whether there was any formal warning,  
or even secret, sensitive contact with  
Oswald by the Cubans or the Russians -  
may have

could have been acts of singular  
importance and under no circumstances  
justifiable or reasonable as far as

allowable reference for what the Cuban agencies  
were doing during the summer of 1963,

which ~~represented~~ gave the interview  
its real significance. The Washington Post  
<sup>abbreviated,</sup>  
did ~~rewrite~~ (Sept 9, p. A-7) which,  
similarly, omitted any reference to the  
main thrust of Coster's remarks. The  
Evening Star, <sup>of Washington DC.</sup> printed the Harker story  
nearly in its entirety ~~but~~ <sup>it</sup>  
(in the shorter section of the paper  
(9 Sept 1963, page B-4). <sup>it</sup> But reordered  
the content of the Harker interview,  
placing the emphasis of the ~~the~~ political  
aspects - in particular highlighting the Gold-  
water element ~~which~~ and burying  
the Coster's explicit ~~the~~ warning to U.S.  
leadership in the middle ~~part~~ of  
the piece.

There is no evidence in the <sup>Agency's</sup> files ~~the~~

with or without CIA's knowledge or  
more properly, the knowledge of the  
President's brother, Robert Kennedy,  
who was personally involved with  
overnight Cuban matters at the  
Federal level after the Bay of Pigs  
failure.

~~Delgado~~

Lettering

Cuban Contact with Oswald, Santa Ana, California, <sup>and</sup>

1959? The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains <sup>an</sup> as-

~~the~~ sections of general significance to any review of the background of LHO's feelings toward ~~and possibly~~ and relations with Costa Rica. ~~of the~~

~~the~~ ~~only~~ record is concerned.

Delgado was probably the closest non-group member to Oswald <sup>his</sup> during special ~~at~~ training period at El Toro Marine Corps Base in 1959.

Dec 58 - Jan 1959. The Warren Commission ~~Report~~ <sup>Report</sup>

takes note of this:

"Oswald told Delgado that he was in trade with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country; which Delgado at first took to be "one of his hobbies, but later believed."

1. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Wash. 1964), p. 687. Hereafter cited as, Report.

14-00000

Actually Oswald's testimony may have had more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report and has not appeared to have been imbedded or disclosed by investigators. While the record of Oswald's <sup>the beginning of</sup> ~~beginning~~ relationships with the Cubans ~~and~~ starts with a question mark.

Delgado  
The period was one of transition in US-Cuban relations after Castro's takeover. ~~Both~~ Delgado, and Belgado at the outset, were North Castro supporters, Edward having particularly been about how to get there. Delgado testified:

"... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that I told him that we were on friendly terms with

Cuba, you know, is in the moment no  
subject of an abstract you know.  
I didn't know what to answer him.  
I told him to see them.

"After a while, he told me he was in  
contact with them ....

"... I saw this envelope in his foot locker,  
well-looked, and it was addressed to  
him, and they had an official seal  
on it, and as far as I could recall  
that was mail from Los Angeles, and  
he was telling me there was a Cuban  
consul. And just after he started receiving  
these letters - you see, he would  
never go out, he'd stay near the  
post all the time ....

"... he had one visitor. After he started  
receiving letters he had one visitor.  
It was a man, because I got the  
call from the MP guard shack, and  
they gave me a call that Donald  
had a visitor at the front gate. This  
man had to be a civilian, otherwise they  
would have let him in. So I had  
to find somebody to release Donald, who  
was our guard, to go down there to  
visit with this fellow, and they spent  
about an hour and a half, 2 hours  
talking, I guess, and he came back.  
I don't know who the man was  
or what they talked about, but he  
looked worried about the whole



them when he came back. I was waiting  
at the way, sitting.

"He inquired. How long did the talking to him,  
do you remember?

"Mr. Delgado, about an hour and half, 2  
times....

"Mr. Wheeler. You never asked Oswald what the  
yellow was that he talked to?

"Mr. Delgado. No. No....

"Mr. Wheeler. Did you connect his visit that  
Oswald had at that time with the Cuban  
Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: I did; because I thought it  
funny for him to be receiving a cable  
at such a late date - time. Also, up to  
this time he hardly ever received mail, in  
fact he almost never received mail from home  
because I made it a policy ~~for~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~  
~~every address~~ received mail from home,  
because I made it

I used to pick up the mail for one hour  
and distribute it to the guys in the, and  
very seldom did I see one for him. But  
very so often, after he started to get in  
contact with these Cuban people he started  
getting little pamphlets and little newspapers.

"... and he also started receiving  
letters, you know, and one booklet,  
maybe pamphlet, you know, little - like  
shreds, things we get from church, you  
know, but it wasn't a church.

Mr. Wheeler. Were they written in Spanish, any  
of them, do you know?  
Mr. Delgado. Not that I can recall, no.

Mr. Wheeler. Did you have any reason to believe  
that these things came to Cowell from the  
Cuban consuls?

Mr. Delgado. Well I took it for granted that they  
did, after I saw the envelope here.... Some-  
thing like a Mexican eagle, with a big,  
impressive seal - you know, they had  
different colors on it, red and white; I don't  
know what the colors, you know. But  
I can't recall the seal. I just know it was  
in Latin, Spanish, something like that I  
couldn't understand. It was Latin.

Mr. Wheeler. You don't know for sure whether  
it was from the Cuban consuls?

Mr. Delgado. No. But he had told me prior,  
just before I found that envelope in  
his wall locker, that he was receiving  
mail from them, and one time she  
offered to show it to me, but I wasn't  
much interested because at the time we  
had ~~the~~ work to do, and I never  
did ask to see that paper again, you  
know.

Mr. Wheeler. Did he tell you what his cor-  
respondence with the Cuban consuls  
was about?

Mr. Delgado. No; he didn't.

"Mr. DeLoach, did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversation about your book about going over to Cuba?"

"Mr. DeLoach, No. The only thing he told me was that right after we had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to — once he got out of the service he was going to Switzerland...." 2

2. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. HEARINGS before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Nov 1964) vol. VIII: 241-243.

Hereafter cited as, HEARINGS.

On 27 Sept 1959 he was issued a US passport valid for travel among other places for Cuba and the USSR.

Albert  
Council application to Schweizer College, Chaux-walden, Switzerland was dated 19 March 1959, and he was promised to report time by June or in April 1960. He returned for discharge from the Marines on 7 Dec 1959. He was accelerated his pay on alleged grounds of family hardship in Sept 1959. He contacted the Soviet Union through Zurich on 15 October 1959.

DeLoach's testimony is the cost of credibility. Denying that, it is a matter of basic importance to focus attention on the real victim who contacted off contacted it at Chaux El Tou com and

14-00000  
The most important, however, is that  
there is no mention of Oswald's activities in the US before or after  
his flight to Mexico. (The  
latter half of the document, 1/2 and 2 pages.)

The word reflects no identification of  
this contact. DeLoach's presumption is that he  
was from the <sup>(assuming that)</sup>  
Customs Consulate in Los Angeles. The question  
is: was there, reporting to Hoover  
in effect  
that would represent, at a minimal guess,  
the opening of a file on Oswald? <sup>3</sup>

US-Cuba diplomatic and consular relations  
were severed on 3 January 1961.

Indication of President Kennedy's demise by CP  
cell leader Morris Bennett Zabala, HQ. Guatemala  
 Station forwarded to HQ on 9 January 1964  
 a duplicate copy of a news report by a  
 penetrating source dated 5 January 1962  
 describing event at this year CP cell  
 meeting. The cell leader, Morris ~~ZABALA~~  
 Zabala told the cell said that the  
 Communist Party in Guatemala should  
 form a single new party: "We need  
 not preoccupy ourselves over the politics  
 of President Kennedy because we know,  
 according to prognostications, that he will  
 die within the present year, 1962."

This report apparently had been disseminated  
 by the ~~CP~~ Station <sup>when</sup> before it had been received  
 and was not forwarded until the Station  
 re-received all of its material <sup>(after the</sup> in compliance

assessors. The file reflect no follow up  
journal <sup>of report</sup>  
or dissemination ~~of information~~ not from  
~~possible to do any more~~ ~~or~~ ~~to~~ ~~necessary~~  
~~inquiries in that regard.~~

Emigrating Puerto Ricans by Cuban Third Secretary  
in the Hague 7 Nov 1963. A summary [redacted]

source, reportedly after the Kennedy assassination,  
indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 Nov  
1963, the Cuban Third Secretary Ricardo <sup>L.</sup> SANTA  
(Pera) discussed the ~~return~~ <sup>refugee</sup> ~~emigration~~ <sup>refugee</sup>  
issue on Cuba and their implications

with a host-country diplomat, concluding  
with the following admonition: "... just  
wait and you will see what we can  
do. It will happen soon." Asked to  
be more specific about what would  
happen soon Santa replied: "just  
wait, just wait."

(Phil Kessel)

(These data were passed to the Warren  
Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964.  
Santa was subsequently reported to have a

1

~~Allegations of... in...  
... ..~~

... ..  
... ..  
... ..  
... ..  
... ..

5. See, REPORT, p. 305 ff.

~~... ..~~

Among these cases, which concerned ...  
of ... ..  
... ..  
Nicaraguan ... ..  
ALVARADO ... ..  
NOTAS ... ..  
... ..  
... ..



San Francisco, California and 5)

Roy Dobkin

The Alvarado case is <sup>taken up</sup> discussed in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "D". <sup>6</sup> ~~The threat of~~ ALVARADO claims

6. See, REPORT, pp. 307-308.

~~account was~~  
that he had seen an American, whom he identified as Oswald, receive money somewhere in mid-September 1963 in the presence of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Alvarado's story was ultimately ~~shown to be~~ ~~the conclusion reached that he was lying~~

~~by the combination of~~  
[the use of the polygraph, which Alvarado showed deceptions, and the bringing Alvarado's Nicaraguan security

service control into its core. ~~That of~~

~~Alvarado~~

The Alvarado story is particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluators of observed evidence. ~~Even when it seems~~  
certain elements of the ~~story~~ persist despite the impairment of its major premises. In this case ALVARADO, ~~whose~~ whose account did not become public until the publication of the Warren Report in October 1964 — talked consistently of the presence in the  <sup>Cuban consulate</sup> transaction ~~of~~ ~~description of~~ a Negro with red-dyed hair.

Clemente Carrasco de Paz is a <sup>Mexican</sup> ~~Mexican~~ <sup>articulate and socially prominent</sup> ~~articulate~~ ~~and socially prominent~~ ~~character,~~

married, but separated, from a high ranking  
Mexican foreign service official. She is, also,  
the cousin of Horacio Duran, the husband  
of Silvia Duran, ~~the wife of the~~  
~~husband~~ ~~of Silvia Duran~~  
Cited above. ~~by name~~  
There is a

strong personal antipathy between  
the two women arising from  
Elena Carr's trenchant anti communism.

~~W.C.P.'s~~ ~~had~~ ~~the~~ ~~initial~~ ~~reference~~ ~~to~~  
From October 1964 until his retirement  
in the fall of 1969, the former ~~political~~  
Charles Thomas, ) a U.S. Embassy Officer,  
( persistently kept up a regular  
~~Charles Thomas~~  
stream of reports and memoranda  
reflecting CARR's account of what  
actually  
had gone on between Oswald, the  
Cubans and <sup>at</sup> <sup>Silvia</sup> Duran in September  
1963, ~~the~~ ~~striking~~ including ~~the~~  
a repeated reference to a Negro with  
~~the~~ ~~name~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~subject~~.

The first reference to the Garro  
story, ~~was noted in~~ was noted in  
Mexico Station  
a Memorandum of Record dated  
12 Oct 1964.

