

DB/P. 1-1220

27 JAN 66

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)**  
**SUBJECT : Related Mission Directive for Mexico**

- 1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.
- 2. Your approval is requested.

*J. C. King*  
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 J. C. King  
 Chief, WH Division

**CONCUR:**

(Signed) S. M. HINES

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Chief, DOP/PG

*Rayd George*  
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**APPROVED:**

*Richard Helms*  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Deputy Director (Plans)

3 JUN 1966

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Date Approved

24 January 1966

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RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

- A. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.
- B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection<sup>24</sup> operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.
- C. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGKR)<sup>01</sup> has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelligence service<sup>28</sup>, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the [redacted]<sup>29</sup> Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.
- D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence

Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 88 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.

It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.

## II. OBJECTIVES

### PRIORITY A

1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.
  - a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.
  - b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.

c. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.

2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies. 24

a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, [redacted] 24 in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests.

b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations.

c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in [redacted] 24

d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda [redacted] 24 against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements.

e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist [redacted] 24 leaders [redacted] against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests.

f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist [redacted] 24 and when necessary, develop additional assets in key [redacted] 24

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- g. Develop and support [redacted] 24 on the staffs of [redacted] 24
- h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions. 27

3. Obtain information [redacted] 4

[redacted] anti-U. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.

- a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the [redacted] 24
- b. Maintain penetrations of the [redacted] 24
- c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the [redacted] 24 and bloc diplomatic installations.
- d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced [redacted] 24  
[redacted] if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the [redacted] 24

4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.

- a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.
- b. Recruit agents in Mexico 24 for operational use in Cuba.
- c. Secure support of [redacted] for the conduct of operations against Cuba. 24
- d. Continue to provide operational support for activities

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directed against the CASTRO regime in Cuba.

- e. Utilize propaganda [redacted] <sup>24</sup>  
[redacted] to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.

PRIORITY B

1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in Mexico, and propagandize the dangers of Communism. <sup>24</sup>
  - a. Utilize existing [redacted] <sup>24</sup> assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.
  - b. Utilize existing [redacted] <sup>24</sup> assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalists and Communists. <sup>24</sup>
  - c. Utilize [redacted] <sup>24</sup> assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
  - d. Spot and develop <sup>24</sup> for future covert collaboration <sup>24</sup> young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U. S. interests.
2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities <sup>24</sup> in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.
  - a. Continue to develop and influence <sup>24</sup> high level contacts  
[redacted]
3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.
  - a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers. <sup>24</sup>
  - b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.

c. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.

d. Obtain <sup>24</sup>communications intelligence on bloc diplomatic <sub>24</sub>traffic.

4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.

a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.

b. Exploit <sup>24</sup> [redacted] on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the <sub>24</sub> [redacted]