MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Director of Training and Education
     Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: J. Kenneth McDonald
      Chief, CIA History Staff

SUBJECT: Survey of CIA's Records from House Select Committee on Assassinations Investigation

1. As you requested on 16 January, the History Staff has now surveyed CIA's records from the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. As promised in my 30 January interim report, I can now give you a full account of our findings, and of my recommendation for transferring this HSCA collection at its existing classification to the National Archives through CIA's Historical Review Program.

2. After the Office of Congressional Affairs arranged permission from Congress for History Staff access to the sequestered 64 boxes of this collection, we examined these and other related holdings at Headquarters and the \underline{Records Center}. As a result of careful, persistent, and determined inquiries, we are fairly confident—that we have seen all the documents that CIA collected for the HSCA investigation of 1977-1979. The summary of our findings which follows is documented in more detail in attachments A and B.

3. **General Description**: The HSCA collection (defined as all records that the CIA provided to that Committee for its 1977-1979 investigation) is a large and chaotic collection. Beyond the 64 boxes sequestered by Congress that have been involved in FOIA litigation, there are 16 boxes of Oswald's 201 file and numerous loose folders (mainly from Mexico City Station records) that were collected for the Warren Commission investigation. Most of this material can be found on microfilm in the sequestered collection. Of the 64 boxes, 34 have material collected by the Directorate of Operations, while...
29 contain records from the Office of Legislative Counsel (now OCA), Inspector General, Office of the General Counsel, Directorate of Science and Technology, Office of Security, as well as several boxes of HSCA staff notes and records. Box No. 64 contains 72 microfilm reels (each equivalent to a box of records), which include the Oswald 201 file and Mexico City Station records, as well as other 201 files and information about Cuban exile groups.

4. Organization: The collection is arranged haphazardly, having been gathered in response to a series of HSCA and (in the case of the Oswald 201 file) Warren Commission requests. Although portions of the collection are organized by a variety of systems, there is no overall intellectual control of the entire body of records. We found fifteen indexes to the collection, none of which is adequate for control or retrieval.

5. Sensitivity: Although the collection is almost entirely at SECRET or lower classification, there is a scattering of TOP SECRET and codeword documentation. Materials we consider especially sensitive—more for privacy than national security reasons—include 201 files, phone taps, mail intercepts, security files, photo surveillance, names of sources, watch lists, and MHCHAOS documentation. Such material occurs throughout the collection, usually in response to HSCA requests for name traces. There are 22 microfilm reels of 201 files in addition to the Oswald file, while eight boxes contain security records, including, for example, files on David Atlee Phillips, Martin Luther King, and Clay Shaw.

6. Non-CIA Material: The collection includes a lot of third-agency material, mostly from the FBI. FBI reports dominate the 16 boxes of Oswald's 201 file, and nearly half of the 34 boxes of DO-collected material consists of third-agency material. The collection's remaining 29 boxes contain mostly CIA records, as does the box of microfilm, except for Oswald's 201 file. There is also some documentation of foreign liaison, mainly with the Mexican government.

7. CIA Complicity? Our survey found nothing in these records that indicates any CIA role in the Kennedy assassination or assassination conspiracy (if there was one), or any CIA involvement with Oswald. These records do reveal, however, that Clay Shaw was a highly paid CIA contract source until 1956. While nothing surfaced on Carlos Marcello in the collection, we found substantial documentation on other members of the mob, including Santos Trafficante.

8. Although the results of our survey fully support my earlier recommendation against inviting a panel of historians
into CIA to examine and report on this collection, the problem that this proposal addressed remains—the widespread allegations, given new impetus by Oliver Stone's "JFK," that CIA was part of a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. That CIA has a closed collection of records concerning the Kennedy assassination is well known, both because it is part of over 800 cubic feet of HSCA investigation records that Congress has closed until 2029, and because our 64 boxes of these records have been the subject of FOIA requests, litigation, and court orders. Since opening all US Government records on the Kennedy assassination has been proposed by former President Ford, Congressman Louis Stokes, and others, many observers will consider your decision on this question a test of your new openness policy.

9. Options: CIA's three principal options are to keep the Agency's HSCA records closed and in our hands, to open them entirely, or to transfer them to the National Archives. Before making my case for the third option, I should note the following considerations with respect to the first two:

a. Closed: To maintain the status quo would keep the collection classified, closed and in CIA's hands, sequestered by Congress until 2029. CIA would, however, remain subject to the 1988 court order to review portions of it in response to FOIA litigation. While putting the collection into Historical Review Program processing would speed and broaden its declassification review (which would nevertheless take several years), such an internal shift would probably not change the public perception of our closed position. Although keeping these records closed remains a viable option, it tends both to encourage suspicion that CIA is part of a cover-up, and to undermine the credibility of CIA's openness policy. If Congress should decide to open all HSCA records, however, CIA would be hard put to keep its HSCA collection closed.

b. Opened: To open the HSCA collection would require the permission of Congress. Indeed, CIA would presumably not consider this option except in response to congressional action or pressure, or in order not to be the last hold-out in a Government-wide opening of Kennedy assassination records. While opening the collection would disclose a good deal of information that deserves continued protection for privacy or national security reasons, a total release would dramatically demonstrate CIA's new openness, and rapidly reveal that these records contain nothing pointing to a CIA role in the Kennedy assassination.
10. Recommendation: I recommend that CIA transfer its entire HSCA collection (as defined and identified in this report) at its existing classification to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), for continuing declassification review by Archives staff, in accordance with the relevant laws, regulations and CIA guidelines. This transfer should be carried out under the auspices of CIA's Historical Review Program. To retire this HSCA collection to the National Archives offers some significant advantages:

a. It would get the collection off our hands. Retiring the records to the National Archives, which is by law the eventual repository for all permanent US Government records, should reduce public suspicion of a CIA cover-up. Such a transfer would not set a new precedent, since CIA has previously retired over 4000 cubic feet of Office of Strategic Services operational records to NARA, as well as all CIA records so far declassified under the Agency's Historical Review Program. Although CIA has not previously transferred classified records to NARA, the transfer of this HSCA collection, resulting from a congressional investigation, follows the special precedent of the classified CIA documents retired to NARA's vaults as part of the records of the Watergate and Iran-Contra investigations.

b. Transferring these HSCA records to the National Archives will protect their existing classification. The Departments of State and Defense have routinely retired classified records to NARA for years. In accordance with statutory guidelines, NARA must ensure the confidentiality of investigatory sources and the proper protection of personal privacy and national security information, including intelligence sources and methods. NARA would continue the court-ordered declassification review according to CIA guidelines. CIA can accelerate the declassification of this collection by funding review positions at NARA, as the Department of State and other agencies have done in the past. (Attachment C outlines declassification procedures for classified records retired to the National Archives.)

c. NARA's professional archivists will bring this collection under control (as they have done with the 4000 cubic feet of disorganized OSS records that CIA has retired since 1984), so that it can be usefully researched as it is declassified. Moreover, many of the records in this collection (especially photographs, carbon flimsies, and Thermofax) need expert preservation, which NARA is organized to provide.
d. If Congress should eventually undertake to open this entire collection without regard to classification, the National Archives will be in a stronger position to protect its national security and privacy information than the CIA, whose motives would appear self-serving, if not sinister.

11. **Action:** If you wish to retire the Agency's House Select Committee on Assassinations collection to the National Archives, the following actions (from the offices noted) will be needed:

a. Request permission from Congress. (Office of Congressional Affairs)

b. Transfer responsibility for court-ordered FOIA declassification review from CIA to the National Archives. (Office of the General Counsel, with Information Management Staff, DO)

c. Prepare CIA guidelines for NARA's declassification review. (Office of Information Technology, DA)

d. Prepare the appropriate Historical Review Program documentation and NARA forms, and deliver the records. (Office of Information Technology, DA)

e. Announce the transfer jointly with Dr. Don Wilson, Archivist of the United States, and Congressman Louis Stokes. (Public Affairs Office)

/s/ J. Kenneth McDonald

J. Kenneth McDonald

Attachments
SUMMARY
CIA HISTORY STAFF SURVEY
House Select Committee on Assassinations Collection

10 February 1992

The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Collection consists of the following parts, which the attached box list describes in further detail:

1. **Sequestered HSCA Records** The first and major part of the collection, 64 boxes of records under Job No. 80-T01357A, is wide-ranging material collected in response to House Select Committee on Assassinations requests for documents relating to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and, to a lesser extent, Dr. Martin Luther King. Coordinated by the Office of Legislative Counsel (now the Office of Congressional Affairs) and now under OCA control, these are the "sequestered" boxes that have been the subject of FOIA litigation and court order.

a. **Boxes 1-34: DO** Boxes 1-34 (34 cu. ft. of records) are about one-half DO-collected materials, with the remainder largely of third agency documents, primarily FBI reports gathered for the Warren Commission. There is also some material from the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as the original HSCA requests. Also included are staff handwritten notes, photographs, and copies of newspaper clippings. These records cover a wide variety of topics but focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans, and a large number of name traces requested by the HSCA staff. There is also material on the Black Panthers, the civil rights movement, and the peace movement. Among the subjects that appear in these boxes are: Jack Ruby, Clay Shaw, Frank Sturgis, E. Howard Hunt, Nosenko, Guy Banister, David Ferrie, Silvia Duran, Martin Luther King, Coretta Scott King, James Earl Ray, William Kunstler, Jim Garrison, G. P. Hemming, Marina Oswald, John Roselli, Sam Giancana, Santos Trafficante, and Rolando Cubela's AMLASH operations against Castro. These records also include the 1967 Inspector General's report on CIA plots against Castro and the testimony of Richard Helms in executive session before HSCA.
d. **Boxes 35-63** Boxes 35 through 63 in this job (29 cu. ft. of records) are equally eclectic, divided as they are between records from the Office of Legislative Counsel (now OCA), Inspector General, Office of the General Counsel, Directorate of Science and Technology, Office of Security (security files), and the HSCA itself. These records, which are mostly CIA material (heavily DO), consist of reports, memoranda, transcripts, cables, letters, newspaper clippings, photographs, and charts. They include materials relating to the Garrison Investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. There is also some material relating to Martin Luther King, black power, and racial violence, as well as a DS&T report on photos of the "unknown man" at the Mexico City Soviet embassy, and an NPIC analysis of the Zapruder film.

c. **Box 64: Microfilm** Box 64 of Job No. 80-T01357A contains 72 reels of microfilm (although the box is labeled "CIA/DDO HSCA Records, box 1 of 2." box 2 has not been found). The History Staff was assured, however, that this was indeed box 64 of Job No. 80-T01357A. In addition to a copy of Oswald’s 201 file (as actually shown to the HSCA staff in 1978), the microfilm contains material on Oswald’s activities in Mexico City (primarily photographic and phone tap surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates), Mexico City Station files (including cable traffic and the station’s “P” Personality files), CIA security files, Nosenko interrogation transcripts, and a great deal of information relating to Cuban exile groups. There are also 22 reels of 201 files, which contain 151 individual files. Some of the material on these microfilm reels reproduces DO material in the boxes, although it is difficult to judge exactly how much.

2. **Oswald’s 201 File** The second part of the HSCA collection is Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, 16 boxes (16 cu. ft. of records) held in the DO's Information Management Staff (IMS). This file consists primarily of copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald, FBI investigations on Oswald and his activities (including items that FBI sent CIA prior to the assassination), interviews with Marina Oswald, Department of State cable traffic concerning Oswald's passport and visa applications, information tracing Oswald's weapons, material on Jack Ruby and Silvia Duran, and a tape of Oswald's August 1963 radio debate. There are also detailed FBI reports concerning Oswald's assassination of the President and his contacts with Soviet officials, as well as records relating to Gilberto Alvarado, who maintained that he witnessed Cubans passing Oswald cash at a party on the night before the assassination.
3. **Loose Files** The HSCA collection's third part comprises a number of loose folders that evidently belong within the collection, including eight bulky Mexico City Station files (including cable traffic and "P" files) that are also in the microfilm. These files are considered to be part of the Oswald 201 file and are held in IMS. A group of 16 file folders that appear to be un accessioned contain a miscellany of HSCA requests and Agency responses on subjects such as Oswald in the USSR, Marina Oswald, Roselli, and Giancana. These appear to belong with Job. No. 80-T01357A.

