

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10365-10020

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68530-449

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : WMFO
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 09/20/1968
PAGES : 268

SUBJECTS :

NOSENKO BONA FIDES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/19/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO, INC MEMO, ANALYSIS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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REASON FOR EXTENSION

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION 9/20/88

SUBJECT: "NORMAN"

ESP - R

Re Bureau letter 2/29/68 captioned "SAMMY" which transmitted copy of CIA letter dated 2/19/68. The CIA letter had furnished to the Bureau copies of a 435 page Top Secret paper entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector." A copy of this paper was also furnished to WFO. ~~SECRET~~

Enclosed are six copies of a paper dated 9/20/68 prepared by Agents of WFO which compares the contents and conclusions of the CIA paper with information obtained during the current (1967-68) interrogations of SAMMY. (An extra copy of this letter and of the WFO paper are enclosed for the Bureau in the event the Bureau desires to furnish a copy of each to New York.) ~~SECRET~~

The WFO paper is classified "Top Secret" because it contains excerpts of material from CIA so classified. ~~SECRET~~

It is noted that a brief chronology of events is set forth in the preface to the WFO paper. It is indicated therein that SAMMY is considered by CIA as a part of a large scale KGB deceptive operation. ~~SECRET~~

In addition to those comments, it is noted that a paper prepared in December, 1964, by CIA as an agenda for a proposed CIA-FBI conference, concluded that SAMMY was dispatched by KGB in March, 1962, as one part of a broad provocation effort conceived as early as 1959 and set in motion in the latter part of 1961. It was stated, "We believe that the major figures in this provocation include at least three defectors, and at one time or another more than eight Soviet officials in-place as American Intelligence Service (AIS) agents. They are supported ~~SECRET~~

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
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I. PREFACE

A. Purpose of Paper

This paper has been prepared to compare the results of the 1967-68 interrogations of YURI NOSENKO with a CIA paper dated February, 1968, entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector." This CIA paper was based on previous interrogations of NOSENKO and concluded that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector. ~~(S)~~ (u)

According to the paper, in arriving at this conclusion the lengthy interrogations of NOSENKO, analysis of KGB operations which he related and comparison of his assertions with collateral information from other sources were considered. ~~(S)~~ (u)

B. Background

For convenience in assessing these papers, the following chronology of events is set forth: ~~(S)~~ (u)

NOSENKO first made contact with CIA in Geneva in June, 1962. After several meetings he returned to Russia and was not again in contact with CIA until his return to Geneva in January, 1964. On his return to Geneva he indicated ~~(S)~~ (u)

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Significant inaccuracies were detected in the CIA paper regarding the []^(S) and ABIDIAN cases.

Contrary to statements in the paper, []^(S) was not interviewed about homosexual activities before he left Moscow;

[]^(S) did have contact with a girl at American House posing as a West German journalist; the Soviet maid TATYANA FEDOROVICH did have access to ABIDIAN's living quarters within six months after his arrival in Moscow. ~~✗~~

COMMENT:

A number of previous CIA conclusions regarding this period were based on deficient interrogations of NOSENKO and inadequate collateral inquiries. These conclusions have been invalidated by current interrogation and collateral inquiries and there is no substantial basis for doubting NOSENKO's basic claims regarding this period. ~~✗~~(u)

[F. 1962-64 Period] ~~✗~~(u)

It is concluded in the CIA paper that NOSENKO's claims of being Chief of the American-British Commonwealth ~~✗~~(u)

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is alleged that NOSENKO did not indicate the sources from which he obtained the information regarding the cases. ~~(S)~~(u)

During current interrogation NOSENKO provided sources or logical explanation for his knowledge in sixteen of the nineteen cases referred to above. He also provided adequate clarification regarding three of the other five cases which were subjects of CIA criticism. In addition a current review of his notes by NOSENKO provided the translation "ECTOR", instead of "ACTOR" or []^(S) previously obtained, as the name of an agent. Collateral investigation has developed a logical suspect by this name. (Logical suspects named "ACTOR" or []^(S) were not previously identified.) ~~(S)~~

COMMENT:

Previous interrogations of NOSENKO in which information was not obtained regarding the sources for these cases were obviously inadequate. Current interrogations have provided significant clarifying information. ~~(S)~~(u)

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I. New Cases and New Information

The current interrogations of NOSENKO have developed six new cases involving nine people which were previously not uncovered during his interrogations. Collateral investigation has identified six of these persons and one [] (S) has been interviewed and admitted the allegations. This case is considered significant corroboration of NOSENKO. ~~TS~~

Additional significant data was developed on three cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO. Data in one case (the Brussels case) may assist in the identification of a KGB agent who supplied NATO codes. ~~TS~~ (u)

Considerable interesting, new and confirmatory data was obtained during the current interrogations. Twelve examples are cited. ~~TS~~ (u)

COMMENT: The new cases, new information and confirmatory data obtained in the current interrogations and collateral inquiries also clearly establish that the previous interrogations were deficient and collateral inquiries inadequate. Failure to acknowledge significance of NOSENKO's personnel identifications and organizational data denotes lack of objectivity in CIA paper. ~~TS~~ (u)

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appear reluctant in the past. One was his

[redacted] ^(S) with a friend of INGA

KARIAMOVA and the other was his arrest in

1954 when he used a KGB cover document to

obtain [redacted] ^(S) As

a result he was removed as Komsomol Secretary.

In addition the "Characteristic" which was prepared

on him in early 1955 was critical of him and his

mother had interceded with PETR FEDOTOV, Chief

of SCD, who transferred NOSENKO to the 7th

Department. This intercession possibly prevented

his dismissal from KGB. ~~XX~~

[2. Assignment Against Correspondents] ~~XX~~ (u)

Pages 76-80 relate to NOSENKO's assignment to operations against American correspondents. It was stated that although NOSENKO could give a breakdown of the network of agents used against correspondents in terms of number and type of agents, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide personality information on any of them. ~~XX~~ (u)

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necessary and they were suitable for use in a case.) NOSENKO had files on both of these agents which he turned over to PHILLIP VASIIYEVICH KISLITSYN when NOSENKO began work on military attaches. He had no opportunity to use "RAKETA" in 1953.

"RAKETA" was an agent for some officer of Section II, 1st Department in 1960 or 1961. ~~(S)~~ (u)

5. [] (S)

On page 88 it is stated that []

[] (S) was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO did not report. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT:

During interrogation of NOSENKO he could not recall specifically the arrest of [] (S) but stated that there were many "akts" against U. S. military attache personnel in which they were detained and written descriptions of their so-called "violations" were prepared. He indicated that the attache personnel, of course, in most instances refused to sign such documents, but nevertheless ~~(S)~~

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they were prepared ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~(S)~~ [] (S)

On pages 89 and 90 the paper indicates that NOSENKO correctly identified []^(S) as an []
[] and named his maid MARIYA NEVEROVA as an agent reporting on him. It was stated, however, that NOSENKO referred to LUDMILA GROMAKOVA in connection with another matter as a KGB agent during 1960-62 but did not relate her to []^(S) or to the 1953-55 period. GROMAKOVA gave []^(S) Russian language lessons. It was also stated that NOSENKO did not know of VOLODYA who was []^(S) driver and therefore should have been NOSENKO's agent. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO, in response to a request, furnished a handwritten list of his agents. For the period 1953-54 he listed as an agent a teacher of the Russian language who was giving lessons to correspondent CLARK. He also listed for the period 1954-55 drivers of the military attache^(u) and his officers, indicated there were five or six and ~~(S)~~

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furnished the name of one as "SHNIREV." (NIKOLAY VASILYEVICH SHNYRYEV). NOSENKO was not specifically questioned concerning VOLODYA and GROMAKOVA's connections with [redacted] (S) X

X. [redacted] (S) X

Pages 90-93 of the paper relate to [redacted]

[redacted] (S) It was indicated that NOSENKO correctly identified [redacted] (S) but knew nothing of his background, did not recall names of agents specifically targeted against him, did not recall a newspaper article in March, 1954, falsely accusing [redacted] (S) and his companion, did not recall any unusual circumstances involving the expulsion of [redacted] (S) and [redacted] (S) in 1954 and when told that the expulsion took place in that year stated this was not the correct date.

It was also indicated NOSENKO did not recognize the name of [redacted] (S) maid, FEDEROVA. X

COMMENT:

On April 18, 1968, (N-182), NOSENKO stated that he had a file on [redacted] (S) and utilized a chambermaid NEFEDOVA against him as well as X

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drivers for the military attache's office. He described the chambermaid and furnished her code name as "SHEVEDOVA". When shown the name FEDEROVA he indicated that this was the name of [redacted] (S) maid rather than NEFEDOVA. He also said that her first name was probably MARIYA but recognized DORA as the first name when it was mentioned to him. He stated that a driver for the military attache office was "SHNYREV" and accurately furnished his first name as NIKOLAY. He said there were several "akts" on [redacted] (S) during his travel in the USSR which [redacted] (S) refused to sign. He recalled that [redacted] (S) was arrested with another officer while NOSENKO and his wife were at Kubienka during the summer of 1954. He said that this occurred on the 8th or 9th of the month, probably July, and had appeared in the newspapers on those dates. He stated that he had been on vacation and his wife had given birth to a baby in August, 1954. (Actually the arrest took place on July 4, or July 5, 1954, and may well not have appeared in the Soviet

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newspapers until the 8th or 9th) ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO also pointed out that KGB obtained considerable information from microphones concerning operations and plans of the Military Attache personnel including their discussions before trips, their plans for visiting various cities and points of interest and their conversations after their trips. In addition KGB knew how much money they had each year for operations, the reactions of the officers to each other, etc. Excerpts of information were given to the Disinformation Department of KGB. ~~(S)~~ (u)

* 8. Expulsion of [] (S) and [] (S)

Pages 95 and 96 deal with the expulsion from the Soviet Union of [] [] (S) and [] (S) This expulsion resulted from seizure of equipment carried by these officers on May 5, 1955, and they were declared personae non gratae. It was stated that NOSENKO claimed that this incident had occurred after he was transferred to the 7th Department; however, when the May 7 date was given to him ~~(S)~~

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he had turned the 1st Section files over to VALERIY BUDYLDIN who had worked for a short period but was later fired from KGB and the files were then transferred to VICTOR RASSADIN ~~(S)~~ (u)

not very strong
It appears that NOSENKO's failure to recall details of this incident could be due to his hospitalization at the time it occurred. ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~(S)~~ [] (S) ~~(S)~~
Pages 97 and 98 relate to [] (S) []

[] at the American Embassy from March, 1951, to March, 1953. NOSENKO had reported that ALLA LARIONOVA was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with an assignment to strike up an acquaintance with [] (S) She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number; however, he did not call her. NOSENKO heard about this from PANKRATOV and knew of no other KGB interest in [] (S) It was pointed out that [] (S) denied any meeting with LARIONOVA as alleged by NOSENKO and further [] (S) was again in Moscow from March 19 to May 19, 1955, ~~(S)~~

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while NOSENKO was still the case officer responsible for Army Attaches. He was reported to the Russians as an [redacted] on permanent assignment although it was actually a temporary assignment. ~~TS~~

COMMENT: As indicated above NOSENKO stated on April 16, 1968, (N-181), that he was in the hospital for 30 or 40 days just prior to transfer to the 7th Department and would have been in the hospital during April, 1955. When told that [redacted] ^(S) returned to the USSR on March 19, 1955, NOSENKO said that he did not remember it. ~~TS~~

[10. EDWARD ELLIS SMITH] ~~TS~~ (u)

On page 99 the paper points out that NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in the KGB operation against EDWARD ELLIS SMITH in 1954-55 but the incident described by NOSENKO in which SMITH was approached occurred in June, 1956, after NOSENKO had been transferred to the 7th Department for about a year. ~~TS~~ (u)

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11. "ANDREY" ~~(u)~~

On page 99 it is also indicated that if NOSENKO served in the Embassy Section (1st Section, 1st Department) during 1953-55, "It is difficult to perceive how he could have remained unaware of 'ANDREY'S' identity." NOSENKO claimed that "ANDREY" was spotted by ROY RHODES and was recruited prior to NOSENKO's connection with KGB in March, 1953. "ANDREY" was a crypto-repairman and the direct subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic security officer, [redacted] ^(S) who was NOSENKO's target. ~~(u)~~

COMMENT:

NOSENKO has consistently stated that "ANDREY" was being handled by KOVSHUK, assisted by BORODIN, and that he obtained information regarding "ANDREY" through conversations with KOVSHUK and BORODIN. Inasmuch as NOSENKO did not enter the KGB until 1953, it does not seem inconsistent for officers in his section not to reveal to him the identity of an important agent who was furnishing important information on a current ~~(u)~~

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their duties and in addition noted that there were 2 FCD officers who were assigned to the Section "in practice" (for training purposes). He named one of these officers. On the same date he listed his special targets among the correspondents and military officers during this period and discussed the actions against them. He indicated that he had operated agents against officers of the Military Attache's office but was not responsible for the officers of the Navy and Air Force. In addition he said that the Sergeants of all of the services were the responsibility of another officer in the section. He stated that the main objectives against the Sergeants were to ascertain their weaknesses and place girls in contact with them. Normally KGB officers were not sent with foreign Attaches when they traveled in the USSR except to look for electronic gear. He described a search of the luggage of the Military Attache

[redacted] (S) in which he participated with

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IONOV and KARETNIKOV of OTU whom he had known since 1953. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(U)~~

When shown a list of Soviets employed by the U. S. Embassy in 1954 he selected the names of eleven as agents of the 1st Section. On February 8, 1968, (N-125), photographs of 18 Soviet employees of American House were displayed to him. He identified an old woman known as BABUSHKA as an agent who had worked at American House before 1953 and who had retired about 1960. In another group he recognized the photograph of TAMARA ANTUFEEVA as an agent utilized in the ^(S) case who was sent to Berlin to contact him but was unsuccessful. He did not recognize the photograph of GALINA G. MOROZOVA and said he never saw her but Officer RAKOVSKIY, who worked against American House and the Sergeants, had an agent named MOROZOVA in 1953 or 1954. He recognized the photograph of RAISA TROFIMOVA and furnished her name as an agent of RAKOVSKIY. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~

