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Box 1
The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Friday, September 12, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Written Tape and Wastes turned over to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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## TESTIMONY OF

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EXECUTIVE SESSION
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Friday, September 12, 1975
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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:10 p.m.,
in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Richard R. Schweiker
presiding.

(Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).
Also present: Paul Wallach and Loch Johnson, Professional
Staff Members.
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Senator Schweiker. Mr. Angleton, the first thing we will
do is swear you in.

Will you stand and raise your right hand, please?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to
give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Senator Schweiker. As you know, since you have been
here before, a Senator is normally present at all times during
the testimony. However, with the press of Senate duties we
have not been able to effectuate that fully. So if I have
to leave -- and I will have to leave for at least a substantial
portion -- you have the right to hold up your testimony until
a Senator is returned.

So would you be willing to proceed without a Senator
present?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

And I understand that I am entitled to the draft of
the testimony?

Senator Schweiker. Yes. We let every witness see it
and correct it. So there is no problem there whatever.

Mr. Angleton. To me it is immaterial one way or the
other.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, would you please state your name, address and organization for the record?

Mr. Angleton. James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia, and no organization.

Mr. Johnson. May the record show that Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania is present, and staff members Loch Johnson and Paul Wallach.

Mr. Angleton, I want to make sure that before we start you understand that you have certain rights under the law and under the Committee Rules of Procedure. Although this is not a criminal investigation, do you know you have the Fifth Amendment right to be silent in answer to questions if the answer might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Mr. Johnson. Do you understand that you may be accompanied by counsel?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Are you appearing here today freely and voluntarily without counsel?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Are you aware that you may stop at any point during the examination and request counsel?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. I would like you during the proceeding to
let me know if at any time you would like to stop and take a short recess.

Let the record also show that staff member Elliot Maxwell is present, but leaving.

Mr. Angleton, do you wish to make a brief opening statement before we begin to talk about the Huston Plan?

Mr Angleton. No, I really don't. I say that because as of the end of December, just shortly before Christmas, I have not really had much access to my files, basically in the sense that a legman necessarily would pull things together.

I imagine that with the number of personnel the Rockefeller Commission had, the number of personnel that you had, that you will get all the relevant documents.

Senator Schweiker. I hope we do. We will sure try it.

Mr. Angleton. The Huston Plan is literally about five-eighths of an inch thick, and I think half of it is a blue-covered report. In other words, there is nothing much by way of files.

Mr. Johnson. I like to forget by tracing chronologically the events surrounding the so-called Huston plan. And it is my understanding that the first important event in this episode has to do with a meeting held in the President's office on June 5, 1970. And at this meeting were the principals of the intelligence community, of course, including Mr. Helms present?
When did you first hear about this meeting, if in fact you did hear about it?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think the first news came when Helms called me, and I believe it was with Tom Karameissines, and simply stated that there would be a rather extraordinary meeting in the White House. I think he did mention the principals being the Executive of the USID and Mr. Hoover. And that the President made some very strong statements regarding the lack of domestic intelligence on the incidents of the time. And therefore, that he had set up -- wanted a working group set up by the principals. And in the course of this discussion, which was very short, he nominated me to be the agency representative, and Dick Ober to be my legman.

Mr. Johnson. Did Mr. Helms give you any additional feeling for what that meeting was about?

Mr. Angleton. He didn't really have to, because the question of what was going on in the country was burning in every investigative agency or agency in government. In other words, it was not -- the Huston Plan was just simply the momentum of what was happening in the country.

Mr. Johnson. Could you be more explicit when you say what was happening in the country?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the question of bombings, the questions of protest, the question of travel abroad -- all...
the things which a contemporary newspaper would set forth, and the statistics which Director Kelley can give you ad nauseam, on which there was not coverage. To put it bluntly, as it came through to me -- and this is the reason I think the thing was rather short -- it was a question everybody was asking themselves, basically, that the President of the U.S. did not feel he had any answers, and, therefore, was more an anger in reaction to the inability of the country to give him answers.

Mr. Johnson. So the summer of 1970 there was perceived to be a definite internal security threat?

Mr. Angleton. It had been growing for a long time.

Mr. Johnson. As the leading counter intelligence expert in the CIA, did you have any concrete evidence yourself that there was a foreign connection to this domestic unrest?

Mr. Angleton. The way I would comment on that is simply that the intelligence that we had gathered, fundamentally from December '61 on through, that the counter intelligence effort in the government was very important.

Mr. Johnson. Does that include the effort of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnson. Before the telephone rang we were talking about the inadequacies of the counter intelligence effort
in this country to include that of the CIA.

Why was the effort in this area inadequate in your view?

Mr. Angleton. I think the reason it was inadequate was simply that we did not have the quality of sources to whom we could turn to resolve these problems.

Fundamentally, the degree to which the Soviet bloc was taking advantage or stimulating the unrest in this country.

In other words, we were dealing with everyone had a hypothesis based on holdings, which was quite a different thing from having a live source who could in fact tell you what was going on.

Mr. Johnson. So in response to the President's concern about foreign connections over domestic unrest, the answer of the CIA, at any rate, was that we are not sure, because we don't have adequate sources to answer that question?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that necessarily follows, because I wasn't present when the President was present.

Mr. Johnson. Let me rephrase the question, then. My earlier question was, what was the degree of foreign influence over domestic unrest?

Mr. Angleton. Well, that's a long -- I am prepared to give you a written paper on that, but to try to verbally reconstruct all of the scene of that period is very difficult for me at this moment. We had bombings going on, and there
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was travel abroad, and the dissident groups -- there was a whole series of literally hundreds of incidents. The whole question came up because of what we knew from 1961 regarding Soviet bloc political action. In other words, the most important development in the Soviet bloc was the re-orientation of their services into their respective central committees to make a return to Leninist principles, that every intelligence operation must have a political objective.

So, the verbiage of the day, and the intelligence we had on Communist Parties, plus what we knew on secret sources, we could hypothicate in terms of the civil unrest and the travel of Americans abroad. Our weakness was anyone in the American department's concern who could give us the black and white answers as to what groups and what was going on.

Mr. Johnson. I have looked at some reports presented to the White House in 1969 by the FBI and the CIA, and those reports conclude that there is little concrete evidence of foreign support, although there was a potential for such support to increase in the future. I am just wondering --

Mr. Angleton. I don't know what reports you are referring to. All I can say is that there was obviously a very cautious approach to this when it was dealing with the subject which might result in another Presidential reaction.
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In other words, you had to be able to prove it, and I can well understand that any reports going in prior to this meeting would be hedged, because within the Agency itself there were those who took a very staunch stand that there was no foreign involvement.

Again, they had no more information than we had that would justify their position. And these were fairly senior individuals, mainly on the overt side of the business. Their attitude was very definitely that there was nothing to it.

Mr. Johnson. But you have indicated to me, if I am reading you properly, that there were gaps in intelligence concerning the degree of foreign influence over domestic unrest.

Is that inaccurate?

Mr. Angleton. No, that is an accurate statement, and it goes back again to what I described to be a source who would have access to information that comes into the first chief director of the GKB that deals with American problems.

Mr. Johnson. Why is it that we didn't have such sources?

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that.

Mr. Johnson. What I am driving at, is whether or not the intelligence agencies are constrained or fettered by barriers to collecting quality intelligence, and if so, what
these barriers are.

Mr. Angleton. There were no barriers as such. I mean, speaking from the foreign point of view, it is just simply that the target is one of the most difficult ones that one can conceive of, because you are dealing with a police state, unless they are on internal security, and with a degree of efficiency that simply doesn't fit in with Western terms.

Mr. Johnson. What are the topics that apparently were discussed at this June 15 meeting at the White House? What was the degree of cooperation between the CIA and the FBI, in particular the liaison between the two agencies? What was your feeling about the quality of liaison between the FBI and the CIA in June of 1970?

Mr. Angleton. This still doesn't have the official date on it?

Mr. Johnson. I understand that in May of 1970 Mr. Hoover terminated the official liaison.

Mr. Angleton. Well, naturally this was a very big blow to every one concerned.

Mr. Johnson. It was more than a symbolic gesture, then?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. And it wasn't on a terminating liaison with CIA, it was a termination, as I recall, of all liaison in government with the exception of the White House.
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Mr. Johnson. So in May of 1970 we had a very serious rupture in relationships between the CIA —

Mr. Angleton. If that is the accurate date of the Colorado Case, there was a very serious rupture.

Mr. Johnson. In what sense was it serious? I wonder if you could elaborate.

Mr. Angleton. Well, fundamentally liaison is misleading, a misleading word, because the fruits of liaison are obtained through daily contact.

In other words, it is a creative process, it is not a static thing of a post office box. It means that cases are discussed, argued, meetings are held, and it is a type of creative process that you cannot reduce to paper in correspondence.

Mr. Johnson. Of course, there was the telephone. Couldn't the same kind of conversations take place over secure telephones?

Mr. Angleton. Impossible.

Mr. Johnson. So in face to face liaison is quite important in your opinion?

Mr. Angleton. It is essential, because it is a process of one side supplying the gaps to the other side, which could not prior to that meeting have been identified. It is only when all the case from one side is laid out, and then you have a rebuttal, and so on, and you define future
courses of investigation, and you reconsider actions that were going to take place. You simply do not have enough stenographers in Washington to keep up to date with that type of give and take.

Mr. Johnson. It is my understanding that Sam Papich fulfilled this role of liaison with the FBI for a long period of time.

Were you his contact in the CIA for liaison purposes?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the history of the liaison is that it started back in the days of Admiral Hillencottter with Ben DeLoach, and he was eventually -- his successor became Papich, whose alternate was ________ from San Francisco, and so Papich took it over, I believe, around 1952, and was ________ and later ________ up until the incident in Colorado in which it was terminated.

Mr. Johnson. And how often would you get together personally with these individuals to discuss interagency problems?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I would say that Sam had two contacts -- excuse me -- he had the following contacts. He had contact with my liaison section, headed by Mrs. Jane Roman, and this dealt with the broad routine business of the agency, much of it not so routine when you deal with operational cases. His other contact would be with the Office of Security, which eventually became, to my knowledge, so burdensome that

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they put on as full time liaison with the Office of Security, plus Bill Creager was handling many of the interagency committees representing USIB and many others. He was a perennial person sent to the committees interagency-wise.

And then Papich's contact was with myself and my various deputies. That was on a daily basis approximately.

Mr. Johnson. In the summer of 1970 it seems to me, then the country and the intelligence community faced these facts of life: pronounced domestic unrest; inability to completely understand the degree of foreign connections over domestic unrest; and a severing of relationships between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community.

Mr. Angleton. With the exception of the White House.

Mr. Johnson. With the exception of the White House.

Were there any other factors that we can bring up as background in this situation of June 1970 that would be particularly relevant?

Mr. Angleton. There would be also the allegations made by bloc defectors, which was maintained at a counter intelligence level, and was never injected into the body politic.

In other words, counter intelligence people were aware of the allegations made, and yet there was a great difference of opinion as to the validity of those assertions.

Mr. Johnson. What allegations are you thinking of?
Mr. Angleton. I am referring to the allegations of the activities of the KGB and the bloc services. In other words, let's take a simple one. That is whether Rumania was independent of the Soviet bloc or not, and this had, of course, far-reaching political impact, because President Nixon had a special relationship with Rumania. The estimators were taking the position that Rumania was in a position comparable to Tito when he broke with Stalin.

Now, on the counter intelligence level this couldn't be supported.

First, it couldn't be supported by way of information derived from defectors.

And second, there were too many cases which were in fact exposed which showed the most intimate relationship between the Soviet and Rumanian intelligence services. And

So, we have cases that we know about in 1961, without knowing the name of the agent, and one in France in particular. If our identification is correct -- this is information, I might add, that we passed to the in 1962 -- there was a French ex-Colonel who was being operated by the Soviets and the and they gave other
descriptions of the person without a name.

Subsequently, after some years, we acquired the man's real name, and we passed it to the [Redacted]. They picked him up and he acknowledged that he was an agent. He acknowledged the broad outlines of the allegation.

He was taken by two [Redacted] people to his apartment and while they were searching his quarters, he jumped out of the window and committed suicide.

So there has never been a thorough interrogation of him, but by tracking on our information, and trying to reconstruct his activities, it showed very clearly that the [Redacted] and Soviet services were working hand in glove, and that the [Redacted] were not reluctant -- that the quality of their FETI's essential elements of intelligence, were for the Warsaw Pact.

Now, we had several other cases in NATO of very deep penetrations into the most highly classified information by [Redacted] and this also resulted in the [Redacted] breaking up an entire network and expelling people from [Redacted].

Now, these were issues, that if you accept them as being more accurate than the so-called overt manifestations of the [Redacted] where they are telling us a story, then you could not distinguish between [Redacted] and the Soviet Union as a member of the opposition. And, therefore, it is ironic
that the President visited [__] and danced in the streets in the [__] at the time that the [__] were picking up the network in [__]

And then the Congress granting favored nations status and trade agreements to [__]

And, therefore, we had sources that stated this was a part of the reorientation of 1959, of presenting a type of wilderness of mirrors to the West, and to encourage the West to deal with these countries independently of one another.

So, this again permeated the counter intelligence picture, not only in Washington, but in all allied capitals, and it was part and parcel of the kind of counter intelligence spectrum, where you could never come to grips at resolving these matters.

One of the reasons simply was that counter intelligence did not have a voice at any policy level in the government and the Bureau could go along with their views, and we could go along with our views, but there wasn't any third party statue who banged heads together and imposed time factors as to when these issues should be resolved one way or the other.

We lived with this from 1961, 1962 on, in all levels of intelligence.

Mr. Johnson, do you think that Tom Charles Huston viewed himself as a potential arbiter for domestic intelligence
disagreements within the community?

Mr. Angleton. I think he did. Because his short
letter of instructions to the heads of the intelligence commun-
ity said that his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger's was
in foreign policy. It was a very clear-cut edict, so to
speak, that he was the ultimate authority in the Executive
for domestic security.

Mr. Johnson. I believe Mr. Angleton is referring to
a July 1970 memorandum.

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Mr. Johnson. What directions did Mr. Helms give to you,
if any, concerning how you ought to respond as the Chief
CIA representative to the work group sessions held to
draft a report for the President on intelligence problems?

Mr. Angleton. He didn't give me necessarily any
instruction. He just simply stated that the President had
outlined his needs, that Huston would in due course call a
meeting. He may have stated that the FBI would chair the
meeting, and he attended the first meeting.

Mr. Johnson. Who attended it, Mr. Helms?

Mr. Angleton. Mr. Helms. But he attended only for a
few moments. Huston made the opening remarks, as I recall,
and since it was being held in our building, Helms made a brief
appearance, so to speak, the host. And he took off, and
I don't think from that moment on he attended any other meetings.
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Mr. Johnson. Could you tell me your impressions of the relationship between Mr. Sullivan, who was chairman of this work group, and Mr. Huston, who was the White House representative to this work group?

Mr. Angleton. Well, it was my understanding that they had known one another for some time prior to this, and that Sullivan was seeing a great deal of Mr. Huston on domestic intelligence problems. And that would be -- I don't know how natural and normal it is. I know that since they maintained the open link of liaison to the White House, there were probably a great number of reports going to the White House from the Bureau directly.

