

Date:08/15/92  
Page:1

## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

## IDENTIFICATION FORM

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OPERATION MONGOOSE  
ASTRO[R]  
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Box 138, Book 1 of 2, Index Cards, June/July 1975-----  
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT *as sent*  
*Of March 3 94 1(a)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BABUN ✓ <del>Mr. Garcia Molina</del> <del>Mr. Lobo Olavarría</del> <del>Mr. Byron Cameron</del> McCone Bundy	Aug 19, 1964	Castro Special Group/303

OCCURRENCE:

One August 19, 1964 John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate government leaders. The memorandum summarized seven reports rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons interviewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to the CIA.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy Aug 19, 1964	Kelley
FILE:	DATE:
Cage	June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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AS SANITIZED

*Of March 10 94 1(b)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Edwards  
King  
Bannerman ✓

Gomez  
~~Holcombe~~  
O'Connell

DATES:

11/62

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarrassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not Gomez or ~~Holcombe~~, knew (100)

SOURCE:

Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 6/30/75

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
AS SANITIZED

Of March 10 94 1 (b1)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL  
DULLES  
GRAY  
MERCHANT

DATES:

Aug. 12, 1960

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On August 12, 1960 the Special Group heard a summary of the budget for Cuban operations from MR. BISSELL. Approximately ~~1.5 million dollars~~ were required to finance Cuban operations for the fiscal year and a balance of ~~10.5/4~~ was necessary for the remainder of the fiscal year. Major subheadings in the budget were (1) political action, (2) propaganda, (3) paramilitary, (4) intelligence collection, (5) counterintelligence, (6) communications support, (7) support.

It was agreed "This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next 10 days. This was believed to be wise, not because any  
(continued)

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting August 12, 1960  
FILE: Cage

STAFF:

DATE: Robert Kelley  
June 29, 1975

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT *as sanitized*  
*87 March 8 94*

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KING, J. C. HARVEY  
IG REPORT EDWARDS  
BISSELL  
HALPERN

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray Treichler, John Warner, Nestor Sanchez, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortner, Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

**TOP SECRET**

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AS SANITIZED

*Pl March 8 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE      FITZGERALD  
BUNDY      PAPIGH  
JESSUP      RFK  
STEAKLEY      JMWAVE  
JMWAVE      VANCE

HUGHES  
~~BOSCH, JOSE~~

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA  
MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPIGH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would contribute \$50,000. [REDACTED] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
AS SANITIZED

of March 8 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE      FITZGERALD      HUGHES  
BUNDY      PAPICH      BOSCH, JOSE  
JESSUP      RFK  
STEAKLEY      JMWAVE  
JMWAVE      VANCE

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA  
MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

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FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

DATE:

Baron. 7/1/75

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AS SANITIZED

of March 8 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE FITZGERALD  
BUNDY OPAPICH  
JESSUP RFK  
STEAKLEY JMWAVE  
JMWAVE VANCE

HUGHES  
~~BOSCH, JOSE~~

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA  
MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report "related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000.--

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SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75



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AS SANITIZED

By March 10 94 1(a)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BABUN	McCone	Aug 19, 1964	Castro Special Group/303
<del>Mr. Garcia Molina</del>	Bundy		
<del>Mr. Lobo Olavarria</del>			
<del>Mr. Byron Cameron</del>			

OCCURRENCE:

One August 19, 1964 John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate government leaders. The memorandum summarized seven reports rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons interviewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to the CIA.

**TOP SECRET**

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy Aug 19, 1964	<u>STAFF:</u> Kelley
<u>FILE:</u> Cage	<u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975

*NSA requests postponement  
on grounds Sec 6  
(1) (b).*

*Romp  
29 Mar 94*

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

*By March 10 94*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY ✓	4 Sept 1962	MONGOOSE (Phase II)

OCCURRENCE:

"Pursuant to our telephone conversation this afternoon, it would seem worthwhile to get the consensus of the group's views as to the type and timing of the activities in Phase II."

In my opinion, the following numbered activities may pose possible policy questions 20 (balloons), 23 (SWAN radio), 27 (sabotage), 32 (attack agriculture with chemicals), 40 (COMINT), 48-50 (Cuban exiles, Caribbean nations), 54 (post-Castro).