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that CIA warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA. The paper noted that CIA did not warn BELITSKIY against SHULGINA but BELITSKIY had reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent. SHULGINA was for two years a Secretary-Correspondent of NBC Correspondent IRVING R. LEVINE and according to BELITSKIY was involved in the sexual entrapment and KGB recruitment of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (S) It was stated that NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of SHULGINA's involvement with LEVINE and other Americans belied his claim that she was his agent during the 1955-58 period. It was also noted that in 1964 he failed to recognize her photograph; when shown her name he identified her not as his former agent but as an SCD agent involved with BELITSKIY. ~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMENT: On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO listed SHULGINA as one of his agents and indicated that in 1960 she left Intourist and worked in the Radio Committee. On January 24, 1968, (N-109), he stated that she was an agent of GEORGIY IVANOVICH RASTRUSIN before she was turned over to NOSENKO with whom she (S)(u)

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or have been her case officer in the 1955-57 period. It was further noted that KUNGAROVA, who [redacted]

[redacted] (S) was interviewed by the FBI and denied collaboration with the KGB; that KUNGAROVA had died in 1965. ~~✗~~

COMMENT:

On December 6, 1967, (N-57), the name VIKTOR KOPEYKIN was displayed to NOSENKO who identified him as a Lieutenant Colonel working as a Senior Case Officer in the 2nd Section of the 1st Department in 1960-62. He stated that KOPEYKIN "was keeping my former agent VERA" who [redacted] (S) He stated that she had left Russia with [redacted] (S) but was coming back to Russia and KGB was also studying the question of whether [redacted] (S) was connected with American Intelligence. ~~✗~~

On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO listed TAMARA KUNGAROVA among his agents for the 1955-59 period. On January 11, 1968, (N-93), NOSENKO stated that she was "in close relations" ~~✗~~ (u)

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with a representative of the Belgian airlines and was trying to marry a foreigner to go abroad. ~~(u)~~

On January 30, 1968, (N-114), NOSENKO in writing about KGB operations against the British stated that in 1954-56 TAMARA KUNGAROVA and MARIANNA ZHETVINA were agents of the 2nd Department of SCD and were working in the British Embassy. Both knew the English language and were later turned over to NOSENKO by ALEKSEY SUNTSOV. NOSENKO understood that they had been "in close relations" with employees of the British Embassy. NOSENKO identified the photograph of MARIANNA ZHETVINA and on March 18, 1968, (N-165), identified the photograph of TAMARA KUNGAROVA. At that time he stated that she had worked for him two or three years but in 1959 he had discontinued working with her. She had been "in close relations" with Americans on her own initiative, some of which she did not report. He recognized the name of [] [] as one of the Americans with whom she was in ~~(u)~~

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contact. She was also an interpreter for the

[redacted] (S) group. ~~X~~

On August 24, 1968, (n-217), NOSENKO stated that he had seen the name [redacted] (S) which reminded him of a 2nd Department, SCD operation against a man by that name. He believed that TAMARA KUNGAROVA worked against this man. This happened prior to the time KUNGAROVA worked for him (NOSENKO) and probably while she was working against the British; however, NOSENKO was not sure that [redacted] (S) was of British nationality. ~~X~~

4. YEVGENIYA DANKO ~~X~~

On page 109 the paper refers to YEVGENIYA DANKO who worked for [redacted] (S) office in Moscow and later for [redacted] (S) successor, [redacted] [redacted] (S) It was indicated NOSENKO stated that he took DANKO over from another 7th Department case officer during the period 1955-57 and she was used to report on both [redacted] (S) and [redacted] (S) The paper noted that [redacted] (S) left Moscow in 1961 by which time NOSENKO had transferred from the 7th Department. ~~X~~

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COMMENT:

On November 4, 1967, (N-11), while discussing [redacted] (S) NOSENKO stated that the true name of Agent "OKSANA" was EVGENIA VASILIEVNA DENKO. On December 11, 1967, (N-64), he listed among his agents EVGENIA DANKO who was a translator at the permanent exhibition of agriculture and industry in Moscow and from 1957 worked as a translator for [redacted] (S) representative in Moscow. On April 18, 1968, (N-182), NOSENKO stated that DANKO was a former Agent of IVAN ALEKSEYEVICH KONSTANTINOV and NOSENKO received her file in 1957 when KONSTANTINOV retired. At that time she was working at the permanent exhibition of agriculture as indicated above. later, however, she was assigned to [redacted] (S) when he inquired concerning an interpreter. After [redacted] (S) left [redacted] (S) in 1961 she continued working in the [redacted] (S) office. X

[5. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV] X (u)

On pages 112 and 113 the paper refers to NOSENKO's Agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. -It was noted that he was unfamiliar (u) X

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with their background and could not say where they lived or how he got in touch with them when he required their service. It was noted that they were involved with one Dutch and five American visitors, including three CIA Agents, in the Soviet Union which was apparently unknown to NOSENKO. In addition they were involved with two other Americans in 1959 while he was their case officer but he learned about it only at the time he retired their files in 1962-63. ~~(S)~~ (u)

COMMENT: On July 3, 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO described in detail his relations with the agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. He stated that as a result of the [] (s) case the "Chiefs" of the 7th Department decided that a homosexual agent was needed. NOSENKO recruited the young fellow who was connected with [] (s) and through him tried to get others. Then he visited the Moscow Investigation Department of the Militia (called Criminal Investigation Directorate of Moscow) for help. He was shown cards of Militia agents among which was the card for ANATOLIY VOLKOV, a former agent of the ~~(S)~~

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Americans who were suspected by KGB of being CIA agents would likely be handled by KGB elements other than the 1st Section of the 7th Department where NOSENKO was assigned. ~~XX~~ (u)

X6. [] S &

Pages 114 and 115 of the paper discuss the [] (S) case. [] (S) according to NOSENKO, was observed in contact with homosexuals in Moscow but was not approached by KGB for recruitment. It was noted that although [] (S) had not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's information, he had, in 1963, prior to receipt of NOSENKO's information, denied any involvement with homosexuals in the Soviet Union. ~~XX~~

COMMENT:

[] (S) has still not been interviewed concerning NOSENKO's allegations but it is noted that in September, 1963, [] (S) an admitted homosexual, advised that he observed [] (S) in [] (S) [] (S) in July, 1963, and saw and overheard him ~~XX~~

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proposition a young male for homosexual activities. On May 16, 1968, []^(S) changed his story but stated that he attended []^(S) with []^(S) in 1944-45 and suspected that he was a homosexual. In 1963 he saw him in []^(S) in a group of homosexuals on a beach frequented almost exclusively by homosexuals. ~~XXXX~~

In addition, information was reported to the American Embassy in Rome, Italy, in 1966 regarding a close association between []^(S) and a young German, []^(S) who according to a physician appeared to be a homosexual. ~~XX~~

The above information effectively supports NOSENKO's allegation that []^(S) was involved with homosexuals. ~~XXXX~~

On November 7, 1967, February 6, March 8, and April 10, 1968, (N-14, 121, 125, 178), NOSENKO furnished detailed information regarding the []^(S) case which indicated he had a personal knowledge of that case. He said he had no doubt that []^(S) was connected with American Intelligence. This conclusion was based on ~~XX~~

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[]^(S) behavior, his manner of studying people and obtaining information from some of them. NOSENKO believed that []^(S) could have been recruited by KGB and said that PERFILEYEV later regretted that he did not permit an approach to []^(S)

7. []^(S)

Pages 115-121 relate to the []^(S) case. On page 120 it is stated that NOSENKO is unfamiliar with the mechanics of KGB tracing procedures. ~~NS~~

COMMENT:

On January 26, 1968, (N-111), NOSENKO stated that the KGB has a rule that when the KGB Archives are checked for information on foreigners, both the FCD Archives and the Archives of the KGB must be checked. On this date he discussed in detail the handling of files pertaining to tourists and the transfer of the files to FCD when the tourists leave the Soviet ~~(S)~~ (u)

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Union. Information furnished by NOSENKO on this date and on other dates indicates that he does have adequate knowledge of KGB tracing and filing procedures. (u)

8. [redacted] (S) X

Pages 137-143 relate to the recruitment and operation of [redacted] in Moscow. It is noted that the versions of NOSENKO and [redacted] (S) of the latter's recruitment and operation agree with some exceptions. It is stated that NOSENKO and [redacted] (S) agree that, with one exception, (when [redacted] (S) was queried regarding [redacted] (u) and WINTERS), [redacted] (S) was not used to report on American Embassy employees. It is also stated that [redacted] (S) while acknowledging that NOSENKO participated in all meetings with him, stated that CHELNOKOV was in charge of the entire operation. It is further stated that [redacted] (S) claims he saw NOSENKO on three occasions, twice in Odessa while visiting the USSR in 1962 and 1963 whereas NOSENKO insisted that he met [redacted] (S) but once in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period. X

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COMMENT:

A review of the results of FBI interviews of []^(S) during 1964 disclosed that []^(S) described the initial recruiting contact of "NIKOLAEV" and "GRIBOV". He identified a photograph of NOSENKO as "NIKOLAEV" and stated that "NIKOLAEV" displayed photographs to him and carried out the interrogation. He stated that "NIKOLAEV" conducted almost all of the interrogations during their meetings; however, "Colonel GRIBOV" was in charge of the entire operation. ~~(S)~~

This appears to agree with NOSENKO's account; he said that he was the case officer and was accompanied by Colonel V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the 7th Department. When CHELNOKOV's photograph was displayed to []^(S) he indicated that it resembled "GRIBOV" but would not make a definite identification. ~~(S)~~

[]^(S) admitted having approximately six meetings through December, 1960, during which "NIKOLAEV" asked his observations of "various American Embassy officials." He specifically requested on one occasion ~~(S)~~

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information concerning []^{(S)(u)} and information regarding an economist at the Embassy whom []^(S) presumed was GEORGE WINTERS. This also is consistent with NOSENKO's account who stated that he questioned []^(S) about the Embassy and about Embassy officers []^{(S)(u)} and WINTERS. ~~XX~~

With regard to meetings in 1962 and 1963, []^(S) said he visited the USSR in February, 1962, and went to Odessa for one day where he was met by "NIKOLAEV" and "GRIBOV." At that time they asked if any American Naval personnel were aboard the ["Olympia", Greek vessel]^(S) on which he was traveling. Again in the summer of 1962 he accompanied a group of newspaper editors to the USSR at which time he was contacted by "NIKOLAEV" at []^(S) Moscow hotel room. He next visited the USSR in February, 1963, and again was approached by "NIKOLAEV" in Odessa. ~~XX~~

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writing about the [redacted] ^(S)case, stated that [redacted] ^(S) returned to the USSR in the summer of 1962 with a group of correspondents and he saw him twice. In March, 1963, [redacted] ^(S) was on [the "Olympia"] ^(S) in Odessa "where I flew and have seen him. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

discrepancy between [redacted] and NOSENKO's accounts
and no basis to suspect that NOSENKO is lying. (S) (u)

[9. NOSENKO Not CI Officer] (u)

On page 145, in discussing NOSENKO's operational activities during the 1955-60 period, it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English speaking specialist in sexual entrapment and not a counterintelligence officer. Further that NOSENKO furnished no information which indicated that there was any material change in his duties and responsibilities after he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. ~~1051~~

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COMMENT:

The statement of []^(S) that "NIKOLAEV" (NOSENKO) conducted almost all of the interrogations strongly suggests that NOSENKO was a counterintelligence officer rather than just an "English speaking specialist in sexual entrapment." A number of other cases, all summarized in the CIA paper, establishes this fact beyond reasonable doubt. []^(S) (pages 115-120) description of his recruitment is one such case. He described his meeting with a Russian, "ANATOLI," [on June 18, 1956,]^(S) who introduced him to "VIKTOR" and "YURI IVANOVICH" in a Moscow restaurant on [June 20, 1956.]^(S) He identified the photograph of YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO as "YURI IVANOVICH" and said he left after about twenty minutes. On [June 23, 1956,]^(S) []^(S) traveled to [Kiev]^(S) where he was met at the airport by "YURI IVANOVICH" and "VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH" who took him to an apartment and introduced him to "ANATOLI SERGEEVICH" (undoubtedly ANATOLI SERGEEVICH KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the 7th Department who ~~TS~~

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NOSENKO said accompanied him to [Kiev]^(S) and participated in the approach to []^(S) []^(S) said "ANATOLI SERGEEVICH" was the ranking officer, referred to as Colonel, and he and "YURI IVANOVICH" had come from Moscow. "VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH" was assigned [to Kiev]^(S) "ANATOLI SERGEEVICH" led the questioning and there was no doubt he was in charge. However, "YURI IVANOVICH" appeared to give orders to "VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH" and also appeared to be in charge during the brief encounter with "ANATOLI" and "VIKTOR" in the restaurant in Moscow before he went to [Kiev]^(S) ~~X~~

It is submitted that a mere "English speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" would not be taken to [Kiev]^(S) by the Deputy Chief of 7th Department after only a twenty-minute encounter with []^(S) in Moscow. Further, such a "specialist" would not give orders to a KGB officer stationed in [Kiev]^(S) This is clearly the ~~X~~

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role of a case officer and [redacted] description
confirms NOSENKO's account. ~~(S)~~

Four other cases cited in the CIA paper support NOSENKO's contention that he was a case officer. The subjects confirmed NOSENKO's accounts of their recruitments ~~(S)~~ (u)

[redacted] ~~(S)~~ (page 128) identified NOSENKO as one of the two men involved in her recruitment and said he "was definitely the man in charge" while the other "was merely present and listened." ~~(S)~~

[redacted] ~~(S)~~ (pages 130-131) identified NOSENKO's photograph as his interrogator and said it was clear that he was the man in charge. ~~(S)~~

[redacted] ~~(S)~~ (132-133) identified NOSENKO as the "Colonel SERGEYEV" who recruited him and said the mere sight of NOSENKO's photograph "sent shivers down his back." ~~(S)~~

[redacted] ~~(S)~~ stated the photograph of NOSENKO might be the "GEORGE PETERSON" who recruited him. ~~(S)~~

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have had access to information concerning all of them while Deputy Chief of the Section in 1958-59. []^(S) was there in 1959; []^(S) was there in 1956 but had subsequent trips; []^{(S)(U)} is believed to have visited relatives (As indicated above, such cases would probably not have come to NOSENKO's attention); []^(S) was a []^(S) rather than American (NOSENKO's section may have had an interest if he was a part of the []^(S); []^(S) was there in late 1959; []^(S) was there in 1957 but did not go as a tourist; []^(S) probably did not visit the Soviet Union as a tourist; []^(S) had previously been recruited in []^(S) in 1946-47 and was re-recruited in 1962; []^(S) also visited relatives. References to all of these cases could, of course, have been in the 7th Department files reviewed by NOSENKO when he became Deputy Chief of the Department. Three of them []^(S) and []^{(S)(U)} were in notes prepared for the BOBKOV list referred to above. Therefore, it does not