I would assume that within the White House staff that as the work was parcelled out, that Huston was probably the recipient, and as a recipient would bring him in touch with the domestic intelligence, in those days the Internal Security Division of the FBI, which was headed by Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. Johnson. Would it be fair to say that Mr. Sullivan, who had a great deal of experience in counter intelligence, was cultivating the relatively inexperienced Mr. Huston, and perhaps tutoring him on the difficulties that the intelligence community faced in obtaining the kind of information the President wanted regarding foreign connections over domestic unrest?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I wouldn't characterize it that way.
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I would say that Bill Sullivan -- that he was a person that would postulate a position, and then it would be in his nature to propagate it. I don't think that Bill Sullivan ever propagated anything that he didn't believe in very deeply. I know that he was extremely frustrated and I think part of his frustration was what the counter intelligence always encountered, and that is that there are no higher forums that take into account the finding of counter intelligence.

In other words, it tends to feed on itself, because unlike espionage, which is conducted for the purpose of disseminating information to customers, counter intelligence produces intelligence for its own consumption. And, therefore, it tends to be blocked off, and there is no question that Bill, who spent many years, Bill Sullivan, who spent many years in the battle, underwent the frustrations that everybody did. I dare say that he found a kindred spirit with Huston, which is reflected in the correspondence that has been published between Huston, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and so on.

Mr. Johnson. I wonder if you could be more explicit about the frustrations that Mr. Sullivan might have been propagating to Mr. Huston.

Are you referring to Mr. Hoover's raising of barriers to certain intelligence collection techniques?

Mr. Angleton. This all gets into the world of hearsay. But it deals with everything as to the Bureau's ability to
operate, and to have a voice. That would cover all type of domestic collection.

Mr. Johnson. Is it true that Mr. Hoover underwent a kind of transportation in his attitudes toward what intelligence collection methods were feasible and acceptable in this country, and that he refused to conduct certain activities that he had conducted in the forties and fifties?

Mr. Angleton. Well, during the Johnson Administration and my facts by way of time may not be accurate -- he was being attacked in the Congress over many operational techniques. It is my understanding that he looked to the White House for some relief or approbation, and he received none. I think his attitude was that if he was not going to have the support of the Executive, he was not going to subject the bureau to a losing battle with politicians. Therefore he began systematically to cut back on all activities.

Mr. Johnson. As an expert in counter intelligence and intelligence collection methods, do you think Mr. Hoover was being unfairly criticized in the Congress and in the press for certain techniques that the bureau had used?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I can't recall having read all of this. I knew it more from people who were knowledgeable and involved, and I think that there was a lack of both the support of the President and the Attorney General. I know that I have been told that when the President's foreign
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intelligence board isolated these areas of neglect, this
eventually resulted in a meeting with the then Attorney
General, the purpose of all this being to restore different
kinds of coverage to the Bureau.

Mr. Johnson. What time period are we talking about, the
Johnson Administration?

Mr. Angleton. The Johnson Administration. And it is my
understanding that the President's attitude was that he was
not going to give any instructions to Mr. Hoover, because he
had never told Mr. Hoover to cut back on operations affecting
the national security.

And so the whole exercise went for naught.

Mr. Johnson. But given Johnson's statement, if indeed
that is accurate, wasn't that in essence a green light for Mr.
Hoover to continue?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't think so. I think he would
regard that as a passive thing, it was not charging him for
directing him, it was given to third parties and not
given to him directly. It was simply to satisfy the third
parties without taking any action with Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Johnson. So the upshot was for Mr. Hoover to elimi-
ate certain collection methods he had used before?

Mr. Angleton. Gradually eliminate them.

Mr. Johnson. Now, what impact did this elimination of
previous collection techniques have upon the CIA from your
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Mr. Angleton. I think the basic thing was that it gradually closed sources of information and quality of information. And more important, -- and I think this is axiomatic -- that counter intelligence is about only as good as the relations between the FBI and the CIA are.

In other words, any activities we took up with the Bureau the Bureau always had constructive operational judgment to make. And I think by the same token we had a lot to say on the matter. As your data base disappeared, then your whole perceptions became cloudy, you didn't have the information. And you could not levy on the Bureau as we had prior to this requirement, targets, and other matters where we had coverage abroad. And this interplay between the external and internal is the heart of the operational task.

In other words, to us, if the Bureau is operating one part of the spectrum and we are operating the other, then we would have total coverage. But when you don't have this kind of relationship, and they can't follow up, and they are thwarted from doing many things, I would say the operational value diminishes, and eventually the final blow, banning, doing away with liaison.

Mr. Johnson. Let's turn directly to the meeting held out at Langley to write the special report for the President. And I want to get into the substance of that.
report a little bit later. But initially I wonder if you could give me your recollection about the personalities involved and who seemed to be setting the agenda for this meeting, and what the role of the NSA generally speaking was, and the DIA, and the CIA, and the FBI?

Can we point to a motivating force here, a certain group that was leading the operation?

Mr. Angleton. You haven't one of the tables of organization of that group so that I can see the names?

Mr. Johnson. Yes, I do.

Let's take a short recess.

(Recess.)

Mr. Johnson. Back on the record.

Based on your recollection of the individuals involved in the work group sections at Langley, I wonder if you could give us a feel for the role that the various spokesmen played at that meeting?

For example, John Downie as a representative of the Army.

Mr. Angleton. Well, going down the list, naturally the key individual was Bill Sullivan of the FBI.

Mr. Johnson. Why was he the key individual?

Mr. Angleton. He was the key individual because Mr. Hoover was the Chairman, and he was representing Mr. Hoover under Presidential instruction, or instructions from Hoover,
and in turn delegated to Sullivan. And the basic concerns
dealt with domestic activities in the FBI.

Mr. Johnson. Did Mr. Sullivan bring to the meeting a
distinct point of view on the problem of intelligence gaps?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, very deeply. He was probably one of
the most cognizant.

Mr. Johnson. What was his viewpoint, as you recall it?

Mr. Angleton. Well, his viewpoint, I think, was the one
echoed by Huston. And I think that to recast this,

Huston was the authority present, because he came cloaked
with White House authority.

Mr. Johnson. He was certainly not the authority when
it came to inter-intelligence, and the problems that CI
specialists faced?

Mr. Angleton. No, he was very knowledgeable. He had
obviously gone into this matter at some length prior to the
meeting. He knew precisely what none of us really knew, that
is, the depth of White House concern. In fact, the
most dramatic moment, I think, was at the beginning
of one meeting, or at some stage in the meetings, after a
preliminary draft had been put forward, he found it totally
unacceptable, and his comments were to the effect that the
subcommittee was not being responsive to the President's
needs.

Mr. Johnson. I wonder if you could explain this to me.
Mr. Sullivan was Mr. Hoover's representative, and Mr. Hoover wanted intelligence restraints maintained on various collection procedures. And yet you tell me that Mr. Sullivan tended to agree with Mr. Huston's point of view, which was that restraints needed to be carefully scrutinized, and quite possibly lowered.

So I am wondering why Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hoover's representative, didn't reflect Mr. Hoover's point of view?

Mr. Angleton. He obviously didn't agree with him.

Mr. Johnson. Wasn't that a rather difficult situation for Mr. Sullivan to be in, then?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. You would have to ask him. He didn't seem to manifest any difficulties with his role.

Mr. Johnson. At no time during the meetings at Langley did he express his dilemma representing Mr. Hoover on the one hand, but wishing to lower restraints on the other hand.

Mr. Angleton. He may have. But it doesn't stick out in my mind. I think he played this role very straight.

Mr. Johnson. Do you remember there being a military point of view at this meeting?

Mr. Angleton. No. Downie -- the one remark that Downie made -- and he may have made it more than once, about which he expanded at some length, was that he couldn't even afford to keep the minutes of the meetings in his own office.
And then he went on to some length about the troubles the military had. I think it had to do with ROTC rioting, and a tremendous number of other civil acts against the military. And he believed that up through the non-commissioned officers that the thing would be leaked, to the detriment of the Army, or the Pentagon. He posed questions as to how he was going to be able to take it up to higher authority within the Pentagon, and really, this was the dilemma which he kept pounding on, that he didn't know how he was going to handle the paper, and he didn't know how he was going to play any role in it, because of the discontent within the Defense establishment, the draftees and what not, the clerical, and non-commissioned officer.

Mr. Johnson. How did you feel on a more conceptual level about the role of the military insinuating domestic intelligence collection.

Mr. Angleton. He thought that in recruiting centers and campuses of ROTC, and places where intelligence existed, that there was a real problem.

Mr. Johnson. And did he see a role for the military in actively assisting in the gathering of domestic intelligence to find out here about domestic unrest.

Mr. Angleton. Yes, a lot of it had to do with activities against the Pentagon, against soldiers.

Mr. Johnson. But isn't it true that during this period...
the military was under severe criticism for earlier civilian surveillance programs?

Mr. Angleton. From where?

Mr. Johnson. I believe the military was preparing for hearings before Sam Ervin's Committee on the subject of military surveillance over civilians. To some degree the military was under public criticism for being in the domestic intelligence gathering field.

Mr. Angleton. But I think the military took the position that they were responsible for their own security in conjunction with all other investigative agencies.

In other words, there has always been a cardinal rule in government that the head of every agency is responsible for his own security, that when the FBI develops information on any subversion, within any branch of the government, they send copies of those reports to the heads of the agency concerned for their action.

And, therefore, as far as I know no one had turned over the military prerogatives.

Mr. Johnson. Do these prerogatives extend beyond the military base itself?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think it has anything to do with what directly affects the security of the armed forces.

Mr. Johnson. Was there an NSA point of view that emerged
in these meetings on the subject of intelligence collection procedures?

Mr. Angleton. The NSA position, I think, was simply that they needed an espionage assist to further their own activities, the results of their own activities, and that Mr. Hoover, in changing his operational posture, was depriving NSA of very highly sensitive collateral, which resulted in one, non-production, or if there was production, tremendous costs to arrive at the same intelligence break-through, and unfortunately getting away from real time collection.

Mr. Johnson. Are you talking about foreign intelligence?

Mr. Angleton. Foreign intelligence, foreign and domestic, but where it is interrelated. But the real time factor was that with the Bureau's help they were able to have real time in terms of their collection.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnson. We are talking about the point of view of the NSA. I am wondering next if the CIA brought to these meetings any perspective on intelligence collection problems and how to resolve the difficulties with gaps in intelligence?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think it brought it anything that wasn't well known in the community.

Mr. Johnson. And that relates back again to Mr. Hoover throwing up barriers on certain procedures?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.
I mean, there wasn't any secret in the community regarding the gradual cutting back of liaison, and cutting back of operational support, and cutting back responsiveness to requests, in other words, every sector of the domestic intelligence, which was a service of common concern which the Bureau bestowed on the community.

And everyone could see, they were too experienced not to see it all disintegrate, and more important, they knew about it as it happened, because there is a great deal of communication within the intelligence community. And, therefore, if the head of NSA was asking Mr. Hoover, and he had been turned down on certain things, then that would be known to many others who were expecting NSA to produce as many as they had been producing a few months prior to that.

So as those things dried up, it just hit more and more individuals in the community. It wasn't any theoretical, it was all fairly hard core coverage.

Mr. Johnson. Earlier you said that Mr. Hoover decided not to allow certain operations because of lack of support from the White House and the Attorney General?

Mr. Angleton. I said that is my understanding.

Mr. Johnson. Is it also true that Mr. Hoover, going one step further, was concerned about the image of the Bureau, and he was afraid that that image might be blackened by public criticism of techniques that had been used once before.
Mr. Angleton. I think so. I would go a step further and state that the success and stature of the Bureau depends in large measure on the public support. And once the public support starts diminishing, it has a direct impact on the effectiveness of the Bureau, because they rely on much of the citizenry of this country to come forward as informants and voluntary cooptees of the Bureau.

And once confidence is lost in the Bureau, they lose this public support. And I think Mr. Hoover was very conscious, and probably more so than many people in the government, was very conscious and sensitive to the degree of public support, or the lack thereof.

And I don't think he was going to stand idly by and have the Bureau make a scapegoat when the Executive would not stand forward.

Mr. Johnson. Before turning to the actual special report itself, I wonder if you can tell me something about the drafting of the special report, and also the degree of consensus among participants as to the product that emerged from those meetings.

Mr. Angleton. To my knowledge it was no real dispute in the product. Oh, my own party used Ober as my research associate. In other words, when I needed information regarding the strength of the operation and activities, and so on, his job was to produce the study.
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Much of this was well known to the community, as I say, prior to the meeting, I mean with the gaps.

So, I don't recall offhand -- this is nothing that stands forward as in any disagreement -- there may have been some, oh, verbiage, but I can't recall it.

Mr. Johnson. Was the actual drafting or the report done by the Bureau?

Mr. Angleton. I think they took all the proposals and came forward at each meeting with the drafting.

Now, whether we cooperated with them in that I don't know. But I know that, as I recall, they would submit drafts that tried to reflect the consensus of the prior meeting.

Mr. Johnson. Let me at this point introduce into the record Exhibit A-1, Mr. Angleton, a special report inter-agency Committee on Intelligence, ad hoc, June 1970.

(The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-1 for identification.)
Mr. Johnson. Now, this is the 43-page special report that eventually went to Mr. Nixon. And essentially it had three major sections.

The first section was a threat assessment. Do you recall what the CIA contribution was to the writing of the threat assessment, just in general terms?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnson. Back on the record.

Mr. Angleton. From reading this, I would say that I don't think there was any dissident on the fact as laid forth here. We now know a great deal more about the Venceremos Brigade because we have had defectors from the Cuban DGI, and their intelligence service. And we are quite accurate on the uses of that for espionage, and so on.

And the projections there, I don't think we dispute today.

Mr. Johnson. The second section of the special report had to do with options for the President. There are parts that are somewhat indistinct, but what I wanted to focus your attention on was the actual options presented to the President under six different collection titles, the first one being communications intelligence. And you can see on page 25 there is a series of options provided for the President with a little space whereby he could check off which one he approved.
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Now, what I would like to know is, from your perspective as a CIA representative, of what relevance were these options to your organization?

Mr. Angleton. What is the intelligence directive No. 6?
I don't recall that.

Mr. Johnson. That just outlines for the NSA its mandate in monitoring the communications facilities, international communications facilities, used by American citizens. You might want to briefly glance over this section which explains it.

Communications intelligence is an activity of the NSA, as I understand it. And from reading the text it seems like NSA had primary interest here. But I wonder if the CIA was also interested in relaxing restraints in this area.

Mr. Angleton. Every participant is a consumer of NSA product. And therefore they all have an equal interest, they all had a departmental interest in enhancing the coverage by NSA.

Mr. Johnson. And this would have included the DIA as well?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because that is all they are, they are under -- NSA is under the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Johnson. Are you aware of the NSA watch list?

Mr. Angleton. I am aware -- you mean as of today, or
then?

Mr. Johnson. Then --

Mr. Angleton. I know they had a watch list.

Mr. Johnson. Let me be more specific, then.

Was not the CIA providing names of individuals of interest to the CIA who had been placed on the NSA watch list?

Mr. Angleton. Are we talking now about domestic intelligence, or normally?

Mr. Johnson. Let's begin with normally.

Mr. Angleton. Normally all customers, to my knowledge, would levy requirements on NSA.

Mr. Johnson. In the case of the CIA, what would be an example of a name that might be sent to the NSA to be placed on a watch list? You say a terrorist.

