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SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

9 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING
COMMITTEE ON CUBAN AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Second Progress Report, Sub-Committee on Cuban
Subversion

ENCLOSURE: Progress Achieved during April in Impeding Travel
to Cuba

1. The enclosure hereto summarizes progress made by the several departments and agencies, during the month of April, in executing the actions approved by the President on 8 March 1963, to control the movement of subversives and subversive trainees to and from Cuba.

2. In addition to the program on control of subversive travel, action programs were completed in all of the companion areas, and were forwarded for approval on the dates indicated below:

- a. Controls on Movement of Propaganda Material - 14 March 1963
- b. Controls on Movement of Arms - 14 March 1963
- c. The Organization of a Caribbean Surveillance System -
15 March 1963
- d. The Exchange of Intelligence - 25 March 1963
- e. Controls on Movement of Funds - 10 April 1963
- f. Training of Latin Americans in the United States -
26 April 1963

3. A significant development during the month of April bearing on the action programs proposed by the Sub-Committee was the Ministerial Meeting held in Managua, Nicaragua, on 3-4 April. The Managua meeting produced a set of eight resolutions which, when implemented, will proceed along the same major avenues as the


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action programs proposed by the Sub-Committee. An interdepartmental team is currently visiting the Isthmian capitals, consulting with Ministers of Government and authorities designated by them in the fields of immigration control, customs control, coastal surveillance and the organization of a local counter-subversive agency.

For the Sub-Committee:


V. H. KRULAK
Major General, USMC
Chairman

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PROGRESS ACHIEVED DURING APRIL IN IMPEDING TRAVEL TO CUBA

1. The Department of State has:

a. Participated in the drafting of a resolution passed at the 3-4 April Managua meeting respecting discouragement of travel of Latin Americans to Cuba for training in subversion. The text of the resolution is appended hereto.

b. Headed an interdepartmental team currently visiting the Isthmian capitals with the objective of securing, where feasible, the fullest and quickest implementation of all the recommendations agreed on at Managua. Prior to the departure of the team, Department of State posts were instructed to inform the host governments of the trip and to encourage them to identify the kinds and extent of technical assistance it would be most useful for the United States to furnish.

c. Caused to be noted in U.S. passports since 1 April that they are not valid for travel to Cuba.

d. Following an indication that the Bolivian Government might be willing to increase efforts to impede travel of its nationals to Cuba, instructed the U.S. Embassy to recommend that the GOB:

(1) Ban travel to Cuba by Bolivian nationals except for official or special purposes approved by the GOB, and establish legal penalties for violations;

(2) Require Bolivian citizens to have a passport or other GOB document to travel abroad;

(3) Make such document invalid for travel to Cuba unless specially endorsed;

(4) Seek arrangements with third countries which are important transit points under which third countries will assist the GOB in preventing unauthorized travel by Bolivians and will help identify violators.

e. Drawing on the recommendation in the paper on "The Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees" and other sources, prepared telegrams to the non-Isthmian posts, instructing them to encourage host governments to take additional counter-subversion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local

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situation in the recipient country and included appropriate suggestions as to strategy which might be used in securing implementation of the desired actions.

f. Requested posts in Latin America to encourage host governments to take appropriate measures to discourage participation of their nationals in Cuba's May Day celebration, and to prevent charter flights from their country to Cuba for the celebration.

2. The Department of Defense has:

a. Continued the U.S. sea and air surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba until 25 April 1963, at the same rate and with the same emphasis as existed prior to that date. Since 25 April 1963, additional sea surveillance has been realized between Cuba and Haiti, due to the stationing of the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron at the entrance of the Gulf of Gonaives occasioned by the deterioration of internal conditions within Haiti. Reports of subversive movement, or suspected subversive movement, obtained by U.S. surveillance are available for immediate transmittal through the U.S. military alerting system.

b. Flowing from recommendations by the committee, greatly accelerated current programs for the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. As of 1 April, a commercial submarine cable from Florida to Panama became operational. This cable gives reliable voice and teletype communications to CINCARIB including both classified teletype and voice. Negotiations are continuing in Honduras, Colombia and Ecuador for the installation of military radio facilities. Installation of a multi-channel radio station has been completed in Costa Rica. A similar facility in Nicaragua is scheduled for completion by 1 July 1963.

c. Established an Intelligence Center at CARIBCOM Headquarters, in connection with the program of surface surveillance of the Caribbean, for rapid processing and dissemination to countries concerned, via the American Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement of subversives.