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appear that his retention and delivery of notes
regarding these cases should be given serious
consideration as an indication he is not bona fide.
His knowledge of the cases is consistent with his
plausible explanations regarding his possession of
the notes. (X) X

[11. American Intelligence Use of Tourists] (S) (u)

Pages 146-150 relate to NOSENKO's awareness of what the KGB knew concerning the use of tourists by foreign intelligence services. It was noted that he claimed to have prepared a report for SCD Chief GRIBANOV in 1959, but could not remember the content, any examples included therein or the conclusions regarding American-British tourist intelligence operations. It is stated that he claimed no agents were definitely identified among American tourists and no tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servicing dead drops, or contacting agents with one exception. This exception he named [as [redacted] [redacted] (S) It was noted that this X

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case as described by NOSENKO actually related to [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] (S) however, [one

(S) [redacted] visited the Soviet Union in April-May,

1959, and was the target of KGB provocations although he had no intelligence connections. It was stated that inter-

rogation did not resolve how NOSENKO knew the name [redacted] (S)

but not the background of his case and knew the background of

(S) [redacted] case but not his name. ~~TS~~

The CIA paper also relates that the KGB agent GEORGE BLAKE furnished to KGB in 1959 a 19 page document covering a conference held in London between British and CIA representatives outlining British and American use of tourists for intelligence purposes. The KGB was therefore fully aware of the use of tourists and it was stated that the substance of this information, if not the document itself, would have been brought to the attention of the Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. ~~TS~~ (U)

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tourists for intelligence. The 1st Department of SCD wrote the final report about overall American Intelligence operations against the USSR, but NOSENKO's portion regarding use of tourists was considered good and was accepted as written. ~~(S)~~ (u)

NOSENKO stated that there was an analysis each year regarding use of tourists for intelligence and even in 1955 there were some indications of tourist use by Americans including "little facts" - how the tourists acted, trying to get military information, trying to find drops, studying candidates for recruitment, etc. Each year they had good examples for the analysis including the use of other nationalities by the Americans. NOSENKO, however, could not remember any of the specific examples used in the analysis. ~~(S)~~ (u)

On April 1, 1968, (N-175), when questioned concerning a case involving [] ^(S) or something like that", ~~(S)~~

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who was mentioned as mailing a letter, NOSENKO stated that this case, at the beginning, was a task for the 7th Department. [redacted] ^(S) was an "aspirant" (student) "and he arrived in Russia having several tours and had about 30 or 40 days." He was young and alone and although there was no information on him in the Archives he was suspected because of his "legend" (stated reason for coming to the USSR). He, therefore, was the subject of coverage which detected his mailing of a letter in Minsk. This was reported to Moscow by KGB in Minsk, apparently directed to GRIBANOV, who turned the case over to the First (American) Department which thereafter handled the investigation. This happened in the late 1950's but NOSENKO could not recall the year. NOSENKO stated that the letter mailed by this [redacted] ^(S) was going to a Russian. (The transfer of this case from the 7th to the 1st Department suggests that the Russian to whom the letter was mailed was being used in an operational game by the 2nd Section of the 1st Department.)

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It should be noted that the [redacted] ^(S) case is mentioned in the KGB document acquired by CIA in 1961 which, as noted below, NOSENKO reviewed after the defection of ANATOLIY GOLITZYN. His knowledge of this case obviously could have been acquired at that time, although it might well have been acquired when KGB, Minsk, was covering him under 7th Department guidance. ~~XX~~

On March 7, 1968, (N-159), in response to a question, NOSENKO said he saw very little information which emanated from the FCD regarding American use of tourists for intelligence; however, he had seen passages from a document which was in possession of SCD and which related to discussions in London between American, British, and Canadian representatives regarding use of tourists for intelligence. He could not specifically recall when the conference took place but believed it was in 1958. This document had come from FCD and he had ~~XX~~ (u)

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(damage assessment). He said the document contained the names of foreigners against whom KGB was working or planned to work. The document was prepared in 1960-61. NOSENKO participated in discussions of the content of the document after GOLITZYN's defection and some cases mentioned therein were considered compromised and "x'd out." He did not believe the document contained the names of any persons who had been recruited but mostly related to suspects. He volunteered the name [redacted] ^(S) as the only name that he could recall in the document. However, on March 7, 1968, (N-159), he was shown a list of 26 names which were contained in the document and selected the names of three as names he recalled. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

It is considered significant that NOSENKO is aware of the document pertaining to tourists purloined by GOLITZYN. A review of this document indicates that most of the cases referred to therein as having occurred in 1958 and 1959, are such that ~~(S)~~

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NOSENKO would not normally have come into possession of information regarding them while he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. Of the 19 cases mentioned therein only seven occurred before 1960 and only one appears to have been the type of case which would have been handled by the American-British Commonwealth Section. [redacted] (S) went to Russia in 1959 as the representative of a tourist firm; [redacted] (S) was an exchange student in 1959-60; [redacted] (S) apparently visited the USSR as a member of a group; [redacted] (S) discussed above, was brought to the attention of the American Department and was handled by that Department; [redacted] (S) who visited in August, 1959, was introduced to a KGB agent employed at the American Embassy and may well have been handled by the 1st Department;

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[]^(S) visited in 1959 with the []^(S)
and not as an individual tourist. []^(S)
visited during November, 1959. He was an Assistant
Professor at []^(S) University and []^(S)
He was apprehended in []^(S)
while attempting to photograph a factory. His is
the only case among those in the document which
logically should have come to the attention of
NOSENKO while he was in the American-British
Commonwealth Section prior to 1960. Thus his lack
of knowledge does not appear to be suspect. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

E. NOSENKO's Assignment to 1st Section, 1st Department,
January, 1960 - January, 1962 ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

Pages 151-261 of the CIA paper relate to the period
January, 1960, to January, 1962, when NOSENKO claims to have
been the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section (1st
Section) of the American Department (1st Department). It is
related that according to NOSENKO, he was supervisor of all ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

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operations against code clerks and for some months against service attaches; case officer for the Embassy security officer, JOHN V. ABIDIAN; custodian of the Embassy Security file; and reviewer of all information obtained from microphones. It is stated that a comparison of his assertions with collateral information indicates that "he was none of these." ~~TS~~ (U)

It was also asserted that NOSENKO claimed complete knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts against U. S. Embassy personnel, knowledge of CIA personnel on the Embassy Staff identified by KGB and status of the KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. It is stated that his apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with [redacted] (S) and KOSOLAPOV's connection with [redacted] (S) refute his contention about knowledge of all recruitment attempts and, contrary to his claim, he does not know of CIA personnel on the Embassy staff identified by KGB. It is also stated that his information on the cryptologic attack on Embassy communications is superficial and in error. It was concluded that NOSENKO was neither Deputy

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- included (1) The Agent net of the 1st Section,
- (2) Knowledge that ROY RHODES furnished the original information on American use of electronic apparatus.
- (3) Knowledge of attempts to obtain permission of the Chairman of KGB to put microphones in a wing of the American Embassy.
- (4) Trips and aims of the trips of GRYAZNOV to Berlin in 1960, and KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in 1960 and Copenhagen in 1961.
- (5) Knowledge of foreign agents obtained from conversations with leaders of other departments.
- (6) Planning for technical counterintelligence from a building opposite American Embassy.
- (7) Overdraft of operative money made by KOVSHUK.
- (8) Facts about the 2nd Section's cases pertaining to BELITSKIY, []^(S) and others and the trip of the Chief of 2nd Section, PETROV, to Frankfort in 1961.

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[2. KOVSHUK's Acquaintance with Americans]

~~(u)~~

On page 158 it is stated that NOSENKO said KOVSHUK had personal contact with some American Embassy Officers but NOSENKO could identify only WINTERS. On page 159 it is indicated that NOSENKO did not know that [] (S) was identified formally by the American Embassy to the Soviet Government as a CIA employee; he was also not aware that KOVSHUK was in personal contact with [] (S) ~~(u)~~

COMMENT:

On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO stated that KOVSHUK had social meetings with [LEWIS W. BOWDEN.] ~~(u)~~ On April 26, 1968, (N-186), NOSENKO stated that he believed KOVSHUK also knew

[] and [] (S) ~~(u)~~

[3. GOLITZYN's Information Re Recruitments]

~~(u)~~

On pages 162 and 163 information is set forth which was obtained from GOLITZYN pertaining to recruitments or possible recruitments of American personnel. It was reported that GOLITZYN visited the Embassy Section in the Spring of 1960 and learned ~~(u)~~

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It is considered probable that the 1961 communication referred to by GOLITZYN is identical with, or related to, data furnished by [] in (S) 1967 which indicated KGB was emphasizing operations against code clerks in 1961. The contents of the document made available by [] undoubtedly (S) emanated from JOHN DISCOE SMITH, a former State Department code clerk and crypto technician who resigned in December, 1959, left the United States in May or June, 1960, and whose whereabouts thereafter were unknown until he was publicized as a defector by the Soviets in the Fall of 1967. X (u)

In this connection it is not clear how GRYAZNOV of the SCD would have knowledge of SMITH in the Spring of 1960. If SMITH was an agent prior to that time he would have been an agent of FCD. NOSENKO has reported, however, that another friend of GRYAZNOV's, NIKOLAY SKVORTSOV of FCD was handling "ZHARI" (believed to be the crytonym of SMITH) in 1961 and later "ZHARI" was X

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being handled by ARTEMEV of the SCD. ~~(S)~~ (u)

The possibility exists that GOLITZYN obtained information regarding the "real agent" from SKVORTSOV rather than GRYAZNOV. SMITH could have arrived in Moscow or otherwise have been in contact with SKVORTSOV during the period April - July, 1960, which GOLITZYN indicates in the period he talked to GRYAZNOV. At any rate, there is no certainty that an American code clerk assigned to Moscow in the Spring of 1960 had been recruited by KGB as alleged. ~~(S)~~ (u)

4. [redacted] (S)

Page 163 also sets forth information obtained from GOLITZYN who said that in the Spring of 1960 he was told by GRYAZNOV that the latter had developed an operation against an Embassy [redacted] (S) KGB was 99 percent sure that

[redacted] would be recruited. ~~(S)~~ (S)

In January, 1961, GOLITZYN learned from KOVSHUK that

[redacted] (S) then a KGB agent, had recently been used ~~(S)~~

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in the successful recruitment of an employee of the American Embassy. (It should be noted that when GOLITZYN was interviewed by FBI concerning this matter GOLITZYN related that he had inquired concerning his possible use of [redacted] ^(S) but had been denied permission because he had been used in another operation. GOLITZYN could not be sure that the operation had been successful and presumed that it was against an employee of the American Embassy. From KOVSHUK's comments he assumed that the operation was successful.) ^(S) ⁽⁴⁾

The comments of GRYAZNOV and KOVSHUK undoubtedly refer to KGB efforts to recruit [redacted] ^(S) Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning this operation is set forth on pages 166-177 of CIA paper. It is noted therein that GOLITZYN's information concerning the use of [redacted] ^(S) in the attempted recruitment of [redacted] ^(S) dates the incident at the end of [1960.] ^(S) NOSENKO claimed that the approach took place about [June, 1961,] ^(S) and [redacted] ^(S) claimed that it took place in October, 1961. It was concluded that GOLITZYN's timing was more plausible and therefore the operation against [redacted] ^(S) took place more than six months prior to the time claimed by NOSENKO and [redacted] ^(S)

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It was stated that such an inaccuracy by NOSENKO concerning an event which took place less than a year before he described it to CIA in June, 1962, undermines his claim to the role he played and his claim to have been Deputy Chief of Section 1 and Supervisor of code clerk operations. ~~XS~~

COMMENT:

It is noted that []^(S) when interviewed substantially confirmed NOSENKO's version of the approach except for the date. He also related that in the middle of [October, 1961,]^(S) on the evening of the KGB recruitment attempt against him, he saw "MICHAUD" (SKVORTSOV), []^(S) and an unidentified female sitting together in the American House Club. (Note that []^(S) actually left Moscow in [August, 1961.]^(S) ~~XS~~

[]^(S) was interviewed by FBI Agents on May 22, 1968, and readily identified the photograph of SKVORTSOV as MARCEL MICHAUD whom he had seen on one occasion at American House. He related that he had visited American House Club one evening during the ~~XS~~

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middle of the week and observed several people sitting at a table. He probably recognized someone at the table (he cannot recall specifically) but approached the table and asked one of the two females at the table to dance. While dancing she said she was a "journalist" from West Germany, that she was with MICHAUD (who posed as a French businessman, a furrier) but he was bothering her and she did not want to stay with him. After dancing with this girl he met MICHAUD who praised the French female's ability to make love. ^(S) [] described the girl as age 24, attractive, dark hair, five feet two inches. He did not recall her name. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

^(S) [] stated that ^(S) [] could have been at the table but he could not recall specifically seeing ^(S) [] on this occasion. He was positive, however, that this was the only occasion that he had seen MICHAUD at American House. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

Later in the evening the West German girl went to his room for a drink. He arranged to see her again. ^(u) ~~(S)~~

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at which time he visited Red Square with her and recalls seeing a puppet show. Thereafter she returned to his room and performed a perverted sex act on him. (u)

[] (s) could not recall the date of this incident but believed that it occurred approximately the beginning of [February, 1961.] (s) He was certain that it did not occur before his vacation trip to [] (s) the last week of [January, 1961.] (s) He was also certain that it occurred in cold weather because the female wore winter clothing when they visited Red Square and he recalled the weather was very cold. He stated that the incident definitely occurred before the first week of [May, 1961.] (s) because during that week he went to [] and did not return until mid-July, 1961. (s) At the time of his return there was a letter waiting for him from this West German girl. He left Moscow permanently in [August, 1961.] (s) (s) [] was interviewed on August 15, 1968, by FBI Agents in an attempt to fix as accurately as possible (s)

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the date on which KGB made the recruitment approach to him. (It is noted he stated on September 28, 1964, that on the evening he was approached, prior to leaving American House, he had seen []^(S) dancing with a girl who accompanied MARCEL MICHAUD (SKVORTSOV) to American House. It is also noted that []^(S) in interview on May 22, 1968, recalled seeing MICHAUD on one occasion only. He was certain this took place prior to the first week of [May, 1961,]^(S) when he left Moscow for []^(S) returning [in mid-July, 1961.]^(S) []^(S) recalled seeing []^(S) with MICHAUD on one occasion which he believed was either the evening of the recruitment approach to him or the date of the prior visit to MICHAUD's apartment about ten days earlier. He also recalled that the weather was very cold at the time of the approach. On the first visit to MICHAUD's hotel it was snowing and on the night of the approach it was very cold because he wore a heavy coat and a hat. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