Would that be an example?

Mr. Angleton. A terrorist, an organization, intelligence individuals, political individuals, travel control.

Mr. Johnson. Would any of these names include the names of American citizens?

Mr. Angleton. As of that time I don't know. I would assume that if they were American citizens coming within our jurisdiction, traveling abroad, there was reasonable grounds for believing that they either belonged to an organization, or have been in contact with foreign intelligence or foreign officials, that these names would appear on the
watch list.

Mr. Johnson. So before the Huston plan the CIA was levying requirements on the NSA to include on the watch list names of relevance to the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Johnson. Now, would one objective of the Huston Plan from the CIA point of view have been to perhaps expand the number of individuals being monitored that were of interest to the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that, because at this moment I do not recollect the procedures or the channels of command through which these watch lists were built up. I can't recall whether it went through Staff D or whether components in the Agency have independent liaisons with NSA.

In other words, the overt side of the House would obviously have relations with NSA directly. And the CIA people who were observers with the USIB covering other sectors of the Agency would obviously have liaison in substantive matters, and then the clandestine side would have relations.

Now, it is that channel command, the channel of liaison, that would normally have been through Staff D.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, I am puzzled by these options presented on page 25. Let me read the second one to you:

"Present interpretation should be broadened to permit
a program for coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities.

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Wasn't that already being done before the
Huston Plan or before the special plan?

Mr. Angleton. I would have to see what this directive
No. 6 says, since it related to that.

Mr. Johnson. Do you have any knowledge that before June
of 1975 the NSA was in fact covering the communications of
U.S. citizens using international facilities?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Johnson. You don't recall getting any product
from NSA?

Mr. Angleton. I didn't handle -- I had a unit that
worked on counter intelligence data that came from
communications intelligence. And there were so many pro-
grams in the clandestine services on travel control --
in other words, all through the Cuban period there were
literally thousands and thousands of pages of information
derived from all other sources.

During the Cuban phase there was all the travel control
on all foreigners going to Cuba. And I assume that covered
U.S. citizens. What I am trying to say is that there are
so many components in the clandestine side of the business
that would be engaged in special operations which through
Staff/D they would levy requirements.

Mr. Johnson. But do you also see my point in I am
wondering why these options would be written for
the President's approval when in fact there is some indication
that these activities were already going?

Mr. Angleton. Because I think it relates to the
question of interpretation of the President's Directive No. 6,
in other words, that NSA was obviously complying with some
portion of that intelligence directive which the group felt
should be changed.

In other words, they were relying on that verbiage
to justify some fields of inquiry into which they weren't
going, because they didn't have the personnel. But if we
had the directive it would be very clear.
Mr. Johnson. Do you recall at the time any discussion about the need to make this directive more explicit by having the President --

Mr. Angleton. No. All I know is, there was a directive that was inhibiting to NSA. What paragraph of it, what it said I cannot recall. But it was something that they held up as a restriction in their liberty of action.

Mr. Johnson. From reading the text here one gleanes the understanding that restriction had to do with coverage by NSA of communications of US citizens using international facilities. And obviously they wanted the directive to be relaxed and broadened to allow that kind of coverage. And so the dilemma I am having is why they wished to have the President expand that coverage when in fact the coverage was already there?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know whether it was present in the sectors we are discussing. I mentioned to you the Cuban thing. There could be dozens of projects which would not be known to the Counterintelligence, which would be known to Staff D, in which there was direct NSA involvement in supplying coverage. I mean, the ones I can think of were such things as Cuban, were matters where there was an enhanced interest on some matter, operational or otherwise. But NSA does have liaison officers covering the needs of NSA and so on.

Mr. Johnson. The second collection method discussed in the Special Report has to do with electronic surveillances and
penetrations. Of what relevance was this particular method
to the CIA? The second opening talks about intensification of
coverage of individuals and groups in the US who pose a major
threat. Now, based on your recollection of the Langley meetings,
to which organization did this operation refer? Who was going
to intensify the coverage?

Mr. Angleton. The coverage would have been FBI, I think.
In other words, they are the only ones that were conducting an
electronic surveillance. If you leave NSA out of the picture.

Mr. Johnson. Within the US?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. And I think our problem, or the
problem that communities always had, is the lack of broad
coverage to begin with on foreign diplomatic establishments,
and individuals within those establishments. And I will give
examples, or at least I will give one example which I think
characterizes the hard core counterintelligence interests.

Soviet intelligence is probably most deadly when it recruits
a foreign diplomat from a friendly country, say, in Moscow, and
follows his career. Eventually he ends up in the US. He has
all the coloration of a friendly country, and thereafter all
kinds of doors are open to him. And he is not under surveillance.
Yet having diplomatic cover he can deal with legal KGB and the
GRU at social functions. And the classic case is the case of
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Wennerstrom, The Swedish Air Attache, who had been recruited by the Soviets in the middle forties. While he was in Moscow the Soviets built him up as the source of the American military, and under Soviet guidance he produced a great amount of information for our attache's, which looked as though he was risking his own life on their behalf to acquire information, it being unknown that he was being manipulated all the time by the Soviets.

So many years passed. And eventually he was assigned to Washington. And the American military, because of his favors that he had done to American military in Moscow, opened up all the gates to him regarding US installations, and teated him almost like one of their own.

Now, his control was in the Soviet Embassy. And he would take microfilm rolled up in the palm of his hand, and as he shook hands he would make his delivery. And he had dead drops, and so on.

Now, taking that one case, and basing it on all of the modus operandi which has come out of the knowledge of the KGB, we would believe that there should be a listing of all diplomats who have served in Moscow, because the real center for compromise and recruitment is there, by the Secretary Chief Directorate.

And they eventually turn it over to the First Chief Directorate, which is the CIA side of it, when a man leaves Russia. So the danger point in terms of economy of personnel allocated to Bloc
countries, and they have no activities really covering the so-called friendly countries. But you could build up a priority list for anyone who had served behind the iron curtain as distinct from any of the other embassies, then if you didn't have constant electronic coverage at least you would have periodic coverage to take the pulse of that individual, what is he doing.

Now, one of the cases the Bureau had involved an individual from a friendly foreign country, and they found him in touch with one of the Bloc countries, and a lot of other activities. This was given to the intelligence -- or the security service of his native country. Eventually they broke him as a Bloc intelligence agent. Now, that came from electronic coverage.

So my point is simply that the status of status for counterintelligence purposes is totally inadequate, based on the information which we had relating to modus operandi.

Mr. Johnson. So this has been strictly an FBI activity?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but working together with the other investigative agencies, because the Pentagon has all of the liaison sections, and they have hundreds of officers who wander in the diplomatic milieu, it is a question of tightening up the controls where there is memorandum of record, and of meetings, and social events, and so, where they are dealing with Bloc people these should be deposited with the FBI in order that they have a data base against their electronic coverage.

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in other words, it is absolutely unbelievable that with all the counterintelligence data and defectors that we do not have the manpower and the lists to perform this relatively easy type of coverage. In fact, in my view it is almost irresponsible.

Mr. Johnson. When it comes to this kind of coverage, does not the CIA also involve itself in planning and lending to the Bureau the use of sophisticated gadgetry?

Mr. Angleton. We have loaned stuff, I don't know how much, to the Bureau. But again I have had something to do with the policy there. My attitude over many years — and I was on the Technical Production Board — was that anything the Agency developed by way of a sophisticated piece of equipment, that prior to its use by us, where it could be compromised abroad, that it be offered — an offer and refusal business would be given to the Bureau to see whether it could be used domestically before its classification of secrecy became exposed, on the grounds that the priority for the Agency is the espionage situation in the US. And therefore if we developed a piece of equipment, they should be brought in and they should be exposed to the equipment to see whether they can apply to a domestic case. And then if they refuse it we submit it at much lower security abroad, where essentially, when it is compromised it compromises the use of that equipment against all Bloc services.

In other words, we had a piece of equipment compromised in Mexico. And the equipment was being used in other places
abroad. So you have to immediately know that that service would have immediately take counter action in all installations around the world, but it would also tell the other Bloc services. And therefore your dilemma is, you had given it to the Bureau without telling them of its compromise. And therefore on the technical side you have to have the closest exchange. And by the same token, if they have a breakthrough, and equipment no longer has the same sensitivity to them, then we should get it for the purpose of either improving it or utilizing it.

Mr. Johnson. Would the CIA also have a rule inviting personnel to administer this equipment in this country vis-a-vis diplomatic establishments?

Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge. I can see the Bureau, say, a very hard case going to any government agency, or even to the private sector, to bring in people who are superior to their own, who complement or supplement their own. In other words, I think when you have any operation, and you find a fault in it, or a lack of expertise, you go where you can find it, without regard to charters or all that stuff.

Mr. Johnson. If you will look at the two operations on electronic surveillances and penetrations, there is quite a difference between the second operation and the third operation. The third one has to do with diplomatic establishment, but the second one has to do with coverage of individual groups who pose a major threat. Did the CIA have an interest in using
this particular collection method within the US against certain
groups that might pose a threat to internal security?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that -- I don't remember
explicitly, but I don't think that it was our desire that
we would take on this activity if we could get the produce from
the Bureau. Our interest would be to see what breaks out of that
in order that we could take the foreign element, if the individual
traveled abroad, and there was a foreign angle to it, then we
would take over that aspect of it. And furthermore, in our
findings abroad we would have those meetings with the Bureau
that we didn't refine in the requirements and we could target
more accurately individuals. When once you get latched on
someone that is domestic, and you make the foreign connection,
you are in. And you have got the Bureau controlling some
double on their side, and we are controlling some abroad, then
you can expand that thing into the entire network all the way
back.

Mr. Johnson. Did you personally feel at the time that there
needed to be some expansion of FBI activities in that area?

Mr. Angleton. In the area of what?

Mr. Johnson. In the area of electronic surveillances and
penetration between individuals posing a threat to internal
security?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that wherever there is a threat
to the internal security, I think the Bureau should be on top
of it.

Mr. Johnson. What I am getting at is, I am wondering that if in June of 1970 you felt that Bureau coverage in this area, using this technique, was inadequate when it came to radicals within the US?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Bureau or anyone else had professional coverage to the degree that it was needed. And this means not to be opposed to these people, because I think that what has to be spelled out here, our motive was never to curtail the legitimate part of this student unrest or whatnot, our real problem was that since we weren't covering the foreigners and the diplomats, and we didn't know from morning to night what they were doing, that we didn't have a credible or professional data base on foreign activities. And the easiest place to start on from is in our own country. The efficiency of the CIA's counterintelligence depends in large measure on the Bureau's, because anyone with a foreign connection is going to broaden our jurisdiction. Every diplomat or espionage operator in this country operates from the headquarters within our jurisdiction. And therefore we have a very highly vested interest that the coverage and the quality of the coverage in the US be brought up. And we didn't think much of the Bureau coverage, because we knew the limitations that existed, as did most everyone in the community.

Mr. Johnson. Looking at these first two collection methods
that we have discussed so far, one on communications intelligence, and the second one on electronic surveillance and penetrations, would it be fair to say that the CIA already had some names on the NSA watch list of interest to the CIA, and the CIA was already receiving some product from the Bureau gained through electronic surveillance and penetration, but in both areas there was a great deal of inadequacy, and so what the CIA was really interested in here was a better product in both areas, which really meant an expansion of the use of this technique?

Mr. Angleton. There is no art in this technique. The problem of the technique is -- let me rephrase that. Mr. Hoover obviously conceived the Bureau as a group of men primarily concerned with law enforcement. And in terms of his budget career, esprit de corps, he didn't want to water his organization with a tremendous number of clerical officers who from the beginning to the end with only in electronic surveillance, because my understanding of the electronic surveillance is fundamentally that the message is in a strange language, and collected by the thousands, and had to be processed by linguists and I don't think he wanted to clutter his table of organization with this. He was prepared to do it as it came up in the course of their normal operational activity if they came across a lead or an agent, then it might stimulate temporarily coverage of that target.
What we wanted was saturation on the foreign people, and on the Soviets. In other words, we had a case in which a young Soviet in the United Nations went outside of the restricted area and threatened or brought a threat to one of our agents who was hidden.

We asked the Bureau, where was he that weekend.

And they said they last saw him that Friday night in New York in his house.

Something was inadequate in terms of manpower, of not knowing that on Saturday and Sunday he had gone to the Midwest on operational assignment. And that is what I am trying to say.

I could take this case and multiply it a hundred times.

And my view is that since the opposition works in a way that both the KGB and GUR are principals, I mean they run the embassies, that there should be coverage on all of them. But the Bureau can only take a limited amount of personnel and then allocate it. And therefore if you are going to have any assurances of evaluating the situation, and so on, then you have got to have the coverage. And the coverage, the easiest, cheapest coverage there is electronic surveillance.

Principally when it is secure. If everybody knows the phone is being tapped, then you learn nothing. And I dare say after all these hearings are over that there won't be much counter-intelligence derived if any.

Mr. Johnson, doesn't the embassy officials from Bloc
countries simply assume that their phones are being tapped?

Mr. Angleton. There are emergencies that arise in which the
phone is the only way you can handle the emergency. Or there
can be pay telephones, and they are unaware that you have the
ability to tap a pay telephone. In other words, there is a lot
of art within this thing where the whole thrust of everything you
do is to get the enemy to underestimate you, so there modus
operandi is geared to really a false estimate of your capability.
And they don't use the phone, but they go to a pay telephone,
and there are only five pay telephones within walking distance.
And this particular day the 5th is the one they are going to
use. And surveillance can state which code that they are going
into number one. And thereafter the calls is picked up. If
he doesn't know that you have that capability he is going to
start running his agents out of those five telephone booths.

I am only giving that example.

Mr. Johnson. I would imagine if we were monitoring pay
telephone booths we would pick up a lot of other calls besides
calls made by embassy personnel?

Mr. Angleton. Those are all pinpointed types of things.
It is known there has had to be communication between the
agent and the principal. If you have a source that you can
possible compromise, it tells you that there is going to be
a meeting, and therefore a call and arrangement made, a code
word said. And since they have gauged the fact that you don't
don't have that kind of thing, that means that for one call
based on inside information, you pick up the business.

Mr. Johnson. I would imagine that vigorous effort by the
Bureau in this effort would have saved the CIA a tremendous
number of man hours.

Mr. Angleton. It would save everybody in the community.
Because you have to keep in mind also that the targets of the
Soviet espionage and black espionage relates also to the State
Department, Atomic Energy, the entire military, and it goes all
the way down the line. Those agencies have standard security
officers. And they have to rely on the Bureau for the domestic
coverage. And my point is this, that when you see cases of
espionage which have occurred, and you go back track on them,
you will find that had there been full time surveillance, and
a lot of manpower devoted, that those would have been nipped in
the bud, and you could have taken a straight agent and double
him back into the opposition. But in a case such as the Dunlap
case, the Sergeant who allegedly committed suicide in SA, his
activity with the Soviets was only after his suicide.

Mr. Johnson. How was that?

Mr. Angleton. It was known, it became known. In fact, if
I am not mistaken, I think some of my communications to NSA,
very sensitive, were found in a plastic bag in his attic, as
I recall.