4. **Organization** Partly because of the collection's origins in the disorderly process of the Agency's response to massive investigatory committee requests, the collection badly organized. Moreover, years of working through these files in response to numerous Freedom of Information Act requests have disrupted the collection further. More importantly, however, the Agency has not taken intellectual control of the collection in the fifteen years since it was created. Partial systems of organization have been imposed upon various parts of the collection without reference to or use of sound archival principles and procedures. Although 15 separate (and unsatisfactory) indexes to the collection eventually surfaced, the lack of any central index or finding aid makes retrieval of individual documents extremely difficult. Although CIA review officers attempted to impose some order to the collection by numbering each document and adding a folder numbering system to each box, there is no central control or finding aid for any of these these systems. Provenance cannot be traced, and entire files are missing that cannot be satisfactorily accounted for.

5. **Non-record Copies** This collection consists for the most part of xeroxed copies rather than original documents. We suspect that the originals of many, if not most, of these xeroxed documents would be difficult if not impossible to locate.

6. **Preservation** Much of the material throughout the collection, especially thermofax copies and photos, is fragile and in poor physical condition, requiring immediate attention to prevent further deterioration.
ANNEX A

FINDING AIDS AND INDEXES

PUBLISHED:


UNPUBLISHED:

(From Russ Holmes)

(1) HSCA Requests November 1976-June 1979 Relating to the DO (3 vol.). This finding aid for DO records provides the OLC number for each request and the date of the HSCA request (basically in chronological order). It also contains a copy of each request which includes the subject, name, or organization for which information was requested.

(2) Subject and Name Index in card box. This is a subject index arranged alphabetically on 3x5 cards. It contains the HSCA request date and whether or not there is CIA (DO) documentation on the subject. If there is no documentation the card has an NR. If there is a 201 file it is listed as well as any loose folders which can be found in boxes 1-34. It is used in conjunction with the HSCA Requests finding aid.

(3) Folder Title List for boxes 1-34 (DO materials). Each box has a handwritten copy of the folder title list. Unfortunately, these lists provide very little data or information on the contents of the folders.

(4) Folder Title List for Microfilm Reels 1-45. This includes a Folder Title List for Oswald 201 File (Reels 30-44).

(5) Finding Aid for House Staff Notes. This finding aid numbers each document 000001-2001204. Unfortunately, there is no listing of the documents themselves. Annotated on this list is the box number where the document may be located (Boxes 1-34).

(6) List of House Staff Members. This is an alphabetical listing of House staff who examined and took notes on CIA documents. It is incomplete. It does provide document numbers for the material they examined.

(7) Inventory Prepared by DO on HSCA Material Returned to CIA. One wooden box of 3x5 cards. The cards include a variety of numbering systems such as a document number, JFK folder number, and a RS number. The system is not useable at this time.
(8) House Indexing System 001-187 JFK. This appears to be a House system imposed on its documents. It appears in boxes 19-21 but there is no finding aid for it and there are gaps. (Only CIA materials were returned to the CIA)

(9) FOIA Inventory Numbering System. This was developed by CIA staff. DO documents are numbered 1-1700, OCA 2000-, All microfilm 3000-, Office of Security 4000-. There is no central index for these systems.

(10) Loose Folder Inventory of DO Materials. This is a folder list for 36 loose folders.

MICROFILM

(11) Folder Title List for Reels 1-45.

(12) Folder Title List for Oswald 201 File (Reels 30-44). This material was actually reviewed by the House Committee staff in 1978.

(13) Computer Print Out Up-Date for Oswald 201 File
   a. Material collected prior to November 22, 1963 (3 page print out).
   b. Material collected after November 22, 1963 includes most recent materials added to the file. (Large print out).

(14) Index to Microfilm Reels 47-72. These are handwritten item lists for reels 47-52; a spot check list for reels 57, 59, 63, 64, and 72.

(15) OCA Index to boxes 49-63. Organized by HSCA request date and OLC number. This is a folder title list. Folder Title List for boxes 1-34 (HSCA Records)

History Staff Checklist of boxes 1-63, Oswald's 201 File, and sampling of microfilm (the microfilm sample includes all reels not covered by Microfilm Index).
BOX LIST OF FILES REVIEWED
CIA HISTORY STAFF SURVEY
House Select Committee on Assassinations Collection

10 February 1992

Job No. 80-T01357A

Box 1: CIA Security files on numerous individuals, including G. P. Hemming, Martin Luther King, Marina Oswald, and others; 1967 CIA IG report on plotting against Castro; Garrison investigation. (File folders 6, 7, 17 and 20 are missing).

Box 2: CIA Security files on William D. Pawley, Frank Sturgis, Jack Ruby, Clay Shaw, and others; numerous FBI documents and assorted CIA material.

Box 3: Helms hearing testimony; Mexico City Station cable traffic; CIA, FBI, Warren Commission, and HSCA correspondence.

Box 4: Chronology of Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR: CIA operations against Cuba, Castro, and the Cuban Intelligence Service, including information relating to ZRRIFLE, AMLASH, AMMUG; description of CIA 201 system; information on Nosenko interrogation regarding Oswald and his Soviet connections. (File folder 8 is missing).

Box 5: Notes on Oswald; various HSCA notes and affidavits; transcripts of Helms's testimony; FOIA information.

Box 6: Information relating to Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City, including surveillance from CIA projects LIEMPTY, LILYRIC, and LIMITED: Garrison investigation; CIA support to Warren Commission; AMMUG debriefing; copies of Mexico City Station despatches (HMMA); sensitive material on photocoverage of Soviet, Cuban, Czech, and Polish embassies in Mexico City; an index to HSCA papers held by CIA; an index of Warren Commission exhibits; information relating to Silvia Duran; a copy of agreement between the Director and Chairman Louis Stokes requiring the CIA to retain for 30 years all materials gathered in response to Committee requests; Richard Helms executive session testimony in 1978 before the committee; an index to requests to the CIA from J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission.

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HSCA material in JFK boxes:
3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20
21 - 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34 - 36, 46, 47
48, 50 - 55, 57 - 62,
Box 7: Mexico City Station surveillance of Cuban, Soviet embassies; AMMUG; Silvia Duran; Oswald's activities in New Orleans (FBI report); monthly operations reports from Mexico City Station; summaries of HUMA cables; Cuban exile mug books; Gilberto Alvarado, the Nicaraguan who claimed he saw Lee Harvey Oswald receive cash in meeting inside Mexico City Cuban embassy; transcripts of phone calls to and from Soviet embassy; machine listing of documents officially recorded as being in Oswald's 201 file (list missing from folder); Warren Commission trip to Mexico City and interview with U.S. Ambassador Thomas Mann; Jack Ruby; Fair Play for Cuba Committee; FBI reports on Oswald; HTLINGUAL documents; Nosenko interviews; and interview of Mexico City Station personnel by committee staff. (File folder 37 is missing).

Box 8: HSCA requests primarily for name traces involving individuals, including James Earl Ray, Clay Shaw, John Roselli, Sam Giancana, Santos Trafficante; 1977 CIA study on Church committee findings relating to the CIA; HSCA requests to interview CIA personnel; ZRRIFLE; information relating to the Cuban airline flight from Mexico City to Havana; Nosenko interviews; photos of anti-Castro individuals.

Box 9: Primarily HSCA requests for name traces on individuals and organizations; CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City; copies of cable traffic from Mexico City Station. (File folder 76 missing). Folder 7 contains name and address card.

Box 10: Name traces from 201 files, HTLINGUAL mail intercepts, and MHCHAOS files, including individuals associated with Black Panthers, Students for a Democratic Society, the civil rights movement, Ramparts, and the peace movement. Material on Henry Winston, Maurice Halperin, George Edward Wright, Julian Bond, William Kunstler, James Earl Ray. Also Lee Harvey Oswald and Jim Garrison.

Box 11: Misc. items on JFK assassination; HSCA material, including personal history of Nosenko and Oswald chronology.

Box 12: HSCA chronologies 1976-78; draft reviews and CIA comments; Oswald dossier forwarded to Warren Commission; Garrison investigation of JFK assassination; CIA chronology of memos received from Warren Commission; HSCA chronology, January-March 1978.

Box 13: Alphabetical files of individuals marked "completed" or "pending" based on 201 files.

Box 14: Primarily HSCA requests for name traces on individuals and organizations; some 201 files; interviews with POWs from Bay of Pigs; FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service reports on Oswald.
Box 15: Alphabetical files based on CIA, State, and FBI on numerous individuals including Claire Booth Luce, Clay Shaw, Martin Luther King, and Coretta Scott King.

Box 16: Copies of 201 files; interview and transcripts relating to Mexico City activities of Oswald and the Mafia.

Box 17: JMWAVE cable; DCI cable traffic.

Box 18: HSCA chronology; Oswald 201 file; report on CIA performance.

Box 19: HSCA staff notes, taken at CIA. (File folders 2-5, 14, 18, 25, 28 and 34-35 missing. With HSCA records?)

Box 20: Follow-up requests from HSCA on name traces; handwritten notes of committee staff members on CIA 201 files; CIA surveillance of Soviet embassy in Mexico City; Oswald's activities in Mexico City; copies of staff interviews with CIA personnel (file folders 58-62, 65, 69-70, 73-74, 80, 83, 85-86, 88-92, 96, 101, 103 and 112 are missing, while folder 57 is empty. With HSCA records?)

Box 21: HSCA requests by JFK file number.

Box 22: HSCA staff notes, misc.

Box 23: HSCA staff notes: misc., including Helms's testimony in executive session.

Box 24: HSCA staff notes: misc., including Mexico City interviews and speculation about a dual CIA filing system re Oswald and Oswald's relationship to Agency.

Box 25: Committee staff notes on materials reviewed at CIA relating to Oswald and his possible connections with the CIA and his activities in Mexico City; a sanitized copy of the 1977 CIA report on the Church Committee findings; information relating to Cuban embassy officials in Mexico City, including Silvia Duran, Eusebio Lopez, and Alfredo Diaz.

Box 26: Documents re Oswald's Mexico City visit; DCI's appearance before Warren Commission; allegations of Oswald's connection with CIA.

Box 27: Agency file on Oswald, as sent to Warren Commission; Nosenko interrogation notes.
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Box 28: HSCA files mixed in with FBI and CIA documents; investigation of Silvia Duran, 28 November 1963; numerous HSCA handwritten notes.

Box 29: Alphabetical file on individuals from various sources, including Guy Bannister, Clay Shaw, and David Ferrie.

Box 30: HSCA report on Cuba trip, 1978; handwritten notes on Oswald; Domestic Contact Division notes on Garrison investigation; and information on Nosenko.

Box 31: Administrative materials, correspondence between HSCA and CIA, index and file of HSCA material returned to DO.

Box 32: Mexico City Station cables and dispatches.

Box 33: Cuban Mugbook and Mexico City Station traffic, October 1963-January 1964.

Box 34: HSCA files on George de Mohrenschildt; Cuban Mugbook; HSCA reading file; CIA relations with FBI and Warren Commission; Nosenko on Oswald; and Ruby's alleged travel to Cuba.

Box 35: Review of HSCA trip to Cuba and Mexico; HSCA report on Silvia Odio; report, "CIA Operations against Cuba prior to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy on 23 November 1963;" and Senate Select Committee reports and comments.