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum from Lansdale to Bundy 4 Sept 1962

FILE: (00688)  
Cage

STAFF:

PGW

DATE: June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

6 of March 10 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge  
~~Castro~~  
IG REPORT  
~~CIA~~

DATES:

early April  
1961  
May, 1975

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that a recent (May, 1975) CIA investigation into possible assassination plots against CASTRO revealed that a cable in Morse code was intercepted about a week before the Bay of Pigs: The cable discusses "Plans of blowing up an electric plant in Havana, and trying to get in a position to assassinate CASTRO. (56) BRECKINRIDGE said that he does not yet know who had sent the cable. But he concludes that this is an assassination plot which was not uncovered at the time the IG REPORT of 1967. (55)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Breckinridge Testimony

STAFF:

DATE: Baron  
7/3/75

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT *as sanitized*  
*of March 1 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~  
Robert F. KENNEDY  
AMLASH-1

DATES:

Oct. 11, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~ (a Spanish-speaking case officer from Headquarters, acting as case officer for AMLASH-1) cabled that AMLASH-1 "was insistent upon meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. KENNEDY, for assurances of U.S. moral support" (88) for AMLASH's activities in Cuba. ~~SANCHEZ~~ recommended that "Highest and profound consideration be given" (88) because AMLASH-1 was determined to attempt an operation against Castro "with or without U.S. support" (88).

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

**TOP SECRET**

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

of March 1 9 84  
2 pages

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
A.M. LASH ✓ <del>STEWART, JACK</del>	March 9, 1961	CASTRO 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

~~JACK STEWART~~, an officer assigned to the Mexico City station, met in Mexico City with a high officer in the Cuban armed forces who was subsequently to become a CIA asset known as A.M. LASH-1.\* ~~STEWART~~ met with A.M. LASH to sound out his views on the Cuban situation. A.M. LASH was in Mexico City to attend a "leftist-sponsored" conference. (78).

The March 1961 meeting was inconclusive, but it led to other meetings out of which Project A.M. LASH was created. A.M. LASH-1 "repeatedly insisted that the essential first step in overthrowing the regime was the elimination of CASTRO himself, which /A.M. LASH-1/ claimed he was prepared to accomplish. He repeatedly requested that we /CIA/ furnish him the special equipment or material needed to do the job." (79).

The IG REPORT concludes that: "The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for /A.M. LASH's/ plottings." (80) (Continued on next card)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

*of March 1 94  
(2 pages)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Desmond FITZGERALD  
AMLASH  
~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~  
Robert KENNEDY  
HELMS

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963  
Nov. 13, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

*Card 1 of 2*

OCCURRENCE:

(CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using ~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

"FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY, who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

**TOP SECRET**

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

*as sanitized*  
*Of March 1 1994*  
*(2 pages)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Desmond FITZGERALD  
AMLASH  
~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~  
Robert KENNEDY  
HELMS

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

Nov. 13, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

*Card 1 of 2*

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using ~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

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According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name. (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

**TOP SECRET**

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AS SANITIZED

*of March 1 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~WATNRIGHT~~

~~TEPEDINO~~

FITZGERALD

AMLASH ✓

DATES:

November 14, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

~~WATNRIGHT~~ met with ~~TEPEDINO~~, who reported to him AMLASH's reaction to his meeting with FITZGERALD. ~~TEPEDINO~~ said that AMLASH dwelt constantly on the fact that "he could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the US Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to ~~TEPEDINO~~, [AMLASH] feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date." (91)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

**TOP SECRET**



CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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*as sanitized  
of march 1 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~Sanchez~~  
AMLASH  
FITZGERALD

DATES:

Nov. 19, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~ prepared a memorandum for the Record which indicated that the CIA would give AMLASH assassination weapons: "C/SAS (FITZGERALD) approved telling [AMLASH] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include... high power rifles W/scopes.....C/SAS requested written reports on AMLASH operation be kept to a minimum." (91) (Emphasis added)

*Note: These are sniper/assassin weapons.*

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

*no sanitized*  
*of March 1 94*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>SANCHEZ</del> Samuel HALPERN AMLASH ✓ Dr. Edward GUNN	Nov. 20, 1963	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

~~SANCHEZ~~ reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)

Samuel HALPERN and ~~SANCHEZ~~ requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for ~~SANCHEZ~~ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93) The next day GUNN delivered to ~~SANCHEZ~~ a pen capable of injecting a poisonous insecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

**TOP SECRET**

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

*as sanitized  
of March 1 94*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>SANCHEZ</del> AMLASH FITZGERALD	Nov. 22, 1963	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

~~Nester SANCHEZ~~ met with AMLASH in Paris and gave him an assassination device (a ball-point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe for the injection of poison). (93-93a) According to the IG REPORT, "It is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (94)

~~SANCHEZ~~ stated "that he received an OPIM cable from FITZGERALD that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off." (94) But, the IG REPORT authors did not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. (94)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

**TOP SECRET**

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMLASH ✓

DATES:

May 3, 1964

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

The [redacted] Station reported that AMLASH "wanted a silencer for the Belgian FAL submarine soonest." (97)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT *as sanitized*  
*87 March 1 94*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>SANCHEZ</del> AMLASH (MANUEL) ARTIME ✓	Dec. 6-7, 1964	Castro
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		
<p><del>SANCHEZ</del> met with AMLASH in Paris. AMLASH indicated that although he was unable to carry out his plans during the past year, he "continued to feel that his solution to the Cuban problem was the only one feasible and that he had to continue trying." (100). AMLASH "was told that the U.S. Government could not and would not in any way become involved or provide assistance in the task he had planned for himself." (100).</p>		
<p>However, the IG REPORT explains that SAS "contrived to put (MANUEL) ARTIME and (AMLASH) together in such a way that neither knew that the contact had been engineered by the CIA. The thought was that ARTIME needed a man inside and (AMLASH) wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, ARTIME might get his man inside and (AMLASH) might get his silenced weapon--from ARTIME. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination weapon for ARTIME to give to [AMLASH], and [AMLASH] did not intend to give it to [ARTIME]."</p>		
<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>	
IG REPORT 1967	F Baron	
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75	

**TOP SECRET**

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT *as sent by*  
*of March 1 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~SANCHEZ~~  
AMLASH ✓  
(MANUEL) ARTIME

DATES:

Dec. 6-7, 1964

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

~~SANCHEZ~~ met with AMLASH in Paris. AMLASH indicated that although he was unable to carry out his plans during the past year, he "continued to feel that his solution to the Cuban problem was the only one feasible and that he had to continue trying." (100). AMLASH "was told that the U.S. Government could not and would not in any way become involved or provide assistance in the task he had planned for himself." (100)

However, the IG REPORT explains that SAS "contrived to put (MANUEL) ARTIME and (AMLASH) together in such a way that neither knew that the contact had been engineered by the CIA. The thought was that ARTIME needed a man inside and (AMLASH) wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, ARTIME might get his man inside and (AMLASH) might get his silenced weapon--from ARTIME. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination weapon for ARTIME to give to (AMLASH), and did not intend to (1001101)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:STAFF:

F Baron

DATE: 7/1/75

**TOP SECRET**

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AS SANITIZED

By March 1 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMLASH ✓

~~TEPEDINO~~

DATES:

Feb. 1965

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

AMLASH requested and received, with CIA Headquarters approval, \$1200 from CIA agents. (106) He also received \$7000 from ~~Carlos TEPEDINO~~ in New York City; approval for this amount is unclear (106).

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

FILE:

DATE:

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AS SANITIZED

*of March 1 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMLASH ✓  
ARTIME

DATES:

Feb. 11, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

AMLASH reported to [ ] ~~Station~~ that he was "to receive one pistol with silencer and one Belgian FAL rifle with silencer from ARTIME's secretary. Both weapons come from U.S. and now [ ]" (103)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF: F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75



DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(Same instruction as card 1.)

DATES:

Apr 17 '61

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)

8. [REDACTED] TSD [REDACTED] participation was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)

9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

10. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

(con't.)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:STAFF:FILE:DATE:

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67

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

**TOP SECRET**

DATES:

FEB. 1961  
(APPROXIMATE)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

Cuba - PHASE I

(Card 1)

OCCURRENCE:

The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEPHERD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, TSD
9. SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35
10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was mentioned repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

FILE:

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AS SANITIZED

62 March 3 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMLASH  
ARTIME ✓

DATES:

Feb. 11, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

AMLASH reported to the [redacted] Station that he was "to receive one pistol with silencer and one Belgian FAL rifle with silencer from ARTIME's secretary. Both weapons come from U.S. and now in [redacted]" (103)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF: F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

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*as sanitized*  
*of March 3 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

**TOP SECRET**

DATES:

*FEB. 1961*  
*(APPROXIMATE)*

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

*Card 1*  
~~CUBA~~ - PHASE I

OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security,  
the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. [REDACTED] Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services
10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to  
the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was en-  
countered repeatedly in this inquiry,  
but he denies knowing of the opera-  
tion in 1960-61.)
12. ☒ ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too  
denies knowing of the operation at  
the time.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

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*67 March 3 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Colby, Wm. E.

*Bay of Pigs*

DATES:

(post 4/17/61)

CATEGORIES:

Trujillo

OCCURRENCE:

When asked what was the reason given for holding back the submachine guns from the dissidents, ~~which guns were already at the station in the D.R.~~, Colby replied "the judgment was that filling the vacuum created by an assassination of Mr. Trujillo was a bigger question than ever, in view of the unsettled conditions in the Caribbean area generally as a result of the Bay of Pigs."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

SSCI; testimony of Wm. E. Colby, 6/4/75

FILE:

Care

STAFF:

JFD

DATE:

6/28/75

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AS SANITIZED

67 March 3 94

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
BISSELL, RICHARD BAY OF PIGS ✓ STATE DEPT.	April 20, 1961	Dominican Republic: Assassination

OCCURRENCE:

The April 20 cable repeats that the [ ] should not be passed until further notice, and states that this is due to the unsettled conditions in the Carribbean (post Bay of Pigs) and also asks the station to report immediately whether the [ ] have been passed. The WH footnote indicates that the [ ] were passed on April 7 of 1961.

Bissell (p. 113) agrees that as of the April 20 cable, the Agency, and in his opinion this was done in connection with State, was telling the station to cool it.