Mr. Johnson. You say alleged suicide. Do you have reason
to believe that it wasn't actually a suicide?
Mr. Angleton. Well, one accepts he is a suicide. But my point is that I do not know that we have such depth of knowledge regarding his case that we know all the facts. And I would say the President's Foreign Intelligence Board made the most exhaustive inquiry into the case, probably more than anyone else in Government. And I have never seen their findings.

Mr. Johnson. The thins set of operations discussed in the Special Report had to do with the subject of mail coverage.

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Of what importance were those operations to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Now, would you tell me your question again?

Mr. Johnson. What significance were those operations for our organization in June of 1970?

Mr. Angleton. I think everybody there, with the exception of the Bureau, was unaware that we had mail coverage.

Mr. Johnson. If you had mail coverage why was the President asked to remove restrictions on mail coverage?

Mr. Angleton. I think the basic thing would have been -- I mean, he would know that this was a covert thing against the other members of the community. In other words, if this had not been brought out from Downie and all those observers, and so on.

Mr. Johnson. I suppose I am still unclear about this. Did the President at this time know that the CIA had a covert mail coverage program?
Mr. Angleton. My recollection is that we had certain information from mail coverage which must have come to his attention.

Mr. Johnson. If you will look at this page you will see that it states "covert coverage has been discontinued." Was that in fact true?

Mr. Angleton. I think this is probably, -- that paragraph, I think, was a Bureau comment.

Mr. Johnson. Do you find this rather misleading, to send a report to the President that tells him the covert coverage has been discontinued, and then asks him --

Mr. Angleton. I am not so sure -- I don't know the origins of that paragraph. In other words, it refers here to Congressional hearings. I don't recall -- I know they were happening, but I don't recall which ones they were referring to here. We had a former Deputy Director, Scientific and Technology, Colville, who had belonged to the group of scientists who wrote some very pointed inquiries to the Post Office -- and I don't remember the date -- regarding the whole mail coverage business. To my recollection, Colville, while with the Agency, knew of the program. Now, what this is referring to I don't know.

Mr. Johnson. Did the Bureau have a program at this time?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. They may have had one that was discontinued. The operative part of that as I see it is
whether those are Congressional hearings involving accusations of Government invasion of privacy.

Mr. Johnson. So you think the sentence applies to the FBI program, not to the CIA program?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think it has anything to do with the CIA. I don't remember any of us ever making any representations to those representatives of USIB regarding the existence of the program.

Mr. Johnson. Including the White House Representative, Mr. Huston?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't think we bring him into it. That was the kind of thing that if anything was going to be said, it would be said to the Attorney General and the President, because the Bureau naturally knew about the program for a long time. And they knew that we had a common code name. And therefore they would be just as conscious of the fact that this was somehow known to the two of us, so there wouldn't be any purpose in a roomful of people of exposing the mail coverage to those people that had to go back and report to principals, particularly when you have the kind of statements that Downie and others made about the fact that they could not vouch for any security in their own organizations.

Mr. Johnson. But isn't there a problem here that a report was prepared for the President which had some misleading statements in it?
Mr. Angleton. No, because I think they would have all been clarified fact to face with the President. And they may well have been. In other words, what I am trying to say is, it is quite conceivable -- and it really never occurred to me -- that it is quite conceivable that given the closeness between Huston and Bill Sullivan, that well before this meeting Bill could have gone into the whole status of the Huston project.

Mr. Johnson. Huston claims now not to have known about the undercover program, and he feels somewhat duped by the intelligence community. And of course, the more important question is, was the President duped into believing that this was such a program, and being asked a few pages later to allow the Agency to institute it?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think other than your thought that the President wasn't going to be notified.

Mr. Johnson. Notified about a new program?

Mr. Angleton. No, notified about why we had to put this thing in there. My God, you couldn't be there asking for electronic surveillance and all those other forms of coverage with a group of counterintelligence people who raised the question of mail coverage.

Mr. Johnson. But isn't it possible that President Nixon read this on its face value and did not know about the mail program, and thought that he was being asked --

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that he ever read the thing.
I don't know myself. Because I was shocked when I heard later on that Mitchell allegedly did not know about the Huston project. And I refused to believe it.

Mr. Johnson. But to return to the question, isn't that a possibility that the President read this report to him at its face value and thought that he was being asked to institute a mail coverage program in which he was already doing --

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that. I know that any byplay of what happened to that report until the blowup, in which Mr. Mitchell begged Mr. Hoover in terms of destroying this project --

Mr. Johnson. This section of the report states that routine coverage is legal, while covert coverage is not.

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. And you said that the CIA had a covert mail program underway?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. So the obvious conclusion was that the CIA was conducting an illegal activity, is that the correct conclusion to draw?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. That was drawn up for the audience which was there. The audience which was there was fairly junior people within the USIB community.

Mr. Johnson. You mean the Special Report to the President was drafted with the junior officer in mind and not the President
himself?

Mr. Angleton. I mean, the people who were there were representatives who were pretty low on the totem pole. I mean, outside of Hunt and Sullivan, all of those were relatively junior officials of the organization.

Mr. Johnson. Well, you were not a general officer?

Mr. Angleton. I mean junior in terms of the entire Agency, yes. Normally there have been Tom Karamessines, the Deputy Director, or somebody.

Mr. Johnson. But on June 5th in a most serious fashion, the President asked the intelligence community principals for a complete report on intelligence gaps and how these gaps could be closed?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. A very serious meeting, and, as you mentioned at the beginning of this proceeding, a rather extraordinary meeting.

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Johnson. And yet it seems to me that the produce that was prepared for the President was not compared in the same kind of serious vein in which all of the fact were laid out in a very valid fashion for the President's position.

Mr. Angleton. I think that the paper responded that --- I said that the first papers or first drafts, I don't remember how many were involved, were such that they were unacceptable
to Huston, and that he turned the thing around by making a very articulate denunciation of the priorities, and of stating that the papers produced did not respond to the President's request. So he was very clear-cut on this.

Mr. Johnson. Even after that upgrading by the 29-year old Huston, did the group drafting this report eventually respond to the President's request, that is, for a thorough complete report?

Mr. Angleton. As far as Huston was concerned, yes.

Mr. Johnson. But of course Huston --

Mr. Angleton. I was the judge of those things, because no one who was present had talked to whoever he was reporting to. He was the only one that would take the thing into the White House and emerge from the White House. He was speaking with the authority of the White House.

Mr. Johnson. Yes, but he was a young man with not much experience in the intelligence community, and certainly no basis to judge whether this was actually a complete and factual report for the President. In fact it wasn't a very complete and factual report in some part, because the President wasn't even told about a mail coverage program.

Mr. Angleton. I didn't say he wasn't told.

Mr. Johnson. In the Special Report, I mean.

Mr. Angleton. I didn't say they were going to get close to a lot of people over there. When Downie made the statement,
I can't even take these papers back -- we weren't talking about anything as high level by way of secret as mail coverage, and that he could not take any responsibility of building the papers.

Mr. Johnson. Because of the concern about leaks?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, penetration.

Mr. Johnson. Within the Defense Department?

Mr. Angleton. That is right, within DIA.

Mr. Johnson. Was this viewpoint shared by you and the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. We have no point of make on his organization, we have no way of judging it.

Mr. Johnson. I mean for your own organization?

Mr. Angleton. We took him at face value for what he had to say.

Mr. Johnson. But were you interested in diluting the report for fear that it might fall into the wrong hands within your own Agency? You were manipulating and diluting it because of Downie's concern about DOD?

Mr. Angleton. Because this was a roster that people were present. Is that it there?

Mr. Johnson. No, it is back here.

Mr. Angleton. You don't have to go over that roster to see that you couldn't do a lot of things. There were a lot of other things you couldn't open up. Their report was not in otherwise supervised lateral arrangements. What business we were conducting with the Bureau, we didn't table with those people. The
things that we are doing with NSA we didn’t talk with these people, because they were already on-going operations or on-going liaisons. So there was no reason to table it to them.

Mr. Johnson. Was this a charade in essence, then?

Mr. Angleton. No, it wasn’t a charade. It was the fact that this was one area where, the same as you would enhance an electronic, you would enhance all forms of communication, all channels of communication.

Mr. Johnson. But you harken back to the June 5th meeting in which the President was deeply concerned about the domestic intelligence, because he says it to the intelligence community leaders, please bring me a complete report on intelligence gaps, and we want to close those gaps. Please do that report back and have it back on my desk in three weeks on June 26th. And yet when the report comes back one could argue that it is not the kind of complete report that the President requested.

Mr. Angleton. All I am saying is that it met Huston’s need, and from what I read in the papers, his correspondence with Haldeman and Erlichman, he expresses surprise at the cooperation received. And he was totally satisfied. And on the basis of that he submitted his famous letter of 8 July that he was assuming that role as the agent for or the White House representative on domestic intelligence. So he was obviously totally satisfied. And he wasn’t as naive as you indicate, because for the years prior to that, or for a year or so prior
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to that, he was working with Sullivan on all the Bureau
problems, as again is reflected in his White House interoffice
memorandums with Halderman and company.

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. Angleton. As I recollect, the letters when they were
printed in the newspapers referred to the fight with Hoover,
Billy Sullivan's own situation. And that was all in the papers.
So my point there was that he was much more sophisticated than
one would think.

And second, he was speaking to a group who respected the
fact that he was the White House representative. And you have
to keep in mind, this was a unique situation, because to my
knowledge it is the first time in history of American counter-
intelligence that a person at that high level ever attended a
substantive meeting. Never in history has there ever been
that type of thing, even though many times in the last 20 or
30 years the Bureau and the CI people, counterintelligence, in
the Agency, had always wished to have a meeting between the
Director of CIA and the Director of FBI with the President to
resolve the question of cooperation between the two agencies.

Mr. Johnson. So were you pleased to see this kind of high
level policy access with the counterintelligence people?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't know whether I was pleased or
not. That never crossed my mind.

Mr. Johnson. You had never had that kind of access to the
White House before as counterintelligence people. Weren't

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you hopeful?

Mr. Angleton. I am not pleased by those kinds of things. It was a development that didn't astonish me, because I was quite aware, in and beyond all the Sullivan and Huston business, of what the real state of affairs were. And I know the problems that Admiral Gayler was having, and knew the issues in counterintelligence organizations regarding the threat.

Mr. Johnson. With this new White House interest in the problem, weren't you hopeful that the thing would change, that the CIA individuals would have their day in court in the White House and be able to point out their position?

Mr. Angleton. I certainly hope that the liaison with the FBI would be reestablished, because all that was something in which myself and my deputies had been involved in since 1954, and even before, and to have that cut off was -- just simply, it was like losing your moorings, you just simply drifted.

Mr. Johnson. Let's return to this discussion we were having before about the meaning of the options here on mail coverage. Is what you are telling me that this document was not really meant to represent the entire truth about collection procedure, because that would have revealed too many sensitive matters to a rather large audience?

Mr. Angleton. We were not going to reveal outside the Bureau the mail coverage operation.

Mr. Johnson. When you say outside the Bureau --
Mr. Angleton. To the people who were present.

Mr. Johnson. But what about the White House representative, he was not to know either?

Mr. Angleton. I never had any private talks with the White House representative.

Mr. Johnson. I know, but he was in attendance at these meetings.

Mr. Angleton. As I said earlier, I don't know what in the year prior to that Huston learned from Sullivan. But I was led to believe that they saw Sullivan frequently, and Sullivan's point of contact, and so forth, was Huston. So it would not surprise me at all if he had not aired it frequently with Huston, because I always knew the fact that Sullivan had a contact in the White House. I didn't know anything about him, and I didn't know his age or anything else. But I thought highly of him, and so on.

Mr. Johnson. I suppose we have belabored this point enough.

Mr. Angleton. Personally it is a very simple one to me, that in a thing of this sort, with the personnel who were present there, that on a compartmented basis you could not disclose to them in an interagency meeting this type of thing when they had to go back and report to unknown principals. And when I say junior, I mean junior in the sense that a colonel in the Army is a very -- and he was then even a full colonel, a lieutenant colonel -- and going back and getting a
Pentagon position, which with the DIA and Secretary of State, means a tremendous channel of staffing, which he himself outlined to us.

Mr. Johnson. Of course one interpretation that is made by some people in examining this document, is that it was an effort by the CIA to conceal from the President one of their on-going collection procedures?

Mr. Angleton. That is not so. Because I can't recall whether it was before or after that we saw the Attorney General, who we regarded to be the President's Chief Executive Officer. And where he was shown the actual messages of intercept. He saw the mail coverage on things which were of deep concern. And so there wasn't any -- the last thing in the world was to withhold from the President anything.

Mr. Johnson. Now, if you are talking about the meeting that is discussed in the Rockefeller Report, that occurred a year after this?

Mr. Angleton. I can't recall those things, because we were working on many levels here, we were working on a level like this, which occurred -- how many meetings, I don't remember?

Mr. Johnson. Four meetings.

Mr. Angleton. Was it the entire month?

Mr. Johnson. Anyway, that was a very short period. And at the same time all the activity was going on. This was
purely a side line affair. And I would have thought that the
meeting with the Attorney General was at a different time. I
always thought this was a meeting coincident with this, because
I remember -- the reason. I feel that there was some communica-
tion with the Attorney General was the shock I felt when I was
told that the Attorney General stated he was aware of the
Huston business, and it didn't make sense --

Mr. Johnson. You know, on this same page, in a footnote
that was apparently added at the request of Mr. Hoover, the
Director of the FBI felt compelled to point out to the
President in no uncertain terms that he was not going to support
a covert mail coverage program.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I can't speak for what was on Mr.
Hoover's mind. But the Bureau, and I think the Secret Service
even, were levying requests and getting all the take, all of
the production out of it. Now, I refuse to believe that given
the quality of the information, that it wasn't -- that Mr.
Hoover did not know what was going on.

Mr. Johnson. My point was, though, that the Director of
the FBI felt compelled to speak very frankly to this issue,
apparently, in a footnote. But Mr. Helms did not speak with
total frankness about his own program in this report.

Mr. Angleton. But I don't know -- the thing aborted. No
one expected this thing to die as it died.

Mr. Johnson. But that is another issue --
Mr. Angleton. No, it is not another issue. Because my view is that Hoover -- I mean that the Bureau and ourselves would have disclosed the mail program to the White House, because we would have no customers.

Mr. Johnson. Would have disclosed the mail coverage?

Mr. Angleton. Of course. Because if you had a man in Huston's position, domestically having the same authority, as he put it, as Dr. Kissinger had for Foreign Affairs, then he would be entitled to all sources of information. That is what I am trying to say. And therefore he would be a point of the closest tie-in with the Administration, with the Executive, to work out priorities.

Mr. Johnson. So the CIA and the FBI were going to hold off on informing the President on this program?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I didn't say the program had gone ahead, if there hadn't been this unexpected reaction, then -- because you see, no one -- I would never have dreamed that the White House staff could have launched such a thing without the Attorney General being fully apprised, because everyone was rightly or wrongly conscious of the fact that the most powerful individual, in terms of the White House, was the Attorney General. And therefore it was inconceivable that in his role you could have the FBI chairing from Justice a meeting of this sort without his being fully apprised at the White House level of what was going on. To me it still is something
I refuse to believe. Because I only heard by hearsay of how his reaction was to the Huston thing, and how he had killed it, and how he went to the President. It was all hearsay.

But it is inconceivable --

Mr. Johnson. I want to return to that point in a moment.

