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TO: DDC/	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO 1957—O-439445

(47)

(CLASSIFICATION)

65-1507/2

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

In reply refer to
Action Memorandum No. A-459

Date 7 April 1965

ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO : Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Agreement Between the United States Secret Service and the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning Presidential Protection in the United States

REFERENCE: Memorandum from DDCI to DD/I, DD/P, and DD/S, dated 8 June 1963, subject: The CIA Role in Support of Presidential Trips Abroad

1. Attached for the information of addressees is a copy of subject agreement developed by the Chief of the Secret Service and me, in accordance with the recommendations of the Warren Commission and the actions of the President's Committee on the Warren Report.

2. The Deputy Director for Plans is responsible for insuring Agency compliance with this agreement and for maintaining the active liaison with the Secret Service. The staff function in this regard is being performed in the Counter Intelligence Staff of the DD/P. All Agency components in liaison with the Secret Service are to keep the Counter Intelligence Staff informed of their dealings with the Secret Service. The Counter Intelligence Staff will provide advice to other Agency components who receive requests for support from the Secret Service.

3. This agreement does not amend or alter current Agency policy as expressed in my memorandum of 8 June 1963 concerning support of Presidential trips abroad. An additional agreement with the Secret Service, involving CIA and other Government agencies dealing with Presidential travel abroad, is in process of development.

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

SUSPENSE DATE:

Attachment

cc: OGC
n/s
C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION)

13-00000

Executive Registry
65-1507

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Purpose of Agreement

A. The purpose of this Agreement is to define the types of information, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The CIA role in support of Presidential trips abroad is the subject of a separate Agreement with the Secret Service.

B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, the Vice President-elect and former Presidents.

II. General Responsibilities

A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the person of the President. It undertakes to identify individuals who, because of their individual propensities or characteristics, are dangerous or who may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever action is required to counteract any threat to the person of the President posed by such individuals.

Copy 1
Executive Registry
Control and
Distribution

B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and maintains biographic and other data on organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of performing its statutory functions. It also originates, and receives from other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the Agency has no police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions.

III. Information to be Reported by CIA

A. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service information that comes into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement concerning individuals coming to its attention of the classes set forth in Appendix B to this Agreement. The information may be furnished in more than one report, and in emergency situations priority attention will be given to its preparation and delivery.

B. After reporting an individual to the Secret Service, the CIA will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or obtains concerning such individual.

C. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service intelligence and intelligence information that becomes available concerning:

(1) Groups outside the United States which advocate assassination of government officials as a political weapon and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any persons named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate a Chief of State or other high official.

D. This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA and the Secret Service annually, or at such more frequent occasions as either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President

A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to such factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be protected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may, at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers

to the Secret Service in order to augment the Service's capacity to carry out its protective functions in the most secure manner.

B. Such officers detailed by the CIA will be designated officers of the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless he has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standards established by the Chief of the United States Secret Service, or in accordance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA. Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.

V. Implementation of Agreement

A. The Secret Service and the CIA undertake to maintain an active liaison to insure the prompt passage of available information concerning individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by the Secret Service as dangerous to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such steps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement are fully carried out.

Central Intelligence Agency

Dated: 27 March 1965 By: Marshall S. Carter
Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director

United States Secret Service

Dated: [illegible] By: [illegible]
James J. Rowley
Chief

APPENDIX A

Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Identification Data - to the extent available to CIA, name or names of individual (including prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms), address, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;

2. Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes in Appendix B, which the individual reported fits;

3. A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any CIA file on an individual reported which cause him to fit any class or classes in Appendix B.

APPENDIX B

Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal, state or local Governments or foreign government officials while they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country; provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government official or employee because of his official status;

2. Individuals who threaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary grievance against Federal, state or local Governments or any employee or official thereof by other than legal means;

3. United States citizens who defect or indicate a desire to defect;

4. Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who have been of special interest or value to the United States, and who cannot be eliminated as a possible source of danger to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B;

5. Subversives, communists, racists and fascists in the United States who meet one or more of the following criteria:

(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record of transitory residence or employment;

(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States sentiment;

(c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.

The term "subversives" shall mean persons (including members of the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States or the government of any state, district or possession thereof or the government of any political subdivision therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

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1963 OCTOBER 1963						
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Friday 22 November

A.M.	P.M.
8:45	1:00
9:00 ~~Intelligence Briefing~~	1:15
9:15	1:30
9:30	1:45
9:45	2:00
10:00	2:15
10:15	2:30
10:30	2:45
10:45	3:00
11:00	3:15
11:15	3:30
11:30	3:45
11:45	4:00 General Carter returned from ISA
12:00	4:15 due in [illegible] of
12:15	4:30 for [illegible] Kennedy
12:30	4:45
12:45	5:00

MEMORANDA

LAST MONTH

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Sat. - Sun. 23-24 November

A.M.	P.M.
~~8:30~~ w/ DCI, Helms, Cline, R. Jack	
8:45 } Smith, Col. White Dr. Wheelon, Mr. Kirkpatrick	1:00
9:00 } at EAST	1:15
9:15 Whip, Helms, Cline, LBK — at EAST	1:30
9:30	1:45
9:45	2:00
10:00	SAT 2:15 Mr. Bross, Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Elder, Mr. Knecht
10:15 SAT Met w/Wheelon + Kirkpatrick	2:30
10:30 at Langley. Colonel White joined for a while	2:45
10:45	3:00
11:00	3:15
11:15	3:30
11:30	3:45
11:45	4:00
12:00	4:15
12:15	4:30
SAT 12:30 Went to White House to pay respects to Jackie at home by w/Mr Kirkpatrick	4:45
12:45	5:00

MEMORANDA

SUNDAY — 8:30 Meeting at East Bldg w/DCI & Intell Briefing briefers. General Carter left at 10:00 for 10:15 meeting at DCI's house; then he was to go home (w/Cline, Colby, & Elder)

LAST MONTH

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NEXT MONTH

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Monday 25 November

A.M.		P.M.	
8:30	~~DCI, Kavanaugh, P. T. Smith~~		
8:45	Clinic — at East	1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Left to pick up Mrs Carter	2:15	
10:15	and Mrs. McCone to go to St. Matthew's	2:30	
10:30		2:45	Returned from Funeral after going to Quarters
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	3:30 Mr. Helms
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	President Kennedy's funeral at St. Matthew's	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

MEMORANDA 6:30 Stag Cocktail - Dinner hosted by General Burns and Dr Montague ~~Flying Navy Tuesday Club~~ (Red Cross) in honor of visiting British JIC ~~team~~. ~~Informal~~

~~(DCI will stop by ... drinks — on way to other engagement)~~

Cancelled due to death of President Kennedy

14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February

1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann, General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban item.

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip, he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while. In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM committee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time. Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with Mr. McCone early next week.

4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

13-00000

the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it. Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba and that this particular paper really does not go far enough. He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation without really accomplishing anything. Mr. Vance stated that prior activities in this regard had created great consternation in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr. McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache. Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro. At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that we should do everything possible to create provocations and distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled) and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The agenda item was left as follows:

a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses of action to include pros and cons, noise levels, estimated results, etc.

b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution which was prepared during Martin's time.

c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified; 3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black-list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we should see just what our opportunities are, and on paragraph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities might be.

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday. Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend, DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.

5. The next item was a very cursory review of the covert action programs for [redacted] France, Tibet, [redacted] and China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor. Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern operations.

6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2 aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over

13-00000

friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organization and resources to be used, either SAC or CIA. Mr. Vance stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of difficulties. Mr. Vance stated it would be the regular cover plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single mission. He said they could understand the need for two airplanes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent. He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for this.

7. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever it required covert flights over friendly territory. Mr. Bundy stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T

13-00000

to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest, most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Distribution:
Original - DDCI
1 - Elder/Enright
Paras 1-5 to Mr. Paul Eckel DDP/SGO
Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

13-00000

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Notes by [illegible]

18 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964 at the White House

1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone. The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk, McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

3. The President opened by stating that he had read the revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection (paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of determining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down -- he simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then

SECRET
EYES ONLY

13-00000

said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we chose. This position was agreed.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights. Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a number of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa for example. The President said that when the crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on nuclear-free zones was eliminated.

5. I then stated that the President should know that there was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some problem areas that could develop in a number of these points, particularly as to our getting back into a position of letting up on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany, and particularly France, that should be considered. The President then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy

level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter. (Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that as a statement by the President there was adequate protection in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United States. (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the requirement for adequate verification and that the additional words inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter of record with the President and the other principals at the meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intelligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.) The President then directed a number of actions as regards Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference statement. In connection with this speech for American consumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sentences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.

6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.

7. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which such a letter would be made public.

b. The President then expressed his great concern over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc., etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article) that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were. He said he still felt it was a good idea and that he thought Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did not get the impression that a decision was made in this regard nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately being in the papers or getting around town. He made some very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard. He felt the situation had become extremely serious in the past two months since he had become President and did not recall any such problem when he was meeting periodically with President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever been

13-00000

bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indicated they would immediately take whatever steps were feasible to improve the situation.

c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were the proper thing for the U. S. to be doing. He thought they were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he understood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these considerations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this program and had the same doubts the President did. McNamara said that he too had never been in favor of this program and questioned our participation. I stated that while this program was conducted by the CIA, every action taken had the full approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented and that the program was designed in part for the specific purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activities in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no control. I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with Castro. I also pointed out that sabotage activities in North

Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor and this point was not developed further. General Taylor noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of this type since to completely desist would eventually lead Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The President then directed that he wanted a complete review of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and McNamara nodded their agreement. The President said he would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba. He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions they might have.

d. There was minor discussion as regards the situation in ~~North~~ South Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation. The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a speech indicating that things were improving and then to have a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and that he had in the past several months based his actions on

the advice and guidance he had received from his principal advisers whom he considered professionals and experts in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number of cases although he was the first to admit that he had been wrong in the past throughout his life at various times and was certainly no more immune than anyone else from making mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he was mighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as a result of recommendations from State. I also got the feeling that from here on out he is much more liable to use his own intuition and prescience as to what should be done and what should not be done in the daily operations of his actions in the foreign policy field.

e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the President noted that the dinner he had given for the Congressional Committee leadership had been a complete success and that he was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. He had received nothing but highly favorable accolades from the people who had attended and many of them indicated it was the first time they had ever been in the White House and certainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing by the Administration leadership. The President said that he had received a phone call saying that he should continue this and he was certainly going to do so. He had also been promised that at least in large measure as a result of this briefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday. The President then said we could do a lot better. He told Rusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the afternoon prior to these two dinners so they would be much fresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 job but not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for the labor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not have been better. The President said he had planned for the briefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lasted an hour. He said that this was entirely too long and that Mr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. He

then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute maximum he would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I subsequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr. McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr. Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abundant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered any further discussion either with Moyer or the President inappropriate.

8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President had to go out to dedicate a building.

9. The foregoing notes are in a single copy and will be shown only to the Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by cable.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

13-00000

4 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Johnson on 31 December 1963

1. The background as to the purpose of this visit is covered in my Memorandum for the Record dated 1 January on my visit to Independence to see Mr. Truman.

2. We departed Kansas City airport in the early afternoon of 31 December, arriving at the Johnson City airport shortly before 3:00. This airport was built by President Johnson in his own back yard and was subsequently turned over to Johnson City as their airport. We were taken to the Johnson residence and made comfortable in the combination office-sitting room just off the dining room. Coffee was served and in a few moments the President and Mrs. Johnson joined us. After appropriate welcoming to the ranch, Mrs. Johnson retired to her household chores.

3. Mr. Murphy briefed the President on our discussions with Mr. Truman and reported to the President Mr. Truman's desire to help in any way he could during the coming year. Mr. Murphy followed generally the comments indicated in my previous memorandum as put forward by Mr. Truman. I thought he gave a much too favorable report on Mr. Truman's condition and mental agility. This was understandable to me since Murphy is one of the junior old cronies of Mr. Truman. The President asked me for my reaction and I gave it substantially in accordance with the last paragraph of my Truman memorandum. I told the President that I certainly felt Mr. Truman was willing to do anything he could or was asked to do to assist President Johnson; that my own reaction was that Mr. Truman was in some respects senile and living 90% on memories and his past. I stated that I thought there was certainly nothing wrong with Mr. Truman's mind or alertness but that I felt some caution should be exercised in just how Mr. Truman's assets might be utilized. The President made no comment except to note

13-00000

wryly that he himself occasionally had problems with his memory but that he did not think he was yet living with it entirely. The President then noted that we should have been briefing Mr. Truman more often and that perhaps had we done so, it would have prevented the type of article he had recently published about the CIA. The President then stated that he wanted President Hoover, President Eisenhower, and President Truman briefed monthly on the international situation as well as on the domestic situation and what his programs were. (Action: This requires follow-up with the White House and possibly a discussion between Mr. McCone and the President since Mr. McCone indicated informally that he thought once a month was too often and that, in any event, while CIA can handle the international situation, we should have some other agency handle the domestic situation.)

4. The President then made a number of statements which seemed to be in part his philosophy of operations and in others a repetition of his conversation with Erhard. It was difficult to separate when he was repeating what he had said to Erhard and when he was stating a Johnson principle.

5. The President stated that he was much taken with Erhard and that he thought him a smart, articulate German who was much more appealing than Adenauer. Erhard apparently attempted to feel the President out as to his reactions to various statements and positions taken by deGaulle. The President got the impression that Erhard was initially trying to play off deGaulle against the President. Mr. Johnson told Erhard that as far as he, Mr. Johnson, was concerned, he was going to do everything possible to promote a peaceful world but without in any way relaxing either our guard or our military strength; he was prepared to walk around the world if necessary to promote peace when he was convinced that such walking would assist -- on the other hand, he had no intention of making trips just to cultivate friends and promote the giving away of U. S. resources in an effort to entice people to join our camp; if they wanted to come in willingly with their eyes open, he would welcome them but he felt it was time for other nations to do some thinking on their own and to make their

13-00000

own judgments without the need for U. S. persuasion in the form of concrete financial and military aid. Accordingly, the President intended to stay home and do his own heavy thinking as to just how he can best promote peace -- if this led to trips, then he would take trips. If people wanted to come to see him to talk about peace or other matters, he would be delighted to receive them but there must be something worthwhile to talk about and something that will lead in the proper direction. He said that during his lifetime the United States had been forced to fight two wars because of Germany and that he was not going to allow any situation to develop which might lead in that direction again so long as he was President. He said he would not be a party to any shilly-shallying in that direction and that Germany must make up its own mind and see which way they intend to go. If it were going to be toward deGaulle, then say so. If it were going to be toward the United States and its concept of a free world, then say so and prove it by putting more effort into their actions in this regard -- more effort in the way of more money and more support of United States policies. He told Erhard that this was the way he felt and there was no point in Erhard trying to play off deGaulle against President Johnson nor to try to get Germany in the middle between those two nations. The President said that Erhard apparently accepted this frank talk and for the rest of the visit never once mentioned deGaulle.

