

29 SEP 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Probable Compromise of Information Furnished
to the House Select Committee on Intelligence

1. Action Requested: Your approval is requested to assemble an Agency-wide task force to conduct an overall damage assessment of the classified documents and/or information previously furnished by the Agency to the now defunct House Select Committee on Intelligence (HSC).

2. Basic Data: I have been concerned for some time with respect to the improper manner in which classified information supplied to the HSC by the Executive Branch was handled from a security standpoint and which culminated in the leak of the HSC's draft report to Daniel Schorr. As you know, leaks of classified information to the news media by the HSC began shortly after its creation and continued throughout the life of that Committee.

In addition to the news leaks, there have been several allegations (both substantiated and unsubstantiated) concerning classified Agency and Intelligence Community documents which have found their way from the HSC into the hands of unauthorized persons. Two of these allegations have been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and in at least one instance (the classified Agency documents found on the West Coast by R&D Associates) the FBI is conducting an active investigation.

The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the leak of the HSC's draft report to Daniel Schorr generated substantial testimony by former members and staff of the HSC regarding the

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degree of protection afforded to classified Executive Branch information by the HSC Staff. This testimony clearly demonstrated that the HSC Staff failed to provide adequate storage and control over classified documents, to include little or no control over the copies made or access to classified material. Further, the magnitude of this situation cannot be determined through an inventory of the sealed cartons stored at the Agency attendant to the "missing documents" allegation, since there is no way of knowing how many copies have been made of these documents nor to whom any such copies may have been provided.

In view of the inadequate security practices employed by the HSC Staff, it would seem to be a fair assumption that much, if not all, of the classified information provided to them by the Executive Branch has been compromised. The allegations and disclosures related to the documents and information provided to the HSC continue to surface at regular intervals, and with each such occurrence the Agency is required to react and prepare a damage assessment on a case-by-case basis.

I feel strongly that the Agency, and perhaps the entire Intelligence Community, should initiate an overall review of the classified information provided to the HSC with a view towards preparing a comprehensive damage assessment. Admittedly, this is an overwhelming task. It could, however, be reduced somewhat by limiting our review to that classified data supplied to the HSC the disclosure of which would compromise sensitive Agency sources and/or current Agency projects or operations.

The above review could best be accomplished through the creation of a task force comprised of representatives from all Agency directorates and preferably of those individuals who were previously involved in preparing Agency information for transmittal to the HSC. As the Review Staff Registry has been kept intact, it would be possible to determine precisely what classified Agency information was provided to the HSC. From a community standpoint, it is suggested that the Intelligence Community Staff initiate a similar review by all other Executive Branch agencies which provided sensitive and classified information to the HSC.

The resulting study would be of value in terms of our commitment to protect the identity and safety of Agency sources and in our future assessments of various programs and projects

with regard to their success and/or failure. In short, the Agency must be prepared, in advance, to deal with the problems that arise through these unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

3. Recommendation: It is recommended that you approve the creation of a task force, chaired by the Office of Security, comprised of representatives from all Agency directorates to conduct a damage assessment of the classified information and/or documents provided to the now defunct House Select Committee on Intelligence.

Robert W. Gambino
Robert W. Gambino

APPROVED : *E.H. Lucho*
701176

DISAPPROVED: _____

- Distribution:
- Orig - Return to OS via DDA
 - 1 - DDCI
 - 1 - ER
 - 1 - DDA
 - 1 - Asst to the DDCI

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT

TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENT

Review Staff Number:
Classification :

Date:

DOCUMENT ASSESSED

Number :
Subject:

Date:

Classification:

Component Performing Assessment:
Analysts Name:
Date Assessment Completed:
Coordination with Other Components:

GENERAL STATEMENT/SUMMARY OF DAMAGE:

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED:

~~SECRET~~TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENTReview Staff Number:
Classification :

Date:

DOCUMENT ASSESSEDNumber : Date: 21.5.73 Classification: SECRET
Subject: Potential Flap ActivitiesComponent Performing Assessment: CI Staff
Analysts Name: R.B.Holmes
Date Assessment Completed: 21.1.77
Coordination with Other Components: None

GENERAL STATEMENT/SUMMARY OF DAMAGE:

In the IG's Memorandum to Mr. Colby of 21 May 1973, the IG identifies those "activities that are or might be illegal or that could cause the Agency embarrassment if they were exposed". The information contained in the attachment to the IG's memorandum was summarized from a longer listing of questionable activities known as the "Jewels Report" or the "693 pages". Although those remarks pertaining to activities involving the CI Staff no longer apply to active operations or present CI Staff officers, public knowledge could be detrimental to the Agency.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

For specific comments see attached sheet.

ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED:~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SUPPORT

Page 6: Police Departments - CI Staff's former Police Group operated Project (ENDOMORPH) Project now terminated. A more detailed description than appears here was given in the Village Voice of 16 February 1976.

Damage: Although this operation has been terminated, detailed knowledge of CIA's involvement in the training (in the United States) of foreign police services under the auspices of Public Safety, AID, could, even now, be damaging to the Agency's present and future relations with police services of friendly countries to the point that the U.S. Government might lose their support in maintaining a united front against the common enemy.

DETAILED PERSONNEL

Page 15: John HART - was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury, along with four other Agency employees.

Damage: Probably little - HART is now retired as a CIA employee.

[redacted] ⁰³ - for over ⁰⁸ (ten) years was Director of the Office of Public Safety of AID.

Damage: Although [redacted] is now retired, he retired under cover. ⁰³ Exposure at this time could cause him considerable embarrassment.

NB: In the Village Voice of 16.2.76 appears the statement that the Director of OPS (the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety) knew of IPS' CIA status. Should it become public that [redacted] ⁰³ who was the Director of OPS, was in actual fact a [redacted] ²⁴ employee, he could find himself the object of attack.

HIGHLY SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES

Page 11: Project SIESTA - not a CI Staff operation.

Project PARAGON - [redacted] a Latin American revolutionary, and her associates were under surveillance by the Office of Security from May to September 1971 at the request of CI Staff.

Damage: [redacted] identified as the objective in an illegal surveillance operation set up by Security in the United States, thus providing more evidence to the "enemy" that CIA operated in the U.S.

Page 13: Project (BUTANE)^{ol} not a CI Staff operation.

Project SRPOINTER - mail intercept program; became HTLINGUAL under CI Staff. Well documented in overt publications.

Project AELADLE - "based on false documentation, the Office of Security obtained passports for Golitsyn, his wife, and daughter by documenting them as U.S. citizens." Damage: CIA use of false documentation to obtain an American passport, a violation of the law.

Page 14: Project REDFACE I - does not appear to be a CI Staff operation, although the Staff may have had an interest in the defector.

Damage: Surreptitious entry into an office in Silver Spring, Md., by Agency employees. Another example of illegal activity carried out by the Agency in the United States.

Page 16: Project ANTLERS - movement of defector out of a European country and into U.S. without leaving any trace of his true identity. Used false passport of another country. Damage: Although defector not identified the fact he brought into U.S. under false identification a violation of American law.

Page 19: Audio-surveillance - not sponsored by the CI Staff, although the Staff may have been aware of it.

Page 20: Project MHDOZEN - Technical surveillance of new Soviet Embassy. Although this operation may not be active - the new Soviet Embassy has not yet been built - the fact that CIA and the FBI were cooperating in planning a surveillance operation against the new Embassy, could cause the Soviets to increase their own attacks against the American Embassy in Moscow.