The WH footnote also indicates that the station reported that it was planning to deliver [ ] on April 22, 1961.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: Bissell testimony, 6/11/75; Cable to ~~Ciudad~~  
~~Guillermo~~ from Director, of April 20, 1961.

STAFF: JFD

FILE:

DATE: June 30, 1975

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*8/ March 3 94*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Bissell Maheu Roselli Fidel Castro	Col. J. C. King Howard J. Osborn "1960-61" August, 1960	Castro

OCCURRENCE: In a memo of June 24, 1966, Director of Security for the CIA, Howard J. Osborn set forth the facts involving the Maheu-Roselli affair. The facts are as follows: In August, 1960, Richard M. Bissell approached Sheffield Edwards to determine if the Office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was the liquidation of Fidel Castro. Because of its extreme sensitivity, only a small group was made privy to the project. The DCI was briefed and gave his approval. Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH Division was briefed but all details were deliberately concealed from any of the **JMWAVE** officials. Certain TSD and COMMO personnel participated in the initial planning stages, but were not witting of the purpose of the mission.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum by Howard J. Osborn to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subj: Robert A. Maheu dated June 24, 1966

FILE:

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE: July 1, 1975



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AS SANITIZED

of March 8 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

✓ Bissell  
O'DONNELL

DATES:

Fall 1960

CATEGORIES:

CONGO  
EXECUTIVE ACTION

BISSELL testified that he "very definitely" (p. 75) asked  
O'DONNELL to investigate the possibility of killing  
LUMUMBA.

BISSELL said that this could be an example of Executive  
Action capability but when pressed on the contradiction  
between the dates of late 1960 for his conversation with  
O'DONNELL and May 1961 (or early 1961) for his establishment  
of the Executive Action capability, he said that he did not  
remember whether his assignment to O'DONNELL was part of the  
Executive Action program. (p. 76).

SOURCE:

t

FILE:

Bissell testimony, SSCI

STAFF:

DATE:

Exam  
7/1/75

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of March 8 74

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Silver, Arnold  
Harvey, William ✓  
Bissell, Richard

DATES:

1/26/61

CATEGORIES:  
EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver (52).

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

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*of march 8 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

~~SILVER, Arnold~~

BISSELL, Richard ✓

DATES:

26 Jan. 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with ~~ARNOLD SILVER~~ about the EXECUTIVE ACTION project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52) HARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with ~~ARNOLD SILVER~~. (52)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

*By March 8 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

**TOP SECRET**

DATES:

*FEB. 1961  
(APPROXIMATE)*

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

*castro* (Card 1)  
-CUBA - PHASE I

OCCURRENCE:

The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI   | 10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D            |
| 2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI                                   | 11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to  |
| 3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P ✓                                   | the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was en-          |
| 4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security                             | countered repeatedly in this inquiry,      |
| 5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security,                      | but he denies knowing of the opera-        |
| the case officer   | tion in 1960-61.)                          |
| 6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4                              | 12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security          |
| 7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD                           | 13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too |
| 8. [REDACTED] Chemical Division, TSD                         | denies knowing of the operation at         |
| 9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services | the time.)                                 |

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

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of march 8 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard ✓ GOTTLIEB, Sidney  
HARVEY  
WHITE HOUSE  
~~SILVER, Arnold~~

DATES:

February 1961  
(HARVEY's rough  
estimate)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION / ZRRIFLE  
CASTRO  
~~LENNIN~~ CONGO

OCCURRENCE:

the  
BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability. i.e.,  
a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required." (37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such  
a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability  
with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ~~ARNOLD~~  
~~SILVER~~ and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

end 1 of 2

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

TOP SECRET

CARD 2 of 2

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, Richard

DATES:

Feb 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY used ~~SILVER~~ in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).

IRUGS states that

Sometime shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38STAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75

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of March 8 94

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>Zoghey</del> Harvey Kennedy, Robert Bissell ✓ <b>HALPERN</b>	<del>1961</del> October,	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and ~~Mr. Chose Zoghey~~. ~~Zoghey~~ was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occurred in the middle of Oct. of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both ~~Mr. Zoghey~~ and to me <sup>"for"</sup> to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (8) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

7/1/75

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of March 8 94

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Halpern / Gen Lansdale Bissell ✓ <del>Zookey</del>	Oct 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Shortly after <sup>Halpern's</sup> ~~his~~ meeting with Bissell, Halpern, and ~~Zookey~~ were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove ~~in~~ the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.

