

SECRET

DATE : 19 DEC. 62

ROUTING	
1	SA-C-ke 4
2	200 5
3	200 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [] 15-11

ACTION: C/EE 3 (MR. PINNEY NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1730 19 DEC 62 DM)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/PI, C/TFW 2, S/C 2

DEC 19 35Z 62

PRIORITY

PRIORITY DIR INFO [] CITE [] 4623

IN38202

CSDB-

RYBAT (INDEVOUT 3) PBRUMEN

REF GNVA 4619 (IN 37981) **

Disseminated by SR/RE

1. FOLL REPORT COVERS TOPICS CITED REF PARA 3A, 3B, 3C. INFO ACQUIRED [] 13 THRU ²⁴ 15 DECEMBER) UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED INFO WAS OBTAINED FROM RAULITO ROA KOURI, CUBAN AMBASSADOR PRAGUE. WHERE ROA IDENTIFIED HIS SOURCES THEY HAVE BEEN NAMED. IN GENERAL ROA DID NOT IDENTIFY SOURCES. HOWEVER SUBJ POINTS OUT THAT ROA IS IN CONTINUAL LETTER CONTACT WITH HIS FATHER, RAUL ROA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AND PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENTS MADE BY RAULITO ROA SUBJ BELIEVES THAT THRU THESE LETTERS THE SENIOR ROA KEEPS HIS SON POSTED RE THE SENIOR ROA'S THINKING ON CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS AND OTHER MATTERS. SUBJ ALSO NOTES THAT ROA HAS CONVERSED WITH VARIOUS CUBAN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE PASSED THRU PRAGUE ON TRIPS TO AND FROM HAVANA AND THAT ROA HAD LONG CONVERSATIONS WITH BLAS ROCA, CUBAN PSP LEADER, WHEN THE LATTER WAS IN PRAGUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO 15 DECEMBER.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

Copy No.

BJW

2. BACKGROUND TO PRESENCE OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE MISSILES

IN CUBA.

A. SOVIET OFFENSIVE MISSILES WERE INTRODUCED INTO CUBA AS PART OF A TWOFOLD SOVIET-CUBAN PLAN WHICH WAS AGREED UPON "SEVERAL MONTHS AGO". UNDER THIS PLAN THE EMPLACEMENT OF SOVIET DEFENSIVE MISSILES WAS TO CONSTITUTE THE FIRST PHASE. IN THE SECOND PHASE A MAJOR SOVIET FLEET UNIT SUCH AS THE BALTIC FLEET WAS TO HAVE BEEN INVITED TO VISIT CUBA ON A CRUISE. ONCE ALL PORTS OF CUBA WERE SCREENED BY SOVIET FLEET UNITS, THE PRESENCE OF N-LES-W WAS ANTICIPATED ^{MISSILES} THAT THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE U.S. REACTION, BUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET FLEET UNITS SURROUNDING CUBA WAS CONSIDERED AN EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT RESORT TO IMMEDIATE INVASION OR OTHER ARMED ACTION TO ELIMINATE THE MISSILE THREAT.

B. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTION WAS TO FORCE A MAJOR CHANGE OF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS CUBA. IT WAS ANTICIPATED THAT U. S. REACTION WOULD BE VIOLENT, AND FROM THE BEGINNING THE PLAN CALLED FOR THE ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. HOWEVER, THIS WITHDRAWAL WAS TO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED AT THE PRICE OF AN AGREEMENT BY THE U.S. THAT IT WOULD END ITS HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS CUBA.

C. SOURCE COMMENTS:

(1) RAULITO ROA DID NOT SAY WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THIS SOVIET-CUBAN AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED. THE STATEMENT THAT IT OCCURRED "SEVERAL MONTHS AGO" MAY INDICATE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS AGREED DURING THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT TO MOSCOW OF RAUL CASTRO EARLIER THIS YEAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, RAULITO ROA INDICATED THAT THERE HAS BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE AT

PRESENT, REGULAR LETTER CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV AND CASTRO. THIS CORRESPONDENCE IS CARRIED BY COURIERS WHO HAVE TRANSITED PRAGUE. THIS LETTER CORRESPONDENCE HAS BEEN USED BY THE TWO LEADERS TO KEEP EACH OTHER IN PERSONAL TOUCH RE VARIOUS PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

(2) RAULITO ROA GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE OR CUBAN LEADERS WITH WHOM HE MAY HAVE HAD CONTACT, NAMELY HIS FATHER VIA CORRESPONDENCE, HAD SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ANY MOTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE ABOVE PLAN OTHER THAN THAT OF EFFECTING THE CHANGE OF THE U.S. POSITION TOWARDS CUBA WHICH WAS DESCRIBED. FOR INSTANCE THERE WAS NO INDICATION IN RAULITO ROA'S CONVERSATION THAT HE SUSPECTED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE INTENDED TO USE THE PRESENCE OF THEIR MISSILES IN CUBA TO FORCE CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS OTHER AREAS, FOR EXAMPLE RE BERLIN. RAULITO ROA APPEARED TO BE GENUINELY CONVINCED THAT THE PLAN WAS AS HE DESCRIBED IT. HE DID NOT STATE THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION.

