



TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Form with fields: COUNTRY, SUBJECT, DATE OF INFO., PLACE & DATE ACQ., APPRAISAL, REPORT NO. TDCS, DATE DISTR., PRECEDENCE, REFERENCES IN 10713, FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. FIELD COMMENT: SUBJECT REPORT IS JUDGED TO PRESENT AN UNUSUALLY GOOD PICTURE OF THE MOOD WHICH PREVAILED IN SATELLITE CIRCLES IN GENEVA DURING THE PERIOD CITED.

2. 27 OCTOBER SEVERAL SATELLITE OFFICIALS STATIONED IN GENEVA DISCUSSED AMONG THEMSELVES DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS. THOSE PRESENT IN THE DISCUSSION INCLUDED CZECH MINISTER AND RESIDENT DELEGATE IN GENEVA MILAN KLUSAK, EAST GERMAN RESIDENT OBSERVER AT THE UN EUROPEAN OFFICE WALTER BELING, AND RUMANIAN SECOND SECRETARY OF DELEGATION MARIN OLTEANU. AT THE TIME OF THE CONVERSATION, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF DISMANTLING OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES IN CUBA IN EXCHANGE FOR REMOVAL OF AMERICAN BASES FROM TURKEY HAD BEEN PUBLICIZED.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Form with columns: DATE/INR, DIA, ARMY/ACSI, NAVY, AIR, JCS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR, ORR, OBI, OO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

**SECRET**

(When Filled In)

TDCS

IN 10713

PAGE 2

3. THE MOOD OF THE OFFICIALS PRESENT WAS ESSENTIALLY ONE OF UNEASE AND FALSE BRAVADO. THE MOOD OF PREVIOUS DAYS IN WHICH SATELLITE OFFICIALS HAD SAID THAT NO WAR WAS LIKELY TO BREAK OUT HAD VANISHED. THEIR STATEMENTS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY EXPECTED WAR MIGHT VERY WELL BREAK OUT. KLUSAK REMARKED THAT "CUBA IS AS IMPORTANT TO THE USA AS TO THE USSR" AND THUS CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE. THE OFFICIALS REMARKS INDICATED THAT THEY EXPECTED PRES KENNEDY TO REFUSE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN QUESTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THEY THOUGHT THAT KHRUSHCHEV WOULD WITHDRAW THE PROPOSAL. OLTEANU POINTED OUT THAT THE ORBIT HAD GAINED A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE THROUGH THE FACT THAT THE CRISIS HAD CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL DAYS, SINCE THIS HAD PERMITTED ORBIT FORCES TO REACH A STATE OF ALERT. OTHERS PRESENT AGREED THAT PRES KENNEDY HAD MADE A TACTICAL ERROR IN NOT SIMPLY INVADING CUBA WITHOUT WARNING. THEY DID NOT IMPLY THAT THIS WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR, BUT WERE SIMPLY POINTING TO AN AMERICAN MILITARY ADVANTAGE LOST. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IMPRESSION WAS GAINED THAT THESE OFFICIALS WERE SIMPLY MAKING REMARKS FOR THE RECORD OR FOR THE SAKE OF HAVING SOMETHING TO SAY, AND THAT NONE OF THEM HAD ANY REAL INSIGHT INTO SOVIET INTENTIONS.)

4. ON 29 OCTOBER, AFTER THE SOVIET DISMANTLING OFFER HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED, EAST GERMAN RESIDENT OBSERVER WALTER BELING, WHO HAD ON 27 OCTOBER EXHIBITED PARTICULARLY STRONG SIGNS OF ANXIETY, WAS FULSOME IN HIS PRAISE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S WISDOM. HE STRESSED THAT HE FOUND

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

**SECRET**

SECRET  
(When Filled In)

TDCS

IN 10713

PAGE 3

DEVELOPMENTS "WONDERFUL" AND MADE PARTICULAR MENTION OF PRESS REPORTS THAT THE RELATIVE DETENTE MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO RAPPROCHEMENT OF SOME SORT BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT SUCH AN ACTION WOULD GIVE A PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE TO EAST GERMANY, SINCE IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AT LAST WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH EAST GERMANY.

5. AT A DIPLOMATIC GATHERING ON 31 OCTOBER, CZECH OFFICIALS, INCLUDING MINISTER MILAN KLUSAK AND DEPARTMENT CHIEF IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE KAREL SVEC, CONTINUED PRIVATE DISCUSSION RE THE EFFECTS OF THE CUBAN CRISIS. THEY ALL STRESSED THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD HAD GREAT SUCCESS HE HAD AVOIDED INVASION AND SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING THE OVERTHROW OF THE FIDEL CASTRO REGIME, AND HE HAD AVOIDED WAR. THEY UTTERED VAGUE AND OPTIMISTIC BANALITIES WHOSE GENERAL TENOR WAS THAT SOMETHING GREAT WAS GOING TO DEVELOP OUT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S HANDLING OF THE AFFAIR. SVEC COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE JUST BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THE FULL SCOPE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S "COUP". THIS, HE ADDED IRONICALLY, WAS UNFORTUNATE "IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO OUR ADVANTAGE HAD THEY REMAINED UNAWARE FOR A LONGER PERIOD". KLUSAK SUBSEQUENTLY REMARKED THAT "WE" - HE ADDED THAT THIS MEANT NOT JUST "THE SOCIALIST CAMP" BUT ALL THE EUROPEAN NATIONS - HAD SHOWN UNDERSTANDING OF "KENNEDY AND HIS SHIPS. WE WILL LET HIM PLAY AROUND WITH THEM UNTIL THE ELECTIONS, BUT AFTERWARDS HE WILL HAVE TO PUT THEM AWAY AND NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY". (SOURCE COMMENT ONCE AGAIN IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT THESE

SECRET

**SECRET**

(When Filled In)

TDCS

IN 10713

PAGE 4

OFFICIALS HAVE NO CLEAR INSIGHT INTO SOVIET INTENTIONS, OR INTO WHAT THE REAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CUBA WILL BE. THEY WERE TALKING TO REINFORCE THEIR FAITH.)

6. NONE OF THESE OFFICIALS MADE ANY MENTION REPRISALS IN BERLIN OR ELSEWHERE. (SOURCE COMMENT TO HAVE DONE SO WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPLICITLY TO CONTRADICT THE THEME THAT ALL THAT HAD HAPPENED WAS DUE TO KHRUSHCHEV'S WISDOM AND IS FOR THE GOOD OF THE ORBIT.)

7. FIELD DISSEM AMB ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

**SECRET**