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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

By Do - Mr. Lynch
SY - Mr. Albright
x 525

12 JUL 1962

7/12/62

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TO : Chief
United States Secret Service
FROM : Deputy Director, Plans
SUBJECT: Visit of President Kennedy to Brazil

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/771,413, dated 22 June 1962, and CSCI-3/771,522 dated 29 June 1962, subject as above.

2. The attached briefing paper incorporates material from referenced CSCI's with additional information received from [redacted] regarding the President's visit to Brazil. Also enclosed for the background information of the Secret Service are brief papers on the political, economic, labor, student, and army situation in Brazil.

CSCI-3/771,616

Attachment: One, as above

cc: Department of State

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7 July 1962

RIO DE JANEIRO

1. Security Forces Charged with Protecting the President

A. Departamento Federal de Seguranca Publica (DFSP)

Responsibility for the security of the Presidential party by law rests with the Departamento Federal de Seguranca Publica which has its main headquarters in Brasilia. The nationwide authority of this unit, however, is challenged by various other State and Federal entities and it is generally recognized that the Departamento Federal de Seguranca Publica simply is not capable of effective action outside the Federal District. In the Rio de Janeiro area, the protection of the Presidential party will be the responsibility of both the Guanabara Police and elements of the Rio-based First Army.

The Guanabara Departamento da Seguranca Publica (DSP) is headed by Chief Newton Marques Cruz. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Secret Service officers should meet with Chief Cruz and Dr. Antunes. Cruz, who has been in his present job for a little over two months, is the sixth chief of police in the last thirteen months.

B. First Army

The commander of the First Army is four-star General Osvaldo Alves. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He has instructed the following key officers to hold themselves available for planning with the U.S. Secret Service personnel upon their arrival: General Jose Ribeiro, Chief of Staff of the First Army; Colonel Antonio Negreiros, Deputy Chief of Staff of the First Army; Colonel Napoleon Nabre, Chief of 2nd

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Section, First Army; Colonel Cesar Neves, Chief of 3rd Section, First Army; Lt. Colonel Domingos Ventura, Commander, Police Battalion, First Army; Major Infante, 2nd Section, First Army.

With regard to the strength and specific assignments of his men, General Gervasio Alves has said that whatever strength is required will be made available, and that specific assignments will not be made until additional details on the program of President Kennedy are received from the Foreign Office. Our representative believes that the Secret Service officers should meet with General Gervasio Alves and his principal aides, but that the key officers will probably be Colonel Cesar Neves and Lt. Colonel Domingos Ventura.

Both Chief Cruz and the First Army officers will receive their instructions from the Brazilian Foreign Office. It is not yet known who in the Foreign Office will be responsible for coordinating the security aspects of the visit. Our representative plans to establish contact with the appropriate official assigned this task as soon as his identity is known.

With respect to the effectiveness of the security forces, it might be said that they can be rated slightly higher than average when compared with most Latin American forces having similar responsibilities. It is believed that they are capable of crowd control and related functions required to insure the safety of the visiting party. Some of the police or military officers mentioned above speak English.

C. Service Federal de Informacoes e Contra Informacoes (SFCI)

In addition to the First Army and the Gabinete Departamento de Seguranca Publica our representative will have access to the Service Federal de Informacoes e Contra Informacoes for certain aspects of the President's visit. The Service Federal de Informacoes e Contra Informacoes can be expected to provide intelligence coverage of potentially hostile groups and individuals posing a threat to the Presidential party's security and, through its access to the highest levels of the Brazilian Government, can insure the availability of necessary armed forces and police personnel to cope with or counter any disturbances. Our main contact in the Service Federal de Informacoes e Contra Informacoes is Major Vanderline Maria de Oliveira Oliveira; he speaks English, Spanish and Portuguese.

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2. Groups and Individuals Expected to Assume a Hostile Attitude Toward the Visit

A. Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)

While the Brazilian Communist Party, with a membership of approximately 30,000 in the country and 2,800 in Guanabara State, now follows a non-violent policy to achieve its goal, it can nevertheless be expected to muster its forces within the student, labor and press fields to stage demonstrations, make speeches, and display propaganda materials such as posters, banners and wallpaintings critical of the United States in general and of the President in particular. As of 5 July 1962, the Party had made no plans to demonstrate against the visit of President Kennedy to Brazil during the time the latter was scheduled to be in this country. Among the plans made by the Party and scheduled for the period of 20-27 July were the following:

- A. Mass demonstrations against the visit and the alliance for progress in the more important cities
- B. Official protests against the visit by labor and student groups
- C. Mass distribution of propaganda materials and paintings of walls and sidewalks in protest against the visit

B. Communist Party of Brazil (CPB)

The Communist Party of Brazil is a dissident group which has broken with the Brazilian Communist Party and advocates violence, along the lines of Fidel Castro's Cuban Communists, to achieve its goal. While the Communist Party of Brazil has relatively few members and much less organizational capability than the Brazilian Communist Party, certain individuals within its ranks might conceivably attempt some sort of violent action against the President or his entourage.