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[redacted] ^(S) at first stated that the approach was about four months before he left Moscow and then stated it was about one and one-half months and not more than two months. He claimed that he did not have long to go until the end of his tour of duty. He is certain that his replacement [redacted] ^(S) had not arrived at the time of the incident. [redacted] ^(S) arrived in Moscow in September, 1961.) He also stated the incident occurred after he saw the message which pertained to [redacted] ^(S) homosexual activities. He believed the incident occurred quite sometime after the Ice Capades people were in Moscow because he had a good time when they were there and he did not have a good time after the approach. He stated that he did not believe he could have "sweated it out" for as long as six months; that regardless of how it may appear, his recollection is that the incident could not have happened more than two months before his departure. Despite [redacted] ^(S) contentions, it is noted that both he and NOSENKO have indicated that MICHAUD did not

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visit the American House over an extended period of time; that []^(S) recalls []^(S) with MICHAUD just prior to his visit to MICHAUD's hotel; that []^(S) dates the incident when he saw MICHAUD as prior to May, 1961; and that both []^(S) and []^(S) refer to the cold weather. []^(S) left Moscow in [August, 1961,]^(S) and []^(S) arrived in [September, 1961].^(S) (Both probably before very cold weather.) These factors together with NOSENKO's assertion that []^(S) was approached before []^(S) departure on [June 16, 1961]^(S) strongly indicate that []^(S) was approached sometime before May, 1961, and that NOSENKO's version of the date of the approach is more accurate than GOLITZYN's version. ~~(S)~~

~~5.~~ [] ~~(S)~~

Pages 178-181 relate to the KGB attempt to defect []^(S) a U. S. Army specialist who served in Moscow from December, 1960, to June 16, 1961. The paper raises a number of questions concerning NOSENKO's version of this incident. ~~(S)~~

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It is stated that no KGB officer directly connected with the case could regard []^(S) as a replacement for []^(S) It was noted that []^(S) did not identify the photograph of NOSENKO as the individual who approached him at the airport and his description of this person did not fit that of NOSENKO. It was stated that []^(S) prior to his departure from Moscow, acknowledged to his superiors that he had homosexual tendencies and admitted being involved in three homosexual incidents at American House. (It is noted that NOSENKO claimed that KGB knew from the microphone coverage that his homosexual activities were not discussed with []^(S) prior to his departure and hoped to induce his defection by sending him a letter which would suggest he was in trouble because of these activities.) ~~XX~~

The paper also concluded that KGB would have learned from microphone coverage, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, that ^(S) [] did report the receipt of the KGB defection letter to his

superiors. ~~XX~~

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COMMENT:

The fact that []^(S) was trained for a period of time by []^(S) in the []^(S) could well suggest to the KGB that he was to be the replacement for []^(S). The U. S. Army intelligence file was reviewed by FBI representatives on July 10, 1968, and contained no indication that []^(S) homosexual activities were discussed with him before he left Moscow on June 16, 1961. On the contrary a memorandum prepared by his superior, []^(S) the U. S. Army Attache dated June 16, 1961, which summarized []^(S) activities, mentioned derogatory comments which had been received about his relations with members of the American Ice Capades who were known or suspected homosexuals and noted that []^(S) had been informed of the reasons for his transfer from Moscow, "except that he was not informed of the allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union." ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

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This memorandum clearly supports NOSENKO's version of this incident. ~~(S)~~ (u)

With regard to [] failure to identify NOSENKO it is pointed out that he saw the individual who approached him only momentarily, but it is recognized that his description of the individual is not close to that of NOSENKO. ~~(S)~~

6. [] ~~(S)~~

Pages 181-184 relate to the KGB operation against [] ~~(S)~~ who arrived in Moscow in September, 1961, to assume the [] duties of [] ~~(S)~~ and to remain there until January, 1963. On page 183 it was stated that [] ~~(S)~~ admitted to U. S. Army authorities in 1963 that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman "LILLIAN" who had visited American House with someone from the United Arab Republic and returned alone a few days later. The American House manager interviewed her and learned that she claimed to be from Vienna and was traveling with her employer, a Czech. The Embassy security officer learned ~~(S)~~

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that she had no Austrian passport and asked her for her passport. She left and never returned to American House. It was stated that NOSENKO described this incident in connection with KGB attempts to entrap []^(S) in []^(S) 1960, not []^(S) in []^(S) 1962; that interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he knew of this incident. ~~XS~~

Also with regard to the []^(S) case, it is stated that NOSENKO identified ELLA UMANETS as a KGB agent employed at American House but never related her to []^(S) ~~XS~~

COMMENT:

On March 20, 1968, (N-167), NOSENKO related that in 1960 GRYAZNOV had gone to East Germany and brought to Moscow two girls who were to be targeted against American House. One of these girls, possibly known as "HANNAH", described by NOSENKO as a fat blonde in her mid thirties, posed as a correspondent from West Germany. This girl was introduced into American House with the help of []^(S) ~~XS~~

NOSENKO stated that another woman had been documented as an Austrian but had not been successful ~~XS~~ ^(u)

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as an agent against American House. He said this woman had some difficulty at American House regarding her passport. ~~(S)~~ (u)

From information set forth above obtained from [redacted] (S) it appears clear that NOSENKO did not confuse the use of a female agent in the [redacted] (S) case with that in the [redacted] (S) case. [redacted] (S) confirmed that he had contact with a West German "journalist" at American House. The "LILLIAN" described by [redacted] (S) could be the girl documented as an Austrian as related by NOSENKO or could be still a third female. ~~(S)~~

The discrepancy between NOSENKO's description of the "journalist" and that by [redacted] (S) is not considered particularly significant although NOSENKO appears to be in error. He probably confused the "West German" with the "Austrian." ~~(S)~~

7. [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)

Pages 185-192 relate to KOSOLAPOV's trips to Helsinki and the [redacted] (S) and [redacted] (S) cases. It is stated therein ~~(S)~~

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that NOSENKO claimed KOSOLAPOV traveled to Helsinki in early 1960 for a double purpose (1) to probe for a new way to get in touch with American code clerks and (2) to make contact with [redacted] ^(S) who was to come to Moscow via Helsinki. NOSENKO claimed to have read KOSOLAPOV's report indicating that he had made contact with [redacted] ^(S) on the train trip from Helsinki to Moscow. It was noted that in fact [redacted] ^(S) name is listed on the train manifest for [March 31,] ^(S) 1960, and the alias used by KOSOLAPOV is listed on the manifest for [April 2,] ^(S) 1960. Thus KOSOLAPOV could not have contacted [redacted] ^(S) on the train. ~~✗~~

It was concluded that the discrepancies indicated NOSENKO was neither KOSOLAPOV's supervisor nor supervisor over all KGB operations against code clerks. This conclusion was strengthened by the fact that NOSENKO could not recall a trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in [November,] ^(S) 1960, at which time he ^(S) apparently returned to Moscow on the same train with [redacted] ^(S) NOSENKO emphatically denied that KOSOLAPOV had traveled to Helsinki except in connection with the [redacted] ^(S) case. It was concluded that ^(S)

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this denial is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor and supervised all operations against American code clerks. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT:

On November 6, 1967, (N-13), NOSENKO submitted comments concerning KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki similar to that information previously furnished by him. On June 1, 1968, (N-200), he insisted KOSOLAPOV made contact with ^(S) on the train trip to Moscow and wrote a report to this effect when he returned. This discrepancy has not been clarified ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

With regard to KOSOLAPOV's second trip to Helsinki it is noted that it took place at about the same time NOSENKO traveled to Cuba. It is also noted that ^(S) denied that he was contacted on the train by any Russian, despite the fact that KOSOLAPOV apparently rode the same train. Since there was no approach to ^(S) and nothing "important" happened on the train, it is not considered ~~(S)~~

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inconceivable that NOSENKO just never was advised of KOSOLAPOV's trip. There appears to be nothing sinister about his denial of knowledge of this trip. (S) ~~X~~

~~8~~ [] (S) ~~X~~

Pages 193-199 relate to the KGB operation against

[] (S) It is stated that NOSENKO is apparently unaware of [] (S) sexual involvement with friends of KGB agent SVETLANA IVANOVA at the apartment of SARWAT EL SHAZLY, his illicit currency dealing with PIETRO CECCHI and his relationship with ELLA UMANETS. It was also stated that NOSENKO erred in relating the East German female agent sent to the American House to [] (S) that this incident occurred later. It was concluded that this case indicates NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks. ~~X~~ ~~X~~

COMMENT:

As indicated above [] (S) has furnished information regarding his relationship with a West German journalist who is undoubtedly one of the East German girls brought to Moscow by GRYAZNOV, one of whom posed as a West German correspondent as related by NOSENKO. ~~X~~ ~~X~~

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On January 11, 1968, (N-92), NOSENKO gave a written summary of the []^(S) case which was basically the same as his previous information but added that []^(S) and a U. S. Marine in 1961 met out in the city of Moscow, a female agent who worked at American House, and her girl friend. They went to a restaurant and about one or two o'clock in the morning returned to the American Embassy (or American House) where the girls remained until morning. He also related that []^(S) was not approached by KGB primarily because []^(S) was considered more important and KGB did not want to prejudice that case. ~~Q~~

On April 6, 1968, (N-177), NOSENKO stated that he believed that the Marine who went to the restaurant with []^(S) was []^(S) further that SARWAT EL SHAZLY also reported something about []^(S) but he could not recall what it was. ~~Q~~

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On May 7, 1968, (N-190), NOSENKO stated that girls working in the American House were reporting on []^(S) and he was particularly friendly with SVETLANA IVANOVA. He said PIETRO CECCHI also reported "pieces of information" about []^(S) but NOSENKO did not know of any black market dealings between CECCHI and []^(S). He stated that the photographs of []^(S) with the Polish girl were considered insufficient to compromise him and KGB wanted to create something more, possibly photographs with Russian girls. IVANOVA was considered as a prospect in this connection and she and her girl friend had met []^(S) and a Marine in a restaurant and thereafter spent the night in the "flat" of one of the Marines. At this time he stated that the Marine with []^(S) on this occasion was possibly []^(S) X

It is noted that when []^(S) was interviewed on October 16, 1962, he furnished information regarding his intimacy with the friend of SVETLANA IVANOVA in the apartment of []^(S) X

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He stated that []^(S) was also present and presumably was intimate with SVETLANA. He related that he and []^(S) had also met three Russian girls in SARWAT's apartment but were not intimate with them. (This is inconsistent with data set forth on page 198 of the CIA paper.) ~~X~~ ~~X~~

[]^(S) admitted exchanging currency with PIETRO CECCHI but claimed that these exchanges did not exceed \$200 or \$300. ~~X~~ ~~X~~

Thus, contrary to the CIA paper, NOSENKO is aware of []^(S) sexual involvements and the East German girl was involved with []^(S) NOSENKO's information seems adequate for a supervisor. ~~X~~ ~~X~~

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X 9. [] (S) (X)

Pages 203 and 204 relate to []

[] (S) in Moscow who was a target of KGB. KGB attempted to lure him into downtown Moscow using SVETLANA IVANOVA. It was related that NOSENKO stated [] (S) had refused her invitations and KGB had no derogatory information regarding him. It was also noted that during a State Department security interview [] (S) admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment; that she had told him that she was pregnant and asked for money for an abortion. ~~SECRET~~

COMMENT:

[] (S) was discussed with NOSENKO on January 27, (N-113), and April 6, 1968, (N-177), but he could furnish no additional information. It is noted, however, that [] (S) during State Department interview on July 27, 1962, stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on December 27, 1961, and was intimate with her in her apartment on approximately three occasions thereafter ~~SECRET~~

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She told him she was pregnant about May 1, 1962, and he was transferred from Moscow during that month. NOSENKO transferred from the American Embassy Section in early January, 1962, and thus would logically not have knowledge of [] (s) intimacy with IVANOVA. (S)(u)

10. JOHN ABIDIAN (S)(u)

Pages 205-220 relate to the Security Officer JOHN ABIDIAN and the KGB operations against him. NOSENKO had furnished detailed information regarding this case which included data indicating that a female KGB agent TATYANA FEDOROVICH was used to place "metka" (an odorless substance) on ABIDIAN's clothing. Later this substance was found on letters mailed by ABIDIAN and traced to him. It is stated that ABIDIAN had no maid until 16 months after his arrival in Moscow and FEDOROVICH did not become employed by him until July, 1961. It was concluded therefore that FEDOROVICH could not have applied metka as claimed by NOSENKO which resulted in the interception of the letter mailed by ABIDIAN on April 1, (u)

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1961, and probably she was not yet employed at the time of his mailing of a letter on July 2, 1961. ~~(S)~~ (u)

The CIA paper also takes issue with NOSENKO's statements regarding ABIDIAN's visit to a dead drop site on December 30, 1961. NOSENKO claimed to have read the initial surveillance report covering this visit, to have visited the site himself and to have reviewed reports covering observation of the site for approximately three months. It was concluded that NOSENKO was not ABIDIAN's case officer. ~~(S)~~ (u)

COMMENT:

NOSENKO was interviewed concerning ABIDIAN on May 1, 1968, (N-187), and stated that KGB knew that [redacted] ^(S) a female employee of the American Embassy, was ABIDIAN's mistress. TATYANA FEDOROVICH was [redacted] ^(S) maid and was sent to ABIDIAN's apartment by [redacted] ^(S) to clean his apartment. This agent placed "metka" on his clothing as early as 1960. ~~(S)~~ (u)

ABIDIAN was subsequently interviewed by a representative of CIA and confirmed that this maid ~~(S)~~ (u)

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disclosed that the name following number 33 was []^(S) that following 34 was []^(S) that following 35 was []^(S) and that following 36 was []^(S) []^(S) The other two names were of KGB case officers who NOSENKO stated were undoubtedly the case officers of []^(S) and []^(S) NOSENKO stated that these were four individuals of interest to PETROV and the 2nd Section was interested in placing microphones against them. (This is discussed later in this paper under New Information and as indicated therein, []^(S) and the []^(S) have been identified. They were in the USSR in 1961 [] []^(S) and had been in contact with components of CIA. ~~XX~~

The above information would appear to be a plausible explanation as to how NOSENKO came into possession of the list of microphones. ~~XX~~(u)

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the Embassy. He furnished information possibly pertinent to this matter on March 22, 1968, (N-168). He stated that in 1961 the First Department had initiated planning in connection with the establishment of an apartment across the street from the American Embassy which was to contain some special equipment. This equipment was to be provided by the Department of Defense which would supply experts to operate it. This operation was discussed with officers of OTU and reference was made to checking on waves or short waves. The planning resulted from coordination of the coverage of all western attaches under YEVGENIY NIKOLAYEVICH ALESHIN, Deputy Chief of the 1st Department who was supervising it. KOVSHUK, Chief of the 1st Section did not handle it. In the late 1950's or early 1960's they [redacted] of the 2nd Department had found out that the [redacted] were [redacted] The monitoring was done from the [redacted] and a cottage owned [redacted]