Eleana GARRO (said) that she  
and her daughter were invited  
to a party at the Cuban Embassy  
during the period she now finds  
out that Oswald was here in  
Mexico prior to the assassination.  
She was invited by a Mexican senator  
in the Cuban Embassy whose husband  
is a cousin of the Garro family  
(Horacio Duran). At the party, she  
saw ~~the~~ three gingsos, not  
drinking, not smoking and more  
or less just standing around  
together like 'three bumps on a  
log'. They were so obviously  
out of place, she asked someone  
in the Cuban Embassy about  
them and was told that "they  
were just passing through." She  
claims that on the way through  
these gingsos stood up she  
took a good look at them as  
her daughter. When news  
about Oswald's assassination and Oswald's  
pictures was spread into the news-  
papers, both Eleana and her daughter

immediately said that he was  
one of the "three geniuses" without  
a doubt' at the party

GARRO repeated her story to Mr.  
<sup>William</sup> Charles Thomas, <sup>an</sup> Embassy Political  
Officer on 10 Dec 1965: In Sept 1963

after her return from abroad, she was  
accompanied by her daughter,  
to a party, at the home of Ruben Duran  
[Emphoria added. Ruben is one of the two  
brothers of Horacio Duran], who married  
her cousin. She met Oswald and 2  
other young Americans. At the party  
she was discouraged from telling  
what he said. Other guests were the Cuban  
Consul AZCUE; General Clark FLOW,  
Silvia DILLON, who she later learned  
was Oswald's mistress while he was  
here, Emilio CARBALLIDO, and a  
Latin American negro man with

red hair. [Embassy added.] In  
November 1963 when the identity of the  
assassin became known, she and her  
daughters went to the Cuban Embassy and  
shorted "assassin" and other insults  
at the staff there. Shortly afterwards,  
she and her daughter <sup>(or CARILLO)</sup> were visited by  
a friend, Manuel (TRIVELLO), then  
an official in the Secretariat of  
the Gobernacion [headed at the  
time by ECHEVERRIA], and were  
told he had orders to escort  
them to a small and obscure hotel  
in the center of town. He was kept  
there for 8 days under pretext  
that they were in danger. When  
she told ~~that~~ CARILLO she wanted  
to go to the American Embassy and  
explain what she knew of Oswald,  
she was told that the American  
Embassy was full of Communist  
spies.

On the 25 Dec 1965 and 9 Jan 1966 in  
further interviews with Thomas, GERALD  
and her daughter elaborated and on

14-00000  
certain particulars, <sup>significantly</sup> modified ~~the~~ her  
mother's account. She also acknowledged that  
that she and her daughter had  
been interviewed earlier by Embassy  
officers to whom ~~she~~ she claimed  
they did not give a very complete  
story because ~~of~~: the Embassy officers  
did not appear to give much  
credence to anything they said.

It was developed that ~~the~~ GARRO  
and daughter had been interviewed by  
the legal Attaches on 17 and 24  
November 1964. Her informant's had  
been similar to what she claims  
in her account to Thorne, but had  
not been substantiated by inquiries.  
The FBI representatives therefore con-  
sidered the matter closed and reapp-

14-00000  
informed his disengagement from the matter  
to the CIA chief of file on 27 Dec 1965  
and to the Ambassador on 28 Feb 1965.

~~But~~ however,  
The Embassy Political Officer, present  
in his interview and reporting. A memoran-  
dum of conversation, 13 July 1966, in which  
GARRO identifies the ~~Hotel~~ <sup>place</sup> to which she  
had been taken by CALVILLO, as the Hotel  
Vermont. (This detail checked out  
affirmatively. J. GARRO was at the  
Hotel ~~from~~ 23-24, 25-27, and 28-30  
November 1963.) Another on 7 Feb 1967  
in which GARRO's continuing vicissitudes  
with the Cubans are set out. The end  
finally, upon Thomas' retirement from  
the <sup>U.S.</sup> State Government service, the Depart-  
ment of State at his request, <sup>28 August 1969,</sup> disseminated  
to CIA and FBI a ~~confidential~~ <sup>extrapolation of his</sup> ~~problem~~



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reporting of the <sup>then</sup> GARO interview.

Then the matter was ~~re-examined~~  
~~date of origin of~~

GARO's chronology of <sup>the</sup> events she  
described ~~in~~ as having occurred  
in the Mexican capital,

(in September 1963 ~~was~~ <sup>confirmed</sup> ~~did~~ <sup>near</sup>  
coincided with the ~~known~~

date of the Oswald's presence there.

Her story however had two points  
congruence with ~~the~~ <sup>other</sup> ~~allegations~~ <sup>allegations by</sup>  
other) <sup>(a)</sup>

Regarding Oswald: Alvarado's allegations  
regarding the Negro with the Red-dyed

hair. [ This detail could, however, be  
gleaned from the Warren Commission's

account of the "D" case ] and (b)

Sylvia Duran's <sup>own later claim of</sup> ~~allegations of~~ ~~intimate~~

~~intimate~~ personal contacts with Oswald.

14-00000  
⑧  
Lartigue has

and amplified in My 57  
Begin in March ~~1967~~ the American <sup>1967</sup>  
Benjamin J. ROYLE  
Consul, in Tampico developed a contact

with a local Mexican journalist, Oscar  
Lartigue

COATEHUAC (with Oswald contacts) <sup>with other pro-Castro students</sup>

to have encountered Oswald at the

University of Mexico campus in September

1963.

June  
in 1969, Contreras was interviewed

by - CIA officer.

He studied law at the Univ. of  
Mexico for 3 years, approximately  
1960-1964. He belonged to a clandestine  
pro-Castro Revolutionary  
group at the University. Regarding  
the Oswald case he was extremely  
cautious and ~~was~~ and although  
he was not able or willing to  
give dates and names, he said  
Oswald visited the University of  
Mexico campus shortly after the  
Cuban Embassy refused him a  
visa to visit Cuba. Oswald  
made inquiries regarding pro-  
Cuban revolutionary groups at

the University and was directed to Contreras and his friends. Oswald met Contreras and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. Oswald told the group it was urgent he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy denied him a visa. He requested aid from Contreras' group. Contreras and others mistrusted Oswald because they felt he was a CIA provocateur. The group allowed Oswald to accompany them the rest of that day, that night and part of the next day. Oswald was very interested and appeared to be slightly crazy. Oswald made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

with FBI knowledge,  
At this point, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that Contreras was indeed at the University of ~~the~~ Mexico but ~~only~~ only for the years 1959 and 1960. ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> that he had been publicly associated <sup>protest</sup> in activities for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (SRB) in

James Stewart,  
about 1961, ~~and~~ the group closed functioning  
midway  
as well as the 1962 and Oscar Contreas was  
never one of its leaders. ~~That is~~

No further work ~~on~~ is reflected in the  
files on the Contreas allegations. If apart  
from the uncorroborated claims made  
by Contreas about his own presence at  
the University, there is an additional  
element that undermines the credibility  
of his account: Oswald's <sup>which was barely adequate to get him</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>never near his hotel, it</sup> ~~seems hardly likely to~~  
~~not~~ have permitted him to ~~function with~~  
a university.

anyone ~~with~~ for an extended period with  
a University student group.

22 November 1963.

9. Mexico Station telegram 7021  
(IN - 66896), 23 November 1963. 1  
page. 02:44 2 times

~~10. Mexico Station telegram -~~

10. CIA Hqs. telegram to Mexico  
Station, DIR - 84822, 23 Nov  
1963. (1 page. 04:22 2 times.)

11. Mexico Station telegram,  
7027 (In - 67185), 23 Nov 1963.  
20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram  
7025 (In 67186, 23 Nov 1963  
20:34 2 times) and 7033 (In -  
67232, 23 Nov 1963, 22:46 2 times).  
[Forward transcript texts.]

10-00000  
Mexico Station telegram, 7020 (In-66591).

23 Nov 1963, 02:31 2 times!

11. CIA Hqs. telegrams to Mexico Station,  
DIR-84821 and 84822, 23 Nov 1963,  
01:36 2 times and 04:22 2 times, respectively.  
1 page, each.

Mexico Station telegram, 7027 (In-67187),  
23 Nov 1963, 20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram 7025, 23 November  
1963. 16:55 2 times. [Forward transcript  
information] 2 pages

~~Mexico Station~~

CIA  
13. Hqs. telegram to Mexico Station, ~~DIR~~  
(DIR-84888), 23 Nov 1963, 17:29 2 times.  
1 page

New  
order 14. [This is Mexico 7025 & 7033, which you  
already have.]

15. Mexico Station telegram 7020  
(In-67189)

16. Mexico Station telegram 7029, (23 Nov 1963,  
20:48 2 times.

17. Mexico Station 7035 (Inv 69235),  
23 Nov 1963, 2254 2 hrs.

18. Memorandum For the Record by Chief of Station, Mexico, 11 April 1964. Subject: Visit by Three Staff Representatives of Warren Commission. 3 pages and covering dispatches (HMAA 23249, 14 April 1964)

~~19-23~~

Texts of

19-23. ~~Texts of~~ Intercept 27, 28 September and 1, 3 October 1963. [For 27 and 28 texts in both Spanish and English, for 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>, in English translation only].

24-26. Five photographs of unidentified individual entering and leaving Soviet Embassy, (1 October 1963.  
Mexico City, Graham)

27-29. Five photographs of unidentified individual in front of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 4 October 1963.  
Graham

30. Two photographs of unidentified individual, taken in front of Cuban Embassy, 15 October 1963.



31-34. Mexico Station - CIA Hqs correspondence, 18 pages 3

18, 29 May and 26 June and

3 July 1967 relative to negatives of photographic notes at 28-30, above.

35. letter by D.A. Deputy Director for Plans, Mr Helms to Mr. J. Lee Rankin, 23 July 1967. 1 page.

36-7. Texts of affidavits by Bradwell D. ODUM, James R. MALLEY and Richard Helms. Hearings, vol. XI, pp. 468-70.

UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproductions of Odum Exhibit No 1 ~~and~~ (Hearings, vol XX, p 691) and Commission Exhibit 237 (Hearings vol XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED

39. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, pages 364-5 and 667, dealing with the photographs of the unidentified individual. UNCLASSIFIED

... (Classified)

40. A Selection of Postment, Documents reflecting <sup>CIA</sup> Hqs and Mexico Stations Reactions to and Handling of the Warren Commission Publications of the Photo of the unidentified individual, September - October 1964

41. Letter by CIA General Counsel, Lawrence R. Hornston to the Honorable Bernard T. Bagert, United District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, 16 May 1967. 2 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Correspondence with <sup>Hq.</sup> Emory L. Brown 4, 17 April, 1970. 3 pages. UNclassified

43. Correspondence with Mr. Paul L. HOCHT, 1 and 15 November 1971 and 24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 8 pages. UNCLAS-SIFIED

44. Correspondence <sup>with and related to</sup> ~~with~~ <sup>and related to</sup> ~~and related to~~ <sup>Requests by</sup> ~~Requests by~~ <sup>Mr.</sup> ~~Mr.~~ <sup>Bernard Fensterwald Jr.</sup> ~~Mr.~~

Bernard Fensterwald Jr. March 22 1971; 8 April (2 HORS); 9-18 February 1972; 24 Feb - 6 March 1972; 11-13 April 1972; 26 and 29 June 1972; 28 July and 17 August 1972; and ~~and~~

<sup>by</sup> Mr Houston <sup>to</sup> Director, FBI <sup>on</sup> <sup>internal</sup> <sup>memorandum</sup> <sup>dated</sup> 11 October 22 - together with two supporting pages, a Cable from Mexico Station dated 3 October 1972, and the transcript of interview, dated 11 October, 1972. 43 pages.

DC/Agoo

Subject: Review of Selected Items in the  
Lee Harvey Oswald File re  
Allegations of the ~~Communist~~ <sup>Communist</sup> Labor  
Involvement in the John  
F. Kennedy Assassination.

~~Reference~~

The attached <sup>review and summary.</sup> ~~report~~, was written at  
the express request of Mr. David W. Belin,  
as a follow up to questions # 3  
of his letter to the Agency of 15 April  
1975.

The results as I have already told  
him - add nuance, not evidence, to  
what the Warren Committee and its  
staff had laid before them in 1964.

