

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAM

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

6/25/75

gyp

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21 JUN 74 Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~for~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~out~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is

~~in accordance with~~
requirements levied on the clandestine services.

Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. Background: needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements

Division D in 1960 began the spotting of

agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements [redacted] became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D [redacted] [redacted] could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 [redacted]

[redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ & sporadically [redacted] in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ~~September~~ ^{October} 1960,

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SECRET

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Q Jwin annual salary : ^{SP} 7,200
Travel + ops expenses for
Q Jwin + other agents & agent candidates : 2,000
Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates : 2,000
Travel of staff employees
engaged in Zorife activity : 2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses : 1,000

\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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1) Legal, ethical → morals, operational problems; political: non-attachability.

2) Our own experience (Coughlin) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/ KGB () → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + adjust to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, ^{with maximum high regard for operational security} assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kuba only (e.g., what does know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies

b. Within Kuba, one focal point for control, search, training, case officing, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-station) commo. Word of mouth + no backchannels re topics

d. No PA's, ^(except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officing, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

f. No use of anyone, agent who ^{JUN 24 1975} ever worked for a ^{IA} U.S. Govt. agency. Training by opposition would need.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubaers who can

pass as foreigners.

i. Pretect [redacted] search; this established [redacted]
 j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.
 4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who were obtained U.S. visas

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meetings any candidates in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers mixed - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning hours or breaks in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as fellows to travel, wanted lists, etc.

→ 9. [redacted]

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. [redacted]

Keeping of files.

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freed to travel

6

Legal; operational + ethical → morale problems.

[redacted] case.

[redacted] not secure enough.

1) Maximum security + within KGB only (e.g., how much does [redacted] know-humor?). Limitation on number [redacted]

[redacted] Use of [redacted] objectives.

- 2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DBP authority in this focal point mandate. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.
- 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g., Opium) has been examined.

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8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Greeks) in case of blow. i.e. 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) [redacted] recommended [redacted]
[redacted]

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (ARS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ^{all} ~~any~~ Subsets personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) [redacted] + stable [redacted]

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) For Danger of standbys.


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ied 21 - 25/1 - eye (action)
"The Magic Button"

8

Narcotics Büro ~~✗~~ 
"for a living" - RIS 201 cover

Button - Blueprint - no star
eyes - Jim A. / Contract structure
not a TSD problem  from U-2

Apply brakes

Last report beyond last report &
a comparison of measures -

- El Benefactor - assumptions -

~~_____~~ Example 3 "magic"

Framework of ~~_____~~ job. ~~_____~~
Memo. 

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

~~_____~~ Year

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Anesthesia -

26/1 - ~~_____~~ - ~~_____~~ - Matter -

no file Review - ~~_____~~

1. Select proper open to run -

2. ~~_____~~ Max of 2

3. Security Rules B-WITH-AS-3

4. ~~_____~~ levels ~~_____~~ - Review.

- 6. No [REDACTED]
- 7. No projects or papers except per cases.
- 8. Principal Agent - [REDACTED] -
[REDACTED] Program Chief LCH -
Ticket 1500 - from MB -
mark spot regm. Staff at
project - deo Diako
- 9. Disposal -
- 10. Targets who's names -
Must know before
we can spot -

11. Case officering

12. [REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

FdJ list - Remember

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