C. Peasant Leagues

The Peasant Leagues are Communist-orientated rural groups consisting of rural workers, tenant farmers, and small land owners concentrated mainly in the States of Pernambuco and Paraiba in Northeast Brazil. A prominent Peasant League leader, Francisco Juliao, while not admitting to Communist Party membership, is definitely a Communist sympathizer and strong advocate of the policies of Fidel Castro and Mao Tse-tung. He is a protagonist of the violent overthrow of the government through peasant uprisings. Followers of Francisco Juliao can be expected to attempt to demonstrate in Rio de Janeiro against the President's visit.

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A report previously furnished your office indicates that these elements are planning to make a red paint bomb to be thrown at Mrs. Kennedy.

D. Cuban and Soviet Bloc Embassies

Cuban and Soviet Bloc Embassies can be expected to marshal selected assets to create disturbances and incidents designed to mar the success of the Presidential visit.

E. Leonel Brizola, Governor of Rio Grande do Sul

Leonel Brizola, well-known leftist, anti-American Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, may very possibly take advantage of the President's visit to inspire further anti-American speeches and actions not only in his own state, but also in Rio de Janeiro.

3. Known Leftist Officials Participating with Goulart in Visit

The identities of all officials who will participate with Goulart in the visit are not known at this time. It is expected that a new Cabinet will be formed prior to the time of President Kennedy's arrival and that other major changes will result in Goulart's official household.

It can be assumed that Raul Ryff, Press Secretary to President Goulart, will survive any major shake-up in the Brazilian Government if Goulart survives. Ryff accompanied Goulart on the recent visit to the United States. Ryff has a long history of Communist activity, dating back to the 1940's. A report dated September 1961 said that Brazilian Communist Party leaders considered Ryff a militant member of the Brazilian Communist Party who was expected to be of great value to the Party because he enjoyed the deep confidence of President Goulart.

4. Issues and Situations that Could be Exploited by Opposition to Create Hostility

At the present time there are few if any local situations or issues that would have mass appeal and could be exploited by the opposition to create hostility. There are the usual themes of economic exploitation of Brazil by "foreign trusts", U.S. military "occupation" of Brazil which refers to the size of U.S. military missions and the frequency of visits of U.S. military, interference in the internal affairs of Brazil through insistence on basic reforms in connection with the Alliance for Progress, etc. It is more likely that the opposition could get more mileage from some such themes as the current nuclear testing by the United States or the alleged intervention in Cuban affairs by the U.S. Government.

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Because of the lack of exploitable local issues or situations that could be used to create hostility against the Presidential Party, it is possible that opposition efforts may be devoted simply to creating disorders and unsettled conditions because of purely local and internal economic and political problems. There are plenty of these. The objective in this event would be to create such an unsettled situation that the visit of President Kennedy might be either prejudiced or cancelled.

5. Route Presidential Party will Follow with Description of Potential Danger Spots.

Enroute from the Galeao airport to the Embassy residence, located at Rua Sao Clemente No. 388, several narrow bridges have to be traversed immediately after departing Galeao. Obstruction of the Presidential party could more easily be accomplished at this area than after the cavalcade has reached the mainland. The UNE (student organization) building is located along the Flamengo at a point which would have to be passed if the party were to use automobiles. Since the UNE can be expected to take an unfriendly attitude toward the visit it can be assumed unfriendly banners, posters or demonstrations will be encountered at this point. Rua Sao Clemente, on which the Embassy residence is located, is a narrow street with a sharp right-hand turn into the grounds from Sao Clemente. This necessitates an almost dead stop in order to effect the turn and is a point where the Presidential party will be for a moment in a crowded area at almost zero speed. These represent the principal danger points along the arrival and departure routes if the trips are made by automobile. At the time of President Eisenhower's visit the trip from Galeao airport to the Naval Ministry was made by helicopter and the official parade began at that point, travelling down Rio Branco, along the Flamengo, and up Rua Sao Clemente. The return trip was made by boat from the Naval Ministry to Galeao so that the long trip by automobile was avoided.