D. THE DECISION TO ACCEDE TO U.S. DEMANDS RE THE EVACUATION OF THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WAS TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE SOVIETS WITH NO PRIOR WARNING TO OR CONSULTATION WITH CUBAN LEADERS. DESPITE THE PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO WAS SO CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET FLEET WAS GOING TO ARRIVE IN CUBAN WATERS ACCORDING TO PLAN THAT WHEN HE HEARD THAT PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT AMERICAN DEMANDS RE THE EVACUATION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA HE CONCLUDED THAT THIS STATEMENT OF AGREEMENT MIGHT WELL BE A KHRUSHCHEV TRICK

TO GAIN TIME FOR THE FLEET TO ARRIVE. WHEN HE LEARNED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, HE WAS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED AND VERY ANGRY.

3. CUBAN REACTION TO THE SOVIET FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE SOVIET-CUBAN PLAN OR TO CONSULT LEADERS ON THE SOVIET ASSENT TO U.S. DEMANDS.

A. THE ATTITUDE OF CUBAN LEADERS, FROM FIDEL CASTRO ON DOWN, TOWARDS THE SOVIET FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE SECOND PHASE OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN PLAN BY MOVING THE SOVIET FLEET INTO PLACE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH CUBAN LEADERS BEFORE YIELDING TO U.S. DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES WAS ONE OF DISMAY, ANGER AND DISAPPOINTMENT. THE REACTION OF THE CUBAN LEADERS WAS CONCENTRATED FAR MORE ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BROKEN THEIR WORD RE THE MOVEMENT OF THE SOVIET FLEET INTO CUBAN WATERS AND ON THE SOVIET UNILATERAL ACTION IN ACCEDING TO AMERICAN DEMANDS, THAN IT WAS ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD CAPITULATED TO THE AMERICAN DEMANDS PER SE. THE CUBAN LEADERS CONSIDERED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BESMIRCHED ITS OWN HONOR AND THAT IT HAD OFFENDED THE PRIDE OF CUBA. AT PRESENT THE CUBAN LEADERS CONTINUE TO POSSESS STRONG FEELINGS ON THESE POINTS.

B. THE ANGER OF THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS STRENGTHENED BY THE FACT THAT THE LEADERS BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET CAPITULATION BEFORE AMERICAN DEMANDS WAS UNNECESSARY. THE CUBANS FEEL THAT HAD THE SOVIET FLEET PROCEEDED TO ITS CUBAN STATIONS ACCORDING TO PLAN, THE UNITED STATES WOULD

NOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN ANY MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST CUBA OR HAVE PLACED A NAVAL BLOCKADE ABOUT CUBA. THE CUBAN LEADERS ARE SO STRONGLY CONVINCED THAT THEIR VIEWS ON THIS POINT ARE CORRECT THAT CURRENTLY THEY ARE MAKING A STRONG EFFORT TO LEARN THE "TRUE STORY" BEHIND THE SOVIET DECISION TO BACK DOWN IN THE CUBAN CRISIS.

C. SOURCE COMMENT: AT ONE POINT IN THE CONVERSATION RAULITO ROA EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT "THE NEW SOVIET POLICY IS ONE OF CONCESSION TO THE UNITED STATES". TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE CUBAN SEARCH FOR THE "TRUE STORY" CITED ABOVE, THE ROA STATEMENT MAY BE AN INDICATION THAT CUBAN LEADERS SUSPECT THAT IN THE CUBAN CRISIS CUBAN INTERESTS WERE DELIBERATELY SACRIFICED TO SOVIET "HIGHER INTERESTS".

D. THE ANGER OF THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP AND OF SENIOR CUBAN OFFICIALDOM CONCERNING THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IN THE CUBAN CRISIS HAS BEEN CLEARLY REFLECTED IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS CUBAN OFFICIALS STATIONED ABROAD AND THE SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH WHOM THEY COME IN CONTACT. DURING HIS DECEMBER TRIP TO PRAGUE FOR THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS BLAS ROCA DID NOT HESITATE TO CHARACTERIZE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO PRAGUE, MIKHAIL V. ZIMYANIN, AS "A CLOWN AND AN IMBECILE" IN THE PRESENCE OF A SPANISH-SPEAKING MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY.