~~Delivered to [unclear]~~  
~~All clear to [unclear]~~

still subject of [unclear]

The results of the review are stipulated  
in the ~~report~~ <sup>attached</sup> at para 8 of the attached.

invest.

of the  
- The documentation for the  
two copies -

This is a comparison with the  
series of the ~~file~~ photographs - the -  
Unidentified - Individual, submitted  
a few weeks ago.

of the case data

There seemed to be no reason to  
attach the copies of the <sup>case</sup> reports  
from the file to this summary. These  
can be made <sup>promptly</sup> available, however, with a  
request.

Background

On Saturday evening, September 7, 1963, Fidel Castro, in an act unusual for him, appeared at the Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana. Even more unusual Castro submitted to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent Daniel HARKER'S.

HARKER'S interview ~~was~~ <sup>reached</sup> New York on Sunday, September 8<sup>th</sup>, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, September 9<sup>th</sup>. There can be no question from the facts surrounding the Castro appearance, <sup>which had not been expected,</sup> and his agreement to the interview, that this was a unprecedented & more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message through ~~the press~~ on the record in the

Castro's statements  
United States. The ~~Harker~~ interview  
~~concerned~~  
to HARKER covered a range of topics  
but dealt principally  
about (with ~~future~~ American  
political leadership, ~~with~~ in particu-  
lar President Kennedy whom he  
excoriated in extraordinarily provocative  
fashion ("... Kennedy is a ~~victim~~," the  
Batista of his times ... the most opportunist  
American President of all time."), ~~there~~  
~~uncomplimentary~~  
were references to Senator Goldwater,

The interview had other content,  
~~rather~~ uncomplimentary, reference  
to Senator Goldwater, and Cuban delay  
in signing the limited nuclear test  
ban and <sup>there were significant differences</sup>  
~~was~~ <sup>in the ~~new~~ ~~part~~</sup> played by  
US newspapers, <sup>(like the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>Time</sup> ~~and~~  
Washington, ~~where this~~ with a result

that Castro's "message" ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> significantly  
modulated.

In New Orleans, where he formerly  
resided until the middle of September  
1968, the HARKER story appeared in  
the principal morning newspaper,  
the TIMES-PIRAYUNE on Monday, Sept  
8, page seven under a three  
column headline: "Castro Blasts  
Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leader  
Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." ~~The~~  
story then followed under the Harker  
by-line:

1  
The New York Times, in its coverage on  
Sept 9<sup>th</sup> used a UPI wire service report which  
omitted any reference to the warning ~~present~~



The results of the review - admittedly  
leaving <sup>utilizing</sup> ~~substantiated~~ <sup>of</sup> the 20-20  
quality of hindsight - may be  
stipulated in summary:

(a) There is no increment of <sup>credible</sup> evidence ~~of~~  
of ~~political~~ Soviet <sup>and</sup> or Cuban political,  
intelligence or security service involvement  
~~with~~ to what was developed and  
considered by the Warren Commission

and its staff. ~~The~~ The Commission's  
~~to the extent that the report properly reflects, based on a~~  
~~finding, therefore, (that) LEO was the killer~~  
~~on the basis of credible evidence~~  
of JFK and Officer Tippett and did  
<sup>and of his own determination</sup>  
~~that~~ them in alone, must stand.

(b) "credible evidence" that would <sup>upset</sup>  
<sup>change</sup>  
significantly  
or modify this judge fact (and law)  
not exist in Webster's ~~for~~  
), but it  
~~is clear that~~ such evidence could

of this kind and that indeed was the  
opinion at the working level, particu-  
larly in the Counter Intelligence  
component in 1964.

or new  
② In the absence of additional "credible"  
evidence there are "meager"  
elements in the record that ~~may~~  
~~may~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~review~~ ~~are~~  
~~review~~ ~~etc.~~

is noteworthy, in the light of <sup>the</sup>  
~~the~~ conclusions, ~~(a) and (b)~~  
of ~~the~~ ~~review~~ ~~and~~  
other ~~circumstances~~  
shown, ~~circumstances~~

(d) ~~is~~ ~~of~~ ~~great~~ ~~potential~~ ~~significance~~  
~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~review~~ ~~and~~ ~~circumstances~~  
~~shown~~ ~~circumstances~~  
~~shown~~ ~~circumstances~~  
~~shown~~ ~~circumstances~~  
of great potential significance

(e) ~~is~~ ~~of~~ ~~great~~ ~~potential~~ ~~significance~~  
~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~review~~ ~~and~~ ~~circumstances~~  
~~shown~~ ~~circumstances~~  
~~shown~~ ~~circumstances~~  
~~shown~~ ~~circumstances~~  
of great potential significance  
important ~~circumstances~~  
of ~~great~~ ~~potential~~ ~~significance~~

get this great production of Oswald  
from the program, psychiatric, and  
his education with field notes  
and to look into going back to  
study by Cuban.  
etc

(going back.  
and, Cuban revolution, which is directly  
traceable as far back as his Marine  
Corps service in El Toro, California.)  
(If Oswald read Castro's threat and  
warning?)

What about

(Get more info  
on Oswald's  
statements to AF correspondents  
Hosken - irrespective of the extent  
whether there was any formal records,  
or even secret service contact with  
Oswald by the Cubans or the Soviets,  
anyhow  
could there be any acts of singular  
responsibility and under no circumstances  
allowable, retroactive for what the Cubans might  
were doing during the summer of 1963,

with or without CIA's knowledge, the  
man proposed, the knowledge of the  
President's brother, Robert Kennedy,  
who was personally involved with  
overseeing Cuban matters at the  
Federal level after the Bay of Pigs  
failure.

(Delgado) <sup>Delgado</sup>  
Cuban Contact and Oswald, <sup>in</sup> Washington, D.C., <sup>in</sup>  
1959? The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains <sup>in</sup>  
~~the~~ sections of general significance to my  
review of the background of LHO's feelings  
toward and <sup>possibly</sup> relations with Costa Rica. Delgado  
is a key figure in the case.

Delgado was probably the closest ~~person~~ <sup>friend</sup>  
member to Oswald <sup>his</sup> during <sup>his</sup> specialist training  
period at El Toro Marine Corp. Base <sup>in</sup> 1957  
Dec 58 - Sept 1959. The Warren Commission Report  
takes note of this.

\* Oswald told Delgado that he  
was in touch with Cuban diplomatic  
officials in this country; which Delgado  
at first took to be "one of his ~~stories~~  
lies, but later believed." 1

1. Report of the President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy  
(Wash. 1964), p. 687. Hereafter cited as  
Report.

Cuba, you know, is the main subject  
subject of our absolute program here.  
I didn't know what to do with him.  
I told him to see them.

"After a while, he told me he was in  
contact with them....

"... I saw this envelope in his foot locker  
well-looked, and it was addressed to  
him, and they had an affair real  
on it, and as far as I could recall  
that was mail from Los Angeles, and  
he was telling me there was a Cuban  
consul. And just after he started receiving  
these letters I got here, he would  
never go out, he'd stay near the  
post all the time....

"... he had one visitor - after he started  
receiving letters he had one visitor.  
It was a man, because I got the  
call from the US Guard shack, and  
they gave me a call that Oswald  
had a visitor at the front gate. This  
man had to be a courier, otherwise they  
would have let him in. So I had  
to find out what it was Oswald, who  
was our guard, to go down there to  
visit with this fellow, and they spent  
about an hour and a half, I guess,  
talking, I guess, and he came back.  
I don't know what the man was  
or what they talked about, but he  
looked somewhat about the whole

14-00000  
"The rebels. I saw him. Did you talk to him,  
do you remember?"

"The jailer, about an hour and half, 2  
hours...."

"The rebel. You were asked Corwell about this  
bellow was that he talked to?"

"The jailer. No. No...."

"The rebel. Did you correct the mist that  
Corwell had at that time with the Cuban  
Comrades?"

"The jailer: I did; because I thought it  
funny for him to be receiving a letter  
at such a late date - time. Well, up to  
this time he hardly ever received mail, in  
fact he all but cleared, read of from home  
because I made it a policy, in fact, to  
never address received mail from home,  
because I made it -"

"I used to pick up the mail for one hour  
and distribute it to the guys in the, and  
very seldom did I see one for him. But  
every so often, after he started getting  
contact with these Cuban people he started  
getting letters, pamphlets and other newspapers."

"... and he also started receiving  
letters, you know, and one book  
maybe pamphlet, you know, little - little  
things, things was got from church, you  
know, but it wasn't a choice."

"Mr. Wheeler. Were they written in Spanish, or  
in French, or in German?  
"Mr. Delgado. That that I can recall, no.

"Mr. Wheeler. Did you have any reason to believe  
that these things came to Oswald from the  
Cuban consulate?

"Mr. Delgado. Well I took it for granted that they  
did, after I saw the address here... some-  
thing like a Mexican eagle, with a flag,  
impression of seal you know. They had  
different colors on it, red and white; I don't  
know what the colors, you know. But  
I can't recall the seal. I just know it was  
in Latin, I think, something like that I  
couldn't understand. It was Latin.

"Mr. Wheeler. You don't know for sure whether  
it was from the Cuban consulate?

"Mr. Delgado. No. But he had told me prior,  
just before I found that envelope, as in  
his work books, that he was receiving  
mail from them, and one time she,  
offered to show it to me, but I wasn't  
much interested because at the time I  
had ~~the~~ work to do, and I never  
did ask to see that, you know, you  
know.

"Mr. Wheeler. Did he tell you what his cor-  
respondence with the Cuban consulate  
was about?

"Mr. Delgado. No; he didn't.



"Mr. DeLoach said he was positive to you that at that time he was in conversation with you and about going over to Cuba?"

"Mr. DeLoach. No. Actually, they he told me was about eight after we had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to — once he got out of the service he was going to Switzerland." "

2. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. HEARINGS Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of

President Kennedy, (H.R. 704) Vol. III: 241-243.

Hereafter cited as, HEARINGS.

Jan 27 Sept 1959 he was named a US passport agent for travel - common with plans for Cuba and the USSR.

Albin

Council application to Switzerland College Board - Walden, Switzerland was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report same to James on 21 April 1960. Indicted for discharge from the Marines on 7 Dec 1954. Allegedly accelerated his exit on alleged grounds of family hardship in Sept 1953. He contacted the Soviet Union through early Finland on 15 October 1959.

DeLoach's testimony has the cost of credibility, meaning that, it is less of basic importance to form attention of the real sector who contacted it at least it was easy and

The report on the...  
 there is...  
 ...  
 ...

... reflects no advertisements, identifications of

this contact. DeLoach's presumption is that he  
 was informed assuming this

... Cuban Communist in his rights. The question

... is: was there reporting to Havana  
 in effect

that would represent, at a minimum guess,

the opening of a file on Oswald? 3

US - Cuban Diplomatic and consular relations  
 were severed on 3 January 1961.

Indication of incident involving house of ...  
cell leader ...

Station forwarded to HQ on 4 January 1964  
a duplicate copy of a news report by a  
penetrating source dated 5 January 1962  
describing events at the year end cell  
meeting. The cell leader, MORSE SANCHEZ  
Zabala told me said that the  
Communist Party in Guatemala should  
form a single new party: "We need  
not preoccupy ourselves over the politics  
of President Kennedy because we know,  
according to prognostications, that he will  
die within the present year, 1962."

This report apparently had been discussed  
by the <sup>HQ</sup> Station <sup>when</sup> but it had been received  
and was not forwarded until the Station  
re-received all of its material <sup>after the</sup> in compliance

associations. The following  
 journal  
 or ~~circumstances~~ ~~of the~~ ~~committee~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~from~~  
~~possible to do any~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~necessary~~  
~~inquiries in that regard.~~

4  
Imaginary Friends by Cuban Third Secretary  
in the Hague 7 Nov 1963. of similar relation

source, reportedly after the Kennedy assassination,  
indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 Nov  
1963, <sup>the</sup> Cuban Third Secretary Ricardo <sup>L</sup>SANTO  
(son) <sup>refugee</sup> discussed the <sup>refugee</sup> ~~subject~~ <sup>subject</sup>

write on Cuba and their implications  
with a host-country diplomat, concluding  
with the following admission: "... just  
wait and you will see what we can  
do. It will happen soon." Asked to  
be more specific about what would  
happen soon Santo replied: "Just  
wait, just wait."

