

DISPATCH

SECRET

FORM 1-63

Chief, W. Deputy Chief, W. 24

Chief of Station, [redacted]

Chief of Station, [redacted]

Activities - contacts between GUEPOT/1, ANLASH/1, and AMBLIST/1.

FCI - [redacted] 21-21779

SOI - [redacted]

SO - [redacted]

11 October 1964

See paragraph F, below

The following is a summary of a recent report prepared by GUEPOT/1 concerning his contacts with AMBLIST/1 in Madrid and developments concerning ANLASH/1 and AMBLIST/1:

1. GUEPOT/1 was contacted by AMBLIST/1 in Madrid on 7 December 1964 and said:
 - a. The plans they had made in New York to get ANLASH out of FRENCH for a meeting were no longer necessary since he had come out via Prague-Paris.
 - b. He was very optimistic about his meeting with ANLASH/1 because:
 - (1) ANLASH/1 definitely counts on at least 5 ex-commanders and many other officers for the coup.
 - (2) ANLASH/1 himself is again active in the Army with the help of Raul Castro.
 - (3) The situation in FRENCH is deteriorating and the right moment for the coup lies in the next few months.
 - (4) ANLASH/1's morale is high and he plans to return to FRENCH soon.
 - (5) AMBLIST/1's people have contacted ANLASH/2 and ANLASH/3 in Madrid and knowing that "something was going on inside FRENCH with a big Commandante involved" (both said they did not give any names), AMBLIST/1's people were so excited over this that AMBLIST himself was coming to Europe. (He arrived in Rome 2 or 3 days later).
 - c. AMBLIST/1 was offering:
 - (1) Any amount of small weapons and money for a big operation.
 - (2) A well trained group of men.
 - (3) A small size air force and navy.
 - (4) Any sort of military notice as replacement of the coup inside.
 - (5) Immediate diplomatic recognition of at least six Latin American Governments principally in Central America.
 - d. BRASE/1 would like to speak with GUEPOT and they should take the next plane for Paris.
2. GUEPOT told AMBLIST/1 everything was all right except for three points:
 - a. ANLASH/1 was offering programs about half a dozen.
 - b. They can not take half anything without AMBLIST/1 or GUEPOT.
 - c. AMBLIST/1 seems very little without half a dozen.
3. GUEPOT/1 told he then suggested AMBLIST/1 to pass BRASE/1 immediately and not going on so as to not to create any officers or commandants.
4. AMBLIST/1 was in touch with BRASE and would like to tell AMBLIST that

AMBIENY/1 was coming to Europe to see him. This apparently "sick" did not do because the following day AMBIP/1 phoned AMIASH/1 in Paris to get his decision regarding the meeting with AMBIP/1. AMIASH/1 told AMBIP/1 over the phone that he knew nothing about the meeting. AMBIP/1 then took the next plane for Paris and later phoned GURPOST/1 to tell GURPOST/1 that AMIASH/1 had decided not to meet with AMBIENY/1 for the present. AMBIP/1 then left for New York City via Rome.

5. In the meantime AMBIENY/1 had gone to Rome with three of his men apparently determined to see AMIASH. He sent Lien A to Madrid. Lien A told GURPOST/1 that AMBIENY/1 would like to speak with either AMBIP/1, ACARH/1 or GURPOST/1 but that he could not come to Spain legally because of the Sierra Arancas incident. GURPOST/1 told Lien A that AMBIP/1 was in New York City and AMIASH/1 had no intention of meeting with AMBIENY/1, at least for the present, and that a conversation with GURPOST/1 would not change anything. AMBIENY/1 insisted on trying to see AMIASH/1 and went to Paris with two of his men, one of whom is Lien B.
6. On 21 December GURPOST/1 received a letter from AMBIP/1 in New York telling GURPOST/1:
 - a. AMIASH/1 did not want to meet with AMBIENY/1 because of security.
 - b. AMIASH/1 will return to FB HQS at the end of January 1967.
 - c. AMIASH/1 has a fixed idea of what the solution is to the PIRENE problem.
 - d. AMBIP/1 was coming to Europe shortly and he hoped the three of us could get together.
7. AMIASH/1 phoned me from Paris on the 22nd of December to tell me he would be here on 26 December and that he would try to stay at the Embassy. GURPOST/1 told him about AMBIP/1's letter.
8. On 22 December AMBIENY/1 phoned me (GURPOST/1) and told me the following:
 - a. A meeting of all forces is necessary.
 - b. To tell AMIASH/1 that the "Americans" want to take him for the immolation (sic) and that with the failure of the Em. of Pias he, AMBIENY/1, had had a very bitter experience, that was paid off in blood and jail and all because of the inconsistencies of American Policy.
 - c. That he has under his own control the necessary forces to produce, together with AMIASH/1, a definite action without any outside help and even against anyone's will.
 - d. He was going back to PIRENE for a few days on the 23rd of December to clarify a few things and then back to Paris.
 - e. That regardless of AMIASH/1's decision he wants to speak with GURPOST/1 anyway.
 - f. That he was sending Lien A to Madrid on 23 December as his contact man.
9. GURPOST/1 summed up his opinion as follows:
 - a. Regardless of whatever explanation is given, the situation is EMERGENCY.
 - b. In view of all the circumstances I do not think AMIASH/1 can go on such a journey with this exception; without taking some definite action or being disarmed and I feel that AMIASH/1 knows it.
 - c. I feel this is the moment to reconsider the whole business and come out with some specific plans to be worked out soon.

- 6. Something has to be done within the next few days.
- 10. In view of [REDACTED]'s close involvement with ANCAH/1, ANMHP/1, ANCAH/2, ANLAI/3, and ANDIX/1 please see the [REDACTED] re: [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] on my contacts between ANMHP/1 and ANCAH/2, as well as ANMHP/1's travel plans to Europe.

Wallace A. GROVEY

29 December 1964

Attachments: Identities A and B, under separate cover

Distribution:

- 2 - C/1, v/atts, u/s/c
- 2 - IC/1, v/atts, u/s/c
- 1 - CCB, [REDACTED] v/atts, u/s/c