Box 36: Review, what could Castro have known?--review of HSCA draft report; IG report on Cuban operations for 1960-64, for any bearing upon JFK assassination; Book V of Church Committee final report, with review by Agency of provocation theory (charges of Agency cover-up of Cuban operations); E. Howard Hunt file; Mexico City/Havana flights; Win Scott; AMTRUNK; Oswald contacts with Soviet and Cuban embassies, Mexico City; CIA relations with FBI and Warren Commission; Alpha 66; photo of unidentified man, Mexico City; cable traffic, AMLASH, AMWHIP; Mafia plotting; Jack Ruby/Cuba; QJWIN, ZRRIFLE.

Box 37: Information relating to Cuban exile activities against Castro, such as the Torriente Group and Alpha 66; name trace on E. Howard Hunt; and information relating to the Garrison investigation.

Box 38: Alphabetical files, including Hemming, Luce, Sturgis, Roselli, James McCord, and Nosenko; file on U-2 overflights from Japan; DDS&T report on photos of unknown man.

Box 39: Photo comparisons of E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis with tramps arrested in Dallas on day of JFK assassination; chart of frames from the Zapruder film showing the actual assassination.
Box 31

Envelope No. 1 contains nine (9) linear inches of 5x8 cards (and some 3x5 cards), created by HSCA staffers, containing gists information obtained from interviews with CIA employees, from CIA files and reports or HSCA observations. They are white-touched as HSCA documents - many to require sanitization. Yellow Post-Its are attached to 11 cards requiring sanitization. One issue is the Mexico Station window - many cards reflect troche to and from Mexico City after December 1964.

Also in Box 31 is a wooden box (8 1/2 linear inches) of 3x5 cards: an inventory, prepared by M. Do, of HSCA material returned to CIA. The cards contain a variety of (unexplained) numbers and names, mostly, HSCA staff citations of interviews, CIA responses to queries, Warren Commission or CIA/DG papers; no substance, just topic listing or names/crypts, etc. Nearly 100 of the cards definitely require sanitization; another 100 contain names (mostly Cuban) that would have to be further researched to determine releasability. The file does not appear to be useful as such, even without sanitization. Thus it has been white-touched also.
Box 40: Security files (including record of those files inadvertingly destroyed).

Box 41: Security files (alphabetical), including Lucien Conein; also material on Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Box 42: Name traces from Office of Security files; Garrison investigation information; a copy of a manuscript, "The Kennedy Conspiracy: An Uncommissioned Report on the Jim Garrison Investigation;" copies of material relating to Oswald shown to committee staff at CIA.

Box 43: Security files (some missing, inadvertently destroyed). Files present include that of Martin Luther King.

Box 44: Security files.

Box 45: Security files, including those of David Atlee Phillips and Clay Shaw.

Box 46: HSCA requests for information relating to Frank Sturgis, Clay Shaw, and Watergate; information relating to JMWARE and the Miami Station; FBI reports on left-wing and racial unrest in U.S.

Box 47: Security files, mostly newspaper clippings; list of notes by HSCA staff member; Oswald security material; newspaper articles on Oswald; unsanitized material released in sanitized form via FOIA from Oswald material.

Box 48: Security files, including __Position Control Register (1960-64); HSCA staff notes reviewed by OS; HSCA staff review at headquarters of selected OS files (including Roselli and Giancana), plus other name traces through OS, including Gerald P. Hemming.

Box 49: Name trace requests; transcripts of interviews of CIA personnel; executive session transcript of a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting, 21 November 1973, regarding CIA assassination plots; CIA plans to assassinate Castro; and the Mafia/CIA connection in attempts to assassinate Castro.

Box 50: HSCA requests by date; Oswald chronology; draft copy of Hornbeck Report.

Box 51: Numerous HSCA requests and individual files; Jack Ruby file as well as Hemming, Hall, Pawley, M. L. King, and others.

Box 52: HSCA reviews by date; Cuban Counter-revolutionary Handbook, 1962 & 1964; photos of unknown man; NPIC analysis of Zapruder film, and Hoch memorandum.

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Box 53: HSCA request log and priority response list; copy of manuscript, "Castro's Red Hot Hell": information relating to HSCA leaks, guidelines, procedures, clearances, and secrecy agreements.

Box 54: HSCA staff notes.

Box 55: HSCA staff notes; HSCA chronologies, 1953-77.

Box 56: FBI reports on racial violence in the U.S. in 1967 and the Black Power movement and Martin Luther King; deposition material, but not the actual depositions, of Ray Rocca, John McCone, Richard Helms, and David Phillips.

Box 57: Mexico City Station file, 1959-68; correspondence concerning HSCA visit to Mexico; HSCA receipts, testimony, etc.; 1975 report on unidentified man at Cuban embassy; HSCA request for JMWAVE traffic.

Box 58: IG report on Church Committee final report, book V; annex to task force report (AMLASH); DDCI testimony before committee (Dec. 1978); HSCA final report (summary) and correspondence; internal DO memos re Warren Commission (what to tell it re Cuban operations?); correspondence/memos re HSCA interviews and depositions from Win Scott, Golitzyn, Shevchenko, McCone, Nosenko (for most part, interviews and depositions themselves not here).

Box 59: HSCA press releases and correspondence.

Box 60: Nosenko material, including polygraph transcripts; misc. HSCA memos; James J. Angleton material, 1977-78.

Box 61: Copies of House Select Committee draft reports and CIA comments relating to Cuban exiles and their activities against Castro, Silvia Duran, AMLASH, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City.

Box 62: HSCA requests; photo surveillance around Cuban embassy in Mexico City; CIA/HSCA defector study; various interviews about JFK's death.

Box 63: Warren Commission reports on Oswald; a House report on Oswald's activities in New Orleans; CIA plots to assassinate Castro; and a folder on Ray Rocca's testimony before the Rockefeller Commission (his testimony is not present in the folder); and information relating to the disposition of CIA materials relating to the House investigation.
Box 64: Microfilm

History Staff reviewed Reels for which there were no description. These were Reels 46, 53-56, 59, 60-62, and 65-71. History Staff also sampled Reels 1, 14, 18, 22, 24, 26, 30, 31, and 44. Reels reviewed, as follows:

Reel 1: CIA Security files in alphabetical order, containing background investigation results, memos, passport applications.

Reel 14: CIA Security files, in alphabetical order.

Reel 18: True name dossier from Office of Security files; list of U.S. defectors to Soviet Bloc; material on WIROGUE and the Congo; Cuban exile operations to infiltrate men into Cuba.

Reel 22: AMMUG; LIEMPTY; LILYRIC; LINCHPIN; LIENVOY (Mexico City surveillance activities of the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

Reel 24: Photo surveillance of Cuban embassy in Mexico City, August & November 1963; photo surveillance of USSR embassy in Mexico City, July-December 1963; Garrison investigation articles and CIA correspondence.

Reel 26: Extensive file on Cuban exile groups in U.S. receiving CIA help; DRE, Liberation Army of Cuba.

Reel 30: Mexico City Station files; CIA personnel records; Mexico City message traffic relating to Silvia Duran; photos of individuals entering or leaving the Soviet embassy and the Cuban consulate in Mexico City; press accounts of Garrison trial of Clay Shaw.

Reel 31: Oswald diary; Warren Commission file numbers and inventory; index of Mexico City traffic; Mexico City chronology; 1975 CIA report on unidentified man; 1975 CIA report on Cuba-JFK connection; list of "soft files" at beginning of microfilm.

Reel 44: Warren Commission documents relating to Oswald; Ambassador Thomas Mann's meeting with the Commission staff in Mexico City in 1964; Helms affidavit, 1964; Jack Ruby; Marina Oswald; Clay Shaw; and Jim Garrison.

Reel 46: Nosenko files; Mexico City Station chronological file; and a list of all station despatches from 10/15/63 to 11/27/63 (20 despatches missing).

Reel 53: CIA Security/201 files in alphabetical order.

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Reel 54: CIA Security/201 files; maps of Cuba; reports on Mexican/Cuban activities.

Reel 55: CIA Security files.

Reel 56: CIA Security files.

Reel 59: CIA Personnel files (including fitness reports).

Reel 60: CIA Personnel files.

Reel 61: Nosenko interrogation: information relating to Golitsyn; Cuban exile groups and their anti-Castro activities; William Pawley's anti-Castro activities.

Reel 62: CIA Nosenko interrogation transcripts; Cuban Revolutionary Council progress reports, March-April 1963; list of Cuban consulate employees worldwide; FBI report on Cuban government in exile in NYC; monthly expenditures of Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC).

Reel 65: Cuban exile organizations such as the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front (CDRF), Judicatura Cuban Democarta, and the 30 November Movement.

Reel 66: AMBUD file on CRC, monthly reports, statement of expenses, proposed programs and projects, budget projections and accounting statements of the Council.

Reel 67: AMBUD (Col. Johnson) file; CRC budget and programs, documents relating to the coordination problems within and between Cuban exile groups.

Reel 68: Col. Johnson Working File; weekly summary reports; the underground in Cuba; CRC activities and position papers; translations of Council documents; biographic information on CRC leaders Dr. Miro Cardona and Tony Varona.

Reel 69: CRC and the Cuban exile community; meeting in San Jose and around Latin America—selection of delegates, expenses, and recruitment efforts.

Reel 70: CRC finances; Brigade 2506; Juan Bosch interview in Dominican Republic with Cuban exiles; and information relating to CRC delegates to various Latin American governments.

Reel 71: Cuban organizations; photos of Mexican embassy entrance.

Reel 72: Photos of Mexican embassy entrance.
Oswald 201 File

Box 1: mostly FBI interviews/investigation notes; items sent by FBI to CIA prior to JFK assassination regarding Oswald's activities in New Orleans; State Department correspondence regarding Oswald defection and return; Silvia Duran material; newspaper articles; Mexico City Station files; and other material.

Box 2: FBI background investigation of Oswald and his wife Marina's activities while in the Soviet Union.

Box 3: FBI background investigation of Oswald activities in New Orleans; FBI interviews of Marina Oswald; information relating to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee; State Department actions regarding Oswald's passport and visa applications; FBI tracing of weapons connected with Oswald; information on Jack Ruby; and a tape of the radio debate in which Oswald participated in August 1963.

Box 4: FBI reports on Oswald; FBI interviews with Oswald and Marina after the assassination; copy of Cuban government's protest to Mexican authorities over the arrest and treatment of Silvia Duran; and an index to the FBI reports is included in the box.

Box 5: FBI investigation of the assassination (3 vols.); a copy of Oswald's diary while he was in Moscow; biographic material on Marina Oswald; a copy of Oswald's chronology while in the Soviet Union; and a copy of the questions for the Soviet government composed by CIA officials.

Box 6: Oswald chronology; biography of Marina Oswald; Warren Commission correspondence; name traces of those who appear in Oswald diary; Warren Commission correspondence; Oswald Mexico trip; Oswald address book; Silvia Duran Mexican interrogation; newspaper clippings.

Box 7: FBI reports on Oswald; Nosenko interviews; photos of Oswald in Minsk; list of Oswald's apartment articles; and a name list of CIA traces for the Warren Commission.

Box 8: Photos shown to Marina Oswald for ID purposes; SR/CI Studies for the Warren Commission; continuing FBI investigation, Dallas area; interview with Marina; Oswald/Ruby alleged association; attachments to Oswald chronology in USSR.

Box 9: Copy of Marina Oswald's notebook with addresses; list of items prepared by CI on Oswald care for the Warren Commission;
Oswald's contacts in the Soviet Union; and an FBI report on Oswald's activities in Mexico; a CIA brief for presentation to the Warren Commission on Oswald; Soviet Government documents relating to Oswald; and a translation of a Portuguese book, *A Conspiração*.

Box 10: FBI investigations; Nosenko material; anti-Castro activities in U.S.; CIA report of Oswald in Mexico City; CIA report on Oswald defection; CIA report of Oswald as Kennedy murderer; assorted FBI items.