6. The President then directed that Salinger acquire from USIA and CIA a roundup of world reaction as to Erhard's visit. He said that if we did not make any money on that deal, we might just as well fold up our tent insofar as influencing foreign visitors was concerned because he, the President, had really put out and had really talked turkey to Erhard -- which was the only way he, the President, knew how to talk. He said that this administration was being criticized for either having no foreign policy or a poor one and that he therefore wanted as much publicity as possible on the highly favorable aspects of the Erhard visit. (I subsequently had a CIA report prepared and forwarded to Salinger on 1 January, pointing out that it was an initial report and that a real reading on Ambassadorial and Governmental reactions would be coming along

13-00000

later since it takes more time to acquire these from somewhat sensitive sources.

7. The President then went on to say that people seem to have the impression he was going to sit back and try to keep things on an even keel so as not to disturb the upcoming election. He said that this was a wrong impression for people to have and that he intended to do everything he possibly could to ensure maintaining and augmenting the great forward momentum that President Kennedy had been developing toward world peace and proper domestic policies. He said that this was a time for real action and that the United States must get itself out of this trend of thought that it sits back and reacts to others' actions rather than creates actions of its own. He is tired of reacting -- he wants to act and let others react to him and this is one of the things he intends to think about during upcoming months. He therefore urges the most imaginative thinking possible both in and out of Government to see how best his ends can be attained. He pointed out that this was not going to be easy because this was an election year and lots of people would be looking for ways to attack him and his policies. He said, however, that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because it was an election year in which he would be politically involved.

8. The President then said that he had been totally dissatisfied with what the State Department had proposed he send to Khrushchev and he had therefore sat down at the desk (pointing) and had in his own handwriting composed the New Year's message to Khrushchev. He intended to continue to promote every possibility for a basis of understanding looking toward peace and again reiterated that any agreement would never be at the expense of our own security.

9. He then asked me for a briefing of any current situations that he should be brought up to date on. I brought him up to date on Cyprus, on Cuba, and on South Vietnam since he had indicated that he had read recent Checklists.

13-00000

10. As to Cuba, he stated his dissatisfaction with our present policies and actions connected therewith and said that shortly after his return to Washington, and probably after the State of the Union message, he wanted a comprehensive review of the Cuban situation and our policies and he wanted the most imaginative and forward thinking people put to work on seeing what else could be done. He did not feel the sabotage efforts would ever really result in any ultimate goals for U. S. interests but was prepared to accept some of them if they promote internal dissidents and assisted the morale of the people we were working with in Cuba. He stated he was not at all satisfied with the Governmental actions taken thus far to curtail free world trade with Cuba. He said he had told Erhard that he could not tolerate West German trade with Cuba and that Erhard had assured him that while it was very small, he would put a complete stop to it as soon as he returned to Germany. The President directed that thorough preparation be made so that when Pearson visits the United States, Mr. Johnson can take him on in the same manner and similar preparations should be made for other free world countries doing appreciable business with Castro.

11. There was then a discussion with Staats and Murphy about some sort of pork barrel program which was to be canceled and which Hubert Humphrey and Elvis Stahr had taken violent exception to. Apparently the President had received a vitriolic letter from Elvis Stahr about this matter because he commented that he now understood why Stahr had made such an inadequate Secretary of the Army. The lines of action directed by the President as to preparation of responses was not a matter for CIA.

12. There was then a discussion as to some sort of adjustment in tax procedures which, by reducing a figure from 15 to 14, would save some $800 million this year. Neither Mike Forrestal nor I heard this loud and clear but I think it had to do with adjusting withholding tax deductions. In any event, no decision was reached by the President and the conversation was directly with Staats and not for the rest of the group.

13-00000

13. The President then turned to Indonesia and stated that he was faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether or not it was in the national interest to continue aid to Indonesia. This decision had to be made by him in accordance with the foreign aid bill just passed. He said he wanted in writing from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McCone their recommendations as to what his decision should be. He also wanted to get reactions from Senator Russell and several other Congressional leaders. He quoted a figure of $25 million which was involved. (Action: The wheels are grinding in the Agency to come up with a pro and con and consequences paper for the Director upon which he may make his recommendation to the President. The figures are somewhat confused and the actual amount appears to be in the neighborhood of $60 million. Mike Forrestal has these figures pretty well tied down and points out that the Presidential decision does not require any action on PL 480 funds.)

14. The President then stated that he was totally dissatisfied with the proposed program for alleviating poverty which apparently suggested that he ask Congressional authorization for a lump sum of money which he would administer through some sort of newly-created poverty administration. He said he wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole and that if he proposed anything like that on the Hill, they would laugh him out of court and it would probably bring a defeat in the Democratic party in the upcoming elections. He would give absolutely no consideration to anything which could possibly result in graft or pork barrel activities. Any program for the relief of poverty must be designed to get right down to the grass roots out where the poverty actually exists and must be handled by existing Federal, State, and community organizations which are geared in this direction. He mentioned specifically the possibility of utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads and other similar Federal and State organizations. He said that if roads are to be built, they should be built into and out of poverty-stricken areas and to provide access to schools and hospitals and such human needs activities and not, repeat not, for the improvement of major trunk lines and highways. He thought perhaps the people who were receiving this

13-00000

type of aid could be utilized in the construction of these roads where they would see the results of what they were doing and the purpose of it. He stated that any attempt to organize a new administrative entity to handle this matter would not even get off the ground before the year was out and would merely result in more Government people on the payroll and more bureaucracy. He directed an immediate reappraisal of his program for the relief of poverty and coming up with an entirely different concept for his approval. Mr. Staats and Mr. Murphy indicated they would follow through on this.

15. The foregoing covers all pertinent points to the best of my recollection. I shall write a separate memorandum of the tour President Johnson gave us of his ranch and with particular attention to the fact that he built and paid for every improvement on the place out of his own pocket, including the runway, the runway lights, and the dam across the river.

MSC

Rands

Airport
Tempelhof Rice -
Bonn - Cemetery
Coffee - Hinrichs
No Secret Service
Mrs. Johnson -

President:

M/R

Erhardt - much taken - smart - articulate - appealed more than Adenauer -
Pres says he's going to stay home & think of ways to get peace -
If others want to come fine OK - but he not make trips just for trips -
He want Peace do anything to get it but never at expense of our
own Security - told Erhardt not to play off de Gaulle against US -
Germany to say which way they go - put more into it or We had
to fight 2 World Wars because of Germany - this Pres. wasn't going
to be a party to any shilly-shallying like that - Then Erhardt was OK -

Pres. wants round-up from FBIS (CIA) and USIA on world reaction to
Erhardt visit - said if didn't make money on that deal might as well
give up - we got criticized as to foreign policy - build up a story -
highly favorable reporting -

13-00000

1 January 1964

Paragraphs for message to DCI Mr. Enright handled sending of message on 2 Jan

1. The President has not yet approved the 1965 budget and it is being extremely closely held. Agency requirements totaled [redacted] and BOB cuts reduced it to [redacted]. Further cuts are quite obviously in the mill. The '65 total request will be less than '64 and expenditures will likewise be less than '64. There will be departmental reductions in Defense, State, AEC, Agriculture, with increases in HEW and Labor. With relation to Gross National Product, the '65 budget will be the smallest since 1951. This will be the first time in ten years that there has been a decrease in personnel, amounting to approximately [redacted] The smallest increase during this period was [redacted] in 1957.

2. Major legislative proposals will be those that are left over from last session, such as Civil Rights Bill, tax cut, etc. New programs will include a procedure for attack on poverty, new program for aid to education below college level, new program for medicare, preparation for next year's foreign aid bill, etc. Major emphasis on human needs continues.

3. The President wishes to conduct an all-out review of our Cuban policy after returning to Washington. He particularly wants a more imaginative approach with hard-nosed emphasis on economic denials through pressures on third countries. This in line with his statements at recent Cuban meeting at White House.