**TOP SECRET**

<u>SOURCE:</u>	Halpern 6/18/75	<u>STAFF:</u>	Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>		<u>DATE:</u>	7/1/75



<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>SANCHEZ</del> FITZGERALD AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro  Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 2)

In a memorandum by ~~SANCHEZ~~ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that ~~SANCHEZ~~ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting " (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon." In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the ~~SANCHEZ~~ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F. Baron

DATE: 7/1/75

**TOP SECRET**

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>SANCHEZ</del> FITZGERALD AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro  Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

(CARD 2)

In a memorandum by ~~SANCHEZ~~ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that ~~SANCHEZ~~ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the ~~SANCHEZ~~ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now I want to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:STAFF:

F. Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

TOP SECRET

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*as sanitized  
of march 1 94 1(a)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ARTIME  
AMLASH  
SANCHEZ

DATES:

Dec. 30, 1964

Jan. 3, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

ARTIME and AMLASH met in Madrid, where AMLASH told ARTIME that "he had requested a silencer for a FAL rifle from the Americans, which they had not been able to provide. ARTIME agreed to furnish either a silencer for a FAL or a comparable rifle with silencer." (102) ARTIME reported the results of this conversation in a meeting with SANCHEZ in Florida on Jan. 3, 1965.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

FILE:

DATE:

7/1/75

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67 march 1  
1(a)  
as sanitized  
94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ARTIME

AMLASH

~~SANCHEZ~~

DATES:

Dec. 30, 1964

Jan. 3, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

ARTIME and AMLASH met in Madrid, where AMLASH told ARTIME that "he had requested a silencer for a FAL rifle from the Americans, which they had not been able to provide. ARTIME agreed to furnish either a silencer for a FAL or a comparable rifle with silencer." (102) ARTIME reported the results of this conversation in a meeting with ~~SANCHEZ~~ in Florida on Jan. 3, 1965.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

FILE:

DATE:

7/1/75

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*of March 15 94*  
*1(a)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ARTIME

AMLASH

~~SANCHEZ~~

DATES:

Dec. 30, 1964

Jan. 3, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

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**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

FILE:

DATE:

7/1/75

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AS SANITIZED

of march 15 94  
1(c)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> Walt ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, BRUCE CHEEVER (CIA),	<u>DATES:</u> 9/14/62	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented
--	--------------------------	---

OCCURRENCE:  
Possibility of sabotage of [ ] spare parts allegedly ready for shipment to Cuba  
by [ ] is being looked into--Chief, Task Force W says this activity is underway.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962- Walt Elder <u>FILE:</u> Cage 00049	<u>STAFF:</u> PGW <u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975
---	--

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AS SANITIZED

of march 15 94  
1(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
RIFK	✓ Mr. McCone	Oct 9, 1962	Special Group (Augmented)
McGeorge Bundy	Mr. Wilson		
Mr. Johnson	Dr. Charyk		
Mr. Gilpatric	Dr. Scoville		
Gen. Taylor	Col. Steakley		
	Col. <del>John Ford</del> (C.F.A.)		Mongoose

#### OCCURRENCE:

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Over-flights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accompanied by all out Elint support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

#### SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting of  
FILE: Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.

#### STAFF:

DATE: PCW

(02821)

6/29/75

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67 March 15 94  
1(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Bundy ✓ Thompson Vance McCone Desmond Fitzgerald <u>OCCURRENCE:</u>	July 23, 1964	Duvalier Special Group/303

On July 23, 1964 the 303 Committee met and discussed Haiti. "At the present time there is no U.S. involvement with the insurgency effort against the Duvalier regime."

The Committee approved the passage of approximately \$100,000 on a non-attributable basis to [redacted] which might serve a useful purpose". Ambassador Thompson noted that "The Dominican government had formerly requested U.S. assistance in getting [redacted] and his colleagues to move out of the Dominican Republic."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for the record, July 24, 1964, Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 23, 1964 <u>FILE:</u> Cage	Kelley DATE: June 30, 1975



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*as sanitized*  
*Of March 15 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE     FITZGERALD  
BUNDY     PAPICH  
JESSUP     RFK  
STEAKLEY     JMWAVE  
JMWAVE     VANCE

HUGHES  
[REDACTED]

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA  
MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) "The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report "related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000.-- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would contribute \$50,000. [REDACTED] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from [REDACTED] to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

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of March 15 94  
1(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE  
BUNDY  
JESSUP  
STEAKLEY  
JMWAVE

FITZGERALD  
PAPICH  
RFK  
JMWAVE  
VANCE

HUGHES

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA  
MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

**TOP SECRET**

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\_\_\_\_\_ would contribute \$50,000. \_\_\_\_\_ approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

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FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McCONE      FITZGERALD      HUGHES  
BUNDY ✓      PAPICH  
JESSUP      RFK  
STEAKLEY      JMWAVE  
JMWAVE      VANCE

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA  
MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) "The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report "related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000.

The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence." [redacted] would contribute \$50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected.

SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF  
DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

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*as serialized*  
Of March 15 94  
1c

PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
McCONE FITZGERALD  
BUNDY PAPICH  
JESSUP RFK  
STEAKLEY JMWAVE  
JMWAVE VANCE

HUGHES  
[REDACTED]

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA  
MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000. [REDACTED] would contribute \$50,000. [REDACTED] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

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FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

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RELEASE

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*as sanitized*  
*of March 15 94*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

**TOP SECRET**

DATES:

*FEB. 1961*  
*(APPROXIMATE)*

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

*Castro*  
*CUBA - PHASE I*

*(Card 1)*

OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI ✓
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security,  
the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8.   Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services
10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to  
the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was en-  
countered repeatedly in this inquiry,  
but he denies knowing of the opera-  
tion in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too  
denies knowing of the operation at  
the time.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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AS SANITIZED

3 DEC 93

(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

✓ Lansdale  
Lt. Col. Patchel  
~~Bruce Chever~~  
Sec. Gilpatric

DATES:

13 Nov 62

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
Cuba

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale states, "This news came as a surprise, since I had no information about the Matahambre sabotage operation since 4-5 Oct and asked ~~Bruce Chever~~ (in Bill Harvey's absence) specifically for information about all CIA action teams inside Cuba on 30 Oct and again on 31 Oct so that I could give a firm report to Dept. Sect. Gilpatric prior to negotiations with the Soviets. ~~Chever~~ had not mentioned the Matahambre sabotage team when I asked about action teams inside. ~~Chever~~ did mention that two action teams were inside (one small one in Central Cuba, and one with about 200 men in Western Cuba), that these teams were under orders not to take actions, but to collect intelligence.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Lansdale's memo for the record, 13 Nov 62

STAFF:

PGW  
6/30

FILE:

DATE:

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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AS SANITIZED

3 DEC 93

(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms	Gilpatric
✓ Gen. Lansdale	RFK
Lt. Col. Patchell	McCone
Bill Harvey	Gen. Carter
<del>Chever, Bruce</del>	Frank Hand

DATES:

13 Nov 62

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
Cuba

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale states, "at 16:50 tonight, Lt. Col. Patchel informed me that Bob Hurwitch of State had just telephoned to report that Radio Havanna reported the capture of a CIA sabotage team at the Matahambre mines.

Lansdale was in a staff meeting at the time and he asked Patchel to check the truth of the information with CIA. Patchel informed Lansdale at 1705 that he had talked to Bill Harvey who reported that sabotage teams (of 4 and 2 men each) had departed the US on 17 Oct and gone in on 19 Oct, made an attempt, gone into hiding when the exfiltration point was cut off; they had remained in hiding until 2 Nov, when they were picked up.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Lansdale's memo for record dated 13 Nov 62 (00749)

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: PGW  
6/30

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

William Harvey  
Gen. Lansdale  
Walter Elder  
DCI

DDP  
Mr. Halpern

KIRKPATRICK

CHEEVER

DATES:

Nov. 21, 1962

11/14/62

10/30/62

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented  
Operation Mongoose  
Cuba

OCCURRENCE:

With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and AMTORG teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which

SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

STAFF:

Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE:



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*1/5/94*

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*3 Dec 93*

*(1)(A)  
 (1)(B)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

✓ SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,  
 LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-  
 PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER

*Harris Craig*

DATES:

June 27, 1962

~~June 21-23, 1962~~ MONGOOSE

*7/1/62*

*6/21-23/62 ✓*

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. ~~The defector,~~

~~has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 to same abroad.~~ Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented  
 from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-  
 00400)  
FILE:

STAFF:

di Genova

DATE:

July 1, 1975

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*1/5/94*

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*3 DEC 93*

(1)(A)  
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

✓ SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,  
LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-  
PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER

*Harris Craig*

DATES:

June 27, 1962

~~June 21-23, 1962~~ MONGOOSE

*7/1/62*

*6/21-23/62*

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented

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SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented  
from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-  
00400)  
FILE:

STAFF:

di Genova

DATE:

July 1, 1975

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*3 Dec 93*  
*(1)(A)*  
*(1)(B)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,  
 LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-  
 PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER

*Harris Craig*

DATES:

June 27, 1962

~~June 21-23, 1962~~ MONGOOSE

*7/1/62*

*6/21-23/62*

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented

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SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented  
 from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-  
 00400)  
FILE:

STAFF:

di Genova

DATE:

July 1, 1975

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3 DEC 73

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, ✓ LANSDALE TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL- PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Mateos, Lopez JFK	July 5, 1962	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE: President Kennedy's visit to Mexico greatly enhanced U.S. goodwill in Mexico. It fulfilled U.S. plans to impress upon Castro that Mexico is solidly with the United States and the West. State believes this should ease the way for future discussions about Cuba with the Mexicans. Re: Operation MONGOOSE, the joint communique issued by President Kennedy and President Lopez Mateos included a phrase which was "They proposed to respect and maintain the principles of non intervention--whether this intervention may come from a continental or extracontinental state--and of self-determination of peoples." In response to a Lansdale query, the Department of State noted that "There were no developments resulting from the President's trip to Mexico including the text of the joint United States-Mexico communique which alter the basic guidelines which govern the Cuba Project." Lansdale noted that the CIA now had 45 Asians in Havana operating. In addition there are agents and teams in the provinces. "Voice of Cuba" broadcasts from the U.S. Navy submarine were successful. "It is noted that UPI carried this news item but spiced it up with added stories of Castro's use of militia against guerillas in Mantanzas. SOURCE: The 2 stories put together by UPI have no relationship in reality and to keep within Mongoose guidelines."