Box 11: Bulky material, mostly SR/CI Studies for Warren Commission; FBI reports; Marina Oswald material; Oswald Cuban application; USSR radio and newspaper traffic; Silvia Duran interview; foreign press reaction to JFK assassination and Warren Commission report; photos of unidentified man in Mexico City; Bernard Fensterwald FOIA case; assorted CIA and FBI material.

Box 12: Warren Commission Log Book from National Archives; master list of Warren Commission correspondence and exhibits from National Archives; and copies of FBI reports on the assassination.

Box 13: HTLINGUAL intercepts (Russian language with some translations); SE soft file on Oswald; Nosenko information on other Soviet defectors.

Box 14: Copies of CIA documents still classified in the Warren Commission records held at the National Archives; Oswald's activities in the Soviet Union; information relating to Gilberto Alvarado "Source D", Silvia Duran, and Oswald in Mexico; transcripts of telephone intercepts from the Mexico City Station.

Box 15: CIA-Warren Commission released materials, 1964; background on Jack Ruby, Oswald; Oswald's Soviet medical record; National Archives list of status of CIA documents in Warren Commission records, 1967; Soviet press reaction to assassination; internal memoranda and other records of the Warren Commission; transcript of executive session of the Warren Commission; Oswald's Mexico trip, Soviet defection; Oswald's alleged CIA connections; Warren Commission material; "kook" cases; follow-up on numerous "leads"; Helms's file on Oswald and Warren Commission documents (as of January 1964).

Box 16: Garrison investigation, newspaper clippings, and other reports; Warren Commission memos.

Mexico City Station files (8 bulky files)

(Considered part of the Oswald 201 file; to be placed in box within Oswald's 201 file)
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Mexico Station files on Oswald (P-files); Oswald chronology; newspaper clippings; FBI report on Oswald in Mexico city; misc. material on Oswald in Mexico; Garrison investigation material (mostly newspaper clippings); Warren Commission testimony.

HSCA Miscellaneous Folders (16 folders)

(These file folders, which are unaccessioned at present, will be placed within HSCA collection, Job No. 80-T01357A)

HSCA requests; information on Oswald in USSR; Marina Oswald; documents on Roselli and Giancana.
27 March 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Historical Review Task Force
SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Historical Review Program
          Declassification Guidelines

1. The accompanying report responds to your 13 February 1992 request that we form a Task Force to prepare declassification guidelines for the Historical Review Program.

2. Attached to the report is a revised Headquarters Regulation (HR 70-14), which establishes general policies and guidelines to ensure that the Historical Review Program has an impetus toward declassification. The guidance in this Regulation will enable the Program both to fulfill the expectations of the Congress when Mr. Casey established the Program in 1985, and to give the American people the expanded access to CIA's historical records that you announced in your 21 February speech in Tulsa.

3. We asked the deputy directors and independent office heads to select Task Force members who could address both general policy and declassification issues, and we asked members to express their components' views as well as their own. We have attached a list of Task Force members and of other Agency officers who took part in our work. The Task Force met eight times as a group, and we met separately with many of its members and consulted with other federal agencies, including the National Archives and Records Administration, the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Information Security Oversight Office.

4. Our report reflects a consensus of the Task Force members, and we are grateful for the knowledge, judgment, and good will that all members brought to our efforts. We are prepared to discuss the Task Force's work and report at your convenience.

J. Kenneth McDonald  
Chief, CIA History Staff  
Co-chairman

W. George Jameson  
Chief, Litigation Division  
Co-chairman

Attachment
MEMBERSHIP

Task Force on Historical Review Guidelines

Cochairmen:

W. George Jameson
Chief, Litigation Division (OGC)

J. Kenneth McDonald
Chief, CIA History Staff

Members:

Doug A.
Chief, DO Component

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Director, National Intelligence Council,  
Analytic Group

Chief Paralegal, Litigation Division (OGC)
27 March 1992

REPORT OF THE DCI TASK FORCE ON
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
DECLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES

1. On 13 February 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence asked W. George Jameson, Chief of the Litigation Division, OGC, and J. Kenneth McDonald, Chief of the CIA History Staff, to co-chair a Task Force to prepare declassification guidelines for a reorganized and expanded Historical Review Program. This report is the result of the work of that Task Force.

2. Premises: The DCI's speech on "CIA and Openness" to the Oklahoma Press Association of 21 February 1992 expressed the intent to make CIA and the intelligence process more visible and understandable in light of changing world circumstances, and from this the Task Force operated on the following premises:

A. The Historical Review Program (Program) established in 1985 will become the responsibility of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI).

B. Custody, control, and declassification authority for records reviewed under the Program will be transferred from the originating offices to the Director, CSI, in order to accelerate declassification review.

C. The Program will fully conform to EO 12356, "National Security Information," and maintain the DCI's broad statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.

D. As part of CIA's movement toward greater openness, the DCI has directed that the Program have "a bias toward declassification of historical documents."

E. The Program will review for declassification three principal categories of CIA records:

- All documents 30 years old or older (except for certain operational files exempted from FOIA search and review by the CIA Information Act of 1984).
• All National Intelligence Estimates on the former Soviet Union 10 years old or older.

• Records (including operational files) on selected topics and events of particular historical value or public interest.

F. On an annual basis, CIA will publish an index of all documents the Agency has declassified and approved for release.

3. Objective and Products: The Task Force's primary goal was to prepare guidelines to help this voluntary Program make sound and consistent declassification decisions and to ensure that the Program has an impetus toward declassification. Recognizing the futility of any attempt to formulate rigid instructions that dictate decisions for all possible cases, or exhaustive lists of categories of information that reviewers automatically must declassify or protect, the Task Force prepared for DCI approval a proposed revision of Headquarters Regulation 70-14 (attached), which establishes general policies and guidelines for the Program.

The Task Force expects that the guidelines in this document will advance the Program's objective to declassify and release the maximum volume of information to the public consistent with national security by emphasizing clearly and specifically that:

• The Program is guided by a presumption for disclosure.

• The CSI rather than the components will exercise declassification authority for historical records.

• Reviewers may not automatically protect or release documents.

• Reviewers may not withhold information without articulating with reasonable specificity the possible damage to national security expected from disclosure of the information.

• The guidelines, firm in principle yet flexible in application, identify certain factors that reviewers must consider in determining whether damage could result.

• The Program will continue to protect information, including intelligence sources and methods, that could damage the national security.
4. Organization: The History Staff in CSI, after consulting with a wide range of historians, will select groups of permanent records (excepting certain operational files) 30 years old or older for systematic declassification review, and locate and collect for review records on specific events or topics of historical interest selected with the DCI's approval. A new Historical Review Group in CSI will carry out declassification review in accordance with the Program's guidance. (The Program will ordinarily focus on inactive records, although on occasion it may be necessary to review active files.) At the beginning of each calendar year, the Director of CSI will submit a report to the DCI on the Program's work during the preceding year, and on its plans for the coming year.

5. Guidelines for Declassification: In preparing the guidelines in the Regulation to give new impetus to declassification, the Task Force focused on the following issues:

A. Presumption for Disclosure: To carry out the DCI's commitment to the Program, the Task Force emphasized the presumption for disclosure. Since EO 12356 provides that information may be classified only if its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, an essential Task Force objective was to prepare useful guidance for reviewers to determine damage. Unless reviewers can articulate how disclosure could damage the national security, they must declassify information even if it concerns matters the Agency has routinely withheld from public release, such as CIA presence in a specific country, the fact of certain covert action operations, Agency organization and personnel, and information withheld solely on grounds of the "mosaic" effect. Since most records will be at least 30 years old, and most operational records will be exempt from systematic review, the Task Force expects that the Program can declassify substantial amounts of information without damage to national security.

B. Sources and Methods: The Task Force was careful to ensure that the Program's guidelines do not undermine the DCI's broad authority to protect intelligence sources and methods. The guidelines reiterate EO 12356's presumption that the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources, methods, or foreign government information will damage the national security. Such information, however, will not be automatically withheld under this Program. Although members were concerned about cover disclosure issues, the Task Force agreed that as an intelligence method, cover will be governed by these guidelines.
C. CIA Presence Abroad: The Regulation does not automatically protect the fact of the presence of CIA representatives in a specific country or relationships with foreign governments. Such information may be protected upon a reasonable showing of possible damage. The Task Force concluded that in many cases such presence or relationship might be disclosed by substituting for deleted particulars such terms as "CIA representatives" and "government officials" or "authorities."

D. Publicly Available Information: Under this Program, the extent to which information is already available to the public, especially information that the Publications Review Board has approved for publication, will be a significant consideration in declassification review. There is a presumption that information that has appeared publicly will not damage national security, unless a reviewer can articulate how official confirmation could cause additional damage.

E. Protection of Unclassified Material: Reviewers may withhold some information even if it is unclassified. (Examples are information protected by discretionary privileges such as deliberative process—especially involving the Director and President—attorney work product, attorney-client, and witness statements.) This material also will not automatically be protected, and reviewers must articulate expected harm to US interests in order to protect it. Much of the information in this category will probably be disclosed. Information prohibited by law from disclosure (e.g., privacy data) will continue to be protected.

6. Procedures: To be effective in accelerating the declassification review, the Program will ensure that components are consulted. The Regulation addresses this and certain procedural matters as follows:

A. Consultation: The CSI will advise the responsible components of its selection of records and consult with them as necessary in conducting its review.

B. Appeal Process: Records approved by the Director of CSI for declassification will be made available to the appropriate deputy directors or heads of independent offices, who will have 30 working days to appeal any decision to the Director, CSI. If the appeal is denied, they will have 10 working days to appeal that decision to the DCI.
C. Re-review: In its review, the CSI will identify records that cannot be released, and will review them again not more than 10 years later.

D. Index: CIA will publish an annual index of all Agency documents approved for release (e.g., under the FOIA, but not the Privacy Act). This will serve both the public and the Program's research needs. It has been suggested that CSI publish this index, but the Task Force is convinced that such an index will require ADP expertise, personnel, and equipment far beyond anything available in the Center. Although the Historical Review Group will record its final review determinations, the Task Force recommends that the Office of Information Technology (OIT) be asked to develop and maintain this index.

7. Application to Other Review Programs: The guidelines will inevitably have an impact on the release of Agency information under other review programs, such as the FOIA. While standards need to be consistent, many different factors will determine whether CIA will release information in any given situation. The Task Force therefore agreed that the Program's guidelines for historical records should be taken into account Agency-wide, but that their specific application to other review programs should be the subject of future study.

8. Resources: The Agency's current means of recording declassification and other disclosure decisions are rudimentary, fragmented, and entirely inadequate. The Task Force believes OIT should develop and maintain a data base both to track all Agency disclosures and to facilitate the publication of the annual index. Additional resources for OIT may be required. Directorates and independent offices also will require additional resources both to conduct appeals of the Program's decisions, and to cope with the impact of the new declassification guidelines on their review of Agency information under the FOIA and other programs.

9. Conclusion: The Task Force recognizes that applying the proposed guidelines will raise some complex issues that CSI can only resolve by consulting the rest of the Agency as the Program actually gets underway. While making the Program succeed will demand extraordinary energy, commitment, and sound judgment, we believe that our guidelines give the Program the foundation it needs to begin its pioneering work.

Attachment
14. CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SYNOPSIS. This regulation prescribes the responsibilities, guidelines, and procedures for the declassification review and release of permanent Agency records under the CIA Historical Review Program.

a. GENERAL

(1) The Agency's Historical Review Program (hereafter, the Program) is established to make significant historical information available to the public without damage to the national security interests of the United States. This includes systematic review for declassification and release of: all permanent records 30 years old or older (with the exception of certain operational files); other records on selected topics or events; and certain National Intelligence Estimates.

(2) Reaffirming the principle that the US Government's records should be available to the public, this Program will declassify and release to the public the maximum volume of historical records consistent with:

(a) The responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) under the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, to protect intelligence sources and methods and organizational and personnel information.
(b) The requirements of Executive Order 12356 and successor orders to protect national security information.
(c) Provisions of law that govern the public disclosure of information.