4. President personally wrote New Year's message to Khrushchev, released today.

5. President faced with decision on whether or not to continue $25 million aid program to Indonesia. As you know, this is primarily civic action. He wants a study of pros and cons with recommendations in writing from you, Secretary of State, and others. Also wants reaction from Senator Russell and others on Hill. Will take up when he returns.

6. Salinger will send me tomorrow the memoranda he wrote on conversations with the Russians as to President's intentions.

7. President established outstanding rapport with Erhard and things are looking up in that area.

8. President greatly concerned over continuing situation in South Vietnam.

9. President wants General Eisenhower, Mr. Truman, and Mr. Hoover briefed monthly on international and domestic affairs. Stated that had President Truman been getting these regularly, he probably would not have authorized publication of CIA article. In connection with Truman article, this matter not argued at Independence.

10. President much interested in foreign reaction to Erhard talks. We furnished roundup news media reaction to Salinger today.

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Mr. [redacted]						[redacted]	5 June
Mr. [redacted]							June 5
Mr. Kirkpatrick							
Mr. Shea							
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
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2 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Dave Morales, GS-14, Chief of CI Section, Miami Base, 25 May 1961

1. Morales, who was born in Arizona of Indian and Spanish parents and is bilingual in Spanish and English, former football player, arrived in Miami in October 1960 after spending two years at the Havana Station. He appears to have done a unique CI job in organizing, within the Frente, the future intelligence service for the new government of Cuba that the invasion force expected to install. He also organized two other groups. He did this with the help of a Chilean instructor that was supplied by headquarters, and with materials training that WH/4/CI Section, [redacted] sent down to him.

2. The principal group were 39 selected, highly educated Cubans, who were trained as case officers to form the future intelligence service. They are known as the "AMOTS". After being trained they were employed by Morales in doing a series of highly important tasks for the good of the station. These were as follows:

a. Penetration of the local anti-Castro organizations.

b. Penetration of the pro-Castro organization in Miami, the so called 26th of July organization.

c. Preparation of biographical information on all prominent persons in the Frente.

d. Carding some 200,000 Cubans in the period of three months.

e. A special section of the AMOTS monitored all radio transmissions coming from Cuba. This amounted to eight stations that were covered on a 24 hour a day basis.

f. Screening of all persons recruited for the ~~grade~~ Brigade (but this work first started in November 1960, and by that time 300 or 400 men had already gone to camp). This AMOT screening of the military trainees really amounted to a field check since the various cases were discussed with Cuban sources of information present in Miami.

TOP SECRET

g. Mail censorship. All mail coming from the military camp in Guatemala was censored by this group before being released for transmittal to Cuba.

h. Four of this were sent back to Cuba with instructions to report on CI targets; chiefly the secret service and the police.

3. The second group trained by Morales were 100 selected Cubans who were given training as future CI officials and civil government officials. Of the 100 thus trained, 61 were sent to the camp in Guatemala for training with the brigade. They accompanied the brigade on the invasion, and of the 61 only two were lost, nine were caught and the rest got out, due to the circumstance that most of them were on the steamer Lake Charles which owing to the developments at the beaches did not land its troops. These men were given the job of penetrating inland as fast as possible with the troops and identifying and seizing records and documents of the Castro government. Following that they were to set up the temporary civilian government of Cuba. This group were known as the AMFATS. The members of this group were brought back to Miami where they are now living privately. The third group were the AMCHEERS, a group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical individuals, who received training from Morales as a reserve intelligence personnel. Eighty of these had been trained by April 1961 for eventual legal return.

4. Morales stressed that POA's had been received on members of all three groups and that the AMOTS received tradecraft training far in excess of that received by the average Agency staff employee.

5. After the invasion the Frente leaders endeavored to change the AMOTS into a political organization and remove the chief leaders of the AMOT group. Such a development had been anticipated by the base and prior to that action all files, the most valuable part of the AMOT organization had been microfilmed (see my interviews with Simmons for more details on this protective maneuver). The chief AMOTS who were thus removed by the Cuban leaders are still organized under Morales as a shadow intelligence organization.

6. Personnel shortages. Morales accomplished all of the foregoing with the aid of only two girls, one a GS-9 analyst. He tried in vain for more than three months to get a junior case officer assigned, but in vain. This request was forwarded through [redacted] the CI Chief in WH/4. Morales tried to get one or both of two JOTs who were in Miami on TDY, but the JOT office refused to release them on the ground that it would interfere with their training. Morales feels that these young officers would have learned more in

TOP SECRET

three months under him than they would learn in three years of formal training. As a result of being so short handed, Morales had to work about 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Otherwise, however, he received excellent support generally, both from Headquarters and the other sections of Miami Base.

7. As for suggestions for better operation in the future, Morales made two points. (a) the screening of military trainees should start at a much earlier point than was done this time; (b) more adequate number of personnel should be furnished.

R. D. Shea

R. D. Shea

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Mr [redacted]						[redacted]	9 June
Mr [redacted]							6/12
Mr. Kirkpatrick							
Mr. Shea							

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5 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted], Chief of WH/4's CI Section, 1 June 1961

(This memorandum should be read after Morales interview)

1. [redacted] is a dedicated CI type having spent the last 11 years chiefly on CI matters largely under OTR auspices. He spent two years in [redacted] 1954 to 1956, setting up and training the [redacted] CI Staff, apparently starting from scratch. He has been with OTR since then and came to WH/4 in mid-April 1960. He is about to be transferred to the WH Division Staff and his replacement will be Louis Napoli who will head the new combined FI/CI Section of WH/4. He stressed that the charter of the new combined section will give CI the right to interfere in any operation. This will be spelled out explicitly, thus countering the difficulties that [redacted] had in dealing with the PM Section prior to the invasion. Bob Andrews will stay on for CI matters and Seehafer will head the FI part, both under Napoli.

2. AMOTS (future Cuban intelligence service trained by Morales at Miami). This idea started when Anderson of WH Division Staff told [redacted] that he had a [redacted] CI officer who was available for training Cubans. Drawing on his [redacted] experience, [redacted] drew the AMOT plan and prepared the training materials and sent them to Morales for execution. It was Morales who subsequently conceived the idea of training the AMFATS (future CI service) and the AMCHEERS, a reserve intelligence corps consisting of substantial older men. These matters are discussed in detail in my memorandum on Morales. Morales also organized a group of former Cuban diplomats presently in Miami to have them available when a new government is set up. Subsequent to the invasion the AMOTS have been substantially changed by Cardona. He has replaced the top AMOTS by political appointees who have no skill in tradecraft. The top men thus fired had anticipated such a move, and, in addition to microfilming 120,000 cards, they removed all cryptonyms and all memoranda of conversation between them and Morales with the result that the new service doesn't know the identity of the AMOTS who are presently in Cuba. The AMOTS initially numbered 96. The Miami Base now has from 18 to 22 of them of whom ~~a~~ four are inside Cuba with 14 subsources; all of them producing FI and CI reports. By December 1960 the AMOTS had produced 1,800 intelligence reports and 750 radio monitor reports.

not controlled by Cardona or Varona

3. In dealing with the Miami Base, [redacted] stuck strictly to the relationship between Headquarters and a foreign station. His command channel was, of course, via Chief of WH/4 to the Chief of Miami Base to Morales. He and Morales understood each other perfectly and there was no ~~other~~ obstacle of any sort in their collaboration. There was no second-guessing or double case offering in CI matters.