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by the [redacted] (s) In 1961 discussions were held regarding checking of the [redacted]
[redacted] (u)

NOSENKO also stated that the Ministry of Defense had a permanent post behind the American Embassy which was not related to the above matter. When NOSENKO went with VENYAMIN KOSLOV to visit surveillance posts of the 1st Department, 7th Directorate, located around the American Embassy, KOSLOV pointed out the building where the Ministry of Defense monitoring post was located. This post had been set up prior to 1961. (u)

On March 26, 1968, (N-169), NOSENKO expressed the opinion that the new installation which was planned in 1961 was not related to either the [redacted] (s) monitoring or the permanent post of the Ministry of Defense, but was a different kind of technique. (u)

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14. NOSENKO's Knowledge of CIA Personnel

Pages 240-248 relate to NOSENKO's knowledge of CIA personnel within the American Embassy. It was noted that NOSENKO claimed that he would necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected as CIA officers. NOSENKO had stated that [redacted] (s) was considered to be the CIA resident. [redacted] (s) had no connection with CIA.) ABIDIAN was considered a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct. (He was a State Department officer who was utilized by CIA and was, in effect, the CIA resident.) [redacted] (s) was correctly identified as being connected with CIA. [LEWIS BOWDEN] (s)(u) who according to NOSENKO was suspected of being a CIA officer, had no affiliation with CIA. The same was true of RICHARD FUNKHAUSER. WILLIAM HORBALY was correctly identified by NOSENKO as being connected with CIA, as was GEORGE WINTERS. ~~XS~~

According to NOSENKO, STANLEY BROWN, [redacted] (s) [redacted] (s) and PAUL GARBLER were not suspected by KGB. (They were CIA employees.) The paper noted that both [redacted] (s) and GARBLER were known to KGB as CIA officers although this was apparently unknown to NOSENKO. GARBLER was known as a CIA officer to GEORGE BLAKE. ~~XS~~

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COMMENT: On January 27, 1968, (N-113), NOSENKO was shown a list of names including some American and Soviet employees of the American Embassy. He recognized the name of RICHARD FUNKHAUSER, stated he was suspected of connections with American intelligence and VYACHESLAV ALEKSANDROVICH KUSKOV was working against him. Concerning the name [redacted] (S) he stated that [redacted] (S) was an [redacted] (S) in the American Embassy and "mailed letters" and was considered to be connected with American intelligence ~~XXXX~~

In connection with NOSENKO's statements regarding [redacted] (S) it is suggested that the fact he replaced [redacted] (S) who had been regarded by KGB as the CIA resident, would be sufficient for KGB to consider that [redacted] (S) was connected with CIA despite the fact coverage of his activities disclosed no clandestine operations. ~~XXXX~~

It is also noted that PAUL GARBLER did not arrive in Moscow until November 29, 1961. Information identifying him as an American intelligence officer ~~XXXX~~

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would undoubtedly have been in possession of FCD but there is no assurance that it would have come to NOSENKO's attention prior to his departure from the 1st Section, 1st Department, SCD in January, 1962.

It is suggested that FCD would have been very careful in disseminating information received from FCD agent GEORGE BLAKE prior to BLAKE's apprehension by the British. ~~(S)~~

15. ~~(S)~~

On page 248 it is stated that NOSENKO did not know of ~~(S)~~ contacts with homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in 1961 although NOSENKO claimed to have been their case officer at that time. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT:

Elsewhere in this paper NOSENKO's relations with these two agents is set forth in some detail. NOSENKO stated that he possibly did not know of all contacts these homosexuals made with Americans. On November 14, 1967, (N-22b), NOSENKO described in some detail the ~~(S)~~ case indicating that these ~~(S)~~

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two agents were used in [1959]^(S) to get compromising photographs of []^(S) The compromising materials were furnished to the 2nd Section of the 1st Department which recruited him when he returned to the USSR in [1960 or 1961].^(S) PETROV, Chief of the 2nd Section, told NOSENKO that []^(S) had admitted connections with American Intelligence; that his task was to find Russians for future recruitment. The 2nd Section was preparing some individuals (to serve as double agents). The case officer was VADIM UDILOV~~✗~~

The fact that the 2nd Section was handling the case in 1961 may well explain why NOSENKO would not be aware of []^(S) 1961 contacts with these two homosexual agents. ~~✗~~

[16. NOSENKO's Travel to Cuba] ~~✗~~ (u)

On page 254 it is stated that NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States and his travel to Cuba damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks in 1960. It was indicated that with active operations going he ~~✗~~ (u)

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COMMENT:

On November 4, 1967, (N-10a), NOSENKO furnished basically the same information concerning the Bulgarian trip set forth in the CIA paper. The fact that there was no apparent necessity for the Bulgarian Minister of Interior to request a KGB officer for consultation is not a reasonable basis for judging this account to be untrue. ~~(S)~~ (u)

[18. Transfer to 7th Department] ~~(S)~~ (u)

On page 260 it is stated that NOSENKO dated his transfer to the 7th Department from the 1st Department as occurring before the defection of GOLITZYN which he dated as mid-January, 1962, despite being advised that the correct date was December 16, 1961. ~~(S)~~ (u)

COMMENT:

NOSENKO during interview on March 6, 1968, (N-157), recalled that KGB had sent a cable to Helsinki after GOLITZYN's defection instructing that the residency make contact with [redacted] ^(S) to warn him. NOSENKO and KOVSHUK contacted TARABRIN of FCD to arrange for the cable to be sent. KOVSHUK ~~(S)~~

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and NOSENKO were Chief and Deputy Chief of 1st Section, 1st Department. It appears that his previous recollection of transfer before GOLITZYN's defection was in error. ~~(S)~~ (u)

19. NOSENKO's Knowledge of [] and [] (S)

On page 261 it is stated that NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with [] (S) and KOSOLAPOV's connection with [] (S) refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB recruitment attempts. ~~(S)~~ (S)

COMMENT:

During the April 10, 1968, (N-178), interview, NOSENKO stated that KUSKOV had the file on [] (S) who was the [] (S) Advisor at the Embassy. He advised he never heard anything particular about [] (S).

With regard to [] (S) NOSENKO on April 6, 1968, (N-177), stated KOSOLAPOV had his file; however, NOSENKO insisted that he had no knowledge of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki in connection with [] (S) and he would have known about it if anything important developed. It is noted that [] (S) denies any recruitment approach. ~~(S)~~ (S)

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On April 22, 1968, (N-184), NOSENKO stated that he could not make a flat statement that he would have known of any recruitments in the American Embassy during the 1955-59 period but believed he would have heard of them. He would have known of any such recruitments in 1960-61. He believed he would also have known of any recruitments in the 1962-63 period because he saw GRYAZNOV frequently and GRYAZNOV talked freely because NOSENKO helped him advance from Senior Case Officer in January, 1962, to Deputy Chief of Section 1, then Chief of Section 1, and then Deputy Chief of Department 1 about August or September, 1963. ~~(S)~~ * (u)

In view of NOSENKO's stated knowledge of [] (S) and [] (S) and the officers who had their cases and since there is no evidence that either was the subject of a recruitment approach or other important development, it is submitted that his lack of knowledge ~~(S)~~

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of KOVSHUK's relationship with [] and of
KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki does not refute his
contention that he would have known of all important
developments pertaining to the 1st Section, 1st
Department in 1960-61. ~~(S)~~ (u)

[F. Assignment to the 7th Department
January, 1962 - January, 1964] ~~(S)~~ (u)

Pages 263-333 pertain to NOSENKO's claims of
assignment to the 7th Department during 1962-64, first as
Section Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
to July, 1962, and thereafter as Deputy Chief of the 7th
Department until his defection. It was concluded his claims
are not credible. ~~(S)~~ (u)

[1. NOSENKO's Substitute as Chief] ~~(S)~~ (u)

On page 265 it is stated that NOSENKO claimed he had
no Deputy Section Chief and did not indicate who was assigned
his duties in his absence. ~~(S)~~ (u)

COMMENT: On July 3, 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO specifically
stated that V. G. DERA was the officer whom he designated ~~(S)~~ (u)

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to act as Section Chief during his absence. He also utilized NOSKOV in this capacity on occasion. (u) ~~(S)~~

~~2.~~ NOSENKO's Contacts with [] (S)

On page 266 in discussing the [] (S) case it is stated that [] (S) asserted he met NOSENKO in Odessa in February, 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT:

On November 4, 1967, (N-10b), NOSENKO wrote concerning the [] (S) case that [] (S) returned to the USSR in 1962 with a group of correspondents and "I have seen him twice. In March, 1963, 'Artur' [] (S) on the ship 'Olympia' was in Odessa, where I flew and have seen him." Whether NOSENKO saw him in Odessa in February, 1962, has not been clarified. (S) ~~(S)~~

~~3.~~ VOLKOV and [] (S)

On page 267 it is stated that NOSENKO is apparently uninformed regarding the use of VOLKOV in a KGB entrapment operation against American tourist [] (S) in July, 1962. ~~(S)~~

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COMMENT: This has not been clarified but as indicated above, NOSENKO stated that VOLKOV and YEFREMOV may have had contacts with Americans without advising him. On July 27, 1968, (N-212), []^(S) name was included in a list displayed to NOSENKO. He failed to recognize it. ~~(S)~~ (U)

[4. MARINA RYTOVA] ~~(S)~~ (U)

On page 268 it is stated that NOSENKO claims that he was officially registered as the case officer of MARINA RYTOVA until his defection in 1964 although she had obtained a job at the Communist Party Central Committee school and had ceased all agent work. ~~(S)~~ (U)

COMMENT: On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated that although RYTOVA was no longer being used, her file had not been retired and he was still considered the case officer until his defection. ~~(S)~~ (U)

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5. [] (S) (X)

Pages 268-272 relate to the KGB entrapment of []

[] (S) It is stated on page 272 that although [] (S) apparently confirmed NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual time frame. It was pointed out that according to his version, within five days of [] (S) arrival KGB would have discovered he was a homosexual, concluded he was a threat, after intercepting his letters, and arranged his entrapment. The rapid pace of events suggests that his homosexuality was already known to KGB. Therefore, NOSENKO's participation contradicts his assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American Department (S) (X)

COMMENT: On November 7, 1967, and March 6 and 7, 1968, (N-15, N-157, N-159), NOSENKO discussed the [] (S) case, furnishing basically the same information previously furnished. He added that DERA was the case officer for this case and DERA had posed as the Administrator of the hotel in which [] (S) was registered (S) (X)

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took the "akt" from him and then brought him to NOSENKO who obtained the agreement not to criticize the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated that the homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV spotted ^(S) soon after his arrival. At about the same time his letters were intercepted. KGB had no advance information concerning his homosexuality. ~~(S)~~

Considering NOSENKO's limited role in this matter and his claimed position as Chief of Section, it seems that his recall of this matter is adequate. With regard to the rapid pace of the operation, it is believed that KGB is certainly capable of moving rapidly when necessary. NOSENKO's account does not appear implausible. ~~(S)~~ ^(u)

~~(S)~~ ^(S)
On pages 272-273 the ^(S) case is discussed. It is stated that NOSENKO's ignorance of ^(S) Bible smuggling and the fact that his activities had been ~~(S)~~

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publicized in the Soviet press indicates that he had no intimate connection with this case. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On May 25, 1968, (N-198), NOSENKO related that

when he returned to the 7th Department as Chief of Section 1 he was shown, at his request, materials on Section 1 cases which included the ~~(S)~~ case.

~~(S)~~ was suspected of intelligence connections;

however, NOSENKO disagreed with this conclusion.

Although ~~(S)~~ was involved with a girl he carefully turned off the lights during intimacies and was not successfully photographed; he drank with her in restaurants and gave gifts to Baptists; he had indicated he would return to the USSR and consideration was given to covering him again at that time. ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO identified the photograph which was supplied by ~~(S)~~ of the girl with whom he was involved, LUDMILA BUGAEVA, and said he had seen her a couple of times. ~~(S)~~

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Considering NOSENKO's position and connection with this case, his recall appears adequate. ~~(S)~~(u)

[7. KGB Officers in Geneva] ~~(S)~~(u)

Pages 279-280 discuss NOSENKO's comments regarding KGB officers within the Soviet delegation to Geneva in 1962. It was noted he identified only OLEG GRINEVSKIY as having a connection with KGB although he described A. K. KISLOV and V. G. FILATOV. It was stated that CIA tentatively identified all three of these Soviets as KGB officers. KISLOV was observed in KGB operational activity in Washington and Moscow; FILATOV served as an alternate contact in France with the KGB agent GEORGE PAQUES. [redacted] ^(S) reported that GRINEVSKIY handled a [redacted] ^(S) On page 280 it is noted that NOSENKO reported in 1964 for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGP operational contact in the U. S. and had been introduced to NOSENKO by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to their departure for Geneva in 1962. ~~TS~~

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was a Section 2 case, but as a part of his duties in Geneva as a counterintelligence officer he was to direct BELITSKIY only if the Americans should make contact with him. It was stated that ARTEMEV, contrary to NOSENKO's claims, was not inexperienced and had been involved with a series of CIA American tourist agents in the Soviet Union of which NOSENKO was unaware although it occurred in 1958-59. It was also stated that NOSENKO had limited knowledge of the BELITSKIY case and it was concluded that he did not exercise any supervisory functions. ~~XX~~ (u)

COMMENT:

One of the CIA tourist agents involved with

ARTEMEV was [] (S) who was in Russia in

1958. NOSENKO has advised that coverage of [] (S)

was started by 7th Department but 1st Department took

the case over after [] (S) was observed to mail a

letter. Since NOSENKO was in 7th and ARTEMEV in the

1st, it is not unreasonable NOSENKO did not know of

ARTEMEV's connection. ~~XX~~

Another CIA tourist agent involved with

ARTEMEV traveled on a diplomatic passport. It is ~~XX~~ (u)

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NOSENKO stated he was thankful at the time to the Americans for continuing the BELITSKIY operation although he had exposed it in 1962 ~~(S)~~ (u)

On August 1, 1968, (N-213), NOSENKO stated ARTEMEV was selected as Security Officer for the delegation because he knew English and French. The 2nd Section did not have anyone with language capabilities. This may explain why an officer of the 1st Section, would have been given the task of directing BELITSKIY in Geneva rather than an officer of the 2nd Section which handled the case. It is also noted that BELITSKIY was the subject of investigation. However, NOSENKO in the current interviews does not claim that ARTEMEV was inexperienced or that he (NOSENKO) exercised any supervisory functions of ARTEMEV's handling of BELITSKIY. ~~(S)~~ (u)