(3) The Agency will transfer records declassified and approved for release under this Program to the National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter, National Archives) for public use.

(4) The Agency will also make information available to the public in other ways, including the release of declassified records to the Department of State for
publication in its documentary history series, *The Foreign Relations of the United States*. Such Agency material released to the Department of State will also be transferred to the National Archives through the Program.

b. **AUTHORITY.** The Historical Review Program is established in accordance with:

(1) Executive Order 12356, which prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information, and provides in § 3.3(c) that the DCI may establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of classified information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods.

(2) The responsibility of the DCI under § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3), to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

(3) Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, which exempts the Agency from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.


c. **RESPONSIBILITIES**

(1) **THE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE,** has principal responsibility for the Historical Review Program. Custody, control, and declassification authority for all purposes of records selected and received for review under the Program will be transferred from the components to D/CSI. At the beginning of each calendar year the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence will submit a report to the DCI on the Program's work in the past year, and on its plans for the year ahead.

(2) In the Center for the Study of Intelligence the History Staff and the Historical Review Group (HRG) are responsible for carrying out the Program.
(a) The History Staff will both select groups of records for systematic declassification review, and locate and collect for review records on events or topics of historical interest selected with the approval of the DCI.

(b) The Historical Review Group will be responsible for declassification review of records under the Program in accordance with this Regulation and additional guidance promulgated by the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, with the DCI's approval.

(c) In conducting this Program, the History Staff and Historical Review Group will advise the responsible components concerning the selection of records to be reviewed under the Program and will consult as necessary with the Agency Archivist and responsible directorate and DCI area Information Review Officers.

(d) To advise the Program on its policies and procedures the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, may from time to time convene the Historical Review Panel, which will include the Archivist of the United States, the Librarian of Congress, and representatives of the historical profession.

(3) The Agency Archivist will assist the Historical Review Group in maintaining the integrity of all permanent records (as determined by the Archivist of the United States) received or created by the Agency, and in preparing appropriate documentation to provide data for an annual index of all Agency documents approved for release under this Program or through other means. The Agency Archivist will transfer records declassified and released under the Program to the National Archives.

(4) The History Advisory Board will advise the History Staff in its responsibilities for the Historical Review Program.

d. CRITERIA FOR REVIEW PRIORITY

(1) The History Staff, with the assistance of the Agency Archivist and the relevant Information Management Officers, will use archival data and listings that describe the Agency's permanent records as well as
on-site research at the Agency Archives and Records Center to identify and locate specific groups of records for review under the Program.

(2) The History Staff will determine the order in which records are reviewed, using as primary criteria their historical value, public interest in the subject matter, and their potential yield of documents that can be released. The Program will give special attention to records originated by the DCI or his principal subordinates and other senior Agency officials, finished intelligence, and disseminated intelligence reports. Priority for review will also be given to file series requiring prompt reproduction or other conservation action to ensure preservation of the information contained in the records.

(3) The History Staff will evaluate records in light of the contribution their declassification and release can make to understanding the history of CIA and its role in US intelligence, foreign policy, and international developments.

(4) To determine historical value, the Chief, History Staff, will consider the recommendations of the Historical Review Panel, and of a wide range of government, academic, and private historians.

(5) The following records will be subject to systematic declassification review:

(a) All permanent records held by the Agency that are 30 years old or older when reviewed, with the exception of certain operational files designated by the DCI under the provisions of the CIA Information Act of 1984. Included in this review will be files inherited from predecessor organizations and formerly designated files that have been removed from exempt status as a result of the periodic review required by the CIA Information Act of 1984.

(b) All issues of Studies in Intelligence.

(6) In addition to selecting records for systematic declassification review, the History Staff will locate and collect for HRG declassification review National Intelligence Estimates on the former Soviet Union that are ten years old or older when reviewed, and with the
DCI's approval, records (including operational files excluded from systematic review) on selected events or topics of historical interest.

e. GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION

(1) Executive Order 12356 requires that information be classified only if its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, and that it shall be declassified or downgraded as soon as national security considerations permit. The Order further states that information that no longer requires protection in the interest of national security shall be declassified and released unless withholding is otherwise authorized by applicable law.

(2) There shall be a presumption in favor of disclosure except as provided in subparagraph (e)(4). Reviewers conducting declassification review of information under this Program who advocate the continued classification of information will bear the burden of identifying any damage its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause to the national security. Information may remain classified only if the reviewer can identify such damage and a clear connection between disclosure and the projected damage. To show such damage with respect to information 30 years old or older, a reviewer must articulate how disclosure of the information is likely to affect, in a significant and adverse way, the US Government's current or future ability to carry out its authorized activities. Unless a showing of possible damage is made with reasonable specificity, the information will be declassified, even if the information concerns Agency matters normally withheld from public release, such as:

(a) The fact of CIA presence in a specific country abroad.
(b) The fact that certain covert action operations were conducted.
(c) The existence of foreign government relationships.
(d) Agency organization, functions, names, official titles, and salaries, and numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.
(e) Information withheld solely on grounds of the "mosaic" effect.

(3) Factors to be considered in determining whether damage to the national security reasonably could be expected to be caused by disclosure include the effect of the
passage of time on the sensitivity of the information, any prior disclosures of the information, the link between disclosure and possible harm, and past experience with respect to disclosures of similar information.

(4) Under EO 12356 the unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information, the identity of a confidential foreign source, or intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security. Such information, however, shall not be automatically withheld under this Program.

(5) In accordance with the third agency rule, the Historical Review Group will coordinate its review decisions as necessary with other US Government agencies before taking final declassification action and arranging to transfer records to the National Archives.

(6) A significant consideration in reviewing information for declassification under this Program will be the extent to which the information is already available to the public. Information that CIA has officially acknowledged (including inadvertent disclosures) will not be eligible for continued classification. There is a presumption that information that has appeared publicly, including information that the CIA Publications Review Board has approved for publication even if not confirmed officially, will not damage the national security unless the reviewer can show how official confirmation could reasonably be expected to cause additional damage to the national security.

(7) The Historical Review Group will determine whether the information under review warrants continued protection, even if declassified, pursuant to statutory or other requirements. Such information (e.g. privacy data and information protected by executive privilege) will be released, except when prohibited by law, unless there is a showing that US interests will be adversely affected by the disclosure.

(8) In no case will information be kept classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; or to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.
F. PROCEDURES

(1) Individual documents will be released in full, withheld in full, or released in part. When a document cannot be released in full, an effort to sanitize the document by deleting those portions that may not be declassified, or that may not be made public for other lawful reasons, will be undertaken. This procedure will be followed only when it will not slow the pace of the review unduly, will not obscure the record's essential significance, and will not distort the document's bibliographical identity, even if details of internal dissemination are excised. Documents that cannot be sanitized according to these criteria will be withheld in full.

(2) The Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review the determinations proposed by the Historical Review Group, and if approved, make them available to the deputy directors, heads of independent offices, or their designees, whose components originated or have a substantial interest in the records. The responsible official will have 30 working days from the date of receipt of such records in which to appeal in writing to the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, any decision to declassify and release information.

(3) If the appeal is denied, the responsible deputy director or head of independent office will have 10 working days from the receipt of the decision of the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, to appeal that decision in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence, whose decision will be final.

(4) The Historical Review Group will maintain a record of all final determinations.
(5) At the time of review, HRG will identify Agency records that cannot be declassified. The HRG will again review such records for declassification at a date not more than 10 years later specified by the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence. That date will be marked on the document.

(6) This Regulation is intended to provide direction and guidance for those engaged in declassification review of records under the CIA Historical Review Program. Nothing contained in this Regulation or in any procedures promulgated to implement this Regulation is intended to confer, and does not confer, any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.
Preparations for Handling the Kennedy Assassination Papers

30 March, 10:00 A.M.:

I met in CIA/HS with Mary McAuliffe, Jerry Haines, and Kevin Ruffner, at Mary's invitation. She gave me a copy of the results of History Staff's Survey of the HSCA Collection—the Summary, a Box List, and Finding Aids. These lists comprise the total of CIA's holdings on the Kennedy Assassination, we are told. Everything looks to be in order, and we can begin to get ready for this high-volume, high-velocity, early-product job. [A jarring note at the end of this session: Mary objects to my suggestion that we consult DO and OS experts regarding their concerns with these files. She says the whole point of this is that we own these files now; we don't have to show them anything.]

The job number is 80T01357A.
Boxes 1-34 are the DO collection.
Boxes 35-63 are collections located by OLC, IG, OGC, DS&T, and OS (but most documents are DO, FBI, HSCA originated).
Box 64 is a collection of 72 reels of microfilm and probably equates to 72 additional boxes, but with a large likely overlap.
A separate collection of boxes (1-16) comprises the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 File, and comes mostly from the FBI.
There are 8 "bulky" files from Mexico City Station which also belong to the Oswald 201 collection.
There are 16 loose files, miscellaneous material from the HSCA.

These boxes are physically located in IMS/DO, where the HS historians did their survey. They are currently the property of OCA, but will presumably be turned over officially to CSI.

History Staff (Mary) asked us to give first priority to the Oswald 201 boxes.

I called Kathy Stricker right after the HS meeting to see what DO's understanding of this is. She said that Russ Holmes has been the custodian for over a decade (since 1963?), but that he reports to [blank] and her deputy, [blank] (on green 44577). [blank] is tied up on other legal matters down town; she suggested I should call [blank], who knows the case in detail. *She also counseled us to look into related files that are mentioned in the Oswald/Kennedy files: the Ruby File, the Clay Shaw File, for openers. These are not included in the total collection we've been told about.

30 March, 1:00 P.M.:

I held a meeting in HRS to pass on the word and copies of the survey and box lists. We decided to get ready to get to work right away on this, as soon as our new bosses give us the word. Taking the two-year deadline in newspaper stories of the
Joint Resolution soon to be passed as a starting point, and DCI Gates's desire to get this material out as soon as possible, we figured that we would have to show some product within a month or so and schedule the whole job to be delivered to the Board of Five in segments of 8-9 boxes each per month, which should ensure that the whole case would be in their hands in manageable chunks and long before the deadline. This schedule is far faster than we have been able to work on the HS/HC and DCI Record File boxes, but we are assured that there are a lot of duplication, a lot of non-CIA material and newspaper clippings, and a lot of already released material, and we'll have more people to work on the job. Presumably, we'll also be working on other big jobs concurrently.

I called [_____] to ask him to send us up the first two boxes from the Oswald Files, so we can see what the job will entail. I also invited him to give us a briefing on the contents on 7 April at 10:00 A.M.

Late Monday afternoon, Ken McDonald came into Edgar's office to object to our procedures and timetables. Mary, who had been sitting at Bill Zumwalt's desk reviewing material ready to go to NARA, had carried our plans back to Ken. Edgar called me in. Ken said this had to be a much faster job than we were contemplating, that it had to get out right away, that the Joint Resolution would not allow us this much time. I mentioned that the Joint Resolution would not have the force of law. Ken said that a new chief for the HRG had been chosen and would be announced on 31 March. Then we could get this Program moving. And would I kindly disinvite [______]

31 March 1992, 4:00 P.M.:

No announcement. Edgar says that Ken says Dave Gries would be in Ames on 1 April to look over the 4th Floor property. We'll probably hear then.