6. General Estimate of Situation

At this time, the general security situation prevailing in the Rio de Janeiro area is satisfactory. It is believed that the local forces - civilian and military - are capable of coping with any hostile demonstrations or attempts at rioting or violence. At the time of the visit of former President Eisenhower to Brazil in 1960, the local forces proved capable of providing the security needed for the protection of the Presidential party while in Rio de Janeiro. At the time of the

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resignation of President Quadros in August 1961, the local forces again showed their ability to cope with hostile crowds and street demonstrators. The good will generated by the friendly reception of President Goulart on his recent trip to the United States will be a factor in insuring a similar reception for President Kennedy. It is expected that the Brazilian official attitude towards the visit will be highly favorable and that this in turn will contribute towards a similar attitude on the part of the press and the public.

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9 July 1950

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1. Security Service Planned with Assistance from President

2. Responsible Departments in Brazilian Police

The Portuguese Departamento de Seguranca Publica (DSP) is headed by Colonel Jose Costa Cavalcanti whose title is Secretary of Public Security. He has served as Assistant Military Attache in the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D.C., attended the Infantry course at Fort Benning, Georgia, and has held a variety of posts in the Brazilian Government. In March 1949, he visited the United States under the auspices of CIA. Cavalcanti has received many military decorations, including the U.S. Legion of Merit. Relationships between him and American officials have been very cordial and his full cooperation can be expected.

Colonel Cavalcanti advised our representative on 26 June that the security program for the visit could be handled in one of two ways. In one case the Army is given primary responsibility and they, in turn, request the Navy, Air Force, and State Police to render assistance. In other cases the State Police have the primary responsibility with assistance from the military. In either case, Cavalcanti said, the Air Force handles airport security. In the absence of special instructions from the Federal Government, Cavalcanti said the State Police would assume primary responsibility for the security of the Presidential party. When more information is available regarding the President's itinerary, Cavalcanti suggested calling a meeting of local military commanders and appropriate State Police section chiefs to coordinate security procedures. Before doing this, however, he plans to await the arrival of the Secret Service advance party so that their interests may be given thorough consideration in planning the security details.

Cavalcanti resigned on 2 July to devote full time to his campaign for Federal Senate. He will be replaced by 38-year-old retired Brigadier General Salvador Batista de Melo, for whom Cavalcanti has high regard. Cavalcanti described him as strongly anti-Communist and pro-American. Although Cavalcanti will not be a police official at the time of the President's visit, he volunteered his assistance and said he would suggest to Governor Oldenburg that he be permitted to participate in the security arrangements. Presumably Cavalcanti or our representative will place Secret Service representatives in contact with Melo.

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B. Fourth Army

Recife is the headquarters of the Fourth Army, which is commanded by General Artur da Costa e Silva. This 16,000 man force is subject to the direction of the Federal Government and has the capability of putting down any major disturbances if necessary. General Silva has been described as a "rightist". His attitude towards the United States is not known. One recent report stated that General Silva will soon be replaced by General Gil Carlos Franco, who has been described as friendly, energetic, pro-American and anti-Communist.

General Silva has been contacted by our Recife representative with regard to the Presidential visit; however, the General said he could not discuss the subject of the visit until he received instructions from higher military authority or was requested by the local State Security forces to assist. A clearance picture of the responsibilities of the military will probably emerge after the security survey, now underway, is completed by your representative.

C. Sid Rangel, Governor of Pernambuco

Governor Rangel is friendly towards the United States and is usually accessible to American officials. He can be relied upon to insure, to the best of his ability, a friendly reception for the Presidential visit to Recife.

D. Military Police of Pernambuco

The Military Police is commanded by Colonel Manoel Rangelito Rangel, cousin of Jose Costa Cavalcanti, Chief of PSP, and Sid Rangel, Governor of Pernambuco State. Colonel Rangel visited the United States in September and October 1961 under the auspices of USA. If called upon, he and his forces can be relied upon to furnish necessary assistance during the President's visit.

2. Groups and Individuals Expected to Assume a Hostile Attitude Towards the Visit

A. Brazilian Communist Party

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) has a membership of 8,000 in the State of Pernambuco of which Recife is the capital. The PCB will probably use all of its influence in the political, labor, and student fields to provoke demonstrations against the President's visit. The vigor with which Party elements in Recife

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will carry out these plans and the extent and nature of their action while the President is in Recife is not known at this time.

B. Communist Party of Brazil

As protagonists for violent revolution, any Communist Party of Brazil (CPB) elements in Recife can be expected to support and encourage violent actions against the President while in Recife. In all probability, any such action taken by the CPB will be in collaboration with the Peasant League.

