

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10084

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF MR. HALLEY (ALIAS)

DATE : 08/19/75
PAGES : 132

SUBJECTS :

- ASSASSINATIONS
- CASTRO
- 5412 COMMITTEE
- CUBA
- CIA
- DULLES, ALLEN
- JMWAVE STATION
- OPERATION MONGOOSE
- BISSELL
- MCNAMARA, ROBERT
- KENNEDY, JOHN F.
- KENNEDY, ROBERT F.
- 303 COMMITTEE
- SPECIAL GROUP
- 40 COMMITTEE
- LANSDALE, EDWARD
- PARAMILITARY
- CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
- COVERT ACTION
- POISON
- ROSELLI, JOHN
- TRAFFICANTE
- GIANCANA, SAM
- MAHEU, ROBERT
- ORTA, JUAN
- GODOY, ARTURO

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AMLASH-1
HUNT, HOWARD
ZRRIFLE
QJWIN
ALPHA 66
FBI
VARONA
HARVEY
SHACKLEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 245
Folder 5

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 matters pertaining to that survey to the team who was then in
2 charge of the operational activity in Miami. That team was
3 essentially headed by ~~Mr. Al Cox, who has since died.~~

4 Mr. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of JMWAVE station?

5 Mr. Halley. Yes. ~~Mr. Cox~~ was the head, then, of what would
6 be the equivalent of the JMWAVE Station.

7 Mr. Baron. Was he the head of JMWAVE until the point when
8 you replaced him, or until the point you became Chief of the
9 JMWAVE Station?

10 Mr. Halley. That is correct. He was the head of that
11 unit until such time as I replaced him.

12 Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this survey that you
13 were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-called
14 Special Group in the White House which was part of the National
15 Security Council structure and used the project name MONGOOSE
16 for anti-Cuban operations?

17 Mr. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted
18 this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence
19 which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a
20 survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted against
21 Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General
22 Lansdale and Mr. Helms.

23 This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practical
24 purposes the task force unit which was managed by Mr. Harvey.
25 I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that you

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use
2 a silent outboard motor if the surf was high.

3 Mr. Baron. The people involved in manning those crafts
4 would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly?
5 They might be agents, even non-paid agents?

6 Mr. Halley. No, they were not paid. For instance, they
7 might work for a particular cover company. In other words, I
8 am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC
9 Shipping Company. That shipping company was a subsidiary of
10 the Station, if you will, and the ABC Shipping Company ran
11 maybe one LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it
12 could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy-
13 five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them
14 was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels -- I
15 would have to go and look at each vessel.

16 Does that give you a feel for the size of the problem?

17 Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in
18 existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries
19 or companies in cover and supplying the JMWAVE Station with
20 personnel or with equipment?

21 Mr. Halley. We are talking about all of these companies,
22 they probably ~~went up into the hundreds.~~ I distinguish between
23 companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed
24 to companies that were proprietaries. You know, these terms
25 mean different things to me. The nature of the Agency's

Phone (Area 202) 544-3300

WARD & PAUL

410 First St., S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Phone (Area 202) 544-6330

1 involvement in each is different. I am having a little
2 trouble --

3 Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of
4 companies you were receiving help from at that point, and about
5 how many of each there might have been?

6 Mr. Halley. I do not think I could do that. We are
7 talking about **hundreds of** companies that we used during that
8 period of time. Some of them might simply have been a company
9 set up and registered and run out of some attorney's
10 office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership of
11 the small boat.

WARD & PAUL

12 Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have a
13 Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that. Even if
14 I had access to the files to answer your question, it would
15 take me weeks to pull all that together to give you an answer.
16 I don't think there is an overview statement.

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

17 Mr. Baron. Would it be fair to say that you had coopera-
18 tion on a grand scale from all kinds of people in private
19 enterprise in the Miami area, or in Southern Florida?

20 Mr. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had
21 extensive cooperation -- I do not like your word "grand" -- that
22 we had extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in
23 Florida, in the state of Florida, to facilitate the conduct of
24 this clandestine mission.

25 Mr. Baron. Did you also have extensive cooperation from

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 Mr. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships
 2 between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatives
 3 or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would
 4 it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station
 5 ultimately were channeled out through you?

6 Mr. Halley. They should have been, and they were -- you
 7 know this Station went through several mutations in organization
 8 during its existence. I guess the organizational structure that
 9 existed for the longest period of time was something like I am
 10 going to describe to you.

11 There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a
 12 Deputy Chief of Station for operations. That is the gentleman
 13 who is now retired, I think he is still alive, by the name of
 14 ~~Moore, Robert Moore.~~ I had a second Deputy Chief of Station and
 15 he was for Support Patterns. That is a gentleman who is also
 16 retired, ~~a Mr. Corris.~~

17 Then the rest of the Station was organized into a number of
 18 branches. Each branch was organized along functional lines.
 19 Let me give you an example. There was a Foreign Intelligence
 20 Branch. These were people in, what in my terminology would be
 21 classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to
 22 recruit a Cuban diplomat abroad, as an example, dealing with,
 23 you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in
 24 Havana. They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might
 25 live in some city like Havana and have a legal job as a baker or

WARD & PAUL

410 First St., S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign
 2 intelligence to them so they had collection assets that were
 3 reporting to them along the same lines that we did. They did
 4 work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a
 5 couple of groups -- in other words, they had contact with
 6 Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group as a general
 7 rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not
 8 have contact with. So they were working with these kinds of
 9 larger exile groups.