9. [] (S)

On page 290 it is stated that NOSENKO was unaware that [] had corresponded with a girl friend in Leningrad (S)

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and that she had spent a week with []^(S) in Moscow during which the recruitment attempt was made by KGB~~(S)~~

COMMENT:

On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated that he did not know about the girl friend of []^(S). He said this was probably known to KRUPNOV, his subordinate, who was the case officer. Considering NOSENKO's limited participation in the case, his lack of knowledge of the girl friend does not seem unusual. ~~(S)~~

[10. PAVEL FEDOROVICH SHAKHOV] ~~(S)~~ (u)

On page 291 it is concluded that NOSENKO did not direct the investigation of PAVEL FEDOROVICH SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1962. The SHAKHOV case is discussed on pages 276-278 and it is noted therein that NOSENKO claimed SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer. It was stated that RASTVOROV had identified him as a KGB officer, PETROV and DERYABIN reported that his photograph was familiar, BOURBON identified him as an "employee" of KGB, an FBI source said he was a pure diplomat and []^(S) said he was still under suspicion. ~~(S)~~ (u)

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(It is noted that [redacted] (S) described SHAKHOV as an agent rather than an officer of KGB.) (u)

COMMENT:

Nosenko was interviewed concerning SHAKHOV on February 24, 1968, (N-108), and related that he was a diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the 1930's and before that had worked for the Young Communist League in Leningrad. In the 1940's he had worked for the Soviet "Embassy" in the USA and was an FCD agent with the code name "RICHARD". In the 1950's KGB stopped work with him as an agent and put his file in the archives. He participated in many meetings and conferences relating to disarmament. In the late 1950's KGB started a "checking file" on him because he was suspected of connections with American Intelligence and there was a "signal" indicating a connection with the American diplomat [redacted] (S). Because of these suspicions, in 1962 a plan was prepared to check him and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva as security (S)

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This suspicious behavior was somehow connected with [redacted] (s) who had worked in Moscow and who was known as an active intelligence officer. KGB decided SHAKHOV must be an agent or contact of [redacted] (s) ~~(u)~~

In addition, SHAKHOV was close to one

(s) [redacted] (possibly [redacted] (s) employed by the United Nations) who was suspected of connection with American, British, and Israeli Intelligence and was also at one time connected with Soviet Intelligence. Investigation of SHAKHOV had been initiated before 1962, possibly 1960 or 1961. After NOSENKO's 1962 report regarding coverage in Geneva, PETR IVANOVICH MASSYA was later sent to Geneva with a delegation and also checked SHAKHOV negatively. ~~(u)~~

NOSENKO commented that, although the file was closed, any KGB officer who would be present at any conference attended by SHAKHOV would be told to keep an eye on him. Also SHAKHOV would never be trusted ~~(u)~~ (u)

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and would not be reinstated as an agent of KGB. ~~(S)~~ (u)

With regard to the identification of SHAKHOV by the defectors mentioned above it is noted that only []^(S) and NOSENKO were in a position to have accurate knowledge of his connection with KGB and both identified him as a former agent rather than an officer. ~~(S)~~ (u)

11. []^(S) On page 296-297 the []^(S) case is discussed.

NOSENKO claimed that []^(S) visited the Soviet Union in 1958-59, was placed under KGB surveillance, was observed in a Ministry of Defense automobile and GRU later admitted to KGB he was of interest to GRU. Subsequently in 1962 while NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors he noted []^(S) name and prohibited additional KGB investigation because of GRU's interest. The paper asserted that []^(S) had no valid U. S. passport between 1940 and June, 1961, and if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently he could not then have been the tourist target of the ~~(S)~~ (u)

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7th Department as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO was mistaken and was referring to ^(S) 1961 visit he could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists because NOSENKO was in the American Department at that time. ~~TS~~

COMMENT: This case has not been clarified but no ulterior motive is seen in NOSENKO's insistence that the first incident occurred in 1958-59, if it were not true. His insistence can only raise questions concerning the accuracy of his recollections. ~~TS~~ (u)

12. LEE HARVEY OSWALD u

On page 309 it is stated that NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of LEE HARVEY OSWALD's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington (in efforts to return to the USSR in 1963) discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with OSWALD. ~~TS~~ (u)

COMMENT: This matter has not been completely clarified although NOSENKO's lack of cognizance of this matter would not appear to seriously discredit him. OSWALD's ~~TS~~ (u)

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With further reference to the 1957-59 cases, NOSENKO stated on July 27, 1968, (N-212) that there was no time limitation put on BOBKOV's request. He wanted a list of recruitments and the list was prepared from available files, recollections of officers etc. without reference to year of recruitment. ~~(S)~~(u)

[15. Recall Telegram] ~~(S)~~(u)

Pages 324 and 325 relate to the recall telegram and it is noted that NOSENKO alleged that a telegram had been received by the KGB Residency in Geneva on February 4, 1964, ordering NOSENKO to return to Moscow. Eventually NOSENKO retracted this assertion and stated that there was no recall telegram; that he invented the telegram to hasten his defection. It is stated that ^(S) does not confirm the existence of the recall telegram but SCOTCH reported on February 20, 1964, that the KGB resident in New York had advised members of the Residency on February 18 or 19, 1964, concerning the content of telegrams received from KGB ~~(S)~~

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other officers of 7th Department examined the document to assess the effect its disclosure to the Americans by GOLITZYN would have on 7th Department cases. ~~(S)~~ (u)

NOSENKO described the document as ten or twelve pages in length and stated it contained the names of several foreigners against whom 7th Department was working or planned to work. He volunteered that the name [] ^(S) was one of the names in the document and stated he did not think it contained the names of any recruited agents but only suspects or those 7th Department was interested in recruiting in the future. ~~(S)~~

It is clear from the above that NOSENKO not only had knowledge of data received from FCD regarding use of tourists by American Intelligence, but he also ~~(S)~~ (u)

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document for [REDACTED] (S)

However, he continued as a member of the Komsomol until the year was up and kept the card for some period after his birthday. ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO described the Komsomol unit as very small, consisting of approximately 17 people. The Secretaries of most of the Departments were females. Dues were collected every month and there was some type of meeting every month. NOSENKO did not remember the name of the Secretary of the KGB Komsomol but stated that he dealt with MARAT SOKOLOV, a member of the Collegium of the Komsomol Bureau who was supervising the Komsomol organization in the SCD. ~~(S)~~ (u)

On April 22, 1968, (N-184), NOSENKO stated he was chosen as Secretary of the SCD Komsomol Unit at a meeting in September ~~(S)~~ (u)

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previously failed to acknowledge that he knew some of these individuals. NOSENKO's current reactions to their names or photographs are set forth below ~~(S)~~ (u)

[redacted] (S)
Page 362

On December 2, 1967, (N-52), NOSENKO was shown a list of names which included [redacted] (S) He said he knew [redacted] (S) who was a Deputy to the Chief of the Special Section, SCD but he did not know [redacted] (S)

[V.A. ZAYTSEV] ~~(S)~~ (u)
Page 364

On February 15, 1968, (N-135), NOSENKO said he knew of some ZAYTESEVs but did not know this one whose photograph was shown. ~~(S)~~ (u)

[redacted] (S)
Page 370

On April 26, 1968, (N-186), NOSENKO said [redacted] (S) was well known but he did not know him personally. ~~(S)~~

[(FIRST NAME UNKNOWN)] (S)
Page 372

NOSENKO made no comment when this name was mentioned to him on November 14 (N-23), and December 2, 1967, (N-51) ~~(S)~~ (u)

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[REDACTED]
Page 373

NOSENKO made no comment regarding this name on October 31, (N-3), and November 20 (N-33) ~~(S)~~ (u)

[VLADIMIR TULAYEV]
Page 373

On December 21, 1967, (N-77), NOSENKO did not recognize this name but later recalled there was an Intourist translator by the name of TULAYEV ~~(S)~~ (u)

[REDACTED]
Page 375

On February 14, 1968, (N-133), NOSENKO, when shown this photograph stated he had seen this person once or twice. He did not recall his name but said he was a young officer of FCD who took English examinations with NOSENKO. ~~(S)~~ (u)

[REDACTED]
Page 379

On December 15, 1967, (N-73), NOSENKO did not recognize the photograph of this individual. He said he knew his father and knew there was a son but he had never seen him ~~(S)~~ (u)

[ANATOLIY GOLITZYN]
Page 383

On November 6, 1967, (N-13), NOSENKO stated that he was not acquainted with GOLITZYN and did not talk to him. ~~(S)~~ (u)

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GOLITZYN did talk to various other SCD officers. ~~(u)~~

~~(S)~~
Page 389 ~~(u)~~

On July 20, 1968, (N-211), although he had not previously recognized ~~(S)~~ photograph when displayed to him, NOSENKO stated he thought this photograph was familiar. It is considered possible that he recalled the photograph from its previous showing to him. ~~(u)~~

[8. KGB Dining Rooms] ~~(u)~~

On page 375 (in Annex A) it is noted SCOTCH stated that NOSENKO knew many of the Chiefs and Deputies of KGB Directorates and Departments and would have knowledge of KGB hierarchy by reason of access to a dining room reserved for Chiefs and Deputies of Departments. The paper stated that NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until January - March, 1965, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the Chief's dining room. ~~(u)~~

COMMENT:

On November 24, 1967, (N-39), while discussing VASILIIY ROMANOVICH SITNIKOV whose ~~(u)~~

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current interrogations have clarified practically all of these cases. ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~(S)~~ Actor [] S

Page 399 refers to a case involving ACTOR (or [] (S)

It indicates that NOSENKO said he was a valuable FCD agent who traveled overtly to Western Europe and thereafter clandestinely to the USSR. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: This case was referred to in notes brought out by NOSENKO in 1964. FBI translated the name in these notes as "EKTER." On December 8, 1967, (N-60), NOSENKO translated the name "ECTOR" but acknowledged it could be "ACTOR." He related that he had noted this name when a representative of the FCD had complained to the 7th Department, SCD, that this name had been included in a communication sent by Intourist through the open mails to various Soviet stations abroad. FCD was afraid its valuable agent would be compromised. This protest took place in 1963. ~~(S)~~ (u)

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NOSENKO believed the agent had travelled to the USSR just prior to the protest. ~~(S)~~ (U)

The translation of the name as "ECTOR" by NOSENKO has produced a more likely suspect than [redacted] (S) referred to in the CIA paper. This individual is [redacted] (S) born [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) He was a communications technician with the United States Air Force in Germany from April, 1957, to March, 1961. [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) reported that a Soviet officer with whom she was in contact requested that she obtain biographic data concerning various individuals in West Berlin, one of whom was [redacted] (S) It appears that this request was made of [redacted] (S) about February, 1961. Investigation disclosed that he is currently an employee of NSA but no record of travel since his return to the United States in March, 1961, has been located. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

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~~2.~~ [redacted] (S) ~~*~~

On page 402 it is indicated that NOSENKO provided no source for his information regarding [redacted] (S) ~~*~~

COMMENT:

On November 14, 1967, (N-22c), NOSENKO stated he had heard from GRYAZNOV that the 1st Department suspected [redacted] (S) was a homosexual and planned "active" work against him. ~~*~~

~~3.~~ [redacted] (S) ~~*~~

On page 403 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [redacted] (S) ~~*~~

COMMENT:

On August 1, 1968, (N-213), NOSENKO stated that [redacted] (S) was in the USSR several times. He was first of interest to the 7th Department in 1957 or 58 but later in 1960, when he came in connection with the Powers case, he was of interest to 1st Department. ~~*~~

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It is noted that NOSENKO was in the
7th Department from 1955 to 1960 and in
the 1st Department in 1960-61. (S)(u)

4. [REDACTED] (S)

On page 407 it is stated NOSENKO did not indicate
the source or date he acquired information on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

COMMENT:

On February 16, 1968, (N-141), NOSENKO
stated that he remembered the name of [REDACTED] (S)
as an auto tourist handled by the 6th Section,
7th Department, who was arrested in 1960 or
1961. He could recall nothing more. (S)

5. [REDACTED] (S)

On page 409 it is stated that NOSENKO has not explained
why he learned of the [REDACTED] (S) case only in 1963 when he
was reviewing the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV although [REDACTED] (S)
was in the USSR in 1959 when they were agents of NOSENKO. (S)

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COMMENT: On February 27, 1968, (N-147), NOSENKO said he remembered the name of [] ^(S) as a tourist, possibly a father and son but could recall nothing more. (It is noted that NOSENKO's notes in which the name [] ^(S) was included have been destroyed. ~~(S)~~)

~~6.~~ [] ~~(S)~~

On page 410 it is stated that NOSENKO indicated no source for his information on [] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On March 18, 1965, (N-165), NOSENKO stated that he got this information from VLADIMIR KRIVOSHEI. ~~(U)~~

~~7.~~ [] ~~(S)~~

On page 413 it is stated that NOSENKO claimed to be in the 7th Department at the time [] ^(S) was a target of the 1st Section, 1st Department. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On December 12, 1967, (N-66), NOSENKO stated that in June, 1963, GRYAZNOV of 1st ~~(S)~~

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Section, 1st Department, had requested NOSENKO's (7th Department) assistance in obtaining a hotel room for a homosexual agent who was acquainted with [] (S) 1st Section desired to obtain photographs through the infrared process of the meeting between the agent and [] (S) ~~XXXX~~

X 8. [MELVIN (MARVIN) KANTOR] ~~(S)~~ (U)

On page 416 it is stated that NOSENKO did not explain why the case on [MARVIN (MELVIN) KANTOR] ~~(S)~~ (U) was included among cases he noted as having occurred while he was in the Embassy Section in 1960-61. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: As indicated previously, NOSENKO related that in 1963 he was requested by a Deputy Chief of SCD to prepare a paper regarding agents of the 7th Department. NOSENKO in turn requested three of the Section Chiefs to give him information. Information regarding ~~(S)~~

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[KANTOR] ^(S) was furnished by EVGENI NOSKOV,
Senior Case Officer, Section 1, 7th
Department, who was acting in absence
of VATALI DERA, Chief of the Section.
This listing of cases was not confined
to the 1960-61 period but included recruit-
ments in other years. ~~X~~

~~9.~~ [] ~~S~~ ~~X~~

On page 417 it is stated that NOSENKO's sourcing
of the lead pertaining to [] has not been estab-
lished. ~~X~~ ^(S)