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d. Established on 11 April a U.S. military alerting system operated by CINCARIB and CINCLANT. Pursuant to the request of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs the Department of Defense has suspended the use of the Military Groups in the alerting system and is working with CIA to reduce duplication of effort to a minimum.

e. Alerting U.S. forces, for the most part within the Atlantic Command, to be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters upon request by the country concerned. Currently, forces are assigned by the unified commander involved, to meet the singular problem encountered.

f. Ordered to the Canal Zone a Coast Guard Mobile Training Team for a period of six months, beginning 15 May 1963, to provide training, in Spanish, in boat handling and maintenance together with surveillance techniques to those Central American countries having 40 foot Coast Guard Utility Boats. In addition, the Mobile Training Team will assist as required in establishing a permanent Small Craft Training and Inspection Facility in the Canal Zone. One 40 foot utility boat has been permanently assigned to the U.S. Naval Station, Rodman, Canal Zone for use by the MTT and will be delivered there about 20 June.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency has:

a. Completed its efforts to improve U.S. government communications in Latin America by the installation of the remaining two commercial leased circuits into Guatemala City and Managua, and the stationing on a permanent basis of 35 CIA radio operators in Latin America in replacement of temporary duty personnel. In November 1962, CIA's active radio facilities in 20 Latin American capitals were augmented with on-line cryptographic facilities and temporary personnel to handle the bulk of all U.S. government communications in the area. These facilities, know as Joint Communications Centers, are now being operated by CIA on a 24-hour basis, as a service to all U.S. government agencies. Latin American traffic handled by the CIA base radio station near Washington has increased from 3,000,000 groups handled in October 1962 to 15,000,000 groups handled in March 1963.

b. Increased its efforts designed to control the movement of persons, arms and propaganda materials to and from Cuba. A summary of actions by country is provided below:

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1) Argentina - Station, in conjunction with the Embassy, has continued to press the Argentine government to enact effective travel control legislation and to adopt measures recommended by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS. Information on Argentines travelling to Cuba is being furnished to the Argentine government by the station. Several potential travellers to Cuba have been spotted and are being assessed by the station. Information from three recent returnees from Cuba is being obtained through debriefings. Station reports that because of increased Mexican controls, all truly clandestine travel to Cuba from Argentina is now via Prague. Che Guevara's mother was arrested on 23 April upon her return to Argentina for importing Castro propaganda.

2) Bolivia - Station and Embassy have been urging Bolivian government to adopt stricter travel controls, without apparent results so far. Names of travellers known to have returned from Cuba are being furnished to the Bolivian government. Thus far, no action is known to have been taken by the Bolivian government on the strength of such information. Station comments that problem with Bolivia is not in lack of information available to government on Cuban subversion, but in getting Bolivia to do something about it.

3) Brazil - Information on Brazilians who have received subversive training in Cuba has been made available to the Brazilian Foreign Office, through the American Ambassador, and to the National Security Council through (CIA 24 liaison) with the NSC's Security Service.

An asset of the CIA station in Rio is in a position to harass and delay Cuba-bound travellers in those instances where the station is able to tip him off regarding their destination. He can also harass returnees when informed in advance. The station is taking steps to get appropriate information to him promptly.

24 4) Chile - Chilean internal security authorities, are trying to impede and harass travellers to and from Cuba. Government is now requiring passport applicants to state destination, and passports must be turned in after travel. The Foreign Minister has stated much progress is being made, with cooperation of the Mexican government, and that travel of Chileans to Cuba has been dramatically reduced in recent weeks.