To finish up this section on mail coverage, I wonder if we could finally reach some conclusion on why it was that mail coverage, covert mail coverage, was called illegal in this report, and yet the CIA had a program going at the time, and the Bureau had one going before. Why is it that the Agencies were involved in illegal programs?

Mr. Angleton. That is the whole history of the mail program.

Mr. Johnson. I don't ask you to do that, because I think Mr. Wallach is going into that.

Mr. Angleton. I say, I would have to go into the whole history of the mail program.

What I am really trying to raise is a philosophical question here. When does an agency feel compelled to conduct an intelligence collection procedure which is widely considered to be illegal? What kind of decisions are made to go ahead on a program like that, despite its illegality?

Mr. Angleton. Well, it went on since -- what was it, 1952? And I think it was going on three years before we became involved in it. So it was an on-going operation. And I don't
think that the files properly reflect that there was a much
stronger counter intelligence interest than the record shows.

And Eric Trimm, who was prominent in the origination of it with
the Office of Security, by background an FBI man in counter-
intelligence. And in OSS he was X-2, counterintelligence.
And I know him intimately. And his whole thrust of any kind of
espionage or other operational usage would have a very strong
counterintelligence base to it.

Mr. Johnson. But you see the thrust of my question. Here
was set before the President some options which presumably
he could improve by making a change in the little blank to
the options and if he had approved those options
he would have been approving in essence the kind of lawlessness
in the intelligence program, he would have been approving a
program that right in the report itself was referred to as
illegal

Mr. Angleton. I understand that.

Mr. Johnson. So could one make the argument that the
intelligence community was asking the President to approve
something of his own?

Mr. Angleton. Not the intelligence community. The
intelligence community was not told of the program. The people
who appeared were not told.

Mr. Johnson. Okay, let me refine that by saying the leading
representative of the Bureau and the CIA?

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Mr. Angleton. I don't understand you at all.

Mr. Johnson. Let me start over on this point, because in fact it was the intelligence community, wasn't it, because this document is signed by Gayler and Helms.

Mr. Angleton. But they didn't know to my knowledge anything about the mail program.

Mr. Johnson. But my point is that they were setting down on paper some options for the President to check off which, had he done so, in case of two and three, would have meant that he would have approved an illegal program. So can't we say that the four principals of the intelligence community signed a document that laid before the President a set of options that were illegal?

Mr. Angleton. Let me see that again.

This isn't it. This is electronic.

It says here: "High level postal authorities have in the past provided complete cooperation and maintained full security of this program." That is, covert coverage. It explains that there is covert coverage in existence.

Mr. Johnson. Where does it explain that?

Mr. Angleton. "High level covert coverage. High level postal authorities have, in the past, provided complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program."

Mr. Johnson. But isn't this the key phrase, "in the past"?

Mr. Angleton. We will come back.
"This technique involved negligible risk of compromise. Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence" which is the present tense -- "and personnel involved are highly trained, trustworthy and under complete control of the intelligence agency.

"This coverage has been extremely successful in producing hard core and authentic intelligence which is not obtainable from any other source. An example, is a case involving an interception of a letter to a Soviet establishment in 1964. The writer offered to sell information to the Soviets."

cetera.

"Other examples include" -- and here we are missing a very operative part in this xeroxing.

You had better read this, because I haven't read it.

Mr. Johnson. I think it is really the key phrase where it talks about covert coverage not being legal.

Mr. Angleton. In your research on this have you come across any draft papers on these different things?

Mr. Johnson. No.

Mr. Angleton. Because I mean, I can't reconstruct who wrote this, who supplied the verbage. In other words, I don't know whether we are the ones or it was the Bureau that devised this phrasing.

Mr. Johnson. Let's go off the record for just a moment.

(Off the record discussion.)
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Mr. Johnson. Back on the record.

The next operations that were discussed in the Special Report have to do with surreptitious entry. And to repeat what we have done earlier, I would be interested in knowing what the objectives of the CIA were here if any.

Mr. Angleton. Let me read it.

Mr. Johnson. The report leads one to believe that this was one of many NSA interests. Was that your perception, too, at the time?

Mr. Angleton. It may have been only because of Admiral Gayler's abortive attempts to change Mr. Hoover's mind on relinquishing this type of operation. But in actual fact we had as much interest as did the Bureau in the surreptitious entry.

Mr. Johnson. Could you briefly explain why?

Mr. Angleton. Because of the product. In other words, it is not solely an NSA product. The NSA would want the cryptographic assist. But on the other hand it could be bag and pouch reports that went through the air, and expense books, and identities of agents, and all kinds of documentation. In other words, it is probably the highest level of collection, both for espionage and counterintelligence purposes, that exists.

Mr. Johnson. Is this kind of operation carried out by the Bureau in this country?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't know what they had
Mr. Johnson. In the past, was this strictly a Bureau activity?

Mr. Angleton. I think that they should be asked. What I am trying to say is that to my knowledge -- I may be wrong -- I don't think that they ever officially told us of their activities, although I think it was well known -- I mean, it was known to selected people.

Mr. Johnson. Does the CIA use the technique of surreptitious entry within the US?

Mr. Angleton. I have read the story, I think I have read in the press something about some disagreement with Mr. Hoover over some operation in Chevy Chase or something, I don't know.

Mr. Johnson. According to the set of options on surreptitious entry -- we are talking about more than diplomatic embassies, we are also talking about the use of this technique against other urgent and high priority internal security targets. To your knowledge has the CIA ever used surreptitious entry against non-diplomatic establishments within the US?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I am not an expert on that. I read that some of the security cases involved it, there are some personnel. And Mr. Colby has given a very lengthy numerical thing as to how many times that is used or not used.

Mr. Johnson. Why is it that the CIA and the NSA have relied upon the FBI to conduct surreptitious entry in most cases when...
it comes to foreign embassies within this country? Why don't they conduct their own activities?

Mr. Angleton. Basically it is because to be successful requires an enormous amount of manpower and expertise. In other words, the process of surreptitious entry first requires sources. It requires identifying the time of the entry. It requires total hermichtical sealing off of any people from that embassy from returning unexpectedly, which means that all parties that might return are kept under total surveillance, so that in the event that they decided they have left something back at the office, the team is warned. And it would be almost impossible for anyone to try to do it successfully except the FBI. They are the only ones with the assets and the coverage.

Mr. Johnson. At the bottom of the page of the Special Report, in this section on surreptitious entry, the FBI added a note. The note is indistinct on the page or copy I gave you. But it is reproduced here. Do you find that a credible reason for eliminating this collection technique is the reason that the number of police guarding the embassy adds to the operational hazards? Or do you think that was a smoke screen put up by Mr. Hoover because he simply didn't want to use that procedure?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know what he means by the increase in the number of police.

Mr. Johnson. He is referring to that executive protection
force that came into existence in late 1970.

Mr. Angleton. I really don't have any comment to make on that. I don't think that the Bureau would have told -- they would have told the Attorney General and the President of the state of the art, but I don't think that Mr. Hoover would feel obligated to expose to the other principals an activity of this sort in which the Bureau is the primary beneficiary. In other words, as the chief law enforcement officer charged with the domestic counterespionage, he would not to my way of thinking share the information until its use had been exhausted for internal security purposes. And this was an audience to which I don't think he was prepared to spell anything out. Normally he would handle that by seeing the Attorney General and the President.

Mr. Johnson. He wouldn't have even shared his views with Mr. Helms?

Mr. Angleton. He was under no obligation to charter-wise or any other way.

Mr. Johnson. The next set of options has to do with development of campus sources. And the list of options are here. And here is one specifically mentioning the CIA.
Mr. Angleton. I think this is mainly FBI language, that is, up until paragraph 5, up to that point it is involving the problems of the Army and the Bureau running into the ROTC problems. And then I guess down to 5 -- of course, we have had experience for many, many years with the international concerns, and the troubles that the Ft. Myer outfit had in the Katzenbach report, we knew from hard core activity that the Youth Festival in Vienna, and that the Soviets -- I mean, the Soviets ran the International Student Business and front organizations.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, would this first option have been of interest to the CIA -- I am sorry, not the first option, but rather the second option?

Mr. Angleton. I would put it this way, that I think it would have permitted the FBI to have gained much more intelligence. And as it opened up, to travel abroad for international conferences, it would give us the opportunity for recruitment, and opportunity to take those people over as agents.

Mr. Johnson. But would you have wanted to develop your own campus sources?

Mr. Angleton. No, we would rely on the Bureau -- we may have selected once where, for example, it was a period for this when in Mexico City Soviet intelligence was cultivating Americans at the University of Mexico for espionage
purposes.

Now, when we get a case of this sort, then we would be zeroed in on the hard core Soviet case. So, we were working from a broad back into the country. This would give us the strength of working from here outward.

Mr. Johnson. In order to protect your own CIA recruiters who were visiting campuses, did you ever think it would be useful to have your own CIA sources who might tell you what the student body was doing?

Mr. Angleton. Personally, outside of the domestic contacts people, I would say at that time we did not have personnel or manpower.

Mr. Johnson. The next and last set of options has to do with the use of military undercover agents.

Would that have been of significance to the CIA directly?

Mr. Angleton. It is the same way as the previous options, that the Agency would benefit from any hard core intelligence developed by the Army. And you have to keep in mind that over the years we had broken the Army cases of espionage abroad, in which the agents concerned came back to the U.S., and so on. They would pass the military counter intelligence to the FBI. In other words, we worked with them abroad, and then when it reverted to the U.S. we worked with the FBI.

So any knowledge that they could acquire extending
this into the Armed Forces on campus, and so on, it is bound to have -- eventually these people would be assigned abroad.

Mr. Johnson. Would you have supported at that time an expanded counter intelligence role for the military within the U.S.?

Mr. Angleton. No. We have always had first rate liaison with the military counter intelligence services. We have trained the original OSI people in the counter -- by "we", I mean my people trained them. And that was a cadre of people who in turn went out and trained others, and we have refresher courses.

Mr. Johnson. What I am really getting at is this second option in which it says, the counter intelligence mix of the military services should be expanded to include the active collection of intelligence concerning student-related dissident activities.

Would you have supported that?

Mr. Angleton. No. That is a matter between the Bureau and the military. We would get a by-product in a rare instance, I would assume. But that appears to me to be primarily a matter between the military and the Bureau. Because I think the military were charging the Bureau with all kinds of investigative leads and things of this sort. I don't think the Bureau had the manpower to comply.
Mr. Johnson. According to the testimony of other witnesses, there were two other options that were discussed in some detail at these meetings, but not included in the special report.

One of these was surreptitious optical surveillance. Now, the questions that I would pose to you on this is, number one, what does it mean?

And number two, how did it relate to the interests of the CIA?

Now, I am just wondering if you thought it did.

Mr. Angleton. Well, again, my understanding of the term, it is simply the accumulation of newscasts, the dissident acts, and violence, and what not, when you acquire enough to identify the ring leaders, you can identify those people who appear in all the different front organizations who are the stimulant in this.

So, it narrows down your investigative target.

Mr. Johnson. Was that -- is that being done already?

Mr. Angleton. I think that -- my understanding at that time was that it may have been done -- I don't know this from direct knowledge. I think that Downie did talk to that subject.

Mr. Johnson. But you don't recall these specifics?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I can remember. I think that is Downie who mentioned something about the photographing of
people who attended rallies and so on, where you can identify that this one person, this group of people who you see visually, who are actually doing the egging on here turning the car over, who are doing that, and then pretty soon you will find that they are in Washington, and they are in college and then some other place. Therefore, as in all that type of Fifth Column work, once you get the hard core of your real targets, then you can anticipate where the next action is going to be.

There were publications then or later when they had the Washington thing, I mean the big hassle here in Washington, where the people that were putting on the show worked up militant plans of every conceivable type on how to handle the police and communications and all of that.

The query was whether they dreamed that up themselves or whether they had technical assistance from professionals.

Now, I was not directly involved in that, but I did hear comment to the effect that it was too professional to just come out of the woodwork, that it had to be that somebody with a professional background to devise the strike action.

I wish I could remember some of the verbiage that was in the cover of this.

Mr. Johnson. I know what you mean. I have read that.

Do you have any recollection why this option was removed from the special report?
Mr. Angleton. No. I would say maybe the only reason it was removed was simply that it was not regarded to be -- that it was a matter of minor importance in terms of the other matters.

Mr. Johnson. The last option that presumably was of some importance in the discussions had to do with the investigation of diplomatic personnel.

Now, I understand that before the FBI will conduct an investigation of diplomatic personnel in this country it will get a clearance from the State Department.

I further understand that some of the members of the Bureau wanted to eliminate this clearance procedure, and so that was brought in discussion.

Do you remember anything about this?

Mr. Angleton. The problem has been a problem that goes far beyond this interagency business. The problem is that it was our understanding, rightly or wrongly, that this was a self-imposed restriction of the Bureau's. In other words, the Bureau was under no compulsion by law or procedures to clear these things with the State Department, that they did it by way of protection, if anything went wrong, then they could fall back on the State Department's agreement.

Our objection was, number one, that we believed it to be a needless disclosure of counter intelligence data, and
because in order to make your case with State, you had to put
into their possession the most sensitive information. And
from our point of view this was again gratuitous.

And second, we didn't agree with their policies of
leniency regarding the activities of the Soviet bloc per-
sonnel in this country.

Now, this was brought out in a very lengthy annual
report by the President's Foreign Intelligence Board, in
which they went down into all the problems and restraints as
they dealt with the diplomatic community here -- the
lack of reposit. And the thrust of their findings was that
the State Department was leaning over backwards in order not --
not facing up to the Soviet bloc presence.

That was submitted, I believe, to McGeorge Bundy by
the President's Foreign Intelligence Board. And answers
were sent back from State to the Bureau and ourselves.
The result of it was, nothing was done, and State argued
and justified their position, but no higher authority arbi-
trated it or moved in and made decisions.

I think that is what it relates to.

Mr. Johnson. But in the context of these others --

Mr. Angleton. It was an on-going argument, and
probably the reason it wasn't raised is because it was so
complex in terms -- I mean, the problem was known already, was
known to the Attorney General, it was known to the President's
Foreign Intelligence Board, et cetera. And I think probably again it was considered to be minor in com-
parison with the other.

Mr. Johnson. I have put others down here.

Do you remember any other options that were discussed and not included in the special report?

Mr. Angleton. I know there were many others, but I don't remember any of them that stand out. You can't get a gathering of these people together. We knew very little about the original meeting, what transpired at the original meeting with the President — and got a great number of proposals that were very far from target.

Mr. Johnson. Do you find it ironic at all that the President was mainly interested in domestic unrest and obtaining better intelligence data about radicals in this country, yet the meeting itself seemed to dwell at great length on foreign intelligence data?

Mr. Angleton. No, I think his interest was equal on both, and I think he saw the problem very clearly in terms of both the intelligence abroad and at home. I think this is borne out by the fact that at some period of time my understanding is he met with Mr. Hoover at Camp David and expressed to him his dissatisfaction with the Foreign Intelligence coverage, and instructed him to increase his legal attaché representation abroad, which in fact was done against
the protest of the State Department or Ambassador in the field.

Mr. Johnson. And also CIA protests?