We received from OCA a copy of the Joint Resolution as it will be introduced in the House by Stokes this week. About 5:00 P.M., I got a call from Fred Wickham of IMS/DO. He asked if I was the one who asked for two boxes of Oswald. I explained what we intended to do. He said we would have to check with OCA in any case; they are the custodians. I told him we better hold off for a while on delivering those two boxes, until we learn more about what happens to the JR and what it will mean for how we do this job. *He told me that one of the Oswald boxes consisted of old microfiche, which would be hard to handle, but that DO had reconstituted this material in hard copy, and they could give us this for the review.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : a. Ancillary Files
          Lee Harvey Oswald, 201-289248

          b. Sequestered Files
          HSCA Collection

1. INTRODUCTION: In August 1976, Chief, CI Staff appointed the undersigned as the Staff representative on a Task Force established in response to DDCI's orders to the Deputy Inspector General. The Task Force's purpose was to review Book V of the "Church Committee"s Final Report: The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, and to formulate comments, based upon an in-depth study of information available in Agency files, on statements made and questions raised in Book V. Since CI Staff, at that time, held Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, the CI Staff chief charged the undersigned with reviewing the file and preparing papers on a series of topics drawn up by the Task Force leader.

2. It quickly became evident to the undersigned that the so-called 201 file on Lee Harvey Oswald was much more than what a 201 file should be. In addition to biographic information on Oswald, the file included radio traffic between Headquarters and the field on matters pertaining to Oswald, information on known and possible contacts abroad and in the United States, correspondence between the Agency and the Warren Committee, the "Garrison Investigation", etc., as well as internal Warren Commission documents containing Agency information. The file also includes some 500 third-agency documents (primarily from the FBI and the Department of State).

3. In order to get a handle on the welter of disparate material in the Oswald file, the undersigned set up more than a few individual files to hold photocopies of documents dealing with such topics as Gilberto ALVARADO-Ugarte, Silvia DURAN, Waldemar Boris KARA-PATNITSKY, Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, etc. (See attached inventory - Tab A.) The undersigned considers these ancillary files, which include 9 folders from the former Special Investigation Group of CI Staff, as an appendix to Oswald's 201 file. Its integrity should be maintained. [See paragraph 8.]

4. FIRST AND SECOND REVIEWS (October 1975 - c. February 1977): For the first time, in October 1975, CI Staff reviewed Oswald's 201 file to ascertain which documents could be released to Bernard Fensterwald who had requested all Agency documents on Lee Harvey
Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. OGC, who was handling Fentserwald's request, considered the first staff review as inadequate and assigned a paralegal (assisted by a CI Staff officer) to do a more complete second review. At the same time, each Directorate was asked to forward to OGC any documents in their files, which pertained to the Kennedy assassination. These documents were included in the second review.

5. SEQUESTERED DOCUMENTS: By the time the Task Force had completed its report in August 1977, the House of Representatives passed a resolution setting up a Select Committee on Assassinations. Later, the House decided to limit its investigation of the assassinations of President Kennedy and Rev. Martin Luther King, III. Members of the Task Force now became involved in handling requests from the House Select Committee (HSCA). The undersigned worked closely with HSCA staff members and with the Agency's Principal Coordinator, HSCA. When the HSCA finished its report on 30 June 1979 (its report did not come out until later that year), the undersigned then moved to the Ames Building to join a group reviewing OSS documents for eventual transfer to the National Archives.

6. By late 1981, the Agency had prepared its material gathered for the HSCA, for placement in sequestered storage in the Agency's Archives. The undersigned, though available, was not asked to assist in this undertaking to ensure all pertinent DO material had been included in the collection.

7. Later, after returning to Headquarters, at IMS's request to work on the many of FOIA requests for Agency documents on the Kennedy Assassinations, the undersigned recalled Oswald's 201 including the ancillary files mentioned above.

8. While preparing an inventory of these latter files, before returning them to IMS/Files, the undersigned discovered to his dismay, that not all pertinent files had not been included in the sequestered Collection in late 1981. Thirty-six of these documents had been clearly prepared in response to specific HSCA requests. The undersigned made a list of these documents to show the History Staff's group reviewing the HSCA sequestered collection. The documents include, for example

a. Response to HSCA Request 77-0076/4, n.d. Subject: Tab C (Unsanitized), John ROSELLI & Sam GIANCANA.


d. Response to HSCA Request 78-2588/1, 15 August 1978. Subject: Comments regarding HTLINGUAL Watchlist Cards.

e. Three volumes of (unsanitized) documents for HSCA's use during Helms's appearance before the Committee in executive hearing.
   Volume I pages 0000151 - 0001873
   Volume II pages 0001874 - 0002071
   Volume III pages 0002104 - 0003369
   Annex pages 0003520 - 0003571
   (Copy 8)

f. etc. [See attached inventory, Tab B.]

9. The undersigned had prepared the remaining material [see paragraph 3 above] to provide background information, along with supporting documents, to the 1976-1977 Task Force. Since this material was available at the time of the HSCA review of Agency documents pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy, it was shown to HSCA staff members either voluntarily or in response to a verbal request to the undersigned. Each file contained a "signature sheet" for the staff member to sign, thereby acknowledging he had seen it. This material, in some thirty-five folders, includes

a. DENIED Documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201. Contained in 5 vols., all reviewed.

RELEASED Documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201. Four volumes of 16 reviewed by HSCA.


c. CI/SIG (soft) File No. 568: HTLINGUAL material and memoranda relating to Lee Harvey Oswald et al (3 vols).

d. Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City: Background for Task Force Report, 30 August 1977
e. Warren Commission: CIA memoranda addressed to
    Warren Commission - 19 February to 29 October
    1964.  [See attached inventory, Tab C]

10. It should be emphasized at this point that most, if not all,
    of the above files contain copies only of "original" documents
    found elsewhere in official files to which the HSCA had access and
    had reviewed.

11. PROPOSAL: In order to ensure that nothing is missing from, or
    out of sequence in, the sequestered collection, the undersigned
    proposes that he or an assistant be granted access to at least the
    34 boxes concerning information belonging to the Directorate for
    Operation so as to

a. Check the contents of each box against the
    inventory sheet contained in each box and note
    any discrepancies;

b. Make copies of the "original" documents listed
    in the inventory under Tab C and place the
    "original" documents in one or more of the 34
    boxes, if there is room - for not all boxes are
    stuffed full. If there is insufficient room to
    accommodate all the "original" material, then
    the left-over material will have to be placed in
    extra boxes - not more than four

c. If documents or folders are put in one of the 34
    boxes, the subject and the number of the folder
    will be added to the existing inventory sheet;
    the folder number will follow the highest folder
    number on the inventory sheet.

Russell B. Holmes
Consultant
CSI 92 0201
13 April 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs

FROM: J. Kenneth McDonald
Chief, CIA History Staff

SUBJECT: Center for the Study of Intelligence Access to All Records Relevant to House Select Committee on Assassinations Investigation, 1976-1979

1. In his 21 February 1992 speech to the Oklahoma Press Association the DCI announced that he was "transferring custody of all documents CIA possesses relating to the assassination of President Kennedy to the Historical Review Program," which he assigned to the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) in the same speech. David Gries, the new Director of CSI, has asked CSI's Historical Review Group to begin work on declassifying the collection of records that CIA holds as a result of the 1976-1979 investigations by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) of President Kennedy's assassination.

2. Pursuant to the DCI's directions, we therefore request approval for all members of CSI (which includes the Director and his staff, the History Staff, and the Historical Review Group) to have access to all records that CIA holds relevant to the HSCA investigation. We understand that 64 boxes of material have been specifically designated as related to this investigation.

3. Upon receiving your approval for CSI access to these records, the Director, CSI, would like the components noted below to transfer custody of the following 64 boxes of material related to the HSCA investigation to CSI, when requested by the Chief, Historical Review Group, CSI:

   Box Nos. 1-34 & 64  Directorate of Operations
   Box Nos. 35-36  Inspector General
   Box Nos. 37-38  Office of the General Counsel
   Box No. 39  Directorate of Science and Technology
   Box Nos. 40-48  Office of Security
   Box Nos. 49-63  Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Center for the Study of Intelligence Access to All Records Relevant to House Select Committee on Assassinations Investigation, 1976-1979

4. We understand that the DO's Information Management Staff holds the 35 DO-originated boxes, and that the 29 other boxes are held together at the Agency Records Center.

J. Kenneth McDonald
J. Kenneth McDonald

cc: D/CSI
    C/HRG/CSI

APPROVED:

Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs

* See attached memo.

4/21/92
Date
MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kenneth McDonald  
Chief, CIA History Staff

FROM: Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: Request for Access to HSCA Records

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum dtd 13 April 1992; Same Subject (CSI 92-0201)

1. In the reference, you requested approval for all members of CSI to have access to all records that CIA holds relevant to the HSCA investigation into President Kennedy's assassination. Upon receiving this approval, CSI would request affected components to transfer custody of the 64 boxes of material in question to CSI.

2. Today, I called Michael O'Neil, Special Assistant to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Mr. O'Neil serves as the focal point for questions arising with respect to the segregated HSCA collection. I informed Mr. O'Neil of your request, noted that the DCI had promised an expeditious review of these documents, and requested his concurrence to proceed with the transfer of custody. Initially, Mr. O'Neil wondered whether this action would frustrate the purposes of the Joint Resolution currently being considered by the Congress. Specifically, since the documents would be provided to a Review Board pursuant to the resolution, would transfer at this time to the CSI hinder that purpose? I told Mr. O'Neil that if the Joint Resolution passed in its current form, we would instruct the CSI to transfer the holdings to the Board. If the Joint Resolution did not pass, we would have a head start on reviewing the documents.
SUBJECT: Request for Access to HSCA Records

3. I then informed Mr. O'Neil that the new historical review group would have at least fifteen officers and that this group would likely review the material. Mr. O'Neil then stated that he concurred in the transfer of custody and in the request for access by CSI personnel.

4. Based on this conversation, I have signed the reference indicating my approval of your request. During the course of your review, you should continue to coordinate closely with Litigation Division, OGC, and this Office to ensure that decisions to release are consistent with litigation and other requirements.

4. Please call me on x35467 if I may be of any further assistance.

cc: C/DO/IMS
    C/LD/OGC

ORIG: DD/OCA: jab:x35467 (21 Apr 92)

Distribution:
    Original - Addressee
    1 - C/DO/IMS
    1 - C/LD/OGC
    1 - D/OCA
    1 - DD/LEG
    1 - OCA Record
    1 - EPM Chrono

2
Count of Pages in the Pre-Assassination Oswald 2000 File Which Was Delivered to NARA on 11 May 1992:

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of General Counsel
Washington, D.C. 20505

Date: 2 August 1993

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<td>Fax:</td>
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Number of Pages (Including Cover) 2

Comments: FYI, copy of Records Retirement Request of 22 August 1980 for the segregated collection. Note that it states: "The filmed portion of this collection is being retired separately." If I have more information on this in the Allen litigation file, I'll let you know.
Consists of all substantive paper documents and other materials created or reviewed as the result of inquiries made of the CIA by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) during its investigations into the deaths of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King. The collection includes all CIA files requested for review, documents generated by the HSCA as the result of its reviews, correspondence exchanged between the CIA and the HSCA, and pertinent supporting documentation. This is an agency-wide deposit. The filmed portion of this collection is being retired separately.
27 June 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: @ DA @ DA

FROM:

SUBJECT: JFK Database Extract for NARA

REFERENCE:

On June 15, we met with Mike Gates and Bill Grover of NARA to discuss improvements to the JFK database extract. The following issues were discussed and will require action.

1. HRG will need to talk with Steve Tilley (713-6620) concerning the NARA requirement that restricted fields be released to them. This could result in a modification to the application.

2. HRG should also discuss with Steve Tilley the new exemption codes and determine what effect they will have on the collection. This could result in a modification to the application.

3. HRG should print ID aids on white paper.

4. NARA would like us to provide at least one keyword(subject) per document and any number of keywords per document. NARA will be expanding their keyword field to 250 characters. Both of these items require a modification to the application.

5. NARA has preliminary plans to expand the title field from 60 characters to 80 characters; they do not want the field truncated. However, the title will still be truncated unless HRG modifies their data to 80 characters. This will require a modification to the application.