(Phil Rissold)

(These data were passed to the Warren  
Commission by memorandum, 31 March 68.  
Santo was subsequently reported to have a

14-00000

3

a history of great instability and was  
occasional from the 1940s  
for a reported air census related to that point,  
in August 1966.

(a) "case" is probably identical with  
"case" in [unclear] a case [unclear] the  
Cuban [unclear] General [unclear]  
([unclear]) [unclear] - The [unclear] is  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] returned to  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

(b) The first [unclear] element in [unclear] city  
in the fall of 1963 was headed by [unclear]  
MIRABAL - [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
1963, [unclear] [unclear] who had arrived on 2 Sept  
[unclear] on the appointment of  
the [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] (deposed 19 Nov  
1963). The [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] June  
1964, MIRABAL's [unclear] was named  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear].

(c) [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] named in  
[unclear]'s conversation was the [unclear] [unclear]  
~~and~~ a [unclear] national, [unclear] [unclear]  
L49's [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
on 27 and 28 September, to the [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
with a [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

(The [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
The [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]





unconscious mind of things.

My hypothesis is that  
each one of the world

There is no evidence in the world case  
that that which is known can be related  
to a systematic distortion of interpretation  
that distorted the world.

It would have related the distorted  
distortion with known distorted — known  
— known and

conferred by intercept — with the

distorted

data which are the known on the

distorted known known — its personalities  
method — in known known known

for a case with known known known — known

to known known known known known — known

for the application to known known known

by a known known known known known

known known known known known

14-00000  
The release that had been taken earlier?

As a chief of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~department~~ <sup>department</sup> what were the answers

to this question, then remain the more  
fundamental question: Would they accept  
the Simon story on its face, could it  
have happened without the WGI elements  
above stated knowledge and participation?

~~Just reply Simon~~ It is doubtful that

the reply could be other than a solid negative  
and in that case, it is palpable that Coster's

<sup>was</sup> intelligence and security service <sup>could</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup>

was more in the file than has been surfaced

in the Simon's statements. ~~But~~ <sup>But</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~file~~ <sup>file</sup>

this suggests that

Coming back to the beginning: "wise" —  
unless <sup>(under)</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>will</sup> ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~department~~ <sup>department</sup> could  
very well have had <sup>had</sup> ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> ~~information~~ <sup>information</sup> that

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would make what she said to be unscientific

rather than of a casual  
order for a matter of  
more substantial illness or hospital self-indulgence

illness - not a possibility, concluded.

There was examined at the time.

Since we can't discuss the...  
like administration...  
1967...)

...  
the Silvia...  
alone. In that context...  
also... to...  
of the intercepted...  
on 26 November 1963;

(... the Cuban incident, IDORT 1205  
and the... in Mexico, Joaquin  
demanded... because the threat of  
the conversation...  
question whether...  
...  
...  
...  
Mexican interrogators.)

...  
... in the Spring

~~SECRET~~



①

Allegations of...  
... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

5. In Report p. 305 ff.

... ..

Among these cases, which concerned ... ..

... ..

... ..

Nicaraguan ... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

idea like it. The United States has been...  
through the ~~... ..~~

... ..  
... ..

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the

... ..  
... ..  
... ..

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... ..

... ..  
... ..  
all.

SUBJECT: The Photo of an Unidentified Individual in the  
Warren Commission Report: A Factual  
Chronological Survey

REFERENCE: Memorandum by David W. Belin to Mr. E. Harry Knoche,  
15 April 1975 (Attachment A)

1. Reference memorandum suggests it would be appropriate to reconsider full disclosure at this time of the circumstances and factual data relative to the Subject. The purpose of this survey is to permit a realistic evaluation of the suggestion.

2. Background. This examination and summary of the record concerns a cropped photograph considered by the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (hereinafter cited as the Warren Commission) and introduced into evidence as Odum Exhibit No. 1.<sup>1</sup> The photograph (together ~~with~~ *with* ~~others~~ with others of the same individual) originated from a ~~photo~~ *photo* ~~and~~ *intelligence* highly sensitive operation being conducted in October 1963 by the CIA  against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

3. Under the ~~provisions~~ *provisions* the extraordinary efforts<sup>1</sup> to develop information on the assassin and the assassination, copies of the

---

<sup>1</sup> See Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (hereinafter cited as Hearings), Vol. XX, page 691.



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photograph were made available by CIA's Mexico Station Chief on the afternoon of 22 November to the local FBI representative, and <sup>essentially on the decision</sup> later that day, ~~the~~ <sup>of the Ambassador,</sup> copies were ~~shown~~ <sup>by a special flight carried out by the US Naval Attache,</sup> by the U.S. Naval Attache and conveyed by ~~the~~ <sup>2 of the FBI - copied by the FBI,</sup> FBI representative to the Dallas office <sup>as to possible use</sup> in the ongoing investigation. ~~One~~ <sup>Oswald's mother,</sup> photograph was shown to Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD, in Dallas on the evening of 23 November 1963 by FBI Agent ~~Richard~~ D. ODUM.

4. The Warren Commission's Report describes the sequence of events at pp.364-365 and 667 (Attachment B) which ultimately resulted in Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD's allegation that she had been shown a cropped photo of Jack RUBY, the day before he murdered her son. (A further complication leading to this conclusion <sup>was</sup> ~~had been~~ the fact that when she had been shown a copy of the same photograph in her appearance before the Commission, it had been cropped <sup>in Washington</sup> by the FBI in a slightly different manner.)

5. No detail in the Warren Commission report illustrates more vividly than this one the difficulties that beset simple truth in the politicized, rigidly determined <sup>the</sup> interpretive climate that has been nurtured by the media over the past decade <sup>about the Kennedy assassination</sup>. The photograph, (now) acknowledged not to be RUBY, has ~~not~~ become a

Continued to  
prosecution for  
"speculators" and  
less now

*the* centerpiece *of an alternate hypothesis* ~~of an alternate explanation~~ that holds OSWALD to have been "framed" by the use of a double in his activity in Mexico City.<sup>2</sup>

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD - Reporting Mexico City Stay. Although in no way related to Lee Harvey OSWALD or his stay in Mexico City

from the morning of 27 <sup>Sept</sup> ~~May~~ 1963 to the morning of 2 October 1963, *at*

*(sent on set D)*  
~~the~~ photograph of the unidentified man originated during OSWALD's

stay there. ~~and~~ It is (therefore important) to an understanding of

*(its acquisition and handling D)*  
~~what was done with~~ the photograph by the Mexico City Station to

review ~~the facts about~~ what the Station ascertained and did with ~~the~~

information it developed about OSWALD in Mexico City, together

with Headquarters action on ~~the~~ information, ~~before the assassination~~

~~on 22 November 1963, and immediately thereafter.~~

7. From all credible evidence known to this time (none, incidentally, added since the exhaustively unique work of the Warren Commission), Lee Harvey OSWALD spent 4 full days and 2 partial days--about 116 hours in all--in Mexico City from about 10:00 a.m. 27 September 1963 to about 8:30 a.m. 2 October 1963. His <sup>base</sup> point of residence was a small commercial traveler hotel, not frequented by "gringos"--the Hotel Comercio --

<sup>2</sup> This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and the Man Who Was Not Oswald" by Bernard Fensterwald and George O'Toole in the New York Review of Books, a copy of which is attached to reference (Attachment A).

where he was registered under alias. Exhaustive and detailed interviews and interrogation by the Mexican authorities and the FBI <sup>after the assassination,</sup> established that in the recollection of all hotel personnel he left early and returned late each day of his stay.

8. Assuming, and allowing for the fact of late arrival and early departure, that he slept one-third of the time of his stay (38 or 39 hours), there remain some 78 hours of activity to be accounted for. Overall, <sup>information</sup> ~~the basis of~~ CIA's <sup>coverage</sup> ~~coverage~~ can account solely <sup>(very brief periods)</sup> for ~~coverage~~ during 27, 28 September and 1 October.

All coverage by CIA during the entire period was technical. The

Station had no live source (living agent) coverage either

or from

[redacted] <sup>It should be noted that</sup> [redacted] OSWALD was in no sense "under investi-

gation." None of the facts of his defection and stay in the USSR

and return to the U.S., 1959 - 1962, were <sup>known to</sup> ~~registered~~ in Mexico

Station files before 10 October 1963, when the <sup>basic bones of his biography</sup> information was

forwarded by Headquarters in response to <sup>a cabled</sup> Station report of

8 October <sup>which had</sup> forwarded, on a routine basis, what <sup>appeared</sup> to be an

<sup>by a!</sup> any American contact for a visa to Cuba in transit to the USSR. <sup>This had</sup>

indicated and deduced from technically acquired information on

1 October, which was the first and only occasion in which <sup>Oswald</sup>

identified himself by true name. <sup>(partially)</sup> At no time during his stay in

9. At no time during his stay in Mexico City did the CIA ~~want~~ acquire a photo of him. →

A careful review of all coverage, voice intercept, as well as photographic, of both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies was ~~made~~ *conducted* by the Station on 22 and 23 November 1963 after the assassination, going back to materials from mid-year. It is, therefore, firm that there was no CIA photo coverage of OSWALD at any time during his Mexico trip or stay in Mexico City. Moreover, *although it has made a call* despite its request on 15 October, the Mexico Station had no photo of OSWALD in its records, nor did it receive one from Headquarters before 22 November 1963.

*During this intercept remains*  
 10. *transmits* voice intercept ~~data~~ *and other pertinent* by the monitor on the basis of the 1 October intercept--which had been reported to Headquarters and disseminated to the interested members of the intelligence community (as an ex-Marine, OSWALD was a Navy and FBI case under the delimitations, and potentially of interest to the Department of State)--~~tuned up matches based on content, not on announced identity,~~ with materials intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963. *These matches were reported to Hqs. on 23 November 1963. Analysis* ~~Matches~~ based on voice comparison (except what could be recalled by the monitor--and this was not insignificant *element* because of the *memorably* ~~uniquely~~ poor Russian spoke by OSWALD) could not be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice, had been erased and re-used.

11. It ~~should be noted~~ <sup>must stressed</sup> that voice intercept and photographic <sup>(most normally, is not)</sup> coverage was not processed in "real time." The nature <sup>means</sup> of acquisition and the volume of the information precluded anything but the spot reporting of items judged by the monitor <sup>to be</sup> of more-than-ordinary ~~human~~ interest and, therefore, noted in summary logs. Full texts of selected items <sup>activity</sup> would require consultation of the tape and either a full transcription or full translation or both. Photo coverage tended to become available in quantity lots which required scanning and selection on a rapid and accelerated basis <sup>in 4 or 5 day "peaks"</sup>. One of the "triggers" that normally operated to focus and accelerate <sup>more speedily</sup> the ~~report~~ review and reporting of this kind raw intelligence <sup>was</sup> to the mention of a name. This <sup>as will be seen,</sup>

was precisely what occurred in the second of two conversations

OSWALD had on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy, <sup>during which the speaker</sup> ~~was~~ he said

he was "Lee OSWALD," ~~and~~ it was this information reported by the <sup>in its first indications on Oswald</sup> Station to Headquarters on 8 October 1963.

12. The Mexico City Station did one more thing in its report <sup>8<sup>th</sup> October</sup> on Lee OSWALD based on its 1 October voice intercepts: it coupled the data with descriptive information it had acquired from a collateral sensitive source--a photograph of a male individual, apparently an American, who was observed entering the Soviet Embassy on 1 October. The Station reported <sup>this</sup> these details as a

*reality of*  
coincident ~~fact~~ *fact*. The Station did not assert or suggest that the data ~~produced~~ *deduced* from the photo was in fact OSWALD, or indeed, *in* any way related to OSWALD.