10 The Task Force also specialized in much more economic
 11 activity than I did. That is a question of looking at such
 12 things as ~~England bus exports from Great Britain to Cuba.~~

13 Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary operations, if an
 14 assassination operation had been run by Task Force W, would
 15 you have assumed as Chief of Station in Miami you would have
 16 been aware of such an operation?

17 Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that.

18 Mr. Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial
 19 practice to let you know that there was an operation that might
 20 have been run through Florida into Cuba?

21 Mr. Halley. No.

22 You know, the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism.
 23 You know, let us dispel one thing very promptly here. If you
 24 are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with
 25 the Mafia -- and I think I can tell you frankly at that time I

1 attempt against Castro.

2 Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the
3 time, as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the
4 '72-'73 period, seeing any evidence of that in the file at the
5 time.

6 Mr. Baron. There are **fourteen** folders in the AMLASH file.
7 Did you read all of those files?

8 Mr. Halley. No, I did not.

9 Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that
10 was in the AMLASH files?

11 Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes
12 of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases
13 keep coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry
14 at the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or
15 discussing it with my staff and so on.

16 Mr. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the objective of
17 the contact with Arttime?

18 Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Arttime?

19 Mr. Baron. Yes.

20 Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Arttime thing was looked at
21 as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to
22 see if they could sort of do it on their own. If they could
23 simply be given, you know, X number of dollars, some equipment,
24 some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban
25 solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know,

TOP SECRET

87

1 money. I was opposed to it at the time. And once it was set
2 up, and I did what I was supposed to do, which was to train
3 Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an
4 awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up,
5 you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period,
6 and talked to officers who had, you know, more intimate knowledge
7 of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had
8 occurred.

9 Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was
10 supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating
11 Castro?

12 Mr. Halley. No, not for the specific purpose of assassina-
13 ting Castro.

14 Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASH-1
15 was a reliable agent?

16 Mr. Halley. I really do not know that much about him,
17 you know. This was an operation that was run at that time out
18 of Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it
19 to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, ~~Madrid~~ newspaper
20 articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe.

21 Mr. Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling
22 Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were
23 connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational
24 purpose including the intelligence gathering?

25 Mr. Halley. The only case that I recall is this case that

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

years I have seen literally --

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Halley. Let me go back. You asked me about ZRRIFLE. This is one of a thousand or hundreds of cryptonyms. Every day I read, you know, hundreds of pages of traffic, so when you ask me do I know what ZRRIFLE is, I must answer you off the top of my head no. I have tried to be helpful. I have asked you several times if you could give me a steering tip or show me what direction you are going, I might be able to try to comment on it, but ZRRIFLE as such means nothing to me. You really could not expect that it would, given the thousands of these things that come across my desk.

Mr. Baron. That is absolutely understandable. I want to try to see what happens in the way of getting an unrefreshed recollection from you, then I will go back over these two, especially the next one, QJWIN. Do you recall a CIA asset who went by the cryptonym QJWIN?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Knowing the system, and so forth, normally it would have something to do with ~~Spain~~. It does not ring any bells with me. That is all I can give you, a sort of Pavlovian response. You flash QJWIN on the screen, I am telling you now I do not know, but it probably has something to do with ~~Spain~~.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that a project involving the development of a capability of carrying on assassination was

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 Mr. diGenova. Were there any restrictions, once, for
 2 example, those weapons caches were delivered either by land or
 3 air -- and we have spoken to Mr. Murray who was in the Havana
 4 Station, for example, for awhile and Arthur Avignon who
 5 was head of the Havana Station for awhile who indicated that
 6 they were aware of the weapons drops and were intimately
 7 familiar with where they would be.

8 Mr. Halley. That was all before my time. I have no
 9 knowledge of that. During my time, we made no drops by air.

10 Mr. diGenova. Were there any limitations that were
 11 placed of how the weapons would be used that were delivered into
 12 Cuba to these internal resistance groups?

13 Mr. Halley. I cannot speak to this period that you are
 14 addressing.

15 Mr. diGenova. During your period.

16 Mr. Halley. During my period, the weapons were issued
 17 essentially as self-protection for the people who were living
 18 in the bush. Secondly, to be used in a military operation at
 19 such time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they
 20 were to be used for self-protection if they conducted raids,
 21 ambushes, sabotage operations.

