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DISPATCH		0204-18, 423
Chief, WZ: Deputy Chief, WE/SA Chief of Station, <input type="checkbox"/>		FOI-271, 272 FOI-407, 37 FOI-4528, 34
Chief of Station, <input type="checkbox"/>		31 December 1964
FREEDOM Activities - Contacts between GUSFOET/1, AMKHIP/1, ANLASH/1, and AMBIDOT/1.		<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED <input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE ACC'D BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2, below		
REFERENCES:		
<p>The following is a summary of a recent report prepared by GUSFOET/1 concerning his contacts with AMKHIP/1 in Madrid and developments concerning ANLASH/1 and AMBIDOT/1:</p>		
<p>1. GUSFOET/1 was contacted by AMKHIP/1 in Madrid on 7 December 1964 and told:</p>		
<p>a. The plans they had made in New York to get ANLASH out of FREEDOM for a meeting were no longer necessary since he had come out via Prague-Paris.</p>		
<p>b. He was very optimistic about his meeting with ANLASH/1 because:</p>		
<p>(1) ANLASH/1 definitely counts on at least 5 commandantes and many other officers for the coup.</p>		
<p>(2) ANLASH/1 himself is again active in the Army with the help of Raul Castro.</p>		
<p>(3) The situation in FREEDOM is deteriorating and the right moment for the coup lies in the next few months.</p>		
<p>(4) ANLASH/1's morale is high and he plans to return to FREEDOM soon.</p>		
<p>(5) AMBIDOT/1's people have contacted ANLASH/2 and ANLASH/3 in Madrid and knowing that "something was going on inside FREEDOM with a big Commandante involved" (both said they did not give any names), AMBIDOT/1's people were so excited over this that AMBIDOT himself was coming to Europe. (He arrived in Rome 2 or 3 days later).</p>		
<p>c. AMBIDOT/1 was offering:</p>		
<p>(1) Any amount of small weapons and money for a big operation.</p>		
<p>(2) A well trained group of men.</p>		
<p>(3) A small size air force and navy</p>		
<p>(4) Any sort of military action as complement of the coup inside</p>		
<p>(5) Immediate diplomatic recognition of at least six Latin American Governments principally in Central America.</p>		
<p>d. ANLASH/1 would like to speak with GUSFOET and they should take the next plane for Paris.</p>		
<p>2. GUSFOET told AMKHIP/1 everything was all right except for three points:</p>		
<p>a. AMBIDOT/1 was offering <u>some</u> <u>help</u> - <u>IMMEDIATE</u>.</p>		
<p>b. They can get this help anytime without AMBIDOT/1 or <u>so</u>.</p>		
<p>c. AMBIDOT/1 means very little without this help.</p>		
<p>3. GUSFOET/1 said he then suggested AMKHIP/1 inform <u>IMMEDIATE</u> immediately what was</p>		

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*ANLASH-1
file*

AMBIDEX/1 was coming to Europe to see him. This apparently "Rick" did not do because the following day AMWHIP/1 phoned AMIASH/1 in Paris to get his decision regarding the meeting with AMBIDEX/1. AMIASH/1 told AMWHIP/1 over the phone that he knew nothing about the meeting. AMWHIP/1 then took the next plane for Paris and later phoned QUSPORT/1 to tell QUSPORT that AMIASH/1 had decided not to meet with AMBIDEX/1 for the present. AMWHIP/1 then left for New York City via Rome.

5. In the meantime AMBIDEX/1 had come to Rome with three of his men apparently determined to see AMIASH. He sent Idea A to Madrid. Idea A told QUSPORT/1 that AMBIDEX/1 would like to speak with either AMWHIP/1, AMIASH/1 or QUSPORT/1 but that he could not come to Spain legally because of the Sierra Aranzazu incident. QUSPORT/1 told Idea A that AMWHIP/1 was in New York City and AMIASH/1 had no intention of meeting with AMBIDEX/1, at least for the present, and that a conversation with QUSPORT would not change anything. AMBIDEX/1 insisted on trying to see AMIASH/1 and went to Paris with two of his men, one of whom is Idea B.
6. On 21 December QUSPORT received a letter from AMWHIP/1 in New York telling QUSPORT:
 - a. AMIASH/1 did not want to meet with AMBIDEX/1 because of security.
 - b. AMIASH/1 will return to ^{CUBA} FE PRIME at the end of January 1955.
 - c. AMIASH/1 has a fixed idea of what the solution is to the ^{CUBAN} PRIME problem.
 - d. AMWHIP/1 was coming to Europe shortly and he hoped the three of us could get together.
7. AMIASH/1 phoned me from Paris on the 22nd of December to tell me he would be here on 26 December and that he would try to stay at the Embassy. QUSPORT told him about AMWHIP/1's letter.
8. On 22 December AMBIDEX/1 phoned me (QUSPORT/1) and told me the following:
 - a. A meeting of all forces is necessary.
 - b. To tell AMIASH/1 that the "Americans" want to take him for the isolation (sic) and that with the failure of the Bay of Pigs he, AMBIDEX/1, had had a very bitter experience, that was paid off in blood and jail and all because of the inconsistencies of American Policy.
 - c. That he has under his own control the necessary forces to produce, together with AMIASH/1, a definite action without any outside help and even against anyone's will.
 - d. He was going back to ^{U.S.} FEPRIME for a few days on the 23rd of December to clarify a few things and then back to Paris.
 - e. That regardless of AMIASH/1's decision he wants to speak with QUSPORT/1 anyway.
 - f. That he was sending Idea A to Madrid on 23 December as his contact man.
9. QUSPORT/1 summed up his opinion as follows:
 - a. Regardless of whatever explanation is given, the situation is out of control.
 - b. In view of all the circumstances I do not think AMIASH/1 can go on much longer with this conspiracy without taking some definite action or being discovered and I feel that AMIASH/1 knows it.
 - c. I feel this is the moment to reconsider the whole business and come out with some specific plan to be worked out soon.

~~SECRET~~

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- a. Something has to be done within the next few days.
10. In view of GUSPOT/1's close involvement with AMLASH/1, AMKIP/1, AMLAH/2, AMLAH/3, and AMHINY/1 please see that [] is kept fully informed on any contacts between AMKIP/1 and AMLASH/2, as well as AMKIP/1's travel plans to Europe.

Wallace A. GROWNEY

29 December 1964

Attachments: Identities A and B, under separate cover

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