4. [redacted] and his section ran a number of CI ops directly from Headquarters. He referred to the following:

a. A certain lady of easy virtue who had a vast acquaintance among the top Castro people.

b. A [redacted] who for eight years has worked for the Agency as a penetration in Communist [redacted] in various countries.

c. A certain former [redacted] who has been living in Havana in the home of [redacted]. Unfortunately, an expected Castro official appointment did not materialize and this operation has not proved to be of much value.

d. A former U.S. negro citizen now in the Cuban service.

e. Juan Orta, former chief of Castro's executive office, now out of office.

5. [redacted] gave me the attached copies of four basic documents.

Tab A - WH/4 counterintelligence plan, June 1960

Tab B - Counterintelligence plan for an FRD security service, late August 1960

Tab C - CI program for future project, 20 April 1961

Tab D - Counterintelligence assets, 29 April 1961

In addition, Morales gave me a copy of a dispatch summarizing Miami's CI assets currently in Cuba, (Tab E).

6. Relations with PM Section: [redacted] relations with the PM section seem to have been marked with a considerable amount of friction, perhaps more than always results from the resentment operators feel at the inhibiting influence of the CI man. Thus whenever a PM agent was lost, a CI man would analyse the files and draw a damage sheet showing what the agent knew, etc. [redacted] showed me a large file containing about 50 of such cases. This work was made more difficult because the PM people kept only very skimpy records. A CI representative, [redacted],

also went over all incoming messages from agents to scrutinize for the use of freedom signals. When the absence of such signals was pointed out to PM they would sometimes claim that the agent had merely forgotten them. CI was able to stop all cable traffic to such agents when under suspicion. After a while [redacted] was delegated to be the CI contact with the PM people, and due to his quiet methods and competence he gained a fair share of their confidence and the work proceeded more smoothly.

7. [redacted] and his section prepared a 225-page study* of Castro's intelligence organization. This document was distributed generally throughout the U.S. intelligence community, as were also some extensive studies on Cuban blockwardens. They also issued CS/CI information reports and [redacted] gave a number of briefings to higher-ups. They were able to identify 14 provocative activities by the Cuban services in the [redacted] They identified a [redacted] as a Castro penetration agent in 1960.

* This document contains the identities of 492 Castro G-2 staff officers.

8. From September 1960 to January 1961 [redacted] spent half of his time working on the case of the three ST ESCALATE members, i.e., the audio and development team which was arrested in Cuba and is still under arrest. If these men had checked in with the CI Branch before departure they would have been warned not to go. [redacted] regards this matter as of the greatest potential danger to the Agency, e.g., if these men should be sent to Moscow to be milked.

9. [redacted] described the following difficulties he had had:

a. His section was not fully staffed until October 1960, although he went to the greatest lengths to get additional people. He first had a machine run made for a list of CI personnel having a knowledge of Spanish. He checked the records of the individuals thus disclosed. He sent the names thus selected to the WH/4 personnel officer who made a great effort, but in no case was he able to get a man taken off his present job. He feels that the DD/P should in the future tell all his senior officers of the importance of such a project so that the latter will cooperate when their valuable men are requested. After borrowing [redacted] from covert training for two TDY trips, [redacted] could not face going to [redacted] with a further request and instead asked Jack Earman in the DCI's office to help him get [redacted] for another trip. The Director of Training complained of this irregular procedure. If Mr. Bissell had so informed his senior officers, [redacted] feels that they would have received better cooperation. The result of lack of personnel was that they all worked six or seven days a week. [redacted] knows of no case of a directed assignment to the project. As it was, he personally had to spend 80 per cent of his time on administrative matters with the result that he could only spend 20 per cent of his time on operations. His final T/O was four case officers, four analysts, two clerk-typists and one secretary.

b. Working space was also a great problem. From May through September 1960 they were working seven or eight in a single room.

c. Dr. [redacted] chief of the JOTP refused to release two JOTs whom Morales wanted as assistants in Miami. One of these is named [redacted] and is very fluent in Spanish.

10. For the future [redacted] recommends:

a. That an LCFLUTTER operator be assigned to each base permanently, not withstanding the expense. The need for such a man at times can be very urgent.

b. There should be one cleared Staff D room containing all relevant files so that the entire job can be done in one room. This means all Staff D files involved, all operating cards, personality and report cards, so that, for instance, a CI analyst can go there and do a complete job in perfect security. The Staff D yield was a "gold mine".

c. If CI section had been told the time and place of the invasion they could have checked their records on the area and the adjacent areas and have given the brigade recommendations for document seizing, etc. in the towns that would be passed through.

11. Despite difficulties referred to above, [redacted] feel that the results of his section's work were very good, and that one indication of this is that the upper echelons of the Agency sent him many matters for handling that were not strictly of a CI nature; for instance, inquiries from the DCI, from Congress, etc.

12. In cases where the CI Section discovered that an agent communicating by radio was not using his safety signals, CI would help the PM or other section to handle that agent in subsequent communications so that he would be kept alive. This sometimes required that requests by the agent for supplies be complied with. In one case LUGLOG. [redacted] was intent on preserving the man so that he could be used at the end for purposes of deception. The agent requested an air drop and it was decided to comply. [redacted] said that Gen. Cabell disclosed to the Cuban aircraft a crew that was to make the air drop that the agent was a double agent. Accordingly the crew did not even go near the drop, nor did PM Section advise [redacted] until four days later that this had occured. The result was that the man was immediately taken off the air and [redacted] had indications that he was shot. If [redacted] had been advised earlier of the failure to make the drop, he could have tried by a suitable message to explain the omission.

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ca. 1960

TAB 4

JMARC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

I. MISSION

To develop and/or maintain and extend, through agents and other covert means, intelligence coverage of the organization, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party; to similarly develop intelligence coverage of activities affecting the Caribbean area which are conducted by the U.S.S.R., by the U.A.R., and by the Chinese Communists or other pro-CASTRO officials and groups; to protect current and future CI, FI and CA operations through analysis of their operational plans and through examination of new operational proposals; and to coordinate designated CI matters with the CI Staff and with staff and geographic components of WH Division.

II. REFERENCE

JMARC OPERATIONAL PLAN

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It is essential that an aggressive counterintelligence program be devised and implemented to ensure sound operational security for JMARC operations. The JMARC counterintelligence effort will, therefore, be directed towards acquiring information concerning the organizations, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of foreign intelligence and security services active in the Caribbean area; towards analyzing JMARC operational proposals and steps in light of what is learned about opposition intelligence capabilities and activities; and towards containing inimical activities directed against JMARC assets and operations.

13-00000

IV. ORGANIZATION

The following personnel and facilities are required for successful attainment of JMARC CI objectives.

a. Personnel: One senior CI officer; four operations officers; five analysts (three with a proficiency rating of "high" in reading Spanish); three clerk typists; one secretary. Initially, two case officers and one analyst should be sent to the JMARC Forward Operations Base (FOB) to carry out assigned tasks discussed below. Two analysts (with at least high proficiency rating in reading Spanish) will be assigned to the task of screening certain information reports. Two analysts (one senior) and a clerk typist will form a records unit for the CI Section at Headquarters; two operations officers and a clerk typist will form an operations unit for the CI section at Headquarters.

b. Facilities: The CI section a t Headquarters will require working space for ten personnel and for the following heavy office equipment: eight desks and chairs; eight standard typewriters; one card safe; three four-drawer safes. Standard office supplies should be provided. The CI operations unit at the FOB will require support commensurate to its size.

V. PHASING

A. PREPARATORY PHASE

1. Principal Objective: To acquire current CI information on opposition services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence operations and through recording CI information.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. The Branch/4/CI officer will:

(1) Keep Chief, Branch/4 informed on CI requirements, opportunities and developments affecting his branch.

(2) Keep FI Deputy, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff, and the latter's appointed staff representatives (Victor Wallen, [redacted] and Birch O'Neal), informed on CI matters in which they have an agreed interest (see below).