Mr. Angleton. We were encouraged to join them, but we did not, because we had different points of view. In our view any American presence abroad, increased American presence abroad, working counter intelligence, is an advantage, as long as we get the product. And as long as they coordinate, and Mr. Sullivan's attitude -- and he knew that we disagreed -- was that it was hampering the Bureau by taking away personnel. He felt his people could be better employed at home than abroad, because he was hurting for personnel.

I think personally -- I disagreed with him -- and he knows this very well -- it was because we didn't have strong enough personnel abroad. And then, the FBI, by virtue of the prestige of Mr. Hoover, and the kind of men they have, inspired a lot more confidence in many instances with foreign police, who really did have a very high regard for Mr. Hoover. And, therefore, his representatives were accorded a kind of professional treatment that wasn't necessarily accorded to us. And they would visit the U.S. and they would meet Mr. Hoover, and he in a sense was the leader in the non-Communist world of law enforcement offices. And, therefore, it accrued to our advantage when the Bureau operated abroad, as long as we got the product.
and as long under the charters, as long as they coordinated
in advance in the business. But there was also a tremendous
amount of law enforcement business criminal in nature, which
sometimes goes into the field of subversion, which only the
Bureau can properly handle.

Again, because of their personnel -- they had lawyers,
law enforcement, they know the chain of evidence, and how it
has to be preserved, and basically because of Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Johnson. The third section of the special
report had to do with the recommendations, and the primary
recommendation was for a permanent interagency committee on
intelligence.

How did the CIA feel about this concept?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that we were in agreement
that if the President -- I mean, I don't know, I don't know
what our position was at the meeting, but I know -- I think
it might have been -- and that is that if the President had
set in motion Mr. Huston for a purpose, therefore, the
implementation had to be controlled by somebody with the
authority. And Mr. Huston was putting himself forward as
that authority. There wasn't anyone to dispute his position.

Mr. Johnson. What I really want you to address your-
self to is the concept of coordinating intelligence evalua-
tion and dissemination within the intelligence community by
some kind of interagency body.
Is that a good concept?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know if this is an accurate statement of that, is it?

(Referring to document.)

Mr. Johnson. Let me show you the text itself in the special report. Here are the options.

Mr. Angleton. Let me see how this gets introduced.

I think it is self-explanatory. The attitude, as I remember, of the Agency was that the whole exercise wouldn't have been done unless the President had in mind evaluations of finished intelligence. And there wasn't any such body in the government.

Mr. Johnson. Was there a hesitancy on behalf of the CIA to get involved in domestic intelligence which was primarily to preserve the FBI.

Mr. Angleton. After all, we are in a number of inter-agency meetings, that is, as observers or members, where the Bureau is the Chairman and so on.

Mr. Johnson. Probably as blatantly oriented as this one would have been --

Mr. Angleton. I mean, the whole exercise was blatantly domestically oriented, and everything stated there is true, that there wasn't any point whether this could be done, and if the Bureau didn't agree on a point, they each went their separate ways.
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There was no one in authority to try to evaluate it and put it before the President as a decision.

Mr. Johnson. Apparently Mr. Hoover viewed it as an encroachment upon FBI turf. I wonder if the CIA viewed it that way, too, and were a little bit hesitant?

Mr. Angleton. No, the CIA's attitude very definitely was that Mr. Huston wasn't their except as the President's representative, and if this was what the whole exercise was about you couldn't do all these things unless it was policed.

And since it was the President's desire from calling the principals together to get this thing embarked on, and at the end you have to see how it was going to be policed, who did you turn to?

So, as I say, there were different attitudes in the community on domestic problems, and to articulate what in fact existed, you had to have somebody, or you had to have some chairman in close contact with the White House who could submerge agency and departmental differences into common priorities, common objectives, and so on. And no one knew how it was going to be. At least it was one of the options.

Mr. Johnson. Do you recall any other recommendations that were made that were later withdrawn from the special report?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Johnson. Do you recall anything about how these
footnotes were included into the special report?

Mr. Angleton. You mean Mr. Hoover's?

Mr. Johnson. Yes.

Do you know the story behind the footnotes?

Mr. Angleton. No. All I know is that I heard that
the report had gone up to him, and he had taken an adverse
position on every recommendation, that he had seen the
Attorney General, and the Attorney General, who had been
unaware of all of this, took a very strong stand against
Huston, and either saw the President or something and got it
killed.

Mr. Johnson. Did you know who were involved in the
discussions that led to this special report, did they ever
really think that it was going to get by Mr. Hoover?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think anyone ever came to a
consideration of it.

Mr. Johnson. Wasn't it widely known --

Mr. Angleton. Personally, as I said earlier, I had
believed that there wouldn't have been any such meeting had
it not been worked out in advance between the Attorney
General and the President. That is the reason I still
refuse to believe that the Attorney General was unaware of
the exercise.

Mr. Johnson. Were you surprised that the Attorney
General was not invited to participate in any of these
proceedings.

Mr. Angleton. I thought he was behind the whole thing. And it stood to reason, he was regarded as the most powerful person under the President, and with a lot of special assignments.

You would hear that such and such a thing, he was the one who was the President's advisor, or making the recommendations. So when this thing came up, I thought that this was the Attorney General, and the President had had many meetings -- they had a meeting of the minds, and Huston was chosen with the Attorney General's blessing.

When I found out later that he didn't even know, then I knew that there wasn't going to be any --

Mr. Johnson. Didn't anyone ever ask at the Langley meeting what the Attorney General's views had been on some of these items?

Mr. Angleton. There wasn't any reason to raise it. I wasn't going to disclose to people I didn't even know what I happened to know about domestic problems, the Bureau and the Attorney General. That wasn't the kind of forum for that.

Mr. Johnson. So no one at these meetings say, look, some of the things we are talking about here are illegal, and before we put them in an option paper to the President shouldn't we have consultation with the Attorney General's office?
Mr. Angleton. There may have been somebody that said that, but it doesn't stick in my mind. In fact, the discussion of those meetings was so fluid and so many times off the target, that it was only when the Bureau brought back the finished draft of the previous meeting that it gave any cohesiveness to what really took place the day before, in other words, the fact that Bill Sullivan had a recorder present, one of his men who took the notes and papers and all that.

Now, whether he had an ad hoc drafting committee I am not certain, but I think he might have had, in which Ober was a party to it.

So, the coherency of the meeting became apparent the next meeting when the papers were circulated. And I think if you wanted some insight into many questions you would ask, it would be to find the different drafts so you can compare what happened in the opening meeting with what emerged out of the last meeting. And I am certain those were in being someplace.

Mr. Johnson. Have you seen these drafts yourself?

Mr. Angleton. I saw -- I was present when the Bureau would disseminate the next draft. And I will certainly -- I can't believe that they don't have a file dealing with this subject.

Mr. Johnson. Do you have these drafts in your own file?
Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. They may be, but I haven't been able to find them. No, I don't think I have them on file. I think that Ober kept the paper, and you have to understand that one thing I would try to resist, since I have probably more paper than anybody in the business. Ober was the one who kept whatever materials we had.

Mr. Johnson. Do you recall other second-hand or strictly hearsay anything about the signing ceremony in which this document was signed by the four principals?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think there was a meeting. I think that they ran it around by courier. I think this was a lot of pressure by Huston or somebody to get it signed, and I think there was also a question that all the principals were in town or something of that sort.

But I don't think there was a meeting at which it was signed, there may have been.

Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce into the record Exhibit A-2, Mr. Angleton, Memorandum for Richard Helms from Tom Huston entitled "Domestic Intelligence, dated 23 July 1970.

(The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-2 for identification.)
Mr. Johnson. This is the so-called Huston Plan which Mr. Huston sent out to the intelligence community principals.

And as you can see, he suggests in the memo that the President approved these various options.

Mr. Angleton. He said that he approved them?

Mr. Johnson. Yes.

Do you remember the CIA reaction to this document?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think I ever saw it, or I don't remember ever seeing it.

Mr. Johnson. Do you remember when Mr. Helms told you that the President had approved it?

Mr. Angleton. Let me just go through it, because it might come back.

Let me ask you, before I reply to your question, something on dates. This was dated the 23rd of July. When was Mr. Hoover's turnover? When did Mr. Hoover take all the exceptions?

Mr. Johnson. He put his footnotes on the document around the 24th, 25th of June. And then the Special Report went to the White House on the 26th of June. As far as I can ascertain, the next response to the intelligence community was this document saying --

Mr. Angleton. A month later?

Mr. Johnson. Yes.

Mr. Angleton. I find that very hard to believe.
Are you sure you got the right date, June?

Mr. Johnson. The President received the Special Report at the end of June. And this was the response to the intelligence community.

Mr. Angleton. The President received the report on 20 June, you say?

Mr. Johnson 26.

Mr. Angleton. The 26th of June?

Mr. Johnson. Off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnson. Back on the record.

Mr. Angleton. I believe that it became known that the Attorney General had not been party to the Hunt business, then the turndown — it didn't seem surprising.

Mr. Johnson. Tell me, is it surprising that a document of this importance which would have changed the intelligence community in many substantial ways would have expanded their collection procedures, is it surprising that such a document was signed over by a 29-year old staffer as opposed to the President himself, or Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know how to respond to that. because I don't think I saw this. The only one I saw was the one in which was three lines or so in which he directed that no domestic intelligence be sent to the White House to his attention.
Mr. Johnson. What was your reaction to that particular memo, the one you have just mentioned?

Mr. Angleton. My reaction was that he was working closely with the President and the Attorney General. It is inconceivable to me from anything that we knew and heard that the Attorney General was not the moving hand in the entire business.

Mr. Johnson. Did you think it was a good idea that there was a domestic equivalent of Henry Kissinger to deal with domestic intelligence problems?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that there should always be somebody who enjoys the trust of the President who is accessible for high level counter intelligence, interagency disputes -- I mean, whether there is an independent co-equality, there should be an arbitor, someone to whom the agencies in question have access. I am strongly in favor of an ombudsman of some sort on the National Security Council, which is not controlled by people involved in the foreign affairs, distinct from it.

And I think the internal security is a legitimate concern of the President, and requires full time or part time, a full time or part time expert who has access.

Mr. Johnson. Do you recall being happy or pleased that the President had approved relaxation of collection restraints?
Mr. Angleton. I imagine I approved. I don't know.

At first I didn't see that.

Mr. Johnson. Did you get the news by telephone?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know if I got the news that way. I mean I am trying to remember, I don't recall any document that Huston signed of this nature other than the one where he said he was a recipient, to be the recipient.

Mr. Johnson. He must have heard in some way the President did not approve the series of options that were to relax restraints?

Mr. Angleton. I am not certain. I don't know.

Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce into the record Exhibit A-3, Mr. Angleton, memorandum for Mr. McManus from Mr. Helms dated 28 July 1970.

(The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-3 for identification.)
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Mr. Johnson. This simply indicates that Mr. Helms was returning to the situation room the previous document which I just showed you. And the reason I show this to you is, I am trying to recall to your mind any recollection about the recall of the Huston decision memorandum.

We have a lapse of five days here.

Do you remember any reaction of the CIA, the 23rd to the 28th?

Mr. Angleton. But what day of the week was it?

Mr. Johnson. It was over a weekend.

Mr. Angleton. You would have to know where the Director was --

Mr. Johnson. My point was simply, were you advised that the President's order was recalled almost as quickly as it was issued?

Mr. Angleton. Not when I heard that Hoover went to Mitchell, and that Mitchell was unaware of the exercise.

Then the whole house of cards became apparent. That was the first indication we had of what the details, power politics were.

Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce into the record Exhibit A-4, Mr. Angleton, a memorandum for the record written by Richard Helms dated 28 July 1970.

(The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-4 for identification.)
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Mr. Johnson. This, of course, refers to the meeting that you have alluded to earlier in which Mr. Helms found out that Mr. Mitchell did not know about the special report or the Huston Plan. I wonder if you could interpret this phrase for me in paragraph 2.

Mr. Helms says:

"I told the Attorney General that we had put our backs into this exercise".

Now, presumably he is talking about the preparation of the Special Report.

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Johnson. And does that indicate to you that the Central Intelligence Agency was enthusiastic and strongly supportive of the options developed in the Special Report?

Mr. Angleton. It is not a question of whether they were in support of all of the actions there, but were supportive of the fact that the President, in accordance with what Huston had to say, did not feel he was getting a picture on the domestic activities, because we didn't feel we were getting it.

I mean, there was no question about that, but that goes in and beyond the Huston things or anything else, the atmosphere in the community was the lowest possible thing in terms of domestic counter intelligence, or foreign, evolving around this split and the lack of liaison.

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Mr. Johnson. The final area that I wanted to talk to you about is the aftermath of the Huston Plan. And when one speaks of the aftermath I think one thinks of the Interagency Evaluation Committee, and also subsequent efforts to relax intelligence collection restraints.

Let's turn first to the Interagency Evaluation Committee. You were a member of that committee, were you not?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Could you describe briefly the origins and purpose of this committee?

Mr. Angleton. I don't remember the -- when was the first meeting, can you tell me?

Mr. Johnson. December 3.

Mr. Angleton. The same year?

Mr. Johnson. Yes.

Mr. Angleton. I don't remember how this thing originated. I think the question of gaps which preceded the Huston Plan was still active on another level, in other words, there were many levels of express concern. It was the normal level of the lack of FBI liaison, and another level with the Huston Plan, and then there was something that generated or brought back to life this whole question of domestic intelligence. And I am not certain unless you have documents on how I was notified to be nominated for that
business.

That is my first statement. It is possible that Ober knows or has the papers, because I know that when it eventually came to having working bodies, Ober was the natural choice for taking that on.

The first meeting, as I recollect, was in Dean's office. And I think that is when they had -- that is my recollection. And that is when Mardian appeared. And whether it was in that meeting or in a series of meetings, he proposed setting up a -- and again this is all as though we were working for the President in this thing, meetings were held there, and one meeting was held in the Vice President's conference room, and here was the counsel to the President doing the laying off of hands. And they had some judge from Seattle in mind, whom they eventually brought to a meeting who was to be the head of this evaluation business. And there was a lot of discussion on the cover he would have, and where he would be located.

And it boiled down to the fact that he was totally out of his depth, he could not foresee his being able to do it the way it was proposed on the grounds that he had too many friends from the State of Washington who had come to Washington, and he had -- and there were questions of prestige involved, and a question of what was he doing in Washington, and so on.
So, I think that was the last appearance he made.

But nothing seemed to be generative regarding these meetings until Mardian began holding them in the Triangle Building. And his whole thrust there was that he wanted permanent representatives from each of the agencies to be there full time under him in some kind of a staff setup to work on domestic -- on the evaluation of domestic affairs.

And this is when the thing began to become concrete, until he ran into problems with Mr. Hoover, and the Bureau took a very strong position that they would not supply a secretary. And as I recall, I was opposed to supplying personnel, and then there were a lot of things that we were not privy to behind-the-scene things.

And finally, George Moore, I believe, was the -- I can't recall whether he was the one nominated.

In our case I reported to Dick, and I believe Tom Karamessines, and the result was that we decided on Ober. But with an understanding that it could not be full time, and a private understanding with him that he could handle it any way he liked.

In other words, we didn't want him to go into a make-work situation.

