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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM

C/WED *W. J. ...*

TO

C/WED

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

INITIALS

*gck*

TO

W/DA/PA

*gck*

*ab*

TO

Sec. Assist. to Dir. DoD

11/16/60

12/16/60

*gck*

TO

Doel

1/17/61

2/17/61

*gck*

TO

Del

1/23/60

*gck*

TO

C/COA

*gck*

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
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DD/PO-1956

8 April 1960

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Review of the Cuban Operation and Examination of Possibilities for Hemispheric Support from Liberal Governments

**TIME & PLACE:** QDDALE's Home; 2245 Hours, 1 April 1960

**PARTICIPANTS:** DCI; C/WH/D; C/WH/4; General Robert Cushman, Vice Presidential Military Aide; Mr. Walter Donnelly, Vice President of U. S. Steel; and Mr. William Pawley, Industrialist

1. The DCI opened the meeting by stating that everybody present should be aware of the fact that Fidel CASTRO and his Communist-oriented regime must be removed from power in Cuba. He said the necessary approval had been given for an operation and that the chosen instrument will be a "government in exile". The DCI went on to say that CIA has been in contact with several non-BATISTA groups which will form the nucleus of this government. These groups were identified as the Montecristi group, the VARONA group, the Catholic Action Front and private Cuban citizens; such as, Dr. RUBIO Padilla.

2. The DCI said that the government in exile had not yet found a seat of government, but that consideration is being given to Venezuela, Costa Rica, Puerto Rico and Mexico. He indicated that the United States has been ruled out and that Puerto Rico also is out of the question, since MUNOZ Marin's attitude toward CASTRO is not firmly crystalized. The DCI then requested any thoughts the group might have on this subject. Mr. Donnelly suggested that consideration might be given to Canada. The DCI said that in many ways Canada would be a good choice, but indicated that relations with Canada on other matters are such that Canada probably could not be used. The possibility of using Colombia or Mexico was then mentioned. C/WH/D said that serious consideration had been given to the use of Mexico, but that present indications are that President LOPEZ Mateos would not be enthusiastic about permitting a "government" to establish its base in his country. Regarding, Colombia, both C/WH/D and Mr. Donnelly said that the recent elections in Colombia, which came as somewhat of a surprise, cast serious doubt on the use of Colombia for this purpose. Haiti was mentioned, but ruled out because of its proximity to the Dominican Republic and the unsettled political situation. C/WH/D said that for the moment the best choice appeared to be Costa Rica, and he indicated that he had been in contact with Adolph Berle who had shown willingness to approach ex-President Jose FIGUERES vis-a-vis permitting the exile government to locate itself there. Both Mr. Donnelly and Mr. Pawley agreed that Costa Rica, for many reasons, would be the best choice. During the summarization of possibilities, Mr. Pawley

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mentioned the recent case of General PEDRAZA and Francisco CAJIGAS as a case in point of the U.S., which illustrated the sensitivity of the United States being used by the exiles. Mr. Pawley explained that at C/WHD's direction, he had persuaded General PEDRAZA to leave the country. Mr. Pawley said he had contacted General PEDRAZA through General DIAZ Tamayo and advised him that an extradition request would soon be received from Cuba and there was a strong likelihood that General PEDRAZA would be picked up and held pending extradition. He said that General PEDRAZA had reacted to this immediately and had departed for Ciudad Trujillo the day following his conversation with Mr. Pawley.

3. The DCI informed the group that plans have already been made to supplement U.S. Government funds from private confidential sources to defray the cost of the Cuban operation. He turned the details of this discussion over to C/WHD. C/WHD explained that over and above a bond issue, which will be floated in the name of the government in exile with Mr. Pawley's help, that donations are being made by private citizens and corporations. He indicated that confidential arrangements have already been made with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to permit individuals or corporate entities making donations to claim these donations as contributions to the U.S. Government for tax purposes. He cautioned that this arrangement is being limited to a very small group.