13. Lee Harvey OSWALD - CIA Coverage of His Mexico City Stay.

One additional element of background must be stipulated now as the final precondition to understanding the relevance (or irrelevance) of the photo of the unknown individual placed in the chain of evidence on 23 November in Dallas by FBI Agent ~~Ed~~ Edwell ODUM: what was the totality of CIA ~~intercept~~ *intercept* coverage of OSWALD's activity as of the afternoon of the ~~22nd~~ *22nd* and 23rd when all available coverage had been rechecked?

14. The totality of Mexico City Station coverage on, or reasonably inferable to be OSWALD, consisted of five (5) voice intercepts as follows:

a. 27 September 1963 (Friday), 1605 Mexico City time.

Silvia DURAN, a local employee *a* of Mexican national *Jan* of the Cuban Embassy, ~~Consular~~ *Consular* section, a receptionist, speaks with an unknown male at the Soviet Embassy. Silvia DURAN tells the man that the American citizen was there, the one who wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union, and he wants to know with whom he was talking there because she *Duran* (Silvia) had sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if

they accepted him and gave him a visa, then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him a visa without further paper work, only advising Immigration in Cuba. <sup>The Soviet</sup> ~~He~~ wants to know with whom he had talked there because he says he was told there would be no

problem. The man in the Soviet Embassy says to wait a moment.

A different <sup>Soviet</sup> man speaks, and Silvia <sup>Duran</sup> explains the same thing to him. This man says to leave name and telephone number and says he will call back. Silvia <sup>Duran</sup> gives the telephone 11-28-47 (Cuban Consulate). <sup>she</sup> Silvia also takes advantage of the conversation

and states she has moved and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy of her change of address so that she can receive the

Soviet Embassy's Bulletin. The man says to call KOUKHARENKO to give her new address, then he asks the name of the Consul or Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa PROENZA and the telephone number is 14-13-26. The man says thanks.

b. 27 September 1963 (Friday), 1626 Mexico City time.

An unidentified male <sup>a Soviet,</sup> calls the Cuban consulate, asks Silvia DURAN if the American had been there. Silvia DURAN says he is there now. The Soviet says the American showed papers from the Consulate in Washington, that he wants to go to the Soviet Union and be there for a long time with his wife, who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in

respect to this problem, and according to this procedure it takes four or five months, but without having permission from the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot issue a visa there without asking Washington. However, according to this man, he showed a letter indicating he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa for the Soviet Union, and now he (the Soviet) does not know what to do with him (the American), because they have to wait for an answer from Washington.

Silvia DURAN agrees the same problem exists with the Cubans, that the problem with him (the American) is that he does not know anyone in Cuba and therefore if that is true it will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he was thinking of processing his visa (for the Soviet Union), because he knew it would require waiting a long time for his visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba, and from there go to the Soviet Union. The Soviet said the thing is that if his wife right now were in Washington she would receive her visa right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to her country, she is going to receive her visa in Washington but having this visa, she could communicate to any place this permission, for example here or any place she could receive it



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(visa or permission), but right now they do not have them.

*My Uncle* Silvia DURAN says certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. The Soviet says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia DURAN says then she will put that on the list. The Soviet says he cannot give a letter or recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and asks to be excused for bothering her. Silvia DURAN says that is all right and many thanks.

c. 28 September 1963. (Saturday), 1151 Mexico City time.

Silvia DURAN calls the USSR Embassy and <sup>tells</sup> to an unidentified Soviet <sup>She</sup> says that in the Cuban Embassy there is a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet says wait a minute. Silvia DURAN speaks English with someone--and comments in Spanish that they gave APARICIO telephone 14-12-99 and to take the number down--Silvia DURAN then says the American citizen is going to talk with you, i.e., the Soviet. The American first speaks Russian and the Soviet speaks English. They continue in English. The American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute. A Soviet takes the phone and asks the American in English what does he want? The American says please speak

Russian. The Soviet says what else do you want? The American says I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.

The Soviet says I knew that. The American, in hardly recognizable Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.

The Soviet says why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it is not far from the Cuban Embassy. The American says I'll be there right away.

d. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 1031 Mexico City time.

An unknown male (American) <sup>calls</sup> ~~contacts~~ the Soviet Embassy, the Military Attache's number, 15-69-<sup>B</sup>07, and says to an unidentified Soviet respondent: I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said that they would send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new? The Soviet says I would like to ask you to call another phone number. Please write it down: 15-60-55, and ask for a consul. Thank you.

e. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 1045 Mexico City time. The

same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian speaks to OBYEDKOV (a Soviet Embassy guard). He says: This is Lee OSWALD speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they would send a

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(telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul. OBYEDKOV says: KOSTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin-?). OSWALD says yes, My name is OSWALD. OBYEDKOV says, just a minute, I'll find out. They say that they have not received anything yet. OSWALD says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. OSWALD says, and what . . . ? OBYEDKOV hangs up.

15. All of these items, including the texts of the raw intercepts, were read, discussed with, and examined by the Warren Commission staffer in Headquarters and at the Mexico City Station during a stay from 8 to 13 April 1964.<sup>3</sup>

3. The Warren Commission group that visited the Mexico City Station consisted of Mr. COLFMAN, Mr. SLAWSON, and Mr. WILLENS. They examined not only the intercepts a through e above, but others for the 27th and one for 3 October that <sup>seem to</sup> ~~appear to~~ have relevance. These have not been included in this summary because they appear, on review, to be excludable from the OSWALD matter on logical or substantive grounds, or both, bearing in mind that the Soviet Embassy received many calls pertaining to visa matters.

On the 27th at 1037 the <sup>Embassy</sup> ~~Embassy~~ received a call from an unknown individual <sup>speaking Spanish</sup> who said he wanted visas to go to Odessa. He was told the consul was not in and to call back at 1130. OSWALD is known to have arrived at the Flecha Roja bus terminal on bus #516 at ca. 1000 on the 27th. It was, therefore, possible for him to have made this call. <sup>But</sup> Granting this, it <sup>is</sup> ~~seems~~ unreasonable to believe the calls were OSWALD's for the following reasons:

a. The caller wanted visas, and specifically for Odessa. OSWALD was seeking a visa and never in any ~~other~~ context did he specify the Black-Sea port of Odessa as a destination.

b. The call was directed to the correct Soviet consular number: 15-60-55. On ~~the 14th~~ <sup>the 14th</sup> October, OSWALD first called the wrong number, 15-69-87 (the MA's number), and had to redirect his call to the correct number, 15-60-55. It seems unlikely he would have made what would have been his initial call, on Friday the 27th, to the correct number, and called the incorrect number on 1 October.

c. There is every reason to believe from the context of the intercepts <sup>para 14</sup> a through e above, that OSWALD's first destination after arrival and check-in to his hotel, was a visit to the Cuban Embassy.

d. The use of the Spanish language would exclude OSWALD unless he made use of an intermediary, which seems unlikely <sup>from</sup> what is known of his modus operandi.

FOOTNOTE 3 (continuation)

On 3 October at 1539 an individual speaking broken Spanish; then English, called the Soviet Embassy and asked for a visa. The Soviet respondent says: Call on the other phone. The requestor says: I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia. The Soviet says: Please call on the telephone of the consul, 15-60-55. The requestor says: One moment please, I'll have to get a pencil to write the number down. They issue the visa there? The Soviet: That depends on your conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call the office of the consul and ask your question. The requestor asks for the number again. The Soviet gives him the number and tells him to ask for the Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

The relevance of this intercept to OSWALD is excludable on three grounds:

- a. The use of broken Spanish. OSWALD throughout used broken Russian or English. He had no competence in Spanish. *to handle*
- b. The substance of the request indicates a visa request in the first stages of initiation. OSWALD had developed his matter with the Cubans and the Soviets to a point well beyond *the previous initiation* the stage indicated by *the substance of this call.*
- c. OSWALD had left Mexico City, based on all the credible evidence, the early morning of the previous day, *2 October,* and could not have made this local call.

16. <sup>Each</sup> ~~any~~ Of these items, including the texts of the raw intercepts, were read, discussed with, and examined by Warren Commission staffers in Headquarters and at the Mexico City Station during a stay from 8 to 13 April 1964.<sup>3</sup> [footnote is on a separate page, but should be inserted in the final typing as part of the continuous text.]

17. <sup>Summarize</sup> Summing up, we can state, or reasonably infer from the evidence, that OSWALD made the following contacts with the Cuban and Soviet official establishments in Mexico City.

a. 27 September 1963 (Friday). After arrival and check-in to his hotel, OSWALD went first to the Cuban Embassy where he talked with Mrs. Silvia DURAN. The time of his first Cuban Embassy visit is unknown. The time of his second Cuban Embassy visit was about 1600 (i.e., just before closing). Sometime between the two Cuban Embassy visits, at Mrs. DURAN's indication, he must have visited the Soviet Embassy. We have coverage only on the second Cuban Embassy visit. We have no indication who he talked with at the Soviet Embassy. There was no photographic coverage of OSWALD's entries into either the Cuban or Soviet Embassies on the 27th. The lack of coverage on the Cuban installation is explainable: the camera, based on the recollection of officers still in service in Headquarters, was

down on the 27th because of mechanical malfunction, which was  
in course of correction. Why OSWALD was missed in his entry to  
the Soviet installation is not yet explained.

b. 28 September 1963 (Saturday). [Note: Both Cuban and  
Soviet Embassies were closed to the public on Saturdays.  
Photographic coverage was normally suspended Saturdays and  
Sundays.] OSWALD, notwithstanding the holiday schedule, went  
on Saturday morning to the Soviet Embassy (his second visit)  
where he spoke to a consul. He apparently could not recall  
his new Texas address. At ca. 11:51 he went to the Cuban  
Embassy--his third entry--where he had registered it in his  
visa application the day previously. He secured the address  
from Mrs. DURAN and she called the Soviet Consulate presumably  
to permit him to give them the address over the phone.

Instead, the Soviet with whom OSWALD spoke over Mrs. DURAN's  
telephone invited OSWALD to come back in person, and he said he  
would. (Presumably OSWALD thereupon went back to the Soviet  
installation (his third entry) ~~to give them his Texas address.~~)

c. 29 September 1963 (Sunday). No activity registered.

d. 30 September 1963 (Monday). No activity registered.

(It is known that OSWALD reserved space this date on a Mexico  
City-Loredo bus, departing 2 October 1963 at 0830.)

c. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday). OSWALD made at least two calls, at 1031 and 1045, to the Soviet Embassy. He identified himself twice during the second call when he talked with OBYEDIKOV--a guard--and referred to his talk on Saturday, probably with KOSTIKOV. There was no photographic coverage of OSWALD on 1 October; <sup>(if the following reasoning is correct, that could be)</sup> ~~from the context of the two calls, we know about,~~ <sup>concluded</sup> ~~there would have been no reason for him to go to the Embassy. His case had clearly been placed at the sufferance of the USSR Embassy in Washington. His two calls on 1 October were concerned with whether any reply had been received from Washington. Under these circumstances, in hindsight it is unreasonable to believe OSWALD would have gone to the Soviet Embassy on that date.~~

18. The camera at about mid-day registered the entry into the Soviet Embassy of an white-shirted individual who, among all <sup>persons</sup> ~~the photographic coverage~~ <sup>(that day)</sup> appeared to be the only person--a non-Latin, and possibly an American--who entered the Soviet installation. ~~that day~~ On the chance that there could be an association between the ~~white~~ <sup>white</sup> identification data derived from the voice intercept and the descriptive data derived from the photograph, the Station reported the two elements <sup>as separate facts</sup> in its cable to Headquarters on 8 October.



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18. The Station's action was not unusual *(Nelly annotated to an analytic "question leaf," considering the)*  
*(justified by the)*  
primitive and initiatory status of the OSWALD identification.