(3) Direct assistance CI personnel in performance of those jobs relating to the responsibilities cited below.

(4) Carry out such other tasks which may be assigned to him by Chief, Branch/4.

The senior CI officer and individual section officers designated by him will accomplish the following:

(1) Familiarize themselves with selected Branch and CI Staff record assets and with designated branch and division personnel pertinent to their responsibilities in order to effectively exploit these assets and to coordinate work on CI operations with the appropriate persons.

(2) Familiarize themselves with current CI operations affecting Cuba which are directed by Branch/4, by CI Staff, and/or by WH Division with the objective of assuming responsibility for these.

(3) Plan, coordinate, initiate and conduct CI operations not specifically assigned to [redacted] or Birch O'Neal of CI Staff.

(4) Prepare draft CI requirements for FI/D analysts (accomplished). In addition, prepare or locate and forward to other Branch/4 officers pertinent CI requirements and operational guidance papers pertinent to these officers' assigned responsibilities. (To date, I have forwarded my own study on "Utilization of Exile Groups in Clandestine Operations" to Jerry Droller.)

(5) Prepare an operational summary format for use by operations officers reviewing cases (accomplished).

(6) Prepare a defector register format card (accomplished) and organize and maintain a register of defectors.

(7) Exploit certain research and operational support assets of the Clandestine Services in order to help all Branch/4 sections in the achievement of their objectives. To this end, one analyst will work on materials controlled by CI Staff.

(8) Examine current operations and/or programs in the FI and CA fields in order to ensure that CI opportunities are fully exploited and to identify operational security threats and to recommend sound courses of action which will prevent or counter such threats.

b. CI Staff components (cited in each instance) will have the following responsibilities:

(1) Chief, SID, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration and double agent operations against Cuban Intelligence and Security Services at home and abroad (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.

(2) Deputy Chief, ICB, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration of Cuban Communist Party via third countries, using Cubans as agents (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.

(3) Victor Wallen, Operations Division, CI Staff: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services. To this end, Victor Wallen will:

(a) Prepare and maintain a briefing notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services (accomplished).

(b) Prepare a guide for screening WH/4/Reports personality cards and other record assets in order to identify suspect persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activities (accomplished).

(c) Prepare lists of suspect persons and maintain these lists on a current basis for exploitation by all Branch/4 sections and other Agency components with operational interest. (Initial lists have been prepared in 13 books).

(d) Prepare or assemble CI requirements, as requested, which pertain to the maintenance of CI notebooks on the Cuban services. (Initial requirements have been drawn up for Ernie Sparks use.)

(4) Deputy Chief, CI/ICG: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Communist Party. To this end, questionnaires have been prepared for Agency officers assigned the task of interrogating persons knowledgeable of Cuban Communist Party personnel and activities.

(5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.

B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE

1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. WH/4/CI: During this second phase, WH/4/CI personnel will:

(1) Screen operational correspondence and cable traffic for leads to CI operations against the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party and forward pertinent leads and CI information to appropriate CI Staff component and/or authorized security officers of agencies of U.S. intelligence community.

(2) In coordination with Political Action Section of WH/4, outline an organization for a security intelligence service for the Cuban Government-in-Exile and list its functions in detail.

(3) Continue and/or complete all tasks cited in Phase I.

(4) Staff the FOB with two operations officers and one analyst to perform those functions necessary to the initiation and conduct of secure CI operations and CI portection activities.

b. CI Staff: The SIG, ICG, and OPS/WH, as indicated, will carry out the following activities:

(1) Revise the notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services as required (OPS/WH).

(2) Prepare organizational studies and blacklists of Cuban Intelligence and Security Services personnel, and black lists of persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activity, in

three categories of sensitivity for use by the Agency, by designated members of the United States intelligence community, and by authorized components of the Cuban Government-in-Exile. (OPS/WH)

(3) Revise lists of suspect persons as required. (OPS/WH)

(4) Prepare special studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and on the Cuban Communist Party and other groups and organizations active in the Caribbean area, as required. (OPS/WH)

c. WH/FI will continue studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.

VI. COORDINATION

Coordination on CI operations and on operational support activities which involve WH/FI, CI Staff and WH/4/CI will be effected by senior CI officer of WH/4. Communications on these matters will be by telephone and/or personal meetings. CI aspects of WH/4/FI and CA operations will be discussed by appropriate section officers and the senior CI officer or the latter's designates.

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Prepared by the Sect

TAB B

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FOR AN FRD SECURITY SERVICE

B

I. MISSION

To select, assess, organize, train on-the-job and support FRD personnel for a security service capable of protecting the FRD, its personnel, installations, secrets and activities from sabotage, subversion and espionage.

II. REFERENCES

A. Project Operational Plan

B. Project Political Action Plan

C. Project Counterintelligence Plan

D. Project Counterintelligence Budget for Fiscal Year 1961

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It is essential that the Agency create an aggressive service for FRD-Project activities. Since there is no certainty that the leaders of the FRD will achieve and hold responsible positions in a new Government of Cuba, and since there is an everpresent threat that political or operational flaps may destroy the FRD as an effective Project instrument, it is essential that the Agency's role in creating an FRD security service be carried out under cover of the BENDER-CARR group. It is also essential that the leaders as well as rank and file members of the FRD pay more than lip service to the requirements of an effective security apparatus, even though these requirements dictate a need for major changes in the modus operandi of individual members. To this end the BENDER-CARR group must direct the FRD to accept, in return for its support, controls and limitations which must be imposed by the security service if operational security is to be achieved.

The Agency's objectives in establishing and supporting a security service for the FRD are:

A. To protect its operational interests in the FRD; and

B. To acquire counterintelligence information through participation in FRD operational security activities.

The security service of the FRD will have as its objectives:

A. Screening all personnel holding significant FRD positions;

B. Screening new adherents to the FRD;

C. Maintaining pertinent file information on FRD personnel;

D. Maintaining physical security of FRD installations;

E. Staffing FRD debriefing centers;

F. Enforcing personnel security regulations;

G. Indoctrinating FRD members on personal security;

H. Monitoring malcontents; and

I. Acquiring both positive and counterintelligence information.

To build a security service for the FRD capable of attaining Agency and FRD objectives, it is necessary for the Agency:

A. To supervise the selection, assessment and training of eight candidates;

B. To identify and select secure office sites in Miami, New York, Washington and Mexico City, and to procure a secure safehouse training site in Miami;

C. To create an organization which can fulfill assigned security functions.

D. To supervise the training of thirty-two additional candidates to staff the organization;

E. To support the organization through the BENDER-CARR group by providing sanitized record data, special training, financial backing, and, at need, operational facilities; and

F. To supervise through the BENDER-CARR group the organization's day-to-day activities.

To implement the plan for an FRD security service, BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York will be briefed on the plan for an FRD security service. The Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, will be directed by BENDER to select seven officers to be processed for jobs with the service. Processing will include medical examination, polygraph, and psychological assessment of the candidates. They will later be briefed on the objectives and functions of the security service by a representative of the BENDER-CARR group. They will be trained on-the-job by a Chilean ex-police officer who will be recommended to the FRD by the BENDER-CARR group. The training will cover subjects pertinent to the service's day-to-day

security responsibilities as spelled out in the organizational plan. The FRD security components in Mexico City, Washington and New York will be initially assigned one officer each from the first group of eight candidates. The remaining five candidates will be assigned to Miami. Of those candidates subsequently trained for the security service, two additional men will be assigned to Washington; six to New York; six to Mexico City; and eighteen to Miami.

IV. ORGANIZATION

The organisational structure of the FRD security service and of the Agency's related support structure are outlined in Attachment "A"; the facilities and personnel required to staff and support these structures are discussed below:

A. Facilities

1. Security office sites in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York. (These will be selected by the Office of Security; the Office of Security will identify these sites to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will direct their use by appropriate FRD components.)