E. SOURCE COMMENT: BLAS ROCA'S COMMENTS WERE MADE IN THE PRESENCE OF AN UNIDENTIFIED SPANISH-SPEAKING MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY. APPARENTLY ZIMYANIN HAD RAISED SOME POINT OF PROTOCOL

(DIPLOMATIC OR SOCIAL) IN A CONVERSATION WITH BLAS ROCA. SUBSEQUENTLY ROCA REMARKED THAT ZIMYANIN APPEARED TO HAVE IMPERFECTLY DIGESTED A BOOK OF OUTMODED PROTOCOL. ROCA ADDED THAT ZIMYANIN WAS NOT A REAL COMMUNIST SINCE COMMUNISTS DID NOT BELIEVE IN A LOT OF PROTOCOL IN THEIR RELATIONS. ROCA REMARKED THAT "MANY SOVIETS ARE CLOWNS" AND THAT "ZIMYANIN IS A CLOWN AND AN IMBECILE". WHEN RAULITO ROA SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED TO ROCA'S ATTENTION THE FACT THAT HIS REMARKS HAD BEEN OVERHEARD BY THE SPANISH-SPEAKING CZECH AND THAT THEY PROBABLY WOULD BE REPORTED TO THE SOVIETS, ROCA RETORTED THAT HE HAD MADE THE REMARKS ON PURPOSE BECAUSE HE WISHED TO HAVE IT REPORTED THAT HE HELD A LOW OPINION OF ZIMYANIN AND OF CERTAIN OTHER SOVIETS.

4. SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV APOLOGIZES FOR SOVIET FAILURE TO CONSULT THE CUBANS DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS.

A. DURING THE FINAL DAYS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY IN PRAGUE IN DECEMBER RAULITO ROA HELD A LONG CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV, WHOM HE HAD KNOWN IN MOSCOW. DURING A TWENTY-MINUTE PERIOD WHEN THE TWO MEN WERE ALONE AND WERE DISCUSSING MATTERS IN RUSSIAN (ROA SPEAKS RUSSIAN WITH SOME FLUENCY) BREZHNEV APOLOGIZED TO ROA FOR THE UNILATERAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET ACTIONS DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS. BREZHNEV STATED THAT DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING 22 OCTOBER SOVIET LEADERS, INCLUDING PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV, HAD SPENT MANY NIGHTS WITHOUT SLEEPING. THEY HAD NOT RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES BUT HAD SIMPLY TAKEN NAPS ON THE COUCHES IN

THEIR OFFICES. ALL OF THEM HAD BECOME EXTREMELY FATIGUED. PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV HAD PERSONALLY COMPOSED THE LETTER TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY PROPOSING A DEAL CONCERNING SOVIET MISSILE BASES IN CUBA AND AMERICAN BASES IN TURKEY. AT THE TIME KHRUSHCHEV HAD COMPOSED THIS LETTER HE WAS SO FATIGUED THAT IN CONTRAST TO HIS USUAL CUSTOM OF WRITING IN LONGHAND THE TEXT OF THOSE PRONOUNCEMENTS TO WHICH HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE HE HAD DICTATED THE TEXT TO A STENOGRAPHER. IN TALKING CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT BREZHNEV INTIMATED THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD BEEN SO TIRED THAT HE HAD NOT FULLY GRASPED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT HE HAD WRITTEN. BREZHNEV IMPLIED THAT SUBSEQUENTLY, AFTER THE LETTER HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV HAD REGRETTED THE PHRASEOLOGY WHICH HE HAD USED, AND FURTHER HAD REGRETTED THAT HE HAD NOT CONSULTED WITH CUBA CONCERNING ITS VIEWS PRIOR TO THE DISPATCH OF THE LETTER.

B. SOURCE COMMENT: FROM RAULITO ROA'S - DESCRIPTION OF THE ABOVE INCIDENT AND HIS COMMENTS CONCERNING IT, IT APPEARS THAT BREZHNEV MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET-UNION TO CARRY OUT ITS PART OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN "JOINT PLAN" (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE), NOR DID HE INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS REGRETTED THAT THEY HAD ACCEDED TO U.S. DEMANDS CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA.

5. ROA COMMENT RE MIKOYAN TRIP.

A. ROA STATED THAT IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT DEPUTY PREMIER ANASTAS MIKOYAN HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO CUBA

IN AN ATTEMPT TO PLACATE FIDEL CASTRO AND TO JUSTIFY TO HIM THE SOVIET COURSE OF ACTION IN THE CUBAN CRISIS. ROA CONFIRMED PRESS ACCOUNTS THAT CASTRO HAD MADE CLEAR TO MIKOYAN HIS ANGER AND DISPLEASURE AT THE VARIOUS FAILURES ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS.

B. SOURCE COMMENT: ROA DID NOT MENTION ANY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS AFTER MIKOYAN'S ARRIVAL IN CUBA, NOTABLY THOSE WHICH HAD RESULTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET IL-28 AIRCRAFT FROM CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER NOTE: *BEING SERVICED FOR CONFIRMATION.

Source: **Advised of Station's 18 December meeting with ENDEVOUT^{of} (1).