

17 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR : Colonel Johnson
 VIA : Mr. Kille
 SUBJECT : Guidance re: Dr. Miro CARDONA
 REFERENCE : Your Memorandum for the Record of
 16 October 1961.

1. In your discussion with State and MIRO it might be wise, for security reasons, to assume they have little specific knowledge of our operations and certainly of specific individuals who have some connection with C. I. A. For example, when they speak of Costa Aguerre, it has gone too far for us to deny any relationship, but we should firmly insist C. I. A. is not directly in touch with Costa.

2. Realizing the difficult handling problems you have, I am putting down my own reactions to some of the parts in your memo, which may, I hope, be of some assistance.

3. Regarding your paragraph 2, item a, I do not believe we should, for security reasons alone, reveal to Miro or State our operations in this area. Much of the time when they raise issues like this they are simply guessing and fishing. Frequently their guesses on our assets are very erroneous. Usually, their forays can be countered by saying we agree that the propaganda "lines" should be discussed or they should tell us what they think the "line" should be and we will comment if we disagree. In short, we are willing to correctly try to support them, but we are not obligated to reveal to State or MIRO our specific operations and personnel which should be in a normal situation classification. Accordingly, I would suggest that you encourage the URC toward diverting some of the million dollars the White House promised them into forming a functioning propaganda commission and suggest they then tell us what they are doing and plan to do, so that if we have assets and approvals from our people we will be in a position to coordinate our efforts with theirs.

4. Regarding your paragraph 2, b, there needs to be general sound enough. Tell him to keep us advised as to what he proposes to do with his funds in this field. Surely he doesn't see he is giving us orders as to what we should do here in our country.

5. Regarding your paragraph 2, c. you may wish to remind him of his conversation with CLARK and HANLEY in Baltimore where this was discussed. You may tell him that we are as agreed endeavoring to provide funds to the internal groups which he indicated should be supported. Naturally the means are secret. If he has a particular leader or group inside he wants us to try to support he should tell us. We could suggest some of his million dollars could be utilized by him also for this purpose. As to commande action, the State Department, which sets policy, has not authorized any commande operations of any kind and we are accordingly not in a position to organize or support any for the present.

6. Regarding your paragraph 3 on Commande Action, this plan is not yet in Headquarters; however, we have no policy authorization from State for such an operation.

7. Regarding your item 4, you will recall and he will recall, he took this up with GOODWIN and then with HURWITZ and then with CLARK and HANLEY. He was unable then to say exactly how or even if he could develop a commo line to Ramirez now how he would get arms to RAMIREZ, or anybody else by air, and in either boat or air operations there would have to be some assurance that he had the capability to arrange a reception party in Cuba for the arms, assuming we had the policy authorization to support this kind of operation. You should tell him that as explained by HANLEY to him, it is not enough for him to just say he would like to support a given guerrilla group. He will have to have some capability for doing it before we can support him, assuming we can get policy approval for same.

8. Regarding your item 6, although we sympathize with his view, as Mr. HURWITZ and Mr. COERR, as well as Mr. GOODWIN, have told him, the U.S. Government has not and does not plan to commit itself to him on the question of sending U.S. troops to Cuba.

9. With regard to your item 7, I could suggest you remind him he agreed in his conversation with HANLEY and CLARK that he would arrange an air-cable takeover of the jets which he admittedly has not done. We still hope he can exert enough influence over his people to keep the mess out of the press.

10. With regard to your item 1, we too would like to see him exert some leadership and induce these groups to unite with him in one way or another, but do not agree with him that in the long run this can be accomplished by just saying "I control the money, and I am THE channel to the U.S. Government." He must keep in mind that there are in existence lots of channels to the U.S. Government and by that we do not mean C.I.A.

11. Regarding your item 11, you probably should emphasize to him again that he has taken over the FRO budget and personnel and it is up to him to get them organized and doing something other than drawing relief checks.

12. Regarding your item 14, I suggest you continue your coordination line with MIRO, pointing out these groups are not under complete control of C.I.A., that they do many things on their own, that we merely support them from time to time, usually indirectly. Accordingly, we are not in a position to turn them over to him, even if we wanted to, which we at this point, are not sure they would agree to in any case. He will simply have to get into some working relationship with them, using his million dollars or leadership, preferably the latter.

DC/WH/4

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