Mr. Johnson. What was the Committee doing, conducting any operations?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was pulling together all
information on given situations. I can't even tell you the
subject matter right now. But I think dissident newspaper
things, I really don't know. I would have to see the
papers, because they were about as incohesive -- I think they
were the most inconclusive meetings I have ever seen in my
life. And so the buck was passed to Ober, really. He had to
arrange some way to go down there -- and I don't know how many
times he went. And any papers, I don't think were very
informative. I don't think they ever came to any kind of
conclusion. The people that had the best information to my
recollected was the Bureau.

Now, whether this got into the Berrigan case -- the
reason I mention that is that while all of this was going
on, Mardian was running the phone all the time, and giving
us -- telling us aside something about the Berrigan business.
And that is about the extent of my immediate knowledge of that.

Mr. Johnson. Did Mardian have a good grasp for
intelligence problems?

Mr. Angleton. No, not at all. I think he was
really out of his depth. But he had connections. He obviously
had a very powerful position, I mean in terms of being able
to get what he wanted.

Mr. Johnson. Did John Dean play an important role
in the history of the IDC?

Mr. Angleton. Well, he loaned his office and himself
to the launching of it.

Mr. Johnson. Did he stay with it?

Mr. Angleton. No. He gradually withdrew, but the whole -- those meetings which gave it a certain prestige and all the rest of it were those at which he was present. And then he gradually got out of it.

Mr. Johnson. Why did you stop attending these meetings?

Mr. Angleton. I had too much to do -- it was partially that, but also -- with my responsibilities I can't go to meetings. And usually I would send people to meetings.

Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce the final exhibit to the testimony today, which is Exhibit A-5, memorandum for the files, John Edgar Hoover, dated April 12, 1971.

(The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-5 for identification.)
Mr. Angleton. What about this?

Mr. Johnson. Did Mr. Helms ever discuss with you this meeting that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Mitchell and Admiral Gaylor attended?

Mr. Angleton. I am trying to cast back and latch onto somebody in '71 to get a feeling.

I am certain he did.

Mr. Johnson. More importantly, do you have any recollection of a report being prepared for Mr. Mitchell as a result of this meeting, a combined CIA-NSA report, as was requested?

Mr. Angleton. I think -- what I am trying to remember here is whether this had to do with an operation that the Bureau was conducting in this country and which they were going to close down, and which we were trying to save, and we were trying to save it in part because of the Director's responsibilities to the intelligence community.

In other words, Dick was not necessarily speaking here as the head of CIA, he was speaking for the USIB.

Now, I may be off on a different phase of life, but I think this is related, and this entailed our moving our man in to replace Bureau men, and putting up money, and I think we used the Office of Security, if I recall correctly, if this is what was the outcome of all of this.

But I know that there were many telephone calls about
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trying to make sure, that there was a problem of rent, and a problem of access, and so on, the time factor that was involved.

Mr. Johnson. Do you remember the Helms-Gaylor report written for Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Angleton. But that is something that would normally be taken up with Staff/D, the people who are in liaison with NSA, or that could have been directly from Dick or his Deputy.

Mr. Johnson. Do you remember Mr. Helms coming to you and saying something to the effect, Admiral Gaylor is after me once again to try and get Mr. Hoover --

Mr. Angleton. This was going on all the time. there were probably hundreds of calls in reference to the problem about the NSA thing. I know that I strongly backed the idea of keeping the operation from dying.

Mr. Johnson. Which operation?

Mr. Angleton. The operation dealt with clandestine procurement.

Mr. Johnson. Did that operation relate to any of the collection methods we have discussed today?

Mr. Angleton. I think so.

Mr. Johnson. Surrupitious entry?

Mr. Angleton. It was a bugging operation, I mean taps.

Mr. Johnson. Could you shed some light on this sentence --
Mr. Angleton. That is, if what I am discussing have any reference to this. But this was a thing that Gaylor wanted to save, and I was called by people in NSA to give support to, and so on. That type of intervention.

Mr. Johnson. Could you shed light on this sentence:

"There was his discussion upon the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail".

Mr. Angleton. No, unless it is dealing with black bag job operations. I think that means diplomatic mail in bags, pouches.
Mr. Johnson. I thought black bag referred to surreptitious entry.

Mr. Angleton. No, black bag could be also stealing a courier's bag. And you have a diplomatic courier, and he has got the code and the mail for an embassy. The plane doesn't leave New York, it is 30 below zero. And he wants to get warm. He leaves his pouch there for a minute, or half an hour. And the Bureau picks it up and photographs the contents. So the black bag -- what I am trying to say is, Mr. Hoover could not use the same art forms that we would use. And I just am trying to think -- he didn't say how long this thing went on.

Mr. Johnson. Would this sentence imply that Mr. Helms is encouraging Mr. Hoover to reinstate a mail cover program?

Mr. Angleton. No. I read it -- my own view is that it would be more than mail. It would be black bag job operations. Now, those black bags would refer to the surreptitious entrance into an embassy, the penetration of a diplomatic pouch in transit, and part of that of course, is mail. And the most secret of all mail is unciphered mail, in other words, it is mail that does not go out over the air waves, but where all the cryptonyms or identities only go by armed couriers with the identities. And then the correspondence goes through the air with those identities. And it makes no sense to an interceptor unless he has got the key. So I can't imagine Mr. Helms referring to coverage of mail except in terms of the
proceedings in those black bags.

Mr. Johnson. Why couldn't he be talking about a mail intercept program?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think he was referring to it.

Mr. Johnson. It notes there that Mr. Helms was going to respond rapidly, take care of the report rapidly. But you don't recall any response?

In other words, it looks as though we were trying to work toward a resolution of the same issues as developed in the Huston Plan, and Mr. Mitchell is going to make a decision --

Mr. Angleton. But those things were all going on -- what I am trying to explain is that people are reading a lot into the Huston Plan, and at the same time are unaware that on several levels in a community identical bilateral discussions were going on. In other words, the Huston Plan didn't affect one way or the other the normal flow of business. And when Gaylor was faced with Hoover's shutting off and cutting out certain things -- there were time factors involved, the lease of a piece of property, the personnel who would take over, the point being that if you didn't meet those deadlines that was the end of it. And therefore those were sort of frantic things. And I imagine that the reason that Helms said it would be taken care of very promptly was that he probably already had staff studies, and all it meant was simply boiling them down into a
letter and sending the letter. And that would involve basically myself. But the principal person would have been staffed, and probably a Deputy Director that he might have called in as a legman on it, and he might have told me something about the Gaylor -- what had happened. But I don't remember his discussing that with me precisely in the meeting with Mitchell and Gaylor. There was no reason why he should have -- with Hoover.

Mr. Johnson. Were you aware of the series of meetings that were very much like this one?

Mr. Angleton. Not of a series of meetings with Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Johnson. But a series of discussions going on at different levels?

Mr. Angleton. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnson. Are you aware of any other specific meetings on this topic between Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover?

Mr. Angleton. No. I think that Mr. Papich, who has the best memorandum of record of anyone in Government, will surprise you by showing you how few times any Director of Central Intelligence ever met with Mr. Hoover. Practically never, except when it was a National Security Council meeting or something by accident.

Mr. Johnson. Why is it that Mr. Hoover would send a formal liaison over to the other Agency? Why didn't it work the other way? Why couldn't the CIA say, we are going to send over Mr. so and so to be liaison from the CIA to the FBI?
Mr. Angleton. That was his own way of operating. In other words, Mr. Hoover believed that his statutory responsibilities were not negotiable. And he would not permit any inter-agency committee to challenge or water down what he had by right. And therefore he never attended usual meetings, and he sent observers or someone, they may have been members in the end, but they were originally observers, and so on. And personally I feel that that was the proper way of operating, because of the compartmentation necessary for the activities of the FBI, and the internal security.

And he didn't want people who are here today and gone tomorrow wandering around in the FBI. And it was very tidy housekeeping on his part.

Mr. Johnson. Let me end by just touching on one other topic. Couldn't one argue that if we could do away with a number of laws that restrain intelligence collection, that the quality of intelligence would increase dramatically? Aren't there certain barriers that keep the intelligence specialists from getting high quality product that they need?

Mr. Angleton. My own feeling is this. This country can never work against the police state, or contain the activities of a police state, until there is a lot of relaxation in the law as far as counterintelligence and internal security people are concerned. To begin with, in an open society you don't have the laws for protection of secrets. You don't have an
official secrets act. You would not have penalties for
disclosure, except the passage of unauthorized personnel to a
foreign power. Now, President Truman made the comment that it
doesn't make any difference whether it is spies or newspapers
who publish the secrets as far as the US Government is concerned.
Washington himself was the greatest believer in intelligence.
And he wrote about it. And he spelled out very clearly that
intelligence was worth nothing unless it was secret. And he
tried to kidnap twice Aaron Burr, once or twice. Benjamin
Franklin opened the mail of the British. He was fired as
Postmaster for doing it. In other words, there is a whole US
tradition that believed in standing up to build up the national
security. It has been wrecked these last years.

Mr. Johnson. Don't we have a real tension here? Isn't
there a danger of transgressing against the civil liberties
of the American citizens when we relax those laws?

Mr. Angleton. I am not proposing solutions. I am saying
that first the law makers and the press -- let's leave the
press out -- the law makers and the Administration, the
Executive, have to know the danger of a threat. And I think
they have to examine the laws in terms of those which are
unrealistic in view of the threat. Now, that has never been
done. And again, I come back to my original suggestion that
there should be an ombudsman, a person who does have that
access to the Executive, who is not shackled by inter-agency,
internecine fights and all of that, and who is in a position powerful enough to take what he does know, that is communicated to him, and be able with the President work out legislation to meet the threat. And also counterintelligence should have a very direct bearing on the objectives of the Executive, I mean the realities. And if you do have, as I mentioned, the Rumanian intelligence working with the Soviets, then obviously you can't treat the Rumanians as something apart from and special in terms of the threat, because if they are arrested on Oslo working against NATO and against the West, and their activities are -- I mean their questionnaires benefit the Soviet Union strategically, then you can't make that differentiation. So you are not arguing philosophy here, you are arguing factual matters that derived from counterintelligence operations. Today there is total gap between the realities of counterintelligence and the knowledge of the public and the knowledge of the Congress. Otherwise you wouldn't find them all going to Russia on jaunts and all that type of thing, there would be an entirely different point of view. In other words, today we are equating ourselves with the Soviets on so many levels. They are not equating themselves with us. What we regard today as having some permanence to them is the tactical. Those are not my words. Those are the words of the Soviet, and the powers who are in the Soviet bloc in official capacities, and you have access to documents and to party directives. So the
point I am coming back to is that I believe -- I have not read his entire speech, but the speech that Kelley gave from Canada to the Lawyers Association, the Bar Association, was something to the effect that there had to be in the interests of internal or national security certain sacrifices of personal liberty. And I subscribe to it all the way. I am not talking now about criminal activity, I am not talking about marijuana or otherwise. But where there is conspiracy, -- and their country is incapable of getting below the iceberg. We know a tremendous amount of illegals. And yet there has not been a true high grade legal case since Abel. And Abel didn't talk. And yet from what we have heard from people in the KGB the identity of high grade illegals are only maintained by the chief of the service and not known to the resident tourists. And those are people who assume the identities of the Americans and who work for the opposition. You have to have a great deal of latitude in order to uncover these types of people, and to penetrate through the communications problem, how do they communicate. They need money. There are many ways that they can be discovered. But they can't be discovered the way we are hampered today, and also where we are breaking down compartmentation. And I think the tragedy of all of these hearings and everything that has transpired from the beginning has been destruction of the secrets as to the collection and modus operandi and techniques and the identity of individuals,
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et cetera. And I don't think we are going to recover from it without a complete housecleaning. But if you are going to have a complete housecleaning, no on is going to be left that knows anything, that knows the techniques and the training schools and so on. There is so much sensationalism -- to discuss cobra venom and all of that. It raises in everybody's mind, did the Agency receive a specific instruction to destroy the toxins? And did the person who allegedly didn't follow through on the order, did he see a Presidential instruction which ordered him to destroy the toxin? It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the Government has to comply with all of the overt orders of the Government.

Mr. Johnson. So treaties passed that deal with other countries do not necessarily apply to the covert arm of the Government?

Mr. Angleton. But you mean, first, you have an allegation that this will kill many thousands of people, we knot that to be a fact. We can just take that announcement.

Mr. Johnson. And what is the point to my question?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying that I think that if I am not mistaken -- and you can correct me -- I have not read the treaty -- I think it is of unilateral declaration by the President? But I may be mistaken.

Mr. Johnson. That was my understanding.

Mr. Angleton. But I don't think that the Soviets agreed
to it, did they?

Mr. Johnson. We both will have to have another look at it.

Mr. Angleton. I know in its original context, I think it
had an element of being a unilateral affair.

Mr. Johnson. But what if there is a bilateral or multi-
lateral treaty? Do their provisions also apply to the covert
arm of the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. I only am taking this one instance up. I
would say -- I don't know how to respond to that. It depends
on what the substance of it would be. If, for example, we find
the other party of the treaty violating through their intelli-
gence service the treaty, then I think it is a question that
would have to be considered here, that we could not permit them
to outdistance us. But let me put it to you another way.
One Soviet -- we had a very high level source who attended a
general staff briefing of the Soviets, addressed by a three-
star general of the general staff. And the subject
was electronics. And this was in 1961. And the Soviet general
stated that the US was ahead 14 years in the field of
electronics. But he said that they would overcome us through
three tactics. One would be through the increase of 2,000
staff officers added to their espionage side on the scientific
and technical to exploit the openings of the West of scientists
and others going to the Soviet Union, for espionage and
recruitment.
Bear in mind that espionage is the highest art form in the Soviet Union. They came out of the cave by reason of what Soviet intelligence did in the atomic and other fields. And here was a Central Committee directive of 1959 that 200 scientists would be added to the espionage corps to exploit opening to the West. That was number one. And number two, as a weapon of overtaking us, would be disinformation, misleading us scientifically up blind alleys, where we would expend both monies and assets and capability and manpower on impossible objectives transmitting disinformation.

And number three, by tying us down with binding treaties which would blunt our technologic growth. Now, that was the word. Before I left the Agency, perhaps a month before, some American scientists and intelligence estimators, sat down and made an estimate that the Soviets were four years behind us in electronics. Now, you take the story of an agent who was present in that high level top secret meeting, and here are people who knonwnothing whatsoever about that meeting, who independently have brought out a study to the effect that they are four years behind us.

Now, my own view is that there will be a terrible reaction in my lifetime against what is going on today. Because there will be a period when there will be a shift in the balance of power or there will be a confrontation with the Soviets where this country will back down, it will be probably an
unpopular issue, and where there will be a new perspective
directed at this period of time, and there will be a very strong
reaction, because the damage can't be seen now, it will be seen
then.

And I have no doubts as to that being the case, because the
long term Soviet objectives were directed and redirected in
'59 to one thing, and one thing alone, the change of the balance
of military power. And I stand on that.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, I would like to thank you very
much for spending the afternoon with us today.

Mr. Angleton. It has been enjoyable.

Mr. Johnson. Do you wish to make a brief closing statement.

Mr. Angleton. I may some other time, but not today. I
may really read the statement and see what I said.

Mr. Johnson. You are welcome to at any time.

Mr. Angleton. And I will direct it to the judge. Because
I am embarrassed about one thing, and that is the lack of paper
regarding the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, I mean the
fact that there weren't files on it.