6. NARA wants the date time user stamp removed from the ID aid. This will require a modification to the application.

7. NARA would like the Opinion Criteria to say a true criteria as opposed to the current canned statement. This will require a modification to the application and data population by HRG.

8. NARA would like the box number and folder information prefixed to the comments field. This will require a modification to the application.

NARA will be facing their new formats and examples to us this week. I will contact you to schedule a meeting to review the above issues. Thank you and I can be reached on 36417(S).

CC: @ DA
Results of 25 July meeting with Mike Getsey and Steve Tilley re JFK database extract.

The following item numbers are keyed to memo of 27 June, same subject.

#1. "restricted data" -- NARA will accept disk with restricted data withheld. Issues will be re-visited after a decision on disposition of CIA's classified (retention) JFK collection.

#2. Exemption Codes -- The Agency is not required to use the additional exemption codes or add them to its system, however, they must be accounted for in the extract disk. Getsey suggested that this could be done by the extract program. Question: is it possible to add a couple of codes without a major programming problem?


#4. Keywords -- NARA has no problem with the length of CIA's 15 character field for keywords, however, with the current format NARA can only search on the first keyword. Each keyword needs to be a separate entity on the extract disk.

#5. Title Field -- NARA is expanding the title field to cut down on the number of truncated titles. Does not effect HRG system which is already 250 characters.

#6. "Identification Number" -- Move date/time ID number to Comment Section along with box numbers and folder information (#8).

#7. "Open Criteria" -- Field can be blank. Use only for special restrictions on documents; unlikely that CIA will have documents that require using this field. Need to delete canned statement.
MEMORANDUM

September 16, 1997

To: Review Board

From: T. Jeremy Gum

Subject: Proposed ARRB Timetable for Review of CIA Records

I. Background

The CIA Team has developed a preliminary timetable that we hope will provide a reasonable framework for completing our review of CIA's assassination records by August 1, 1998.\(^1\) We are creating this timetable for three purposes:

First, to establish our own working target dates to measure Review Board progress against the mandatory deadline established by the JFK Act.

Second, to provide CIA with our best assessment of the order and scope of our review so that it can make its own internal judgments on the proper allocation of its resources. We provided CIA prior drafts of this memo and solicited its specific advice and suggestions for better ways to accomplish our goals. [We have not asked CIA to "agree" to these deadlines, but we have encouraged it to provide alternative suggestions on how best to meet the August 1 deadline.]

Third, to solicit the Review Board's advice regarding "enforcement" of these (or other) targets. Although we surely hope that both the ARRB staff and CIA will be able to meet the targets, and although we certainly plan to make all reasonable accommodations for problems that no doubt will arise, we nevertheless anticipate that it is possible that CIA might not be able to keep to these timetables. Thus, we anticipate that there may well be times when blocks of records scheduled for Board review will not have been fully processed by CIA. It is our judgment that, in keeping with our commitment to Congress and to the goals of the JFK Act, we may need to have the Board act on groups of records for which CIA has not completed its initial review. At the risk of over-repetition, the ARRB staff seeks to be as reasonable and accommodating as it can on timetables, provided that any proposed changes are consistent with our obligation to complete the task. We realize that this review may have resource-allocation

\(^1\)By establishing this target date, we will provide ourselves with a two-month cushion to handle possible appeals and miscellaneous issues that doubtless will arise.
II. Issues applying to all CIA record groups

Records to be opened-in-full
During the course of CIA's review, it frequently identifies records that is it is prepared to open in full without Board action. Although there is a benefit in promptly forwarding such records to NARA, it is less expensive for CIA to process these records during the summer months. Accordingly, we are prepared to agree with CIA that it may delay processing such records, provided that all such processing of open-in-full records will be completed by August 30, 1998.

Duplicates
CIA will continue to identify duplicates and may process them after all other documents have been reviewed and transferred to NARA. If the ARRB is shown that any given record is a duplicate, CIA need not complete the processing before September 30, 1998.

III. CIA Record Groups

A. Oswald 201 File (17 boxes)
- current status:
  review completed (with a few minor exceptions)

B. CIA Sequestered Collection

1. "The 63 boxes"
- current status:
  The ARRB staff has completed a survey of the 63 boxes (on the folder level) and has assigned each folder a relevance priority on a 1 to 4 scale. CIA has completed its declassification review of roughly 66% of the priority 1 folders.

  The ARRB Staff has completed its own review of approximately 50% of the priority 1 records and those records have been (or shortly will) be voted on by the Board.
- target dates:

- time line:
  9/30/97  box 40 (priority 1)
  10/31/97 box 48 (priority 1)
  11/30/97 box 56 (priority 1)
  12/31/97 box 63 (priority 1)
  1/31/98  all priority 2, 3 and 4

2. HSCA Staff notes (originally interfiled in the 63 boxes)
   - status:
     Record Identification Forms prepared for all documents. CIA review is 80% complete. ARRB staff completes its review shortly after receiving records from CIA.

   - target dates:
     Complete Board voting by November 18, 1997.

3. Microfilm (72 boxes)
   - current status:
     CIA identified approximately 33% of these records as NBR. ARRB staff has reviewed all CIA NBR designations, and has identified additional records that should be reviewed by the Board.

     The ARRB Staff will discuss with the CIA the preparation of Record Identification Forms (RIFs or "IDEN aids" in CIA terminology) and develop a plan that will best facilitate review.\(^2\)

   - target dates:
     CIA begins review by November 1, 1997 and completes review by July 1, 1998.

     Complete Board determinations by July 31, 1998.

\(^2\)The ARRB staff has no objection to the records being identified entirely on the folder level provided that all records in the folder are open-in-full. If there are records in which the CIA is requesting redactions, those records must be identified individually. The remainder of open-in-full records may still be identified with one RIF as being the contents of the same folder.
- tentative time line:

11/30/97   boxes 1-6
12/31/97   boxes 7-13
1/31/98    boxes 14-19
2/28/98    boxes 20-25
3/31/98    boxes 26-31 & 44-45

(Boxes 32-43 contain LHO's 201 file, which will be treated as a special case.)

4/30/98    boxes 46-51
5/31/98    boxes 52-62
6/30/98    boxes 63-72

4. Microfilm copy of Oswald 201 (approximately 12 boxes)

- issue:
The vast majority (if not all) Oswald Microfilm records are duplicates of records the Board has already reviewed under the JFK Act. To the extent that the records previously have been reviewed, there is little value in re-reviewing the records. The ARRB staff will survey the Microfilm 201 in an effort to identify any additional records that have not already been acted upon by the Board. All records not previously acted upon by the Board will be so designated, a RIF will be prepared, and they will be sent for Board action. The remaining Microfilm 201 will be transferred to the JFK Collection at NARA and opened in full in 2017.

- status:
Staff has completed its initial survey and has thus far identified no records in the 201 Microfilm that are not already in the JFK Collection.

C. "Working Files" (including "Russ Holmes" papers, etc.)

- status:
No Record Identification Forms have been prepared. ARRB staff has conducted a general survey.

- target dates:
Work to commence by CIA on October 1, 1997. CIA should prepare Record Identification Forms for all records by January 1, 1998. Completion of review and Board determinations by March 31, 1998.
-strategy:
The "working files" is a group of records that was assembled at CIA by Russ Holmes. Although he was not asked formally by CIA to create this separate records group, he did so in order to facilitate his work and, perhaps, to satisfy his own curiosity. The group contains many original records (copies of some of which are already in the collection) and it includes some records of which we are aware of no other copies. It is the best-organized collection of assassination records held by CIA. Its value as a reference tool is greatest as a collection. Therefore, though the file contains many duplicates of records found in the JFK collection, the ARRB staff recommends that it be preserved as a single group. Duplicates and open-in-full documents should be treated in the same manner as they are in the rest of the JFK Collection. As with the microfilm from the Sequestered Collection, the ARRB staff has no objection to the records being identified on the folder level provided that all records in the folder are open-in-full. If there are records in which CIA is requesting redactions, those records must be identified individually. The remainder of open in full records may still be identified with one RIF as being the contents of the same folder.

D. Additional Records
- status:
Research, requests, and negotiations continue to identify and include additional CIA records for the JFK collection.

Oswald Office of Security File. As a result of an ARRB staff request for additional information and records, CIA located portions of a previously undisclosed Office of Security file on Lee Harvey Oswald. This seven-volume file, of which six parts have been located, contains two volumes of press clippings, third agency material on Oswald, a copy of Oswald's address book, and Marina Oswald's INS file. In the upcoming months CIA will begin to review and process these materials.

- time line:
Completion by July 31, 1998.

- strategy:
Continue current efforts.
E. Referrals

1. HSCA referrals (Numbered files, Security Classified Testimony, etc.)
   - status:
     most of these records have been reviewed. The database suggests
     that a percentage of them has slipped through the cracks.
   - target date:
     Complete Congressional records to be reviewed by March 31, 1998.
   - strategy:
     Continue to clarify the status of records. Review any remaining
     records.

2. Other referrals (FBI, Church Committee, LBJ Library, JFK Library, etc.)
   - status and strategy:
     Records will be coordinated and reviewed on a case by case basis.
3 October 1997

NOTE FOR:  Rich Warshaw
           Chief, ADD

SUBJECT:  HRG Topics for "Watch List"

Per your request, here are descriptions of our current, major declassification projects for use in your "Watch List." As these are first cuts, we may well revise them at some point. Following are the projects described:

JFK Assassination (FOIA + EO)
Bay of Pigs
Office of DCI Records
Guatemala Covert Action (1954)
DI Soviet Analysis
Soviet NIEs (brochure)

If further information is needed, please contact Karen Galuska (x31816), or the action officer noted at the end of each project description.

John Pereira
Chief/HRG

Attachments

cc: Lee Strickland, OIM

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

CL BY 611637
CL REASON 1.5(c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FR: LOC 3-82
8 October 1997

JFK Records Review Project

(U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to deal with requests for, and decisions concerning, Agency documents and materials that may already have been reviewed and released to the National Archives (in full or in part), pursuant to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination; but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination or investigation into the assassination.

I. The Agency's JFK Collection.

(U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. The next sixty-four (64) are referred to as the "JFK files" or sequestered collection and break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of OGC and IG materials; and one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm.

(U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm includes: 201 files on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels) and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels).
(U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act.

II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records.

(U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for information which is clearly related to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, there is no time frame limitation. Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project.

III. Key Topics, Etc.

(U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects are central to the Oswald/JFK story and the ensuing investigations, which causes a number of documents with no mention of Oswald or the assassination to fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not possible to list every category of document which may have been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review.

(U) A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

-- Warren Commission, 1963-64
-- James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966-68
-- Rockefeller Commission,* 1975;
-- Church Committee (Senate),* 1975-76
-- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79
* JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti-Cuban operations only.

B. Key subjects

(S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.
SECRET

(AI尤O) -- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.)
    if they involve JFK figures (see comment on
    Meagher's "index" below); most US anti-Castro
    activities in 1963 are considered relevant.

(U) -- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and
    organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures.
    -- Castro assassination activities (plans and
      attempts); no limit on time frame.
    -- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans
      during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology).