2. A training site will be selected in Miami by the Office of Security and identified to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will recommend it to the Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

3. One four-drawer safe will be acquired by the Office of Security for use in each office site in the above-named cities.

4. Appropriate office supplies will be assembled by the FRD component in each site.

B. Foreign Personnel

1. A Chilean police officer has been selected and recruited as training officer for the security service. The BENDER-CARR group will recommend him to the FRD for this job as an individual who, in its experience, is best suited for the job, and as one who is most acceptable to the BENDER-CARR organization.

2. The BENDER-CARR group will direct Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, to immediately select seven officers for processing and training prior to assignment in the FRD security service. Later, thirty-two additional officers will be selected for processing and training.

C. Staff Personnel

1. BENDER-CARR representatives will deal directly with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, in all matters pertaining to the security service.

2. Project CI officers will provide through BENDER-CARR representatives all advice, guidance and support to the security service and its chief.

V. PHASING

A. Preparatory Phase (25 August - 15 September):

1. Primary Objective:

To implement the plan for the security service by selecting, assessing and training an initial cadre of eight officers, including chief of the proposed service.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Advise BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York, by dispatch where appropriate, before 26 August, of the Agency's plan and objectives regarding an FRD security service.

b. Advise Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER, to select seven officers to participate with him in processing and training for assignment to the FRD security service.

c. Procure from each candidate a complete PHS, a certification of health dated this year, and three letters of recommendation from as many FRD sponsors.

d. Arrange for polygraph examination of candidates through the Project security office.

e. Procure through the Project security office an appropriate training site in the Miami area which will accommodate a minimum of eight trainees and an instructor.

f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrence of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

g. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miami to brief trainer on his assignment.

h. Quarter trainer in training site.

i. Advise FRD representative to purchase minimum office supplies from list to be provided by the Project CI officer.

j. Provide trainer with a curriculum and a training schedule which encompass on-the-job application of techniques and skills.

k. Discuss with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, the organization and functions of the proposed security service.

l. Initiate training of eight candidates (including Chief of the service) and processing of others.

m. Get signed secrecy agreement and loyalty oath from each student.

n. Identify and assess (for recruitment) potential agent candidates as Agency-controlled sources.

B. Development Phase: (16 - 30 September)

1. Primary Objective:

To build the security service in a way which will enable it to perform its assigned functions.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Assign trainees to FRD components in the cities named above.

b. Complete processing of remaining candidates.

c. Procure secure office sites in the cities named above or check the sites previously selected.

d. Initiate training of remaining candidates.

e. Activate a records center in Miami and provide it with sanitized record data.

f. Forward physical security plan and physical security regulations to Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER.

g. Forward operational security regulations for security service to Chief, through BENDER.

h. Forward administrative procedures (involving communications among FRD elements, document controls, etc.) to Chief, through BENDER.

i. Give remaining trainees their security service assignments.

j. Recruit candidates selected in Preparatory Phase.

C. Action Phase (30 September on):

1. Primary Objective:

To identify and contain rabid CASTROITES, Cuban Communists, members of the Cuban Security Services, and Orbit espionage and sabotage personnel.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Move the security apparatus into Cuba with the FRD.

b. Provide FRD security service with black lists and record data pertinent to the above objective.

c. Monitor FRD security activities through the BENDER-CARR group.

D. Consolidation Phase:

1. Primary Objective:

To direct the FRD security service in its efforts to maintain public security and to contain foreign services activities.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.

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b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD.

c. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba.

VI. COORDINATION

The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of the Project.

VII. SUPPORT

See SUPPORT ANNEXES.

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FOR FUTURE
(present) TABC

20 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT : CI Program for JMATE Project

1. **Objectives:**

a. To add to our knowledge of objectives, operations and assets of the GAITRO services.

b. To bring about the defection of selected key personalities in the Castro Government and military services.

c. To plan and mount deception operations involving Agency-controlled double agents and W/T play backs. To date, four W/T operators in Cuba are deemed suspect. The fate of our two double agents, who may have accompanied the BRIGADE in its assault on Cuba, will be determined during the course of the next few days. It is anticipated that other candidates for double agent operations will be identified in the States; their exploitation will be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

d. To support and direct the AMOT Intelligence and Security Service in Miami in the fulfillment of agreed upon objectives.

e. To support and direct 44 AMOT officers and agents now in Cuba, in the collection of intelligence pertinent to Project needs, and in the fulfillment of such other covert action assignments which may be deemed within their competence.

f. To introduce into Cuba unilaterally-controlled counter-intelligence agents.

g. To intensify the Project's Communist Party penetration program.

h. To increase counterintelligence operations run into Cuba in conjunction with liaison services of friendly countries.

i. To counter the espionage, subversive and sabotage operations directed by the Castro services against other States within the Western Hemisphere. This to be done in conjunction with the services of these countries with which we maintain liaison.

C

2. Assets:

a. AMOT Security Service: The AMOT complex is made up of 97 AMOT staff and clerical personnel, 34 AMFASTS (security-counterintelligence teams) located in the Miami area, and 63 AMCHEERS (senior Cuban citizens drawn from banking, commercial and ranching circles in Cuba), also located in Miami.

b. An Agency-controlled Communist Party penetration agent located in Havana.

c. An Agency-controlled agent with access to leftist and Communist circles in the Western Hemisphere, now in New York City.

d. An agent candidate with access to engineering circles in Havana, who will be available for assignment in Cuba in June of this year.

e. A third country agent under diplomatic cover now assigned to, and in place at, Havana.

f. Other CI assets inside Cuba:

Through the AMOT and other clandestine channels approximately 30 individuals, the majority of whom are Army officers, had indicated a willingness to defect in place and help the opposition forces when the strike came. Although the rebellion was crushed before it could advance sufficiently for the 30 individuals to fulfill their commitment, it may be assumed that some of these people are still willing to cooperate and may be recruited for the purpose of furnishing information now denied us and possibly for performing certain operational functions such as establishing nets and recruiting agents. At the [redacted] Base, for example, where approximately 4,000 troops are stationed (according to AMOT-34), three captains have indicated willingness to cooperate. The Infantry commander agreed to try to take the base and the nearby cadet school. Assuming that he had that capability, it may be further assumed that he could recruit agents and informants at these bases.

Other possible assets of this type include the [redacted] in Pinar del Rio and the [redacted] in Santa Clara, Las Villas Province.

In addition we have on hand a list of potential defectors who have shown disillusionment with CASTRO, and who have been approached but who have not yet declared themselves. It is possible that the turn of events may have heightened their disillusionment; may be worth trying to recruit them at this time.

3. Problems and Resolutions:

a. AMOT-KUBARK Relationship. The Agency must recognize the possibility of strained feelings because of the failure of the invasion. It is believed that the Agency representative in Miami will be able, because of his excellent personal relationship with the Chief of the AMOT service, to maintain a satisfactory working relationship.

b. Status of AMOT Agents in Cuba. The Agency must anticipate the need to exfiltrate AMOT agents now in place in Cuba in the event their positions become untenable.

c. Operational Climate. The Agency must anticipate the development of an increasingly unfavorable operational climate inside Cuba in view of the increased security measures being implemented by the Castro services.

d. Compromised Agent Assets Inside Cuba. The Agency must assume that the paramilitary assets inside Cuba have probably been compromised by Castro security counter measures taken at the time of the invasion. Each of these assets or nets must be examined to determine their continued usefulness. The inclusion of trained CI officers, such as the AMOTE or AMMETE, in various teams infiltrated into Cuba can serve to ferret out and neutralize identified penetrations.