Many examples of a similar kind of thing can be found in the  
day-to-day record of Station/Headquarters correspondence *and reporting*

19. Developments from 8 October - 22 November 1963. Mexico

City station reported to Headquarters on 8 October (received in  
Headquarters 9 October) the following initial information on OSWALD.\*

1. On 1 Oct 63, an American male who spoke

broken Russian and said his name Lee OSWALD (phonetic),  
stated he was at SovEmb on 28 Sept when <sup>he</sup> spoke with a  
consul whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich  
KOSTIKOV. Subject asked the Soviet guard [Ivan]  
OBYEDKOV, who answered, if there anything new  
regarding a telegram to Washington. OBYEDKOV upon  
checking said nothing had been received yet, but the  
request had been sent.

Mexico Station said it  
2./ had photos of a male who appeared to be

an American entering Soviet Embassy 1216 hours,  
leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. Apparent age 35, athletic  
build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, balding top.  
Wore khakis and sport shirt.

3. No local dissemination was being made by

the Station.

*here, and throughout,*  
\* Cable has been rendered <sup>14</sup> into readable English *the without*  
*substantive changes have been made for clarity or precision.*  
*Cryptonyms and pseudonyms have been omitted or foot noted.*

*(see memo. to us)*

32. Headquarters responded 0422Z time, 23 November 1963, cancelling its immediately preceding request:

"1. No need send staffer with photos. We have asked Navy for photos again, but Mexico can see OSWALD's picture sooner on the press wire.

"2. Have just re-emphasized to FBI *(the press reports)* the sensitivity of photos you are sending and also relaying names of travelers with similar names. Note radio says OSWALD lived under alias of O. H. LEE."

33. On the 23rd at 1729Z time, Headquarters advised Mexico City:

"The FBI says that the photos of the man entering the Soviet Embassy which Mexico Station sent to Dallas were not of Lee OSWALD. Presume Mexico Station has double-checked dates of these photos and is also checking all pertinent *photos* photos for possible shots of OSWALD."

34. And at this point, 2048Z time, 23 November, Mexico *Station* City Station *finally* agreed:

"Saw photos of Lee OSWALD on television night of 22 November and it obvious photos sent to Dallas were not identical with Lee OSWALD held in Dallas. Dates are as given on photos."

"Mexico Station is reviewing all available photos of persons entering Soviet and Cuban Embassies."

35. Two hours later (2254Z time, 23 November 1963) the Station had reported the results of its effort to review all available coverage:

"Complete recheck of photos of all visitors to Cuban Embassy from August through first half of November against good press photos shows no evidence of OSWALD visit. Similar blanks against all Soviet Embassy photos from 1 September. Note, only visit we know he made was to Cuban Embassy 28 September, Saturday, on which Embassy closed and we had not had coverage . . . ."

16. With this communication the matter of the "unidentified individual" reaches the end of Phase I, the key element of which is the conviction, at first latent, then expressed, that the photographed individual might be identical with OSWALD. This applies especially to the Station, though at a certain point even Headquarters moved no rebuttal despite

the hard fact <sup>of quite disparate descriptions</sup> ~~of quite disparate descriptions~~ <sup>that the descriptions of Oswald and the unidentified individual were quite disparate.</sup>

37. This review has attempted to deal even-handedly with all items in the case record that have a bearing on what happened. The operational zeal, innovativeness and the high committment of all involved, especially in Mexico City, speaks for itself. Equally apparent - because of the 20 - 20 advantage of hindsight - is the evidence of non-performance. It was a critical failure, for example, that no photo of OSWALD was made available - though it was expressly requested both at Headquarters and by the field - or that it was not more aggressively sought by CIA, before the twenty-second of November. A photograph of OSWALD would have obviated - in a way the mere possession of a correct physical evidently could not - the whole successive deterioration of what began <sup>in Mexico City</sup> as an impressionistic selection of the photograph on 1 October 1963 into a cause celebre today.

38. It should be clear from this factual survey that never has there been a cause celebre with less intrinsic merit. Equally clear should be the demonstration of the facts themselves that there was nothing contrived or conspired in what happened unless we we have now descended to that point in human values achieved under STALIN in the USSR and under HITLER in Germany, where just a plain mistake is per se evidence of conspiracy.

<sup>41</sup>  
39. The Genesis and Development of ODUM Exhibit No. 1 and Commission Exhibit 237.

Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell D. ODUM, on 23 November 1963 showed one of the six photos flown up from Mexico City the previous day to OSWALD's mother, Marguerite OSWALD. ODUM himself had trimmed the off the background by straight cuts. Mrs. OSWALD had no recognition of the image in the photograph. Bardwell's own detailed account may be found in HEARINGS, op cit, Vol. XX, p. 268

<sup>42</sup>  
40. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It was one of the five photos taken of him in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after OSWALD had left the city.

<sup>43</sup>  
41. At this point for the record the total available photo coverage of the unidentified individual numbers twelve photographs:

- a. Five taken on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a white shirt a light colored (khaki) trousers.

the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a dark, open, button-down shirt ~~xxxxxxxixzanzxxx~~ with a high neckline under-shirt showing and dark trousers.

c. Two taken on 15 October 1963 in front of the Cuban Embassy. He is wearing a dark, collarless T-shirt or light sweater.

The negatives of all of these are extant and are now held in Headquarters as integral parts of the OSWALD and related file holdings.

42. The result of ODUM's display of the photograph-- to repeat, a cropped version of one of those noted under paragraph 41b, above - was Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD's allegation that she had been shown a picture of her son's killer, Jack RUBY, a day before he perpetuated the deed! Again the Warren Commission Report (pp. 364 - 365, 367) exhaustively disposes of this erroneous charge and requires no repetition here. A complicating fact developed along the way was Mrs. OSWALD's (correct) observation, when she finally admitted before the Commission that the ODUM photograph was not RUBY, was that the photo had been cropped differently from the one she had been shown in Dallas. Inspector MALLEY's cropped version of the ODUM photograph became Commission Exhibit 237 (see HEARINGS, Vol. XVI, p. 638).

43. The net effect of the developments in the hearings of the Commission was to require the admission of the cropped photograph into evidence in a chain of depositions beginning with

ODUM, including the FBI Inspector, James R. MALLEY (who had trimmed the photograph used by the Commission in Washington) and Mr. HELMS, who deposed for the originator. These documents speak for themselves and will be found in the HEARINGS, Vol. XI, pp. 468- 470.

44. Mexico City Station and other senior Agency officers strongly advised against the publication of the photograph in any form on the grounds that the Soviets would be immediately alerted to the existence of a useful and continuing U.S. intelligence operation and the operation would go down the drain. There were repeated cables exchanged on this point between Headquarters and Mexico City Station during the summer of 1964 in particular from 23 September to 15 October 1964 when the Station had plans underway to abandon the operation.

45. In acceding to the Commission's request for a deposition Mr. HELMS, then the Deputy Director for Plans, replied affirmatively to Mr. RANKIN by memorandum of 23 June 1964 which including the following additional observation:

"The Central Intelligence Agency recommends that this photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individual involved who as far as the Agency is aware had no connection with

Lee Harvey OSWALD or the assassination of  
President KENNEDY."

46. In this instance the needs of the Commission prevailed  
over the DCI's statutory obligation to protect sources and  
methods. The "Unidentified Individual" remains to this day  
unidentified and there is no credible evidence up to this  
time to rebut the assertion made by Mr. HELM's in the concluding  
sentence of his memorandum to Mr. RANKIN on 23 June 1964 e.r.  
And the photo operation did, as predicted, go down the drain.  
Within a week of the public appearance of the ODUM Exhibit  
No. 1 and Commission Exhibit 237, members of the Soviet Embassy  
began systematic efforts to survey the surrounding buildings,  
ostensibly for rental space, but clearly their inquiries  
were directed to spotting possible camera sites. The operation  
was continued in any case. Within a year it had become almost  
totally unproductive in coverage on Americans in contact with  
the Embassy - a clear sign that this category of visitor was  
being warned away the the Soviets themselves.



PHASE THREE: THE "UNIDENTIFIED MAN" PHOTOGRAPHS, 1964 - 1975

49. As could be foreseen, there has been persistent pressure by critics of the Warren Commission Report to exploit ~~the~~ ODUM Exhibit No. 1 and Commission Exhibit No. 237 for partisan interpretive purposes.

A considerable correspondence has accumulated since the end of 1964 in which the Agency has attempted to be responsive to these requests <sup>made</sup> <sup>has, attributed to</sup> simultaneously, to satisfy what has been <sup>it</sup> the sole interest from the inception of the matter: to protect the method of acquisition of the photograph and the  which made the acquisition possible.

50. Following are highlights from the correspondence from the current phase:

a. On 16 May 1967 over the signature of the General Counsel of the Agency, Lawrence R. Houston, CIA voluntarily submitted <sup>about the photographs</sup> ~~the~~ statement to Judge Bagert of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. The response dealt affirmatively with the contents of the subpoena that had been delivered to the United States Marshall in the District of Columbia. <sup>(</sup> Despite the fact that the subpoena could not be executed because of the lack of jurisdiction, <sup>Mr. Houston proffered on Agency behalf</sup> categoric assurances to the court regarding <sup>the</sup> <sup>of</sup> inaccurate statements and inferences made by Mr. Garrison in New Orleans about the

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photograph of the unidentified individual. The following is <sup>essential</sup> quoted

from Mr. Houston's memorandum:

"Because of the publicity which has surrounded the Orleans Parish Grand Jury proceedings, we have recently carried out an exhaustive search of the files of the Central Intelligence Agency for any picture of Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Mexico. As a result of this search, I can state categorically that the files of this Agency do not contain, and never have contained, any such picture of

Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Mexico and that we have no information whatsoever that any such photograph ever existed. To the best of our knowledge and information, therefore, there is no such photograph. Furthermore, the photograph which is printed in the Warren Commission Report, Exhibit No. 237 in Volume XVI, never contained more than one figure, and the figure in the photograph depicts an individual who, to our knowledge, has not been identified. The circumstances of the filing of this photograph with the Warren Commission are set forth in affidavits of pages 468 and 469 of Volume XI, Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Consequently, we have no record of any photograph that answers in any way the description of the one we understand was requested in the subpoena.

"I hope you will accept this information in this form in the spirit of cooperation in which it is proffered."

1. The Agency has repeatedly serviced requests about the identity of the unknown individual <sup>from</sup> Mr. Emory L. Brown, Jr., Rte #4, Box 82

Sqanqum Road, Farmingdale, New Jersey. The last exchange of correspondence in our record covered the period 4 - 17 April 1970.

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20. On 10 October 1963 at 2011Z time the WH Division component responsible for action on this report disseminated to the Department of State, the FBI, and the Navy Department by routine electrical transmission, <sup>with the</sup> the report received from Mexico <sup>adding some</sup> Station together with preliminary collateral details drawn from a file review:

1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a "receding" hairline.

2. It is believed that OSWALD may be identical to Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangements through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna PUSAKOVA [sic] and their child.

3. The information in paragraph one is being disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.

Any further information received on this subject will be furnished you. This information is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

21. Although the reaction of the Headquarters desk was "by the book" and in good time, there were a number of errors in this advisory to the departments which, on the record, were concerned with the OSWALD case:

a. OSWALD's middle name was misspelled: <sup>given:</sup> "Henry" for Harvey.

b. His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "PUSAKOVA" for <sup>PR)</sup> RUSAKOVA.

Neither of these errors are significant, <sup>(though they persist in the Headquarters communications)</sup> more important was: <sup>throughout the month,</sup>

c. Paragraph 2 of the Mexico City Station's report

which had dealt with a concurrent, but separate, phenomenon,

the description of an individual observed going into and out of the Soviet Embassy, had been locked on to Lee OSWALD as an alleged descriptive fact. <sup>(There can be no question that this misreading</sup>

of the Mexico City Station report was an analyst's error

which escaped detection in the coordination before release:

the descriptive details attributed to OSWALD were so far off

the mark as to be immediately recognizable as such by the

recipients. <sup>in Headquarters, among whom both the Navy and the FBI had photos of Oswald,</sup> <sup>partial explanation, if not exculpation,</sup>

be it recalled that as of that moment CIA had no photograph  
*in files in Mexico City*  
of OSWALD to refer-to. 1)

21. Confirmation of this judgment is provided by the contents  
of the cable composed by the same analyst and sent as of 22093 time  
(two hours later) to Mexico City Station, *referring its 8 October cable:*

1. Lee OSWALD who called SovEmb 1 Oct  
probably identical Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD born  
18 Oct 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar  
operator in United States Marines who defected  
to USSR in Oct 1959. OSWALD is five feet ten  
inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light  
brown wavy hair, blue eyes.