COMMENT: On November 6, 1967, (N-12a), NOSENKO related
that in 1961 or 1962 this individual had con-
tacted Intourist with a proposal to send
tourists to the USSR. This, of course, was
within the responsibilities of 7th Department
with which NOSENKO was affiliated in 1962. ~~X~~

~~10.~~ [] ^(S)

On page 417 it is noted that NOSENKO saw information ~~X~~

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pertaining to []^(S) only when he was reviewing files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV although he was their case officer when they were in touch with []^(S) in 1959. ~~XXXX~~

COMMENT: It is noted that NOSENKO's notes on []^(S) have been destroyed. This case has not yet been discussed with NOSENKO for clarification. ~~XXXX~~

11. []^(S)
On page 419 it is stated that NOSENKO claims personal knowledge of []^(S) meeting with agent []
[]^(S) father", although he was in the American Embassy Section at the time. ~~XXXX~~

COMMENT: On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated that he had heard of this meeting through another officer. The incident happened after NOSENKO had turned her over to another case officer. ~~XXXX~~ (U)

12. []^(S)
On page 420 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on []^(S)

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COMMENT:

NOSENKO's notes which pertain to [] (S) have been destroyed. On May 23, 1968, (N-197), NOSENKO stated that this case happened in 1959 before he went to the 1st Department in 1960. VLADIMIR IVANOV was working against [] (S) and consideration was given to using GRUSHA, who had been publicly compromised in the United States in the operation. The idea was to photograph [] (S) with GRUSHA as a means of exerting pressure on [] (S) at a later time. This was a 7th Department case while NOSENKO was in the 7th Department. (S)(u)

X13. [] (S)

On page 421 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of information on [] (S)

COMMENT:

On December 5, 1967, (N-54), NOSENKO stated that the information was obtained from the special file of the 7th Department in 1963. (S)(u)

X14. [] (S)

On page 422 it is stated that NOSENKO did not relate the [] (S) case to his 1962-64 service in the 7th Department. (S)(u)

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COMMENT: On November 28, (N-46), NOSENKO stated that this case was included among the notes furnished to him by EVGENI NOSKOV acting for Section Chief VITALI DERA in 1963 (as noted above) ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~15.~~ [] (S) ~~(S)~~

On page 422 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate his original source of information on [] (S)

COMMENT: On March 18, 1968, (N-165), NOSENKO stated that he did not recall how he learned about this case but it happened after he left the 1st Department in January, 1962. ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~16.~~ [] (S)

On page 423 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On November 10, 1967, (N-18d), NOSENKO stated that [] ^(S) was in the USSR as a tourist in 1959, and an agent of the 3rd Section, 7th ~~(S)~~

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Department, had relations with her at the National Hotel which were photographed. ~~(S)~~

In 1962 or 1963 NOSENKO heard from GRYAZNOV that she was again in Moscow [as

[redacted]

[redacted] ^(S) and was in "close relations"

with a foreign Negro. 1st Department was planning to approach her and, if successful, to use her against American code clerks. ~~(S)~~ (u)

17. [redacted] ^(S)

On page 424 it is stated that NOSENKO did not relate the [redacted] ^(S) case to his 7th Department service and did not indicate the source of information. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: NOSENKO stated on November 28, 1967, (N-46), that this was one of the cases furnished by EVGENI NOSKOV in 1963 acting for VITALI DERA as indicated above. ~~(S)~~ (u)

18. [redacted] ^(S)

On page 425 it is stated that NOSENKO did not recall ~~(S)~~

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from whom he had heard about the [redacted] case. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO stated he saw the file on this case. The file was still in the 1st Section, 1st Department, in 1960. ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~19.~~ [redacted] (S)

On page 427 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [redacted] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On November 28, 1967, (N-46), NOSENKO advised this was from NOSKOV as indicated above. ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~20.~~ [redacted] (S) ~~(S)~~

On page 428 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate his source of information on [redacted] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On January 10, 1968, (N-91), NOSENKO recalled this case while discussing cases where KGB or GRU officers came under suspicion. He stated that 7th Directorate surveillance ~~(S)~~

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detected [redacted] ^(S) in contact with a KGB officer.

Such contact had not been previously approved.

This was reported to the Chairman through regular channels and there was a scandal in SCD. GRIBANOV personally reprimanded the officers involved ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

21. [redacted] ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

On page 430 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate his source of information on [redacted] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: It is noted that NOSENKO's notes pertaining to [redacted] ^(S) have been destroyed; however, on November 16, 1967, (N-25), NOSENKO stated that this case occurred in 1959 when he was Deputy Chief of the 1st Section, 7th Department. The case officer for [redacted] ^(S) was MICHAEL VINOGRADOV. On March 29, 1968, (N-174), NOSENKO stated that the Chief of 7th Department, DUBAS, had one or two meetings with him. He was considered to be recruited ~~(S)~~

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but NOSENKO did not know if he ever worked

for KGB. (~~S~~)(u)

X22. [] S

On page 431 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate his source of information on [] (S)

COMMENT: On February 27, 1968, (N-147), NOSENKO stated that he remembered this name and that she was not an American. He said the 2nd Section of the 7th Department was working against her.

[] (S) was in the USSR January - February 1960) (~~S~~)

X23. [] (S)

On page 433 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [] (S)

COMMENT: On November 28, 1967, (N-46), NOSENKO stated that this case was among the cases furnished to him in 1963 by EVGENI NOSKOV, acting for VITALI DERA as noted above. (~~S~~)(u)

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~~24.~~ [] (S)

On page 434 it is stated NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his information on [] (S)

COMMENT: This was also one of the cases furnished NOSENKO by EVGENI NOSKOV as noted above. (~~S~~) (u)

~~25.~~ [] (S)

On page 435 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [] (S)

COMMENT: On November 25, 1967, (N-41), NOSENKO stated that they were auto tourists who were caught by the 7th Department engaging in intelligence activities but the case was taken over by the 1st Department when they visited the USSR in 1961. NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the 1st Section at that time. KOSOLAPOV, who worked closely with NOSENKO, was directly involved in the case. (~~S~~) (u)

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IV. NEW CASES AND NEW OR CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION

Information set forth above regarding the cases discussed in the CIA paper has clearly indicated that the current series of interrogations of NOSENKO in 1967 and 1968 have been much more thorough and have produced voluminous information clarifying data obtained from him in previous interviews. Of particular significance, however, in addition to that set forth above is information obtained during the current series of interviews which is completely new. Some of the information relates to new cases and some of it is new information on cases mentioned previously. Set forth below is a summary of the most significant data in these categories and additional new and confirmatory data obtained during the current interrogation. This material not only suggests that the previous interviews were inadequate but also appears significant in assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO. (S) (u)

A. New Cases

1. [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) and [redacted] (S) and [redacted] (S)

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people of interest to PETROV of the 2nd Section. These names were []^(S) and []^(S). The name A. A. MIKHAILOV was listed beside the name of []^(S) and Y. E. CHERNETSOV was listed beside the name []^(S). NOSENKO stated that these were the case officers handling the cases of []^(S) and []^(S). Ditto marks under the name CHERNETSOV suggested that he also was handling the cases involving the []^(S). At the bottom of the sheet was a name and some numbers which NOSENKO said was the name "ZAITSEV" and a KGB telephone number. ~~XS~~

This is new information and so far as is known
this material had not heretofore been observed or translated
by CIA. ~~XS~~ ^(u)

Investigation has disclosed that []^(S) is probably identical with []^(S) who was in the USSR in connection with the "Plastics, USA Exhibit" in 1961, which was under the auspices of USIA. ~~XS~~

[]^(S) and []^(S) appear to be identical with a man and wife who in applications for passports in April, 1961, indicated they planned to depart about April 20, 1961, for a ~~XS~~

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business trip of four weeks to Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union and England. A subsequent passport application filed by

(S) [] indicated that he was in Moscow from May 20-29, 1961, for "USIA." Inquiry at USIA disclosed that (S) [] was given a contract on April 13, 1961, to design, produce and install the exhibit, (S) [] in the Soviet Union. He was instructed, however, on October 20, 1961, to stop work on the exhibit and travel expenses of \$1600 submitted by him were disallowed. ~~(S)~~

On July 19, 1968, the Director of Security, CIA, advised that in May, 1961, a component of CIA was in contact with (S) [] to discuss problems in the (S) [] field; however, it was not known whether his services were utilized. The Director of Security of CIA has also advised that [] (S) [] was of interest to a component of CIA in 1959 when he represented his company at a fair in the USSR and in 1960 when he was again scheduled to visit the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

(S) [] has not been identified but may be identical with [] (S) [] who was in contact with ~~(S)~~

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YURI V. ZAITSEV, Attache, Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1955; became employed by State Department in 1958; was detached to USIA in 1959 and assigned to the American National Exhibition in Moscow; and is currently a State Department employee. The connections of both [redacted] (S) and [redacted] (S) with USIA and the fact that they were both of interest to CIA are completely consistent with NOSENKO's comments regarding the type of cases handled by the 2nd Section and with PETROV's interest in establishing coverage. The same would apply to [redacted] (S) if he traveled to the USSR in 1961. However, it cannot be stated with certainty that these are the cases PETROV had in mind or, if so, whether they were the only cases in which he was interested at that time. ~~(S)~~

X2. [redacted] (S)

On November 27, 1967 (N-43), when shown a list of American Embassy personnel which included the name [redacted] (S) [redacted] NOSENKO stated there was a military officer who was in Russia for a short period in 1962 who was of interest to the 1st Section of the 1st Department which ~~(S)~~

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initiated an operation against him. This man was born in Russia or his parents were born in Russia and KGB put a female agent "ELLADA" (KLARA GORBUNOVA) in contact with him and NOSENKO believes that photographs were taken of their relations. []^(S) told the agent that he would come again to Moscow. NOSENKO stated that he was told about this case by GRYAZNOV. Investigation to identify this individual has not been initiated but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of NOSENKO's information. ~~(S)~~

~~3.~~ []^(S)

On January 13 and 30, April 10, and August 1, 1968, NOSENKO furnished information pertaining to this case. On January 13 (N-97), he stated that ALEKSANDR STEPANOVICH MALYUGIN was working with agent "AMICO" (PIETRO CECCHI), an Italian cook working in Spaso House. He said that MALYUGIN had another Italian agent who was working in the Argentine Embassy. On January 30 (N-114), NOSENKO stated that MALYUGIN recruited an Italian cook of the Argentine Embassy, a friend of PIETRO CECCHI, in the late 1950's. About 1960 or the beginning of 1961 this agent left Moscow for New York to work as a cook ~~(S)~~(u)

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for the representative of Holland to the United Nations.

This agent's file was transferred to the 1st Department of FCD which was planning to work with him in the U. S. ~~(S)~~ (u)

On April 10, 1968 (N-178), NOSENKO stated that this Italian agent may have been recruited on a homosexual basis and had gone to New York to work as a cook for either the Belgian or Dutch representative to the United Nations. BORIS IVANOV, KGB resident in New York, was in Moscow about this time and was very interested in this cook. NOSENKO believed that he might recognize the name of this agent. ~~(S)~~ (u)

Investigation disclosed that the individual referred to by NOSENKO was most likely identical with [] (S) Italian, born in 1920, who arrived in New York August 31, 1960, and thereafter served as an employee in the household of the

(S) [] Ambassador to the United Nations, [] (S)

Subsequently, in 1961, he began employment as a cook in the

(S) [] Embassy in Washington, D. C. ~~(S)~~

On August 1, 1968 (N-213), NOSEKNO was shown the photographs and names of PIETRO CECCHI and [] (S) at which time he stated that he recognized [] name ~~(S)~~ (S)

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and he was the friend of CECCHI recruited by MALYUGIN. He said ^(S) [] had given "some hint" to MALYUGIN concerning another Italian working in another Embassy who was a homosexual. ~~(S)~~

^(S) [] was interviewed by FBI Agents on August 14 and 16, 1968. He immediately recognized the photograph of MALYUGIN and related how he had been "set up" in Moscow for black market activities. An Indian had requested that he sell some watches. He sold one to a Russian chauffeur and was in contact with another Russian to sell two more. They were picked up by KGB and he agreed to additional meetings under threat of prosecution. MALYUGIN translated at the time of the arrest and subsequently was in contact with ^(S) [] about four or five times. Prior to his departure from Russia another Soviet was introduced to ^(S) []. He selected the photograph of BORIS SEMONEVICH IVANOV as resembling this individual whom he saw for about fifteen minutes. Arrangements were made for subsequent contact in New York but ^(S) [] did not follow through. In 1961 or 1962 he was contacted by a Soviet in Washington. He selected the photograph of VLADIMIR PAVLOVICH ZAITSEV as the Soviet. ^(S) [] maintained that he refused to cooperate with ZAITSEV and has had no further contact. ^(S) [] also denied ~~(S)~~

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that he had furnished information to the Soviets in Moscow but stated that he was afraid not to continue to meet with them. ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ [redacted] ~~(S)~~
On April 2, 1968 (N-176), NOSENKO stated that while looking at an encyclopedia he had seen the name of a flower which reminded him of a KGB agent with an unusual Jewish name FIAKSEL. This agent was married to an American furrier. He also recalled another furrier whose name was [redacted] ~~(S)~~ and another case involving a father and son who were in the tobacco business. This father and son were Americans who had traveled to the USSR and were of interest to MIKHAIL FEDOROVICH SHISHKIN of the 7th Department which had an operation against the son involving KLARA K. GORBACHEVA. (NOSENKO later corrected this name to KLARA KONSTANTINOVA CORBUNOVA.) ~~(S)~~

On April 4, 1968 (N-176), NOSENKO stated that SHISHKIN at one time was Chief of the 1st Section of the 7th Department but later was demoted and became a Senior Case Officer in the Section handling businessmen in the late 1950's. The case involving the American tobacco man and his son occurred in the ~~(S)~~

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period 1957-59 and possibly in 1959. NOSENKO stated that possibly the name of the young man was [] (S)

On April 12, 1968 (N-179), a list of names including those of [] (S) and his son [] (S) was displayed to NOSENKO. He selected the name [] (S) and stated he believed this was the name of the father and son previously mentioned by him. After seeing the name he recalled that he name of the young man was [] (S) rather than [] (S) he did not know if a recruitment approach had been made to these individuals. ~~(S)~~

Investigation disclosed that the [] (S) have been in the tobacco business for many years and have traveled throughout the world including trips to the USSR. ~~(S)~~ (u)

[5. Unknown Subject;] ~~(S)~~ (u)

[American Owner of Hotel or Restaurant] ~~(S)~~ (u)

