

FM A 34-484

6 June 1968

REMARKS FOR: CIO, COMINT, COMINT Operations (U.S. Area)
VIA : Deputy CIO, COMINT (U.S. Area)
SUBJECT : Handout of COMINT Operations

1. During a meeting with Mr. Wood, C. I. O., DDCI, Mr. Cheever, DCI, R/S/C and Mr. Swanson, C. I. O./SA/C on 20 June 1968, Mr. Swanson reviewed the following points concerning the handling of the COMINT operations. These points were the subject of earlier discussions by Mr. Swanson and the various COMINT Chiefs in their Divisions.

2. From the outset, in view of the proposed actions in Canada, A. COMINT has been:

2. To develop An, ComINT's crest and to get the information to the appropriate country desks as a normal procedure. To conduct traces, including field traces, and to analyze the results. Traces to be run by An, SA/C in Canada to staffers and by the various Country desks or Canadian agents in their respective countries.

3. To select target countries for analysis as described by Mr. Swanson and to attach a tier of priority, a ranking, to its overall value, chance of success, accessibility and probability. The selection of targets to be done jointly by DDCI and the various desks.

4. To have a mechanism to apprise any Canadian staff agent before the content of his analysis since the information could be used in another's debriefing and one of which may have a greater chance of success in passing it on reporting to the CIO. The Canadian station would be responsible for the analysis, the transfer of information transferred and the final operation of the

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1. To use the C-1 for drawing pictures of selected targets, agents first and staffers second as outlined above.

c. To provide the information acquired from the briefing

AMM CO-1 TO THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(d) To know [REDACTED] what we have to do [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] information available, and
to prompt them to take any action as we may wish.

(e) To give pertinent information [REDACTED]
who can help us in locating and identifying targets.

d. Meanwhile, as in the A-N exercise for the Canadian
defector who has provided us with considerable information and
has been used in a number of approaches, to release, where appropriate
information to the U.S. intelligence community. In the case of a
personality, the Canadian that is would consist only of descriptive
and biographic data furnished by [REDACTED] himself, including appropriate
headquarters traces. He would request that nothing be released in return.
(This procedure has been used in the A-N exercise.)

e. To decide what information we shall give the various

[REDACTED]

1. To work out in cooperation with the C-1 and C-2 staffs what
can be done in the event it may be useful at some future date to
publicise AMM CO-1's description by releasing certain information to
the press or by possibly having him appear before the congressional
of American states.

2. The above represents a general outline of what our overall
planning has been in connection with the AMM CO-1 case since we
are going to the United States. The type of approach, to understand
it is to manage and coordinate the overall aspects of the
operation and to see that no inadvertent disclosure of any non
interested donor or source that may have damaging effects on other
aspects of the operation.