22 Mr. Baron. There is one further quote from Martinez in
 23 this article that I would like to ask you to comment on.
 24 He is quoted as saying: "I took a lot of weapons to Cuba, some
 25 of them were very special weapons for special purposes. They

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

116

1 Mr. Baron. Are you aware of the ~~AMOT~~ program?

2 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

3 Mr. Baron. How was that spelled?

4 Mr. Halley. ~~AMOT~~.

5 Mr. Baron. What was that program?

6 Mr. Halley. That was a program involving a Cuban emigre
7 group that was used as an operational support mechanism to
8 support the Miami Station.

9 Mr. Baron. What kind of support did they provide?

10 Mr. Halley. They were interviewers of refugees who came
11 out of Cuba. They provided translator personnel to translate
12 the Spanish language publications that were of interest to us.
13 They provided information on the various mainstream activities
14 that were going on in the Cuban exile community.

15 Mr. Baron. Did they provide support for paramilitary
16 operations against Cuba?

17 Mr. Halley. They might have identified people whom they
18 thought we should interview or look to or see if they would
19 fit into other paramilitary programs. In other words, they
20 had the contacts in the Cuban community. Say we had a require-
21 ment for a diesel engineer. We would say to the ~~AMOT~~ organiza-
22 tion, we would say we are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel
23 engineer who has a first engine's license, and they would go
24 through all of their contacts until they would come up with
25 one, a week or ten days or whatever, having identified.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6633

1 the fellow, where he was, what he was doing. We would then
2 send somebody around to talk to him independent of them and
3 pick him up to work for us in our maritime activities.

4 It was that kind of operational support.

5 Mr. Baron. People who were part of this program were
6 not used as paramilitary operatives, at least insofar as they
7 operated under the aegis of this program. There were some of
8 them who may have been in the paramilitary program and then
9 left it and were subsequently picked up in the ~~AMOT~~ organiza-
10 tion.

11 Could we go off the record for a moment?

12 (Discussion off the record.)

13 Mr. Halley. We are now back on the record.

14 The ~~AMOTs~~ also worked with us on a common project, which
15 was ~~monitoring Cuban naval traffic,~~ things like that, so they
16 were used across the board for operational support tasks.

17 Mr. Baron. One more general question.

18 Did the JMWAVE Station have an operational relationship
19 with the FBI?

20 Mr. Halley. I would not --

21 Mr. Baron. Was the FBI involved in supporting your
22 activities in any way?

23 Mr. Halley. I would rather phrase that in my language,
24 because I think --

25 Mr. Baron. Go right ahead.

tape & PAUL
WARD

410 First St. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

page 12 line 9 should read
"I do not recall with precision as to
whether it was"

page 13 line 3 should read "then
~~Chavez~~, after that Hart."

page 13 line 20 should read
"issues that were being discussed
and to provide that detailed"

page 14 line 10 should read "
I am aware of the chronology of the
303 Committee, Special Group
40 Committee and so forth but as
I mentioned to you earlier at that
particular time I could not
distinguish between"

page 15 line 11 should read "
I know that shortly after I arrived
in Miami several"

page 17 line 3 should read "we
going to be a code placement
on the Cuban mainland, that"

page 17 line 25 should read "
"you my time at this was essentially
April of 1962 through"

page 18 line 23 should read " or
Mr. ~~Cheser~~ or others who would be
able to give you a better "

page 19 line 4 should read " engage
you know in idle conversation with "

page 20 line 14 should read " this
was the ambience of the time. People
were talking about these "

page 21 line 8 should read " differently
because I think you have several
things "

page 22 line 9 should read "
expected that I could exercise control
through the station over sub a "

page 25 line ~~22~~ 22 should read "
But my chain of command decaying
his "

page 26 line 4 should read " I dealt
with the individuals and not the
three man group as an organizational
entity "

page 26 line 13 should read " group
as opposed to the agency chain of command or

subsequently "

page 28 line 1 should read " I was a ~~substantive~~ substantive management problem oriented type of conversation."

page 28 line 9 should read " the reader as to when my family moved on a permanent change of status"

page 30 line 10 should read " ~~Beard~~ ~~Chewer~~, several other people who went."

page 30 line 13 should read " thing was over after a period of time."

page 31 line 12 should read " collection of operations against Cuba through paramilitary teams."

page 33 line 1 should read " you are going to get past the guard force this is around a "

page 33 line 3 should read " bypass them, you are successful in getting in without a trial or any "

page 33 line 5 should read " plotting your charge and the guard scramble"

page 102 line 18 should read "
he got before he went out that he
was told that we was putting"

page 102 line 21 should read "submits"

page 103 line 6 should read "multi-
purpose weapon that could be used for a
variety of tasks."

page 103 line 20 should read "very
careful when you mentioned this
before to say"

page 111 line 22 should read "got reporting
on revolutionaries and that is why
I may recognize the name in a"

page 114 line 5 should read "I know
that the Agency is doing all these
things. After they are"

page 117 line 14 should read "He
~~not~~ also worked with me on a [redacted]
project, which"

page 119 line 8 should read "I read
this somewhere in the record in past"