2. On 31 Oct 1959 he attempted to renounce  
his United States citizenship to the United States  
Emb in Moscow, indicating he had applied for Soviet  
citizenship. On 13 Feb the US Emb Moscow received  
an undated letter from OSWALD postmarked Minsk on  
five Feb 1961 in which subj indicated he desired  
return of his US PPT as wished to return to USA  
if "we could come to some agreement concerning  
the dropping of any legal proceedings against me."

On 8 July on his own initiative he appeared at the  
Emb *with* with his wife to see about his return to States.

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OSWALD stated that he actually had applied for Soviet citizenship and that his application at that time had been to remain in USSR and for temporary extension of his tourist visa pending outcome of his request. This application, according to OSWALD, contained no ref<sup>erence</sup> to Soviet citizenship. OSWALD stated that had been employed since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian radio and tv factory in Minsk where worked as metal worker in research shop. OSWALD was married on 30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolaevna PUSAROVA [sic] a dental technician born 17 July 1941 USSR. No Hdqs traces. He attempted arrange for wife to join him in Moscow so she could appear at Emb for visa interview. His American <sup>(passport)</sup> VPT was returned to him. US Emb Moscow stated twenty months of realities of life in Soviet Union had clearly had maturing effect on OSWALD.

3. Latest Hdqs info <sup>was</sup> was an FBI report dated May 1962 saying FBI had determined OSWALD is still US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits and Dept State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.

4. <sup>PM</sup> Station should pass info ref<sup>erence</sup> and para one <sup>(is, outside cable)</sup> to the Embassy to the FBI, the Navy, and I&NS locally. The informants <sup>phm</sup>

as paras two and three originates  
with the FBI.

5. Ref. and possible identification being disseminated to Hdqs of FBI, State, Navy, AND I&NS. Pls keep Hdqs advised on any further contacts or positive identification of OSWALD.

23. The Headquarters feedback, <sup>E Mexico City</sup> of OSWALD's correct description should have been sufficient, in view of the incongruities with the details deduced from the photo of the unidentified male, to keep but things did not work out that way these two matters apart as investigative facts. Mexico City Station on 15 October 1963, ~~In any case~~ asked Headquarters to

"please pouch a photo of OSWALD." Headquarters electrically

delivered to the Department of the Navy the following message on 24 October 1963:

"Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD . . .

"It is requested that you forward to this office as soon as possible two copies of the most recent photo graph you have of subject. We will forward them to our representative in Mexico, who will attempt to determine if the Lee OSWALD in Mexico City and subject are the same individual."

No photo had been received by CIA by 22 November 1963.

24. Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico City Station had done all it could to comply with Headquarters instructions:

a. Headquarters had been alerted and in turn these agencies with an investigative or policy interest in OSWALD *as an American in the United States,* had been alerted, both in Washington and in the field.

b. Mexico City had no further contacts by OSWALD to report because--as it was ultimately ascertained--he had left Mexico City on 2 October.

c. OSWALD was not an Agency investigative responsibility, in any case. Even with a photograph, it would have taken very special efforts triggered by the other interested U.S. agencies to have made a positive identification in view of OSWALD's hotel registration under alias.

There the matter rested until mid-day 22 November 1963.

25. The Insertion of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual with the Chain of <sup>Evidence</sup> ~~Events~~ On 22 November 1963 the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters at 2229Z time after learning of the arrest of Lee H. OSWALD, age 24, possibly in connection with the assassination and referencing <sup>ad</sup> its earlier message of <sup>CF 9/1</sup> 14 and 15 October <sup>4264</sup> and Headquarters' reply of 10 October. The station <sup>requested by</sup> request priority pouch <sup>p photo</sup> photo OSWALD so that Station can check all recent coverage for OSWALD. Forwarding soonest copies of only visitor to SovEmb <sup>it</sup> 1 Oct who could be identical with OSWALD."



28. It is clear that Mexico City Station had forgotten that according to its own communication the unidentified male in the photo was of "apparent age 35" and that the accurate description of OSWALD forwarded by Headquarters on the 10th precluded the person whom they regarded as the "only visitor to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October who could be identical," could indeed be.

29. The Station had meanwhile begun an exhaustive and accelerated review of all its technical and photographic intelligence. A dispatch was prepared in accordance with the indication given in the cable of 22 November, cited in paragraph 25 above.

The dispatch noted that photo coverage of the unidentified individual had turned up on 4 and 15 October at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies, respectively. The text of the 22 November 1963 pouched dispatch ~~was~~ *read*:

"1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained . . . on 1 October 1963, which appeared to be an American. This same man visited the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1963.

"2. Copies of these photographs were shown to the [sic] U.S. Ambassador on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to Chief FBI, Mexico, on that date....

"P.S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing of dispatch. These were taken as [the] person

entered the Cuban Embassy."

Attached were eight photographs: four (of which two were marked 1 October on reverse) showing the individual in a white shirt and four (unmarked on reverse) showing the individual in a black shirt.

It would seem to be logical that the word "sets" was probably omitted from paragraph two of the dispatch between the words "two" and "photographs."

30. That the Station was working under forced draft is *clearly* apparent from the text of the dispatch, which *tacked-on a* ~~contains a~~ material fact ~~inserted~~ as a postscript. That fact was reported simultaneously by cable to Headquarters at 0053Z time, 23 November:

"1. Mexico Station has photos same unidentified American type who is possibly OSWALD entering Cuban Embassy on 15 October. Searching for possibility photo-documented entry Cuban Embassy other days.

"2. Also attempting establish OSWALD entry and departure Mexico."

<sup>31</sup> 29. Headquarters, at 01:36 <sup>23 Nov 1963</sup> Z time, <sub>a</sub> asked Mexico Station to send a staff member with all photographs to Headquarters on the next available flight.

<sup>32</sup> 30. Concurrently with or before the foregoing cables to Headquarters, the Chief of Station, Mexico City *look* spoke directly by double-talk telephone with the Western Hemisphere Chief of

Station, J. C. KING, and secured permission to give copies of the

photographs of the unidentified individual to the Legal Attache

and to make them known to the Ambassador.

*What happened next is best*  
~~The next development is~~

clearly reflected in a personal note by the Chief of Station to the

WH Division Chief, mailed to the latter from Dallas, together with

copies of the photographs, by the <sup>Legal Attache</sup> FBI representative who delivered

them to the FBI in that city.

"22 November 1963

"Dear J.C. [KING]:

"Reference is made to our conversation of 22 November in which I requested permission to give the Legal Attache copies of photographs of a certain person who is known to you.

"Attached are copies of each of the photographs we have with the dates of the visits stamped on the back.

"At 6 p.m. Mexico time on 22 November, The Ambassador decided that this was important enough to have a member of the Legal Attache's office take copies of these pictures to Dallas, Texas. The Naval Attache is making a special flight from Mexico City for this purpose. The Legal Attache's officer who is going to Dallas has promised to mail this material to you for me.

"Copies of these photographs are also being sent by

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pouch which will leave Mexico City on the night of

22 November 1963.

"Best wishes.

"Win [SCOTT]"

• According to <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ sidelined comment~~s~~ on this letter, the Legal Attache's officer was Eldon RUDD.

34. The decision to remit the photographs to the FBI in Dallas had been made by the Ambassador, according to the Chief of Station, who simultaneously with the FBI agent's departure reported to Headquarters by cable (0244Z time, 23 November):

"FBI agent left here 2000 local time with two copies each of six photos of a person suspected to be OSWALD, on a special flight for Dallas. He is carrying <sup>an</sup> envelope with one copy each photo for airmail special <sup>delivery</sup> from Dallas to J. C. KING at home as per telephone conversation with SCOTT. One copy of each of these photos plus a copy of each of the photos showing the same person exiting the Cuban Embassy forwarded by memorandum leaving by regular pouch tonight. In view of above does Hqs still want a staffer with additional photo(s)?"

be stipulated in summary:

a. There is no increment of credible evidence, *applied to this phrase strictly,* of Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement *in the assassination* to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff. The Commission's finding, on the basis of credible evidence, that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did them alone and of his own determination ~~part~~ stands.

b. "Credible evidence" that would upset or significantly modify this ~~judgment~~ *fact* (and does) not exist in Washington. But such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, where voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity *quality,* and ~~purpose~~ *designed* to cover up any knowledge *admission of* of, or connection with OSWALD which might be *related* ~~connected~~ directly or indirectly with the assassination. The ~~belief~~ *belief* that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection *with Oswald* will persist and grow ~~until~~ until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency. ~~and~~ That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level

particularly in the counterintelligence component in *the CIA in 1964.* As was indicated by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA ~~was not~~ *was not* ~~in a position to~~ *was not* ~~investigate~~ *investigate* ~~the~~ *investigate* ~~matter~~ *investigate* ~~concerned~~ *investigate* ~~with~~ *investigate* ~~OSWALD~~ *investigate* ~~and~~ *investigate* ~~his~~ *investigate* ~~connections~~ *investigate* ~~with~~ *investigate* ~~the~~ *investigate* ~~Soviet~~ *investigate* ~~Union~~ *investigate* ~~and~~ *investigate* ~~his~~ *investigate* ~~contacts~~ *investigate* ~~in~~ *investigate* ~~Mexico~~ *investigate* ~~City.~~ *investigate* The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency.

c. In the absence of additional or new *elements* ~~elements~~ "credible" evidence, there are "rumors" ~~elements~~ in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of the other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item-by-item.

1. Investigation of the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy. Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, 1964) *vol 14* *near No. 149* [I'll give you this citations by phone, Andy.]

*Report this report on the Oswald case in all open files*

d. CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963 -

if OSWALD did indeed read it in New Orleans - must be considered  
of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution  
of OSWALD's passive/aggressive makeup and his identification with  
Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban revolution which is directly traceable  
as far back as his Marine Corps service in El Toro, California.  
CASTRO's warning and threat <sup>given</sup> to AP correspondent HARKER, ir-  
respective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even  
security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the  
Russians - ~~was an act of~~ singular irresponsibility  
and under no circumstances ~~excusable~~ <sup>excusable</sup> retorsion for what  
the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963, ~~with or~~  
~~without CIA knowledge or, more properly, the knowledge of~~  
~~the President's brother, Robert KENNEDY, who was personally~~  
~~invested with oversight of Cuban matters at the Federal level~~  
~~after the Bay of Pigs Crisis.~~

Cuban Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD, Santa Ana, California, early 1959(?).

9. The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion of germinal significance to any review of the background of Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine Corps base December 1958 - September 1959. The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country; which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed.'"

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report and <sup>its implications</sup> does not appear to have been rundown or developed by investigation. <sup>There is</sup> The record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with the Cubans starts with a question mark.

|| The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particularly keen about how to get <sup>to the island.</sup> ~~there~~ (DELGADO testified

"... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time/I told him this - we were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know, so this wasn't no sub-<sup>mission</sup> or malintent, you know. I didn't know what to answer him. I told him to see them.

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<sup>1</sup> Report to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington, 1964), p. 687 Hereafter cited as Report.

"After a while he told me he was in contact with them ...

"... I seen this envelope in his footlocker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters - you see, he would never go out, but stay near the post all the time ...

"... he had one visitor after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

"Mr. Liebeler: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?

"Mr. Delgado: About an hour and half, two hours ...

"Mr. Liebeler: You never asked OSWALD who this fellow was that he talked to?

"Mr. Delgado: No. No ...

"Mr. Liebeler: Did you connect this visit that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: I did ; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date - time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, often after




he started to get in contact with these Cuban people, he started getting letter pamphlets and newspapers...