On the matter of the bond issue, Mr. Pawley said he was still waiting to receive from CIA an acceptable list of Cuban exiles who will sign the bond issue. For the general information of the group, it was explained that two candidates had been decided upon, but that a final decision on the last two is still pending. Possible signers mentioned were Dr. Antonio VARONA, head of the Autentico Party, and Dr. RUBIO Padilla.

4. Mention of Dr. VARONA's and Dr. RUBIO Padilla's names led to a discussion of the ex/infiltration problems facing CIA. The group was told that CIA is rapidly developing exfiltration capabilities by sea and air. Mr. Pawley said that if CIA desired to expand this capability beyond present planning, the Chalk Air Line, operating out of Miami, could be purchased for a reasonable price. He indicated that this air line operates five "widgins" in the Caribbean area. C/WHD expressed immediate interest in this air line and indicated he would have a representative of WHD in Miami early the week of 4 April to look at the company.

5. CIA plans for clandestine radio broadcasts were covered with the group. The precise location of the transmitter was not revealed, but group members were told that a series of hard-hitting broadcasts will be mounted in the near future. The group was also told that USIA is increasing its radio effort and that the Montecristi group will be mounting independent broadcasts from WRUL in the United States by April 15. The group was told that CIA has already gathered some talent to produce programs for the radio broadcasts and that additional personnel is being exfiltrated to be employed in a production workshop, which will produce tapes that will be put on the air by the clandestine transmitter. Finally, the group was told that broadcast time in the name of the "government in exile" will also be arranged with radio stations scattered throughout the Caribbean.

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Apart from radio operations, it was noted that Mr. Pawley has already made arrangements for the printing of Diario de la Marina, the leading Cuban daily newspaper, in Miami. It was further indicated that CIA will arrange clandestine distribution of this newspaper throughout Latin America and Cuba as a part of its other propaganda activities.

6. The DCI raised the question of how we play the overthrow of CASTRO with the other Latin American Republics; i.e., what should be done through the OAS. Mr. Pawley said that he thought our Military Missions abroad could be used more effectively. He indicated he felt that Mission personnel, properly briefed, could do much to bring the situation into focus in Latin America by keeping their Latin American counterparts briefed on a continuing basis. He also lamented the fact that historically the Department of State has frequently blocked the travel of Latin American military officers to and from the States on the theory that it would not be good for Latin American relations. (It was during this discussion that the case of General Jesus Maria CASTRO Leon was mentioned, citing the possibility he might be refused a visa to the United States for political reasons. General Cushman was briefed on the vital role that General CASTRO played in protecting Vice President Nixon until his departure from Venezuela in May 1958. General Cushman said he would take action to see that General CASTRO is not denied a visa to the United States.)

7. The question of whether oil sanction could be an effective weapon against CASTRO was mentioned. The DCI and C/WED stated that they anticipated no immediate action in this area. The oil companies have recognized the fact that sooner or later Cuba will turn to the Sino-Soviet bloc for oil. Donnelly speculated that CASTRO is, in fact, playing the United States off against the Soviets in the matter of oil importation and that the only limiting factor in this gambit is the probable fact that the Soviets will want cash for oil they deliver.

8. Considerable time was spent discussing the present pathetic effort on the part of the Catholic Church to face up to the Communist threat in Cuba. The discussion revealed that the Church's ineffectiveness stems from fractionalization within the hierarchy and a complete absence of leadership on the part of the Papal Nuncio, further complicated by his secretary's close connivance with the extreme left. Two lines of action were agreed upon to remedy this situation:

(a) The DCI directed that a cable be sent to  immediately, requesting that he approach the Vatican at the proper level and briefly explain the Church's situation in Cuba. He would also request that the Vatican send a senior official to Cuba to investigate and return to the Vatican with specific recommendations. (Note: A cable to Rome was prepared on 4 April.)


(b) The Director indicated he would be attending a dinner being given by the Apostolic delegate in Washington for Mr. Robert Murphy of the Department of State on 12 April. He indicated he would endeavor to apprise the delegate of the Cuban situation during this dinner.

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10. The meeting adjourned at 0100 hours, 2 April. The group agreed that if any further discussions were necessary this would be covered the morning of 2 April before the Director's departure on leave.



J. D. Esterline  
C/WH/4

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