STAFF:

di Genova

1 1975

STATE  
(X)(B)  
JW  
6 JUL 73

(00406-00408)

NO OBJECTION *as excised*  
 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
*MM 1/5/94*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED</del> <del>MONGOOSE, (TAYLOR, (RFK), (JOHNSON),</del> <del>GILPATRICK, (MCCONE), CARTER,</del> <del>LEMNITZER, (LANSDALE), CLINE, PARROTT</del>	July 12, 1962 July 20, 1962 April 9, 1963	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE (CARD ONE OF TWO)

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize ~~Japanese~~ purchases of Dominican sugars so that the ~~Japanese~~ could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned,

SOURCE: Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE,

(00031-00032)  
FILE:

STAFF: (continued)

di Genova  
DATE: July 2, 1975

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to  
☐ With concurrence of ☒ In part and excise as shown  
☐ Declassify, Sec. 1.3 (a)  
 EDC/HDR by *945*  
*(C)(c)*  
*6/24/93*

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(1)(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LANSDALE, HARVEY, ~~MONGOOSE~~, SPECIAL  
GROUP AUGMENTED

CARD ONE OF TWO

DATES:

✓ July 24, 1962  
~~July 11, 1962~~  
~~July 31, 1962~~  
~~July 23, 1962~~  
~~March 16, 1962~~

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE: As to Phase I, CIA staff personnel up to 477 are devoting full time to this effort. "A very large number of additional personnel are devoting part time efforts to Operation MONGOOSE." Hard intelligence coverage of Cuba has been developed. Fifty-nine controlled agents inside of Cuba exist. Not so successful on infiltrating intelligence reporting in resistance cadre teams. Failure to meet the original schedule of team infiltrations primarily was due to two factors: "(a) Lack of policy approval by higher authority to make any extensive utilization of Department of Defense personnel and support." "Had we been permitted to mount a more intensive and aggressive, the original infiltration schedule probably would have been met, possibly exceeded." The speed and extent of future infiltration teams for resistance purposes into Cuba "will of course depend upon policy approvals by higher authority and the amount of support we can count on thereunder." "It is our opinion that there is an excellent chance such a revolt could be incited

SOURCE:

Memorandum for Lansdale from William K. Harvey  
re: Operation MONGOOSE--end of Phase I, July 24, 1962 (00452-  
00458)  
FILE:

STAFF:

(CONTINUED)

DATE:

di Genova  
July 2, 1975

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7 Dec 93  
(1)(A)

CARD #1

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Special Group (Augmented);  
MONGOOSE; Lansdale; Taylor; Johnson  
Gilpatrick; McCone, R. Kennedy,  
Limnetzer Barry Leon

DATES:

4/9/63

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented;  
MONGOOSE

(CNR) 14/63

OCCURRENCE: Memo from the Special Group (Augmented) from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE progress, dated 31 May 1962. CIA attempting to recruit a Cuban diplomat in place and an official in an airlines office in Havana. The CIA team in Pinar del Rio province was successfully resupplied by maritime means on 24 May. "Fracturing the regime has been given priority attention by CIA. A senior case officer has been assigned full time to the specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of twenty-four desirable defection targets, CIA has found several who seem vulnerable (including the [redacted])

[redacted] " CIA awaits approval for "Voice of Free Cuba" which it can now put into operation immediately: CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castro's failure to Cuban population via balloons; CIA requests group approval for defense support in training of twenty-man teams for possible use in beefing up resistance groups in Cuba; and CIA asked the group for approval before

SOURCE: proceeding with the counterfeit currency project under Task 23.  
continued on Card 2

Memo for the Special Group (A); Lansdale, re Operation

FILE: Mongoose progress, 31 May, 1962 (00335-37)

STAFF:

DATE:

di Genova  
2/1/75

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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JE 7 Dec 93  
(1)(A)