"... and he also started receiving letters, you know, and no ~~books~~, maybe pamphlets, you know, little-like church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. Liebeler: Were they written in Spanish, any of them, do you know?

"Mr. Delgado: Not that I can recall; no.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did you have any reason to believe that these things come to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope know ... Something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive seal, you know. They had different colors on it, red and white, almost looked like our colors, you know. But I can't recall the seal. I just knew it was in Latin, United something like that. I couldn't understand. It was Latin. 


"Mr. Liebeler: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: No. But he had told me prior, just before I found that envelope in his wall locker, that he was receiving mail from them, and one time he offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested because at the time we had work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did he tell you what his correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about?

"Mr. Delgado: No, he didn't.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversations that you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. Delgado: No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to -- once he got out of the service he was going to Switzerland... 

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~~Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY, Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, 1964), Volume VIII, pp. 241-243. Hereafter cited as Hearings,~~

1. OSWALD's application to Albert Schweitzer College, Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, OSWALD accelerated his exit on alleged grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On 27 September 1959 he was issued a U.S. passport valid for travel - among other places to Cuba and the USSR. He entered the Soviet Union from Finland on 15 October 1959.

2. DELGADO's testimony has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contact OSWALD at El Toro camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, <sup>and</sup> actually there is nothing like it - on the record - in everything else we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States or after. The record reflects no identification of the contact. <sup>El Toro</sup> DELGADO's presumption is that the was from the

Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the question is: *Who was it?*

*And was there reporting to* <sup>from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>Cuba</sup> ~~minimal guess~~ that would, in effect, represent the opening of a file on OSWALD? *24*

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U.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.

14-00000

Prediction of President KENNEDY's Demise by Communist Party Cell  
Leader Morse BENITEZ Zabola, 1962.

13 [redacted] forwarded to Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party in Guatemala should form a single new party: "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President KENNEDY because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present years, 1962."

14 This report apparently had been discounted ~~by the Station~~ when it ~~had been~~ received and was not forwarded until the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no followup or formal dissemination of the report.

Enigmatic Threats by Cuban Third Secretary in The Hague,  
7 November 1963.

15. A sensitive [ ] source, reporting after the KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: "... just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."

16. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was ~~subsequently~~ reported to have a history of mental instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966. †

14-00000  
Intercepted Conversation of Cuban Embassy Employee, Luisa CALDERON,  
Afternoon of 22 November 1963

17 At 1730 Mexico City time, about five hours after the KENNEDY assassination, ~~was~~ a Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an unidentified male outside.

18 The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. Luisa jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before Kennedy ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs), what barbarians!.."

19 Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at Silvia DURAN's had been called off so it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she said she planned to move that night into the house of a doctor (a woman) friend.

20 Later hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of fore-knowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage ~~of the~~ <sup>of the</sup> Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that ~~presented~~ <sup>(contains)</sup> the suggestion ~~of fore-knowledge or expectations.~~

21 The ~~tenuous~~ <sup>tenuous</sup>, enigmatic character of the conversation is sharply highlighted by the following facts:

a. "Luisa" was probably identical with Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI). She returned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported to be working in DGI headquarters.

b. The DGI element in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally as the replacement of the Consul Emilio AZCUE (departed 19 November 1963). The deputy DGI chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez.

c. ~~The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversations was the receptionist, a Mexican~~

c. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who ~~worked~~ <sup>dealt with</sup> Lee Harvey OSWALD during his known visits on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban installations in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit. Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness <sup>on the records</sup> regarding LHO's activity in Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its entirety was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct confrontation with her was requested by the Warren Commission <sup>but</sup> rejected by the Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia DURAN's statements that it was learned that LHO became engaged <sup>personally</sup> in a /altercation on 27 September with Eusebio AZCUE.

d. Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Anastasio SOMOZA. VEGA, it is established, was on post in Mexico City during OSWALD's stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took 15 days.

e. There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitive interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD, known and confirmed by intercept, with the data held ~~in the file~~ on the Cuban DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck AZCUE whose slot had been taken ~~over~~ by the DGI chief?

Whatever the answer to the <sup>10</sup> questions, they were 5. For example, VEGA would have handled the details of the visa application

and facilitator of the trip to Cuba via Mexico City, that  
was taken by Vincent Theodore Lee, the organizer  
of the Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which  
Lee Harvey Oswald established relations from Dallas in  
~~April 1963~~ and from New Orleans ~~from the~~ ~~from the~~ ~~from the~~

during the period 1961-  
2 Nov 1963. There is an ~~interesting~~ ~~connection~~ ~~between~~ ~~the~~ ~~two~~ ~~trips~~  
~~to Cuba during that period~~

overlay between Lee's and Vago's travels to Havana during  
that period: VEBT departed Mexico City on 6 January for  
Havana and returns on 13 February 1963.

not asked at the time. Good. These

remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it have happened without the DGI <sup>personnel</sup> ~~elements~~ above cited (knowledge and participation)? ~~It is doubtful that the reply could be other than a solid negative and in that case, it is~~

~~palpable that~~ CASTRO's <sup>unique</sup> intelligence and security service could have more in its files than ~~has been~~ <sup>was</sup> surfaced in the DURAN statements. Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" - Luisa CALDERON - as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City - could very well have known something that would make what she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at that time.

especially because VEGA - later, having cited by a Cuban ~~sec~~ <sup>sec</sup> ~~defector~~, or having ~~acknowledged~~ <sup>acknowledged</sup> stated he was aware of several visits to the Cuban ~~dominate~~. ~~It~~ <sup>It</sup> is clear that



14-00000

*Spec*

Silvia DURAN, Substantial Amplification of Admission of  
Alleged Personal Relations with LHO, 1967.

*cf.* The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. (In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquim Hernandez *Armas*, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the question whether Silvia DURAN had been asked *(or been offered?)* about money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)

*cf.* As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, *in 1967,* of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that she had gone out with LHO during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him.

*spell out*

Allegations of Conspiratorial Contact between OSWALD and Cuban Government Agents with Particular Reference to Allegations of (a) Elena GARRO de Paz and (b) Oscar CONTRERAS

25. As the Warren Commission reported, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated ...". Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad - and similarly the FBI in the United States - ~~was~~ the Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte, ~~(1) the case of Victor Rojas Villeneuve in Coahuila and Guadalupe; (2) the allegations of Enrique Ruedolo Sanguera in New York; (3) the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT in Santa Clara prison in California; and (4) Roy DOBKIN.~~

26. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cyrptograph "D." ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money sometime in mid-September 1963 in <sup>in a meeting in a patio</sup> of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the use of the polygraph, on which ALVARADO showed deception and bringing ALVARADO's Nicaraguan security service <sup>contact</sup> into the case.

27. The ALVARADO story is a particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. In this case ALVARADO, whose account did not become public until the publication of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of the presence in the Cuban Consulate transactions of a Negro with red-dyed hair.

28. Elena GARRO de Paz is a mecurial, articular and socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is, also, the cousin of Horacio DURAN, the husband of Silvia DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women descending from Elena GARRO's trenchant anti-Communism.

See Report, p. 305 ff. Some of the other cases: the case of Ylario ROJAS Villeneuve in Coahuila and Guadalupe; the <sup>allegations of Enrique Ruedolo</sup> GONZALEZ, in New York City; the claims of Robert Edwards GALLANT, Santa Clara prison farm, California, and the allegations of Roy DOBKIN.

29. From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1969, a U. S. Embassy officer, Charles THOMAS, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting GARRO's account of what had actually gone on between OSWALD, the Cubans and in particular Silva DURAN in September 1963, including a repeated reference to a Negro with *red-tyed hair*.

30 The first reference to the GARRO story was noted in <sup>a</sup> Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

"Elena GARRO [said] that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that OSWALD was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the GARRO family [Horacio DURAN]. At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a log. They were so obviously out of place, she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three Gringos stood out she took a good look at them as did her daughter. When the assassination occurred and OSWALD's picture was spread into the newspapers, both Elena and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos without a doubt' at the party."

31 GARRO repeated her story to Mr. Charles William THOMAS, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965: In September 1963 after her ~~return~~ return from abroad, she went to a party, accompanied by her daughter, at the home of Ruben DURAN [emphasis added], Ruben is one of the two brothers of Horacio DURAN], who married her cousin. She met OSWALD and two other young Americans. At the party she was discouraged from talking with him. Other guests were the Cuban Consul AZCUE, General Clark FLORES, Silvia DURAN, who she later learned was OSWALD's mistress while he was here, Emilio CARBALLIDO, and a Latin American Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. In November 1963 when the identity of the assassin became known, she and

her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted "assassins" and other insults at the staff there. Shortly afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend, Manuel CARVILLO (or CALVILLO), then an official in the Secretariat of the Gobernacion ~~which was headed at the time by ECHIVERRIA~~, and were told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for eight days under pretext that they were in danger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain what she knew of OSWALD, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies.

32. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further interviews with THOMAS, GARRO and her daughter elaborated and in certain particulars significantly modified her earlier account. She also acknowledged that she and her daughter had been interviewed by Embassy officers to whom she claimed they did not give a very completed story because the Embassy officers did not appear to give much credence to anything she said.

33. It ~~was~~ developed that GARRO and daughter had been interviewed by the Legal Attached on 17 and 24 November 1964. Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her account to THOMAS, but had not been substantiated by inquiries. The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA Chief of Station on 27 December 1965 and to the Ambassador on 25 February 1965.

34. The Embassy Political Officer, however, persisted in his interviews and reporting. A memorandum of conversation, 13 July 1966, in which GARRO identified the place to which she had been taken by CALVILLO as the Hotel Vermont. (This detail checked out affirmatively. GARRO was at the Hotel 23 - 24, 25 - 27 and 28 - 30 November 1963.) Another, on 7 February 1967, in which GARRO's ~~account~~ continuing vicissitudes with the Cubans are set out. And finally, upon THOMAS' retirement from U.S. Government service, the Department of State, at his request, 28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of his reporting of the Elena GARRO ~~interviews~~ interviews.

35. There the matter rests. GARRO's chronology of the events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital in

*E. These particulars were not confirmed by independent observers, at this time.*

September 1963 never coincided with the confirmed ~~date~~ <sup>date</sup> of OSWALD's presence there. Her story however had two points of <sup>con</sup>gruance with allegations by others regarding OSWALD: (a) ALVARADO's allegations regarding the Negro with the red-dyed hair [this detail could, however, have been gleaned from the Warren Commission's <sup>published</sup> account of the "D" case] and (b) Sylvia DURAN's ~~own~~ later claim of intimate personal contacts with OSWALD.

26. Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the American Consul, Benjamin J. RUYLE, in Tampico developed a contact with a local Mexican journalist, Oscar CONTRERAS Lartigue, who claimed to have encountered OSWALD with other pro-CASTRO students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963.

27. In June 1969, CONTRERAS was interviewed by a CIA officer:

He studied law at the University of Mexico for three years, approximately 1960 - 1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro-CASTRO Revolutionary group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD case he was extremely cautious and although he was not able or willing to give dates and names, he said OSWALD visited the University of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. OSWALD made inquiries regarding pro-Cuban revolutionary groups at the University and was directed to CONTRERAS and his friend. OSWALD met CONTRERAS and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. OSWALD told the group it was urgent that he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy denied him a visa. He requested aid from CONTRERAS' group. CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of that day, that night and part of the next day. OSWALD was very introverted and appeared to be slightly crazy. OSWALD made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the ~~point~~ point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

At this point, with FBI knowledge, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that CONTRERAS was indeed at the University of Mexico but only for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publically <sup>associated</sup> in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased functioning as such in the middle of 1962 and Oscar CONTRERAS was never one of its leaders. No further work is reflected in the files on the CONTRERAS allegations. Apart from the unsustained claims made by CONTRERAS about his own presence at the University, there is an additional elements that undermines the credibility of his account: OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals near in hotel, ~~it~~ seems hardly likely to have permitted him to carry on for an extended period with a University student group.