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Station and Embassy are continuing pressure on Cuban government in this regard. Names of travellers to Cuba are being passed to the Ambassador, who furnishes them to President Alessandri (who has asked that this collaboration be kept secret). Information from CIA unilateral operations against Cuban Embassy is being used by a newly created Chilean surveillance team in checking out purpose of travel projected and in following up on returnees from Cuba. The station has an agent in daily contact with leaders of the extreme militant left and is exploring the possibilities of sending three station assets to Cuba for training and intelligence missions. A Cuban First Secretary was declared persona non grata during April for using false identity documents, and the Cuban charge d'affaires was subsequently recalled by his own government.

5) Colombia - Chief of Customs has indicated to station his willingness to institute an improved travel control system. One station asset expects to travel to Cuba in the near future. Station believes it has identified a courier operating between Colombia and Cuba and has mounted an operation to uncover his Colombian contacts.

6) Costa Rica - Station reports little pro-Castro activity during April. No recorded travel to or from Cuba has taken place. Local authorities appear inclined to cooperate in control program.

7) Dominican Republic - Efforts to get Juan Bosch to take active steps against Communists and travellers to and from Cuba have been fruitless to date, as have been efforts to establish a new and effective internal security organization in the Dominican Republic. Bosch appears to have lost his previously stated enthusiasm for such a service, but efforts to persuade him to approve a proposed budget for the service are continuing.

8) Ecuador - Station reports that, largely as a result of both overt and covert propaganda activities of U.S. agencies in Ecuador, the public awareness of Cuban subversion has changed from apathy to genuine concern. The government, however, is no more inclined to take action than before. The National Director of Immigration has stated that he personally would like to do whatever he can to stop travel to Cuba, which he realizes is for subversive purposes, but present laws do not permit him to impede travel via third countries. He is exploring possibilities of reprisals against citizens who return

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from Cuba. He has checked a list of names and passport numbers obtained by CIA from airline manifests in Mexico, and reports that not one name or passport number corresponds with official Ecuadoran records, indicating the possibility of fabrication of passports by Cuba.

A recent Ecuadoran returnee from Cuba, recruited by the station, lost his hand in testing a homemade bomb made in accordance with instructions received in Cuba. He made a public statement and wide publicity was arranged by the station and USIS. Plans are to keep this incident alive as proof of revolutionary training given in Cuba for terrorist activity in Ecuador.

The station chief has accompanied the American Ambassador on visits to the Ecuadoran Ministers of Defense and Government to stress the threat of Cuban backed subversion.

Approximately 7,000 pounds of Communist propaganda are being destroyed monthly as a result of a unilateral operation of the CIA Base in Guayaquil.

9) Haiti - Station reports that several assets have travelled to points outside Port-au-Prince in an effort to learn of possible travel to and from Cuba. Reports from areas of Cape Haitien, Port de Paix, and La Gonave and La Tortue Islands, were negative.

10) Honduras - The government has shown little inclination to ~~tighten up~~ on travel control. A travel control system presented to the Minister of Government has been fully approved by him, but not yet put into effect. Several known Honduran Communists have recently travelled to Cuba. Information as to their identities is being furnished to President Villeda through the U.S. Ambassador.

11) Mexico - A CIA source states the Cuban Embassy has issued 10-15 visas during April on pieces of paper separate from the passport, but the government's practice of stamping all passports to show travel to or from Cuba has largely nullified this effort by travellers to avoid the stigma of travel to Cuba. All Cubans arriving in Mexico, whether in transit or otherwise must have Mexican visas. This is not true of other nationalities, who need no visa if in transit. The government continues to confiscate propaganda material from Cuba sporadically at the airport. The government recently refused visas to five Cuban doctors who wished to attend a Urology Congress

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in Mexico. Several station assets have recently travelled to Cuba for intelligence purposes.

12) Panama - [redacted] the Guardia Nacional has been ordered to increase its vigilance concerning returnees from Cuba and to prevent them from establishing an effective organization. Several recent returnees from Cuba are being debriefed regarding their training and contacts, and several CIA assets are expecting to leave for Cuba in the near future for training. CIA has increased its personnel assigned to travel control functions at the Panama City airport, now permitting a three-man detail for each eight-hour shift. Station is continuing its pressure on Panamanian officials to tighten travel controls.