C. Peasant League

The stronghold of Francisco Juliao, the Peasant League leader, is Recife. As previously reported, the League are planning to make a red paint bomb to be thrown at Sen. Kennedy. It can be assumed that followers of Francisco Juliao will try to stage demonstrations, possibly of a violent nature, in protest against the Presidential visit to Recife.

D. Miguel Arraes, Mayor of Recife

Miguel Arraes is a probable Communist. Although some sources have labeled him a member of the PCB, PCB documents refer to him as an "ally". While it is doubtful that Arraes will actively plot action to embarrass the President, he will probably not interfere with the plans of other hostile groups to disrupt the visit.

3. General Estimate of the Situation

Based on the information available at this time, it is possible that subversive elements in the Recife area could pose a definite threat to the safety of the Presidential party, particularly if a motorcade through the city is planned. A final decision, however, should await the results of the Secret Service survey now being conducted in Recife.

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9 July 1962

BRASILIA

1. Security Forces Responsible for Protecting the President

The primary responsibility for protecting the President during his stay in Brasilia lies with the Departamento Federal da Seguranca Publica (DFSP). The DFSP, headed by Lt. Colonel Carlos Cairoli and under the Ministry of Justice and Interior Affairs, has the responsibility for the Federal District of Brazil. Since the higher positions in the Ministry and the DFSP are appointive, those holding them are generally loyal to the administration in power. The caliber of personnel at the lower levels is poor because the salaries are low and the training is inadequate. This has been remedied to some extent, however, by the training given to the DFSP by the ICA police training program in effect since 1959. The lack of continuity in leadership and therefore of long range objectives has also been a hindrance to the efficiency of the DFSP. Nevertheless, it is believed that the DFSP will be capable of controlling any anti-United States demonstrations which may arise during the President's visit.

Colonel Cairoli has been reported to be pro-Communist. Regardless of his personal political beliefs, he can be expected to use his full powers as Chief of the DFSP to insure that appropriate security procedures are implemented in connection with the visit.

The most important organization within the DFSP is the Divisao de Policia y Social (DPPS) with about 450 employees. This division is headed by Captain Aristonio Goncalves Leite who has reportedly been given this position by Cairoli. Although the DPPS is responsible for the control, prevention, and investigation of all matters and activities pertaining to disturbances in the political and social order of Brazil, its activities are largely confined to the Federal District.

Assisting the DPPS and under its jurisdiction during the President's visit will be the following:

- a. The Militarized Police with about 7,800 men.
- b. The Special Police of the DFSP consisting of about 500 selected officers and men. This is a specially-trained riot squad for emergency duty and for guarding important persons; it is most efficient in handling unruly crowds.

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- c. The Civil Guard of the DFSP, consisting of approximately 2,500 officers and men. It is used chiefly on patrol and traffic duty.
 - d. The Municipal Police, consisting of approximately 2,300 officers and men.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

2. Groups and Individuals Expected to Assume a Hostile Attitude Towards the Visit

[REDACTED] has reported that there are certain groups which are likely to take limited action in protest against the President's visit to Brasilia. The Brazilian Communist Party and possibly the Dissident Communist Party of Brazil (which has recently broken off from the Brazilian Communist Party), strongly anti-United States nationalist political organizations (especially those which support Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul), and supporters of the Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao comprise these groups.

The capability of these forces to take hostile action is limited by the rather isolated location of Brasilia and the character of its population. Government employees make up the bulk of the population and they are unlikely to become a nucleus for hostile activities. The main forces of the Communist and ultra-nationalist groups are located in other parts of Brazil. Any large scale demonstrations would necessitate the transportation of large numbers of demonstrators into Brasilia from outlying areas. There is a possibility of demonstrations from the students of the National University of Brasilia and from small labor organizations in other cities. In either case, the number of demonstrators would be small.

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Since the Brazilian Congress meets in Brasilia, the whole political spectrum is represented there. Anti-United States speeches and statements may be expected from members of the ultra-nationalist parties. Although the statements will undoubtedly receive national coverage in the Brazilian press, it is probable that the coverage will be, on balance, favorable to the visit.

3. General Estimate of the Situation

Although the security forces in Brasilia are somewhat inexperienced and untested in providing protection for visiting dignitaries, the Chief of the Federal Police can be expected to do everything possible to keep the district orderly during the President's visit. The Police Chief and his staff are attempting to gain national recognition for his organization as the prime police force in the country. Since the President's visit will give the organization an opportunity to gain national prestige, complete cooperation may be expected from the Police Chief during the visit.

Unless the situation changes radically before the end of July, we do not believe that hostile elements are sufficiently well organized or numerous enough to pose any threat to the President.

The President will probably receive a warm reception in Brasilia.

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