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15 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris, 31 January to 3 February 1965

1. AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965 and was met for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH in order to arrange a meeting for the following day. The following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and 2 February 1965:

a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1 before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the security implications involved in the infiltration and possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964. Orozco, according to his wife, went to Cuba to rescue [redacted] and three others who were hiding in the home of a woman named [redacted] who lived at [redacted]

[redacted] Havana. Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established by AMICE-14 (Miguelito). Upon his return to Cuba, AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if Orozco is under the control of the security service, will decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-10. AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to UNSNAFU-9 to indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is still in hiding. If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco is not under the control of the security service. If the letter talks about a long, tiring trip, this will indicate that Orozco has been arrested. AMLASH-1 was also requested to send a report on the above and any complications which have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.

b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles," which we have been using for the past three years, be changed to "Gerardo."

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c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer pills and carbon. He planned to take the S/W material back with him to Havana. AMLASH-1 again reviewed with UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris case officer all letters regardless of how received from AMLASH-1 to either UNSNAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed to his parents-in-law. AMLASH-1 also agreed to send S/W out in letters addressed to [redacted] (AMWHIP-1's [redacted] in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed to inform Ventura that any letters he received from AMLASH-1 should be immediately air mailed to AMWHIP-1 in New York. Since AMLASH-1 will probably find it necessary some time not to sign the letters to [redacted] in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform [redacted] to forward to New York any letter received from Cuba addressed to him and signed by a person unknown to him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should continue to be addressed to [redacted]. In an emergency a letter can also be sent to AMLASH-1's mother.

d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had been put down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he had previously reported and attempted to answer most of the questions in the WAVE cable. A cable on this subject was sent from [redacted] to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb. AMLASH-1 was requested to send a message either through his channel or through ANTRUNK-10's S/W channel reporting how much of the radio equipment and other material had been recovered from the cache.

e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in Cuba whom he could recruit and who could be inserted into the Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting to get the DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela. AMLASH-1 could think of only one possibility, an individual known as [redacted]. AMLASH-1 has full confidence in [redacted] and [redacted] has previously been approached on several occasions by Pinero to work for him. Upon his return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if [redacted] can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be sent on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1, who also knows [redacted] will provide the background information upon his return to New York.)

f. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections on 10 February 1965. AMLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the president of the Communist Youth, will become the new

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president and that his man, ²Lázaro Mora, would be one of the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent to Headquarters from [redacted])

g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Pizzolo regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage of the locomotives being shipped from France to Cuba; specifically, how carefully do they check the placement of the seals, are they special seals or regular load seals, are there going to be any additional checks once the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run the locomotives under their own power or are they towed. AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above requirements and pass the information to his contact in the [redacted]. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find out and pass to the [redacted] through UNSNAFU-9 the names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.

h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela. AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a friend which was the only reason for writing to him.

i. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from [redacted] to Headquarters.

j. A cable was sent from [redacted] to Headquarters suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to AMTRUNK-10 stating: "Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."

k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the following persons:

(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes. AMLASH-1 reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and is a good and brave man.

(2) Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Occidental Army. AMLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has heard nothing bad about Lusson.

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(3) Cmdte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of Artillery of the Occidental Army.

(4) Elpidio Baez Bigo. According to AMLASH-1, Baez is a trusted Fidelman.

(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young and has for several years been with Pinero and the Cuban IS.

(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime rises or falls as does that of Faustino.

(7) Sergio Tolxon. Code clerk in the Embassy in Paris. Tolxon is staying in Paris at the request of Ambassador Carrillo.

l. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems, although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do cause some problems. The purification of water has been a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the sickness in the country.

m. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragonés had invited him to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him back because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1 did state that Aragonés was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not return to Cuba. Since Aragonés cleared AMLASH-1 for his trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragonés does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1 decides to stay out.

n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and December since he had been out of the country since early November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and explained the issues, the background and personalities involved.

o. Soviet advice or influence in political and economic matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.

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p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of their influence in making national policy. Raul is still the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara. After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy. President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative ability and is able to work within the general outline laid down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers. Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority because of his earlier policy of industrialization. Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays a very small role in the political field. He is serious and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1, who has worked seven days a week without leave since the revolution. Emilio Aragonés holds an important position as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the official who was always at the office of the National Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but, according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries, the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation. Other DR people who continue to hold important positions in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and Jose Naranjo.

q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the Embassy in Madrid.

r. According to Emilio Aragonés, Anibal Escalante is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to location.

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5. AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern, is approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime. AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, Cuban Ambassador in Rabat, is approachable if approached and developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez assigned to the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy in Rabat, AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo, AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in a compromising situation. Ambassador Carrillo is a close friend of Lucy Echevarria.

2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to provide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the requirements on which he did provide information.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

cc: WH/EA/EOB
WN/SA/mob

File:
AMLASH-1 201
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