CARD #1

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Special Group (Augmented); MONGOOSE; <u>Lansdale</u> ; Taylor; Johnson Gilpatrick; McCone, R. Kennedy, Limnetzer <i>Boyle, Leon</i>	4/9/63	Special Group Augmented; MONGOOSE <i>(C) (S) (U) (K) (L)</i>
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> Memo from the Special Group (Augmented) from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE progress, dated 31 May 1962. CIA attempting to recruit a Cuban diplomat in place and an official in an airlines office in Havana. The CIA team in Pinar del Rio province was successfully resupplied by maritime means on 24 May. "Fracturing the regime has been given priority attention by CIA.—A senior case officer has been assigned full time to the specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of twenty-four desirable defection targets, CIA has found several who seem vulnerable (<u>including the</u> <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;"> </span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;"> </span>). CIA awaits approval for "Voice of Free Cuba" which it can now put into operation immediately: CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castro's failure to Cuban population via balloons; CIA requests group approval for defense support in training of twenty-man teams for possible use in beefing up resistance groups in Cuba; and CIA asked the group for approval before</p> <p><u>SOURCE:</u> <i>Proceeding with the counterfeit currency proposal under Test 23.</i> continued on Card 2</p> <p><u>FILE:</u> <i>Memo for the Special Group (A); Lansdale, re Operation Mongoose progress, 31 May, 1962 (00335-37)</i></p>		
		<p><u>STAFF:</u></p> <p><u>DATE:</u> <i>di Genova 2/1/75</i></p>



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7 Dec 93  
(1)(A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>WAINWRIGHT, William</del> LASH, A. M. <del>TEPEDINO, Carlos</del> McCONE	McNAMARA SPECIAL GRP. (AUGMENTED)  August 10-11 1962	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

CIA officer ~~WAINWRIGHT~~ and A.M. LASH-1 meet, along with ~~Cuban ex-ile jeweler in New York City~~, in Copenhagen (85). ~~WAINWRIGHT~~ reported that the term "assassinate" was used in the discussion of A.M. LASH's future role in Cuba and it visibly upset A.M. LASH, who preferred the term "eliminate." (85).

DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place at the same time that DCI McCONE lodges his objection, after the SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) meeting, to McNAMARA's suggestion that the technique of assassination could be used against CASTRO.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

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*7 Dec 93*  
*(1) (A)*

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

WAINWRIGHT, William  
WILLIAMSON, Earl  
LASH, A. M. ✓

DATES:

August 14-23  
1962

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

WAINWRIGHT and EARL WILLIAMSON, a Spanish speaking case officer from Madrid, give A.M. LASH-1 S/W training and supplies.

On August 17, 1962 WILLIAMSON cables CIA headquarters that "have no intention give /A.M. LASH/ physical elimination mission as requirement but recognized this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." (85).

CIA headquarters replied to WILLIAMSON by cable on 18 August: "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given /A.M. LASH/." (85).

*(emphasis added)*

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

**TOP SECRET**

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*7 Dec 93*  
*(1)(A)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

✓  
Insp. General (CIA)  
*CARTER USIB*

DATES:

Nov. 16, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

On November 16, 1962  at the CIA Inspector General's request and with General Carter's approval sent the Inspector General a brief summary of comments by USIB members regarding the FFIAB request that the Inspector General was working on.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

To memorandum from  to the Inspector General dated November 16, 1962. (00885)

FILE:

STAFF:

Paul Wallach

DATE:

July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION *as exercised*  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*ADA*

*1/5/93*

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*gc 7 Dec 93*

*(1)(A)*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>		<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
MURPHY	LYMAN ✓	4/23/63	CUBA
KILPATRICK	CASTRO		
<del>McCONN</del>	CASTRO'S		SPECIAL GROUP
FITZGERALD	SISTER		

OCCURRENCE: Murphy asked Fitzgerald whether Castro's immediate entourage had been penetrated. Fitzgerald replied that worked for us, but that she didn't always have inside information.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum, dated 4/23/63, prepared by Lyman and Kilpatrick.  
FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: WALLACH  
7/2/75

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 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
*1/5/93*

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*7 Dec 93*

(1)(A)  
 (1)(B)  
 (1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Bautzer O'Connell Maheu ✓ Edwards	/59-/65	<i>Castro</i>

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that Maheu helped CIA to supply women for foreign leaders. Request came to O'Connell from Edwards. Greg Bautzer introduced royal foreign leader to starlet at Hollywood cocktail party at Maheu's request. CIA arranged for starlet to go to N.Y.C. to be with leader for rest of his stay in America. CIA monitored mail thereafter between royal visitor and starlet unbeknownst to either. (Tr. 144-151)

CIA, again through Maheu, *sex* set up cocktail party for 2nd leader in San Francisco.

SOURCE:  
 Testimony of James O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 6/30/75

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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QC 7 Dec 93

(1)(B)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Maheu ✓ Edwards Rosselli Giancana	Trafficante <i>Breckinridge</i> 3 or 4-61	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

*that was*  
Breckinridge testified Maheu on retainer to CIA "in the early days" (Tr. 99) ('50's?) ~~and on one occasion he obtained a female companion for an important foreign leader.~~ (Tr. 99) Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted Roselli who contacted Giancana who contacted Trafficante, who "travelled to and from Cuba," (Tr. 100) and who "had a source inside Cuba (who) ...was believed to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that he was to insert into Castro's food." (Tr. 101)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

7/2/75