On December 15, 1967, (N-73), NOSENKO stated that when Premier KHRUSHCHEV came to the United States he was accompanied by various individuals including a Deputy Chief of the 9th Directorate of KGB named SAHNO (or SAKHNO). This individual dealt with managers of hotels and restaurants in connection with KHRUSHCHEV's visit. In 1962 an American tourist, who was the owner of a hotel or restaurant, probably in New ~~(S)~~ (u)

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York, came to Moscow and requested through Intourist to see SAHNO. SAHNO told NOSENKO that he knew this man and asked NOSENKO to accompany him to a meeting with him. The meeting took place in the office of ANKUDINOV, Chief of Intourist and VLADIMIR BABKIN, Chief of an Intourist Department, was also present. The meeting was purely social and there was no recruitment attempt. On March 15, 1968 (N-164), NOSENKO in discussing this case, stated that this man was probably manager of a hotel and merely wanted to see SAHNO out of politeness. ~~(S)~~ (u)

Investigation to date has not identified this individual. (Note: NOSENKO made reference to this incident while discussing the 9th Directorate on July 9 or 13, 1964 but a separate case was not initiated.) ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~6.~~ [] ~~(S)~~ (S)

As indicated above NOSENKO mentioned a furrier by the name of [] ^(S) on April 2, 1968. This case was discussed with him again on April 4 and 12, 1968 (N-176, 179). He stated that he did not know the first name but the man was a furrier who was in the USSR on several occasions. KGB was working against him in the early 1950's and possibly also in the late 1950's. His case was handled by the Section in the 7th Department which handled businessmen. NOSENKO did not know whether this man had been recruited. ~~(S)~~ (S)

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Investigation has disclosed that the individual referred to by NOSENKO is undoubtedly [] (S) a fur broker in New York who has made a number of trips to the Soviet Union. [] (S) has been interviewed and has advised that he lived with a Soviet woman during his stay in the USSR [from 1941-1945.] (S) This woman's name was [] (S) He also advised that he had met TATIANA FIAKSEL about 1946 in the Soviet Union. She later married a friend of his, DANIEL SHERICH also engaged in the fur business in New York. [] (S) did not admit being contacted by Soviet Intelligence but stated he had always suspected that TATIANA F. SHERICH was working for Soviet Intelligence from the time that he had first met her. ✕

B. Additional Significant Data u

[On Cases Previously Reported] ✕ ✕ (u)

[1. JOHN DISCOE SMITH (ZHARI)] ✕ (u)

This case illustrates the inadequacy of the processing of information obtained from NOSENKO during previous interviews. On June 25, 1964, NOSENKO furnished information concerning an American code clerk who had defected to the USSR and who was being handled by NIKOLAY SEMENOVICH ✕ (u)

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KGB as reported by [redacted] ^(S) during early 1967. NOSENKO's information relating to "ZHARI's" connection with India suggested that he was identical with SMITH who was stationed in India from 1955 to 1959 as a code clerk and communications technician. He transferred to Vienna, Austria, in late 1959 but resigned from State Department in December, 1959. SMITH's whereabouts was unknown from May or early June, 1960, until October, 1967, when the Soviets publicized his defection and reported he was in the USSR. ~~(S)~~ (u)

NOSENKO was reinterviewed concerning this matter on October 31, November 29, and December 6, 1967 (N-3, 47, 57), and furnished basically the same information as previously furnished. He was of the opinion that FCD had taken "ZHARI" from India and believed that he had first heard about him in 1961; however, ARTEMEV was connected with him in 1962. ~~(S)~~ (u)

There is little doubt that inquiries in 1964 regarding communications personnel stationed in India prior to 1961 would have discovered the JOHN DISCOE SMITH case three years before the case was reported by [redacted] ^(S) ~~(S)~~ (u)

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for this agent was PAVEL FEDEROVICH PANKRATOV who introduced the agent to NOSENKO because NOSENKO was considering the possibility of using her against correspondent []

[] (S) He and PANKRATOV had a short meeting with her on the street and NOSENKO was introduced to her by PANKRATOV as his KGB colleague. She had been an agent for some time and used on a "neutral base," (occasionally when there was a need on a particular target). PANKRATOV told NOSENKO it would be easy for her to agree to have "close relations" (intimate relations) with a foreigner and NOSENKO said he did not use her against [] (S) but later saw her file when it was in possession of KOVSHUK. ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO said that he had met this agent with PANKRATOV in 1954 and it would have been before mid-1954 when PANKRATOV was transferred from the 1st Department. On April 16, 1968, (N-181), NOSENKO said that KOVSHUK had the file on FIAKSEL in 1960 or 1961 but he did not know why KOVSHUK was holding the file and did not know if KOVSHUK had taken the file over from PANKRATOV in mid-1954. At the time KOVSHUK had the file it was reported that she was coming back to Russia (from the U. S.). ~~(S)~~ (u)

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4. NIKOLAI SKVORTSOV ~~(S)~~ (u)

On June 29, 1968, (N-206), a photograph containing the name of ALEKSANDR MIKHALYLOVICH CHECHEVITSYN was displayed to NOSENKO who identified the photograph as an old photograph of SKVORTSOV. It is noted that CHECHEVITSYN had accompanied ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH SOLOVYEV to Bangkok in 1960 where SOLOVYEV was in contact with a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) This contact was the first step of an attempted recruitment of [REDACTED] (S) who went to Italy later in 1960. It is noted also that NOSENKO advised that SKVORTSOV during 1960-61 was trying to get a visa to go to Italy. ~~(S)~~

Recruitment approaches were made to [REDACTED] (S) by the Soviets in Italy in 1960 and in France in 1962. He was prominently mentioned in information furnished by SHAMROCK which undoubtedly emanated from JOHN DISCOE SMITH, who was well known to [REDACTED] (S)

D. Significant Confirmatory Information U

1. [STRUKOV and URYVAYEV] ~~(S)~~ (u)

On June 29, 1968, (N-206), NOSENKO was shown a list of 165 Soviets who applied for visas to come to the United ~~(S)~~ (u)

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States in 1963 and 1964 under the sponsorship of the Council on Student Travel of the YMCA East-West Committee. NOSENKO selected the photograph of VLADIMIR GRIGORYEVICH STRUKOV which he said was familiar and he thought he was a young officer who "practiced" in SCD in 1962-63 after studying at the higher school of KGB. He also recognized the photograph and name of YURIY VLADIMIROVICH URYVAYEV as a senior case officer in Section 4 of 7th Department. He then recalled that STRUKOV had been afraid to come to the United States. He and URYVAYEV had been selected as security officers for the group but URYVAYEV for some reason did not receive a visa. STRUKOV became an officer in 2nd Section, 7th Department in 1963. ~~(S)~~ (u)

After the interview of NOSENKO a recheck of FBI records disclosed that STRUKOV did come to the United States but URYVAYEV did not. While this is not of major importance, it is considered a significant indication that NOSENKO's knowledge of KGB was not derived from KGB briefing but from actual service as an officer. ~~(S)~~ (u)

2. [] (S)
On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO recognized the

name [] on a list of American Embassy ~~(S)~~

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personnel. He described []^(S) as head of the Sergeants at American House who was spying on the Russian agents in American House and giving KGB trouble. The KGB, therefore, used some "medicine" against him to make him leave. This was done by placing the "medicine" in his bed. This caused an illness which the doctors did not diagnose. NOSENKO thought []^(S) left Moscow in 1960. The case officer working against him was VLADIMIR DEMKIN. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

FBI files indicate that []^(S) U. S. Army Attache and security files were reviewed on May 6, 1963. They disclosed that he arrived in Moscow May 8, 1958, and was assigned duties as manager of American House. He was scheduled to leave Moscow May 7, 1960, but got an extended tour for another year. However, he left April 10, 1961, before the year was up as he was suffering from erysipelas with severe skin rash, swelling about the face and a temperature. It was noted that []^(S) had excellent efficiency ratings and had been commended for his assistance to the exhibit manager of the American National Exhibition in Moscow. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

This also is considered as significant indication that NOSENKO is furnishing information from personal knowledge and not from KGB briefing. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ^(u)

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~~3.~~ [] ~~(S)~~

Page 435 of the CIA paper describes the KGB operation involving the captioned individuals who were arrested and recruited by KGB during 1961 while visiting the USSR. NOSENKO reported that his former subordinate, V. V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case. After the [] ^(S) departure from Moscow they reported their arrest to U. S. authorities and furnished descriptions of the individuals involved in their recruitment. ~~(S)~~

On June 22, 1968, (N-205), the descriptions furnished by the [] ^(S) were discussed with NOSENKO. He suggested that "VIKTOR" described by them would be KOSOLAPOV; the "General" described by them was probably SERGEY MIKHAYLOVICH FEDOSEYEV, and "OLA" was probably BOGDANOVA, a female officer of 1st Section. When shown photographs of one NINA BOGDANOVA and one ELENA BOGDANOVA, NOSENKO believed that NINA BOGDANOVA was identical with the female officer of the 1st Section, 1st Department, who was involved in the [] ^(S) case. He also stated that VLADIMIR L'VOVICH ARTEMEV, an officer of the 1st Department, was involved. ~~(S)~~

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Subsequently photographs of KOSOLAPOV, FEDOSEYEV, ARTEMEV, and the two BOGDANOVAS were displayed to the [redacted] (s) who made firm identifications of KOSOLAPOV, FEDOSEYEV, and NINA BOGDANOVA as being involved in their case. They were not certain that ARTEMEV was involved. X

[4. Trip of NOSENKO's Mother] X (u)

On May 15, 1968, (N-194), NOSENKO in conversation mentioned that his mother had accompanied Madam KOSYGINA on a trip to the Mediterranean and Western Europe in 1956, possibly on the "Pobeda." X (u)

[redacted] to CIA concerning the visit of the "S. S. Pobeda" to Naples, Italy, on September 11-14, 1956. Included in the list of 400 passengers were KLAUDYA KOSYGINA born in 1908, passport number 123494, issued August 27, 1956, and TAMARA NOSENKO, born 1910, passport number 123495 issued August 27, 1956. X (u)

X [5. [redacted]] (s) X

Pages 424 and 425 of the CIA paper contain information concerning the captioned individual. NOSENKO reported that while she was working in Moscow she fell in love with a KGB agent and was the target of an unsuccessful KGB recruitment attempt. X (u)

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It was noted that she reported this recruitment approach in January, 1959, and later furnished details of this attempt to a State Department security officer. ~~(S)~~ (u)

This case is undoubtedly identical with a case previously reported by ANATOLIY GOLITZYN concerning an American secretary who rebuffed a recruitment attempt. The two cases had not been tied together prior to the current series of interviews of NOSENKO. ~~(S)~~ (u)

6. [] (S)

~~(S)~~ VLADIMIR DMITRYEVICH CHELNOKOV ~~(S)~~

On November 18, 1967, (N-30), NOSENKO furnished a written memorandum in which he identified [] (S) as head of [] (S) who dealt with Intourist and visited Russia several times. He worked with his son, [] (S) and both were suspected by KGB of having FBI connections. In 1960 CHELNOKOV, who was Chief of the 7th Department, became acquainted with [] (S) under cover of Intourist. Thereafter he was in contact with [] (S) when the latter was in Moscow. [] (S) had CHELNOKOV's telephone number and CHELNOKOV received a telephone call from [] (S) (who was abroad) on one occasion when NOSENKO was in CHELNOKOV's office. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

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On November 18, 1967, (N-31), NOSENKO stated that although []^(S) would have considered CHELNOKOV to be an Intourist official, NOSENKO believed []^(S) who was very sly, "suspected" CHELNOKOV and used him to settle questions which could not be settled through Intourist. He did not believe that []^(S) would know CHELNOKOV's full name and said that CHELNOKOV had a "city number." NOSENKO had previously explained that KGB officers frequently gave their contacts a "city telephone number" rather than the telephone number of their KGB office although the telephone would be physically located in the office of the KGB officer. ~~(S)~~

On July 3, 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO stated he did not know whether []^(S) knew CHELNOKOV under his true name. On June 10, 1968, a photograph of CHELNOKOV was displayed to []^(S) who failed to recognize it. However, he stated that he knew two Soviets named CHELNOKOV; one worked in the section of Intourist that handled Intourist guides and appeared to hold the position of supervisor. The other was introduced to him in 1958 by an Intourist official SERGI M. GUSKOV, as "an important friend" who could help []^(S) secure an appropriate ~~(S)~~

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gift parcel license. The introduction took place in the Intourist office in Moscow and subsequent meetings occurred in this office or at [] (S) hotel. [] (S) recalled having telephoned CHELNOKOV on several occasions from the U. S.

concerning specific situations involving issuance of tourist visas and related matters. (S)

5. [] (S)

Pages 129-130 of the CIA paper discuss the case

reported by NOSENKO involving KGB approach to [] (S)

[] (S) NOSENKO had reported that

[] (S) was compromised on the basis of intimacies with a Soviet woman which were photographed by the KGB. The recruitment

approach to [] (S) was made by DUBAS, Chief of the 7th Department, who extracted an agreement from [] (S) not to criticize the

Soviet Union. This approach was made in 1957 or 1958 and

DUBAS again contacted [] (S) when he came to Moscow in 1963.

Thereafter [] (S) file was turned over to the FCD. (S)

[] (S) was interviewed by FBI Agents in November, 1964, and confirmed that he had been approached and photographs of him and the Soviet female in compromising positions displayed to him; (S)

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however, he denied intimacies with the Soviet woman or agreement to collaborate with the KGB. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

During the interview [redacted] ~~(S)~~ made available a photograph depicting him and the Soviet woman (NADEZHDA KOLESNIKOVA or KOLESHNIKOVA or KALESHNIKOVA). This photograph was displayed to NOSENKO on May 3, 1968, (N-188), who immediately recognized the photograph of [redacted] ~~(S)~~ and stated that he believed the woman was the Soviet woman with whom he had been compromised. However, he could not be absolutely sure because the hair style appeared to be different. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO stated that although DUBAS (KONSTANTIN NIKITOVICH DUBAS) was Chief of the 6th Department in 1962 or 1963 when [redacted] ~~(S)~~ returned to the USSR, he was invited to contact [redacted] ~~(S)~~ because he had previously talked to him. NOSENKO believed that YURIY BELIKOV served as interpreter for DUBAS during the first interview (1957 or 1958), but DUBAS was probably accompanied by somebody from the 6th Department in the 1962 or 1963 interview. ~~(S)~~

On July 15, 1968, photographs of DUBAS and BELIKOV were displayed to [redacted] ~~(S)~~ by FBI Agents. He immediately identified the photograph of DUBAS as "the Chief" who had made the approach to him. He said the photograph of BELIKOV resembled ~~(S)~~

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