(AIUO) C. Key figures
    (the following individuals are considered JFK
    assassination-related, unless the context is clearly
    unrelated or outside the appropriate time period)
    -- AMMUG, Cuban defector;
    -- Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference);
    -- Silvia Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico
      City;
    -- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee;
    -- Howard Hunt, CIA employee;
    -- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist;
    -- Valery Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico City;
    -- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschilt (all documents)
    -- Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his bona fides;
    -- Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas friends of Oswalnds;
    -- David Phillips, CIA employee;
    -- Richard Snyder, State Department Officer.
    -- Winston Scott, COS Mexico City

For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals
related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult
Sylvia Meagher's Master Index to the JFK Assassination

(U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825)

Attachment: Oswald Chronology
SECRET

(U) Attachment:

Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963

--Joins Marines 10/26/56
--Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan 09/12/57
--Returns to US 11/02/58
--Hardship discharge 09/11/59
--Departs New Orleans for Moscow 09/20/59
   via LeHavre, London, Helsinki
--Arrives Moscow 10/16/59
--Resides in Minsk 01/07/60 - 05/22/62
--Departs Moscow via train 06/02/62
--Departs Rotterdam via ship 06/04/62
--Arrives New York 06/13/62
--Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas 06/14/62 - 04/63
--New Orleans 04/63 - 09/63
--Mexico City 09/25/63 - 10/03/63
--Dallas 10/3/63 - 11/24/63
Executive Order

8 October 1997

JFK Records Review Project

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(U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825)

Attachment: Oswald Chronology

SECRET
(U) Attachment:

Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Joins Marines</td>
<td>10/26/56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan</td>
<td>09/12/57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to US</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardship discharge</td>
<td>09/11/59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departs New Orleans for Moscow via Le Havre, London, Helsinki</td>
<td>09/20/59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrives Moscow</td>
<td>10/16/59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resides in Minsk</td>
<td>01/07/60 - 05/22/62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departs Moscow via train</td>
<td>06/02/62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departs Rotterdam via ship</td>
<td>06/04/62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrives New York</td>
<td>06/13/62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas</td>
<td>06/14/62 - 04/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>04/63 - 09/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>09/25/63 - 10/03/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>10/3/63 - 11/24/63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bay of Pigs Declassification Project

Approximately 30,000 pages of records from DO, DI, DCI, DA, and DDS&T files, plus documents from outside CIA (mainly State, NSC, DOD).

Scope: To "tell the story" of the paramilitary invasion at the Bay of Pigs, the HRG collection traces the genesis of the decision to conduct a covert action against Castro, describes the planning that went into the various phases of the covert action program, and lays out the post-invasion inquiries into the failure of the operation.

Status: As of this date, approximately 1/3 of the collection has been reviewed and is ready for release. A selection of documents was provided to OGC in August 1997 in response to a special search for information pertaining to the crash landing of two Cuban exile pilots in Nicaragua. HRG expects to finish reviewing the remainder of the records in early 1998. All documents will be available for MORI processing following their release, although HRG does not have the staff to do the physical scanning and indexing.

Key parts of the record collection include:

- intelligence analysis of events in Cuba 1958-61

- records of meetings between CIA senior officials and counterparts in other agencies at which Cuban developments and/or the covert action plans were discussed

- internal planning documents (virtually all from DO files) detailing propaganda ops, sabotage attempts, coordination with Cuban exile groups in Miami, and support for underground opposition in Cuba

- cable traffic during the Bay of Pigs invasion

- training records of the Cuban-led 2506 Brigade that conducted the Bay of Pigs invasion

- Agency records turned over to the Taylor Committee appointed by Pres. Kennedy to investigate the failed invasion
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- the internal IG report into the Bay of Pigs operation and the DDP response

- IG interviews with Agency employees involved in the covert action

- "official" histories prepared in CIA during the 1970s

Action Officer: [Redacted] x31818 (secure)

g:\hrg\hrgipcrd.doc
October 1997

Declassification of DCI/DDCI files 1946-61

HRG selected pertinent job series from OPI 10 to review box-by-box, page-by-page. These boxes contain a variety of records, including:

- appointment calendars and daily logs
- alpha files of DCI correspondence with parties outside CIA
- administrative traffic collected by the DCI/DDCI in their capacities as heads of CIA
- records of Community meetings and boards, such as the Intelligence Advisory Board/Committee and USCIB
- Draft NSCIDs and DSCIDs
- DCI notes for NSC meetings
- Reports prepared by various outside panels to study the CIA and/or the intelligence function in general
- DCI trip files and communications with overseas stations

Status: Projected completion is 1 year.

Action Officer: [Redacted] (secure)

g:\hrg\hrgipcrd.doc
Guatemala 1954 Covert Action Declassification Project

The main bulk of the collection is approximately 120,000 pages of hard copy materials spanning the period of 1951-1957. These comprise primarily Directorate of Operations records, but also including a small number of State Department documents as well as isolated equities of other components, both Agency internal and Department of Defense. There are also 22 archival (gray Hollinger) boxes with magnetic tape recordings, a few maps, and some press clippings.

Scope: To release to the public as much information as possible relating to the buildup of early 1950s-era policymaker attention to the “Guatemala problem;” the three main phases of the covert operation codeworded PBFOURTUNE, PBSUCCESS, and PBHISTORY; and the immediate aftermath of these operations.

Status: To date 1,400 pages have been released to National Archives, along with the 22 boxes of tapes. The first release also included the collection’s most sensitive records dealing with discussions of unimplemented plans to assassinate leftist officials of the Guatemalan government of President Arbenz.

- Of the remaining unreleased records, some 18,000 pages of the most historically relevant material have been reviewed twice and await final review in HRG, and then by the DO representative. When this task is completed and these records released to Archives, most of the “story” will have been told of US-Guatemalan relations in the 1952-54 era, at least as concerns CIA participation in the events.

- With the decision to review the remaining 100,000 pages, mostly relating to the administrative details of conducting the covert operation, the project will extend well into next calendar year.

Content of the Collection

- Periodic intelligence assessments of the situation in Guatemala as it affected US interests

- Key strategic planning memoranda exploring options and recommendations for operations

- Operational cables between Washington and the field stations, and communications among the field stations, including situation reports

- More detailed, less time-sensitive dispatches between the field stations and Washington
• Instructions regarding propaganda themes for the black radio broadcasts of Operation SHERWOOD

• Contact reports and assessments of CIA assets in Guatemala and surrounding countries

• Post mortems and summarizing documents, debriefing reports, and other assessments postdating the conclusion of operations

• State Department policy information statements and cables from the US ambassadors in the field

• Press clippings indicating regional reaction to the events in Central America

• A large body (over 80 percent) of administrative documents concerning personnel matters, logistical support, iden cables, contact arrangements, etc.

Action Officer: [Redacted] (31817)
Declasification of DI-Produced Finished Intelligence on the USSR

The primary organizing feature of the collection is thematic: all DI-produced finished analysis on the Soviet Union. The collection exists in the form of hard copy retained in the record-copy holdings at the Agency Archives and Records Center and, for the older period at least, is generally interspersed among records representing the full range of DI analysis on all other geographic topics and functional intelligence issues.

- After 1981, the most relevant records tend to be concentrated in the holdings of the Office of Soviet Analysis and its successors.

To qualify as relevant to the Soviet DI project, a piece of finished analysis must have as its primary focus the Soviet target. This can be either stated or implied as, for example, in the monthly series entitled *North Vietnamese Shipping Report* since North Vietnam’s main trading partner for the period in question was the Soviet Union. We have also processed in their entirety pieces whose scope entails comment on “Sino-Soviet” themes.

- Intelligence Community-wide analysis of the USSR, NIEs and similar material, is outside the scope of the DI-Soviet project and is being done elsewhere in HRG.

- An initial decision was made to focus generally on longer pieces with greater shelf lives and to avoid processing the daily “current” output. To date, however, there has been at least one departure from this approach in connection with a conference on 24 October 1997, for which we declassified a number of finished intelligence pieces that were published in dailies and weeklies during the period from 1946-1950.

Scope: To release to the public over the next few years as much DI finished intelligence on the Soviet Union as possible, beginning in 1946 with the creation of the CIG, and continuing chronologically to the most recent material. Most of the oldest material is releasable, including political, economic and military analysis.

The duration of the project depends on issues as yet unresolved:

- No final decision has yet been made with respect to a cutoff date for the project, and various options are currently under discussion. For the present, we are committed to review only records that are at least 25 years old.

- If the cutoff date is set as late as the breakup of the USSR in 1991, there is some concern about giving away too much by declassifying the most recent analysis. One option is to move away from recently produced military/technical analysis based on the
most sophisticated collection methods and to declassify the less sensitive political and economic analysis in the younger records instead.

**Status:** An initial release of approximately 11,000 pages of finished intelligence has been through all stages of preparation, including internal review and external coordination with the Directorate of Intelligence, and is now ready to send to National Archives. In addition, some 75,000 pages of finished analysis has been selected and reviewed internally at least twice and is now awaiting final review or coordination with DI components or other agencies holding equities in the information.

- The 11,000-page proposed first release contains material ranging in date from 1946 to 1972.

**Content of the Collection**

The collection includes both periodic and aperiodic finished intelligence and embraces most of the reporting genres which were produced in the Directorate of Intelligence. The list includes, but is not confined to:

- Research Reports (CIA/RR XX)
- Intelligence Reports (CIA/RR ER XX-XX)
- Intelligence Memoranda (IM-XX)
- Provisional Intelligence Reports (CIA/RR PR-XX)
- Economic Intelligence Reports (CIA/RR ER XX-XX)
- Project Action Memoranda (Project No. XX.XXXX)

**Action Officer:** (31817)
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<th>Document Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Classification</th>
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<td>NIE-43</td>
<td>Strategic Importance of the Far East to the USSR</td>
<td>Secret</td>
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<td>NIE-95</td>
<td>Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action Through Mid-1955</td>
<td>Top Secret</td>
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<td>SNIE 11-9-55</td>
<td>Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons under Diplomatic Immunity</td>
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<td>SNIE 11-11-55</td>
<td>Some Implications of a System of Armaments Inspection</td>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>SNIE 100-5-57</td>
<td>Probable World Reaction to Certain Civil Defense Programs</td>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>SNIE 100-6-58</td>
<td>Implications of Certain US Earth Satellite Programs</td>
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<td>NIE 11-7-60</td>
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<td>NIE 11-61</td>
<td>Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US</td>
<td>TS 0036854</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>The Soviet Space Program</td>
<td>Secret</td>
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<td>Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare</td>
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<td>The Soviet Space Program</td>
<td>Secret (27 January 1965)</td>
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<td>Warning of Soviet Intention to Attack</td>
<td>TS 0039208 (18 August 1966)</td>
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<td>NIE 11-1-67</td>
<td>The Soviet Space Program</td>
<td>TCS 6224-67 (2 March 1967)</td>
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<td>M/H</td>
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<td>NIE 4-68</td>
<td>The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US</td>
<td>TS 190415 (13 June 1968)</td>
<td>11 pages</td>
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<td>NIE 11-1-69</td>
<td>Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities</td>
<td>Secret (13 February 1969)</td>
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<td>The Soviet Space Program</td>
<td>TCS 1049-69 (19 June 1969)</td>
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Memorandum for Recipients of NIE 11-8-71, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, Cost of Illustrative Soviet Intercontinental Attack Force Models  TCS 889065-72  (9 March 1972)  19 pages

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TCS 889068-75  (3 March 1975)  46 pages


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Judgments  Secret  (19 July 1983)  15 pages

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SC 03938-84  (20 November 1984)  24 pages

NIE 11-1/7-84  Potential for the Transfer of Space Technology to the Soviet
Union, Key Judgments  Secret  (26 November 1984)  10 pages

NIE 11-1/7-84  Potential for the Transfer of Space Technology to the
Soviet Union, Volume I—Key Judgments and Summary
SC 04127-84  (26 November 1984)  19 pages
14 April 1998

Addendum to 3 October 1997 ADD Watch List: JFK Assassination Records

Section III. B. Key Subjects [items two and three]:

--- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, Bay of Pigs, Cuban exile organizations, etc.).

[Although much anti-Cuban material may be considered ancillary or not related to the assassination (1963 documents are considered directly relevant), a significant amount of this material has already been reviewed and released under the JFK Act. For example: the Kennedy Administration's Cuban National Security File (over 23,000 pages) was reviewed by a joint DO/HRP/ARRB/STATE/DOD team at the Kennedy Presidential Library under the JFK Act; the 3rd Volume of the History of the Bay of Pigs and the Bay of Pigs postmortem Taylor report and attachments have designated as assassination records.]

--- (No change in Castro assassination and Mafia guidance)