13) Uruguay - Station has made arrangements with [redacted] to pigeonhole or "lose" applications for good conduct certificates - which are needed to secure passports, and must be renewed every six months - in cases where information from the CIA station or from the Uruguayans' own sources indicated intention of travelling to Cuba. Pertinent information from CIA unilateral operations is being passed regularly to cooperating Uruguayan officials. Station has a further check in that the Mexican Ambassador to Uruguay is now checking all applicants for Mexican visas with the station. On the basis of information furnished to him, he held up visa applications of Uruguayan Communist Labor delegates who planned to attend May Day celebrations in Havana. Creation of this bottleneck may force some travellers to abandon the Mexican route to Cuba and turn to the longer and far more expensive route via Prague. Information on past travel to Cuba by Uruguayans, furnished by the station, was included in a study of Cuban subversion prepared by Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service for the National Council of Government.

4. The U. S. Information Agency has:

a. Sent circular instructions to all USIS field posts in Latin America advising each to stimulate publicity in the local press and radio, to encourage identification of Cuban trainees through personal-contact work with students and labor, to report promptly evidence of Cuban-aided subversion in each country, to report statements by local leaders and editorial comment, and to publicize economic conditions in Cuba as means of discrediting travellers to Cuba. The Agency's Washington media were issued a detailed guidance on the subject on 28 March.

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b. In addition to the regular news reporting (VOA) of the Managua Ministers' Meeting, broadcast 15 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban subversion to Latin America during the month of April. Among these were a dramatization based on the story of an Ecuadoran boy who was attacked by communists in Guayaquil for carrying anti-communist film, a chronology of subversive acts involving Cuban diplomats, and a history of subversion from the Trojan horse through Nazi fifth columns to present-day Cuban subversion.

c. Transmitted by teletype 13 articles on Cuban subversion during April to USIS posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local press. These included news stories, commentaries, and backgrounders. Among the subjects treated were the Managua Meeting, the Guayaquil incident, the story of an Ecuadoran terrorist trained in Cuba who was wounded by his own explosives, Assistant Secretary Martin's Pan American Day speech, and several commentaries on training in Cuba. The Agency's publications center in Mexico also published a pamphlet based on the defection of the Guatemalan ex-communist leader Carlos Manuel Pellecer, including letters in which he revealed communist subversive tactics.

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APPENDIX

RESOLUTION I PASSED AT THE 3-4 APRIL MANAGUA
MEETING OF MINISTERS

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San Jose, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963.

AGREES

To recommend to their Governments that they adopt, within the limitations of their respective constitutional provisions, measures to be put into effect immediately, to prohibit, restrict and discourage the movement of their nationals to and from Cuba. To this end, they propose the adoption of the following measures:

(1) Provide, as a general rule, that every passport or other travel document which may be issued carry a stamp which indicates that said passport is not valid for travel to Cuba.

(2) Declare officially that nationals who are permitted to travel to Cuba should have the permission duly inscribed in their official travel document.

(3) Promulgate regulations restricting the granting of visas to foreigners who have travelled to Cuba within a stipulated period of time.

(4) Notify travel agencies and transport companies of these measures for due compliance; and inform the governments of other countries through the most appropriate means.

(5) Request the Governments of the Hemisphere:

a) not to allow the nationals of signatory countries to travel to Cuba unless they possess a valid passport or other document issued by their country of origin valid for such travel;

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b) not to accept visas, tourist cards or other documents issued to their nationals for travel to Cuba which do not form an integral (non-detachable) part of their passports or other travel documents;

c) to observe the limitations placed in the passports or other travel documents of the nationals of signatory governments and not allow them to depart for Cuba;

d) to inform the signatory countries through appropriate channels of refusals to allow one of their nationals to depart for Cuba; and

e) to provide the signatory governments the names of their nationals which may appear on the passenger list of any airplane or ship going to or coming from Cuba.

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