[redacted]
Chief, WH/4/CI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/4/CI Chrono

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TAB D

29 April 1961

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, WH/4/OPS

[redacted] : Chief, WH/4/CI

[redacted]

[redacted]

"CI Program For JMWAVE Project", dated 20 April 1961. This paper was prepared at the request of Chief, WH/4 on 20 April 1961, to indicate CI capabilities in the post-strike phase.

D

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Task Force W

NO.

DATE: 10 July 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Deputy Director (Plans)				
2. Mr. Elder for DCI				By Hand
3.				
4. ER - file				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				EYES ONLY
10.				
11.				SECRET
12.				BY HAND
13.				
14.				
15.				

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

EYES ONLY

SECRET

EO 62-4791

10 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Juana (Juanita) CASTRO Ruz

1. ACTION: None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. In connection with Task Force W efforts to split the Cuban leadership, some time ago we targeted Juana Castro Ruz, half-sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz. A number of reports have been received indicating that Juana Castro Ruz opposed the strong communist nature of the Cuban regime and was prepared, at least to some extent, to cooperate with anti-regime elements. In May 1962 we reestablished contact with and [redacted] and a long time personal friend of Juana Castro Ruz.

3. On 11 June 1962, on our instructions, [redacted] proceeded to Havana where she maintained frequent contact with Juana Castro Ruz and other prominent Cuban leaders until 1 July 1962. She discussed the current regime quite frankly with Juana Castro Ruz and, according to [redacted] she obtained Juana's agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban communist regime, short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel. According to [redacted] Juana has agreed to proceed to Mexico or the United States in this connection and return to Cuba after discussions with "the Americans".

4. We are making the necessary arrangements with [redacted] to have Juana Castro Ruz proceed to Mexico as soon as possible in order that we may attempt a direct recruitment. You will be kept advised of any future developments of importance in this case.

William K. Harvey

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
C/TFW

SECRET

EYES ONLY

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13-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executive Registry
62-310

FROM:
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
1317 Barton Hall

NO.

DATE 10 January 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCI DDCI 203 Admin. Building	Admin	file		orig to DDCI - 1/13/62
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

180085

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

EYES ONLY

DDP-2-0171
DD/S-62-0173

Executive Registry
62-310

10 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Project JMATE

REFERENCES : a. Recommendation approved by the President, 4 August 1961, Subject: Covert Action Program Against Cuba

b. C/WHD Memorandum to DCI, Subject: Action with respect to the Agency Reserve for Contingency held by the Bureau of the Budget, approved by DCI 19 October 1961

1. The references cited established the current JMATE activity and obtained funds in the amount of $5.36 millions to operate the project during the period 1 July - 31 December 1961.

2. As set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" it is intended that the financial and audit requirements of this project be regularized to the extent possible consistent with operational requirements.

3. In the Project Authority, reference "a", on 4 August 1961, and in subsequent discussions, the President approved covert operations including the funding of various persons, groups, or activities, Cuban and non-Cuban, which, in our opinion, may be able to advance the over-all objectives of JMATE. These individuals, groups, and activities are and will be many and varied. In many instances we will be able to exercise little or no control over the funds, materiel, arms, or equipment given such entities nor receive any suitable accounting from them.

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4. I have, therefore, authorized the Deputy Director (Plans) to pass to such persons, groups and activities, such JMATE monies, materiel, arms and equipment as in his opinion may be necessary to support such persons, groups and activities. The Deputy Director (Plans) is authorized to delegate this authority to the COP/DDP, the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the Chief, WH/4, and Chief, JMWAVE, as he may desire.

5. Funds advanced in accordance with this authority shall be accounted for in accordance with normal Agency requirements except, that, with respect to activities not controlled or administered by the Agency, such as those described in paragraph 3 above, certifications by the person passing funds to the activity may be accepted as final accounting when approved by an official designated above. Such certifications shall state the amount passed, date, and general purpose of the payment, and that further accounting is not practical.

6. During the Project development, writing of sub-projects as set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" will be deferred. In lieu, thereof, the project will provide you with copies of reference "a" which will be supplemented by more formal documentation when specific projects evolve as determined by the Deputy Director (Plans). With the exception of the activities cited in paragraphs three and four above, activities which in the opinion of the Deputy Director (Plans) lend themselves to regularization through administrative plans or fiscal annexes will be so documented.

7. This authority does not amend regulatory authorities in respect to administrative matters covering Agency personnel.

SIGNED
JOHN A. MC CONE
Director

CONCUR:

/s/
Comptroller

12 Jan 62
Date

CPC
DDCI
Date

CC: DDCI
DDP
DDS
Comptroller
C/Audit Staff

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, [illegible] Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Base, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/JMATE/AMCT Status Report

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action Required: For information and files

1. Following is a brief summary of JMWAVE/KUBESK current assets in the Target Area (CUBA):

a. AMCT-34: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Habana. We are maintaining contact via S[illegible]. Subject had a W/T set, cached it and no longer has access to it. AMRY-1 has been instructed to deliver another one to him.

b. AMCT-48: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Oriente Province. We are in contact with Subject via a cutout at the Guantanamo Naval Base.

c. AMCT-106, 107 and 108: These three Subjects are [redacted] They provide AMCT-34 with operational intelligence in Habana.

d. [redacted] Subject is an AMCT sub source in Pinar del Rio. Subject is currently reorganizing his assets in that Province.

e. [redacted] Subject is an AMCT sub source in the Port of Habana.

f. [redacted] is an AMCT live drop in Habana and is still active.

g. [redacted] is an AMCT sub source and is active in Habana and Pinar del Rio Provinces.

2. JMWAVE/KUBESK current and future plans are to continue to support and direct the existing assets it has in Cuba as outlined in paragraph 1 above. Moreover plans are now in motion for the following:

a. Exfiltrate, either legally or black, [redacted] and [redacted] for further training and return to the target area

Distribution:
3- WHD

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
22 May 61	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UPGA-1639

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-5-3

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIGINATING

b. Recruit and dispatch in the near future of at least four other agents to the target area.

c. Infiltrate AMOT-68 for training and return to the target area. Plan is also to provide him with a trained radio operator.

3. WAVE/KUDESK is in the process of reorganizing both the AMOT and AMFAST complex as follows:

a. AMOT is being reorganized as a unilateral anti-Castro Cuban Security Service.

b. AMFAST will [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] will continue to support the [illegible] such as AMJUD-7 (political within [illegible]), AMZIATTEL-5 (military matters independently and/or [illegible] in the WAVE area), AMOT-4 and AMOT-16 (controlled penetrations within AMOT and [illegible] and for general independent reporting on anti- and pro-Castro activities in the WAVE area), AMWORK-1 (general political matters) and AMPUTAL-1 (general Cuban matters as well as retaining as a future technical asset for telephone tappings).

[illegible] For the [illegible] time the AMCHEER Group is being held in abeyance as a [illegible] operation. This group, however, will be tapped for information as it becomes necessary.

[illegible]. In support of other Base JMWAVE Sections, the KUDESK Section will [illegible] develop and recruit assets for use in the target area. An example is making available at least twelve AMOT/AMFASTS for commando type raids on the Cuban coast and mainland.

[illegible]. WAVE/KUDESK will continue its primary mission of:

a. The detection, identification and neutralization of hostile intelligence action.

b. Provide security checks on agents, potential agents and assets, and

c. Provide, with the security section of Base JMWAVE, security checks on ODYOKE covert relationship with Cubans and Cuban organizations. In addition the KUDESK Section will continue to develop an apparatus to be used as an Agent Corps which can be used in the rollup of Castro and Communist agents in support of the post-Castro government. AMOTS, AMCHEERS, AMFASTS and AM[illegible] will be the main source for the