Mr. Johnson. You will be given an opportunity to inspect
the transcript of your testimony and to make minor corrections.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the Committee adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.)
SPECIAL REPORT (ICI AD HOC)

I. Threat Assessment

II. Options for the President

1. Communications Intelligence
2. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations
3. Covert Mail Coverage
4. Surreptitious Entry
5. Development of Campus Sources
6. Use of Military Undercover Agents
7. Surreptitious Optical Surveillance
8. Investigation of Diplomatic Personnel
9. Others

III. Recommendations

1. Permanent Intergency Committee on Intelligence
2. Intelligence Review Board

Prior to Huxton Plan

Huxton Plan Objectives

After Huxton Plan
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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

SPECIAL REPORT
INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)

CHAIRMAN J. EDGAR HOOVER

JUNE, 1970
June 25, 1970

This report, prepared for the President, is approved by all members of this committee and their signatures are affixed hereto.

/s/ J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Chairman

/s/ Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

/s/ Lt. General D. V. Bennett, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

/s/ Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, USN
Director, National Security Agency

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PART TWO

RESTRAINTS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The Committee noted that the President had made it clear that he desired full consideration be given to any regulations, policies, or procedures which tend to limit the effectiveness of domestic intelligence collection. The Committee further noted that the President wanted the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth so that the President will be able to decide whether or not a change in current policies, practices, or procedures should be made.

During meetings of the Committee, a variety of limitations and restraints were discussed. All of the agencies involved, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the three military counterintelligence services, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), participated in these considerations.

In the light of the directives furnished to the Committee by the White House, the subject matters hereinafter set forth were reviewed for the consideration and decision of the President.

1. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS

A. Interpretative Restraint on Communications Intelligence

Preliminary Discussion

NSA develops significant domestic intelligence information in the course of monitoring foreign communications traffic. However, this information is not developed as a monitoring relationship or a foreign intelligence relationship. NSA uses this information primarily for processing on the interpretation of intelligence and operationally as a processing aid. In the utilization of this information, NSA is restricted to the interpretation of information not associated with a foreign relationship. The current practice of retaining such information is "hold on."
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Nature of Restriction

According to NSA interpretation of NSCID-6, which is the basis of NSA authority for development of communications intelligence, the processing of "foreign communications" sharply limits its authority with respect to those communications in which a U. S. citizen is a sender or recipient. While a case-by-case approach is used in producing such data, the continuation of such a procedure would inhibit the production of domestic intelligence and any expansion could result in encroachment on the jurisdiction of the FBI, as set forth in NSCID-6. Broader interpretation by Executive clarification of "foreign" to include any communications of any individuals using international facilities regardless of the nationality of the sender or recipient could rectify this situation.

Advantages of Maintaining Restriction

1. Extreme vigilance would be required to prevent expanded coverage from straying into an appearance of censorship.

2. Expanded coverage in this area, if disclosed, could result in unfavorable publicity and a move underground by those who now take careful advantage of the supposed inviolability of normal communications.

3. Significant expansion in this area would constitute a breach of the intent of original National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 6 establishing jurisdiction.

4. Expanded operations would require special operating procedures, including a continuation of current regulations and provisions as a "Trust."

Advantages of Relinquishing Restriction

1. Circumstances have altered considerably since the original Intelligence Directive was written. Decrease activity in material threshold of communications over a significant period of time is understandable.
2. A relaxation of the restriction now in effect would sharply increase the amount of intelligence information bearing on foreign involvement in U.S. affairs, and would permit more processing and thus a more timely flow of such information as it is obtained.

DECISION: Interpretative Restriction on Communications Intelligence

Interpretation of Intelligence Directive Number 6 should not be relaxed.

Present interpretation should be broadened to permit and program for coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities.

Present interpretation should be broadened to permit and program for coverage by NSA at the request of the FBI of the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities.

More information is needed.
B. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations

Preliminary Discussion

The limited number of electronic surveillances and penetrations substantially restricts the collection of valuable intelligence information of material importance to the entire intelligence community. NSA has been particularly hard-hit by this limitation, for the absence of electronic penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments has severely curtailed its capability for the exploitation of potentially available communications intelligence. Additionally, other agencies are deprived of access to high-level political, diplomatic, and military information, as well as valuable data regarding hostile intelligence operations.

Nature of Restrictions

Electronic surveillances have been used on a selective basis. Restrictions, initiated at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, arose as result of the condemnation of these techniques by civil rights groups, Congressional concern for invasion of privacy, and the possibility of their adverse effect on international relations.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

1. Disclosure and embarrassment to the using agency and/or the United States is always possible since such techniques often require that the services or advice of outside personnel be used in the process of installation.

2. The disclosure of electronic surveillances or penetration of diplomatic establishments could result in strained relations between the United States and the target country.

3. Certain elements of the press in the United States and abroad could potentially become involved in such controversies.

4. The maintenance of electronic surveillances would
Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions

1. The U.S. Government has an overriding obligation to use every available scientific means to detect and neutralize forces which pose a direct threat to the Nation.

2. Every major intelligence service in the world, including those of the communist bloc, use such techniques as an essential part of their operations, and it is believed the general public would support their use by the United States for the same purpose.

3. The President historically has had the authority to act in matters of national security. In addition, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides a statutory basis.

4. Intelligence data from electronic coverage is not readily obtainable from other techniques or sources. Such data includes information which might assist in formulating foreign policy decisions, information leading to the identification of intelligence and/or espionage principals and could well include the first indication of intention to commit hostile action against the United States.

5. Acquisition of such material from COMINT without benefit of the assistance which electronic surveillance techniques can provide, if possible at all, would be extremely expensive. Therefore, this approach could result in considerable dollar savings compared to collection methods.
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DECISION: Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations

Present procedures on electronic coverage should continue.

Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security.

Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage of foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community.

More information is needed.

NOTE: The FBI does not wish to change its present procedures of selective coverage on major internal security threats as it believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The FBI would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of the Attorney General for coverage required by them and that other entities provide such coverage themselves.

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HANDLING VIA COMMIT CHIEFS ONLY
C. Mail Coverage

Preliminary Discussion

The use of mail covers can result in the collection of valuable information relating to contacts between U.S. nationals and foreign governments and intelligence services. CIA and the military investigative agencies have found this information particularly helpful in the past. Essentially, there are two types of mail coverage: routine coverage is legal, while the second--covert coverage--is not. Routine coverage involves recording information from the face of envelopes. It is available, legally, to any duly authorized Federal or state investigative agency submitting a written request to the Post Office Department and has been used frequently by the military intelligence services. Covert mail coverage, also known as "sophisticated mail coverage," or "taps and seals," entails surreptitious screening and may include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail. This technique is based on high-level cooperation of top civilian postal officials. Insofar as civilian use is concerned, only mail designated to diplomatic establishments in the United States and air mail addressed to specific foreign locations has been covered.

Nature of Restrictions

Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal proceedings, and publicly afforded this matter in Congressional hearings involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

Routine Coverage:

1. Although this coverage is legal, charges of invasion of privacy, no matter how ill-founded, are possible.

2. This coverage depends on the cooperation of mail and postal employees and is therefore in some question as to operation.

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HANDLE VIA COMMUNITY POST
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DECISION: Mail Coverage

Present restrictions on both types of mail coverage should be continued.

Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed.

Present restrictions on covert coverage should be relaxed on selected targets of priority for foreign intelligence and internal security interest.

More information is needed.

NOTE: The FBI is opposed to implementing new covert mail coverage in case it is desirable to keep it in intelligence, it does not believe the routine use of covert forms to the present end will produce to the benefit of the community. It is not objectionable to legal mail coverage providing it is done especially well, and set up under the highly trained security personnel.
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D. Surrerptitious Entry

Preliminary Discussion

NSA has a particular interest in the use of surreptitious entry as a tool for obtaining cryptographic materials necessary for deciphering important diplomatic and foreign intelligence service traffic. In many instances, enciphered messages of this kind can be read only if keying materials can be surreptitiously obtained. NSA could exploit the communications of many additional foreign governments if a surreptitious entry program were reinstated.

Nature of Restrictions

Use of surreptitious entry, also referred to as "anonymous sources" and "black bag jobs," has been virtually eliminated. It involves clandestine entry into areas occupied by an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment to collect intelligence material. In the foreign intelligence field, it includes the collection of vital cryptographic material which enables the deciphering of intercepted diplomatic trraffic.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

1. The activity involves illegal entry and trespass.

2. Information which is obtained through this technique could not be used for prosecutive purposes.

3. The public disclosure of this technique would result in widespread publicity and embarrassment. The news media would portray the incident as a flagrant violation of civil rights and/or diplomatic immunity.

Advantages of Relinquishing Restrictions

1. Operations of this type are performed by a small number of carefully trained and professionally educated service employees. If this technique is employed, it is often difficult to discover. It has been used in the past with limited success. It has also been used with a limited success.
2. Benefits accruing from this technique in the past have been innumerable. In addition to identifying espionage agents, including illegals, vital cryptographic information has been obtained. Without cryptographic material which often can be obtained only from these operations, much significant diplomatic traffic cannot be deciphered even with the most sophisticated equipment. Such cryptographic material has been valued at millions of dollars in terms of the savings in cryptanalytic resources and in terms of the high-level intelligence information which it produced.

3. In the past this technique, when used against subversives, has produced valuable intelligence material.

DECISION: Subreptitious Entry

___ Present restrictions should be continued.

___ Present restrictions should be modified to permit procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material.

___ Present restrictions should also be modified to permit selective use of this technique against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.

___ More information is needed.
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E. Development of Campus Sources

Preliminary Discussion

Public disclosure of CIA links with the National Student Association and the subsequent issuance of the Katzenbach Report have contributed to a climate adverse to intelligence-type activity on college campuses and with student-related groups. It should be noted that the Katzenbach Report itself does not specifically restrain CIA from developing positive or counterintelligence sources to work on targets abroad.

Restrictions currently in force limit certain other elements of the intelligence community access to some of the most troublesome areas: campuses, college faculties, foreign and domestic youth groups, leftist journalists, and black militants. It is recognized that those are prime targets of communist intelligence services and that the opportunity for foreign communist exploitation increases in proportion to the weakness of a U.S. counterintelligence effort.

Nature of Restrictions

The need for great circumspection in making contacts with students, faculty members, and employees of institutions of learning is widely recognized. However, the requirements of the intelligence community for increased information in this area is obvious from the concern of the White House at the absence of hard information about the plans and programs of campus and student-related militant organizations. At the present time no sources are developed among secondary school students and, with respect to colleges and universities, sources are developed only among individuals who have reached legal age, with few exceptions. This policy is designed to minimize the possibility of embarrassment and to the public, including elements of infiltration or subversion in school.
Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

1. Students, faculty members, and others connected with educational institutions are frequently sensitive to and hostile towards any government activity which smacks of infringement on academic freedom. They are prone to publicize inquiries by governmental agencies and the resulting publicity can often be misleading in portraying the government's interest.

2. Students are frequently immature and unpredictable. They cannot be relied on to maintain confidences or to act with discretion to the same extent as adult sources.

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions

1. To a substantial degree, militant New Left and antiwar groups in the United States are comprised of students, faculty members, and others connected with educational institutions. To a corresponding degree, effective coverage of these groups and activities depends upon development of knowledgeable sources in the categories named. In this connection, the military services have capabilities which could be of value to the FBI.

2. Much of the violence and disorders which have occurred on college campuses have been of a hastily planned nature. Unless sources are available within the student bodies, it is virtually impossible to develop advance information concerning such violence.

3. The development of sources among students affiliated with New Left elements affords a unique opportunity to cultivate informants who may rise to positions of leadership in the revolutionary movement or otherwise become of great long-range value.

4. The extraordinary and unprecedented wave of destruction which has swept U.S. campuses in the past several months has provided a clear illustration of the importance of maintaining informed sources in the interest of national security.
5. Contacts with students will make it possible to obtain information about travel abroad by U.S. students and about attendance at international conferences.

**DECISION: Development of Campus Sources**

- Present restrictions on development of campus and student-related sources should be continued.
- Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups.
- CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling abroad or living abroad should be increased.
- More information is needed.

**NOTE:** The FBI is opposed to removing any present controls and restrictions relating to the development of campus sources. To do so would severely jeopardize the investigations and could result in leaks to the press which would be damaging and which could result in charges against present active agents interfering with academic freedom.

**TOP SECRET**

HANDLER VIA COVER OF PREVIOUS GROUP.
F. Use of Military Undercover Agents

Preliminary Discussion

The use of undercover agents by the military services to develop domestic intelligence is currently limited to penetration of organizations whose membership includes military personnel and whose activities pose a direct threat to the military establishment. For example, although the Navy has approximately 31 Naval ROTC units and numerous classified Government contract projects on various campuses across the country, the Naval Investigative Service conducts no covert collection on college campuses. The same is true of the other military services.

Nature of Restrictions

The use of undercover agents by the military investigative services to develop domestic intelligence among civilian targets is believed beyond the statutory intent of the Congress as expressed in Title 10, U.S. Code, and in current resource authorizations. The Delimitations Agreement (1949) agreement signed by the FBI, Army, Navy and Air Force which delimits responsibility for each agency with regard to investigations of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage reflects the current missions of the FBI and the military services. Further, there is a lack of assets to undertake this mission unless essential service-related counterintelligence missions are reduced. There is also concern for morale and disciplinary reactions within the services should the existence of such covert operations become known.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

1. If the utilization of military counterintelligence in this mission is contrary to the intent of the Congress, discovery of employment could result in unfavorable legislation and further reductions in appropriations.

2. Further direct stationing authority, the role of the military services in the operations could result in high factionalized unit to the Executive Branch.

3. The use of military personnel to cover covert.

...
4. In order for the penetration of the military services with regard to college campuses to prove effective of any significance, it will require corollary increases in resources.

5. Prosecutions for violations of law discovered in the course of military penetration of civilian organizations must be tried in civil courts. The providing of military witnesses will require complicated interdepartmental coordination to a much greater extent than the present and will serve, in the long run, to reduce security.

6. Disclosure that military counterintelligence agencies have been furnishing information obtained through this technique to nonmilitary investigative agencies with respect to civilian activities would certainly result in considerable adverse publicity. The Army's recent experience with former military intelligence personnel confirms this estimate. Since obligated service officers, first enlistees and draftees are drawn from a peer group in which reaction is most unfavorable, morale and disciplinary problems can be anticipated.

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions

1. Lifting these restrictions would expand the scope of domestic intelligence collection efforts by diverting additional manpower and resources for the collection of information on college campuses and in the vicinity of military installations.

2. The use of undercover agents by the military counterintelligence agencies could be limited to localized targets where the threat is great and the likelihood of exposure minimal. Moreover, controlled use of trusted personnel leaving the service to return to college could expand the collection capabilities at an acceptable risk.

3. The military services have a certain number of personnel pursuing special academic courses on campuses and universities. Such personnel, who in many instances have already been investigated for security clearance, would represent a valuable pool of potential sources for reporting on subversive activities of campus and student-related groups.
DECISION: Use of Military Undercover Agents

Present restrictions should be retained.

- The counterintelligence mission of the military services should be expanded to include the active collection of intelligence concerning student-related dissident activities, with provisions for a close coordination with the FBI.

- No change should be made in the current mission of the military counterintelligence services; however, present restrictions should be relaxed to permit the use of trusted military personnel as FBI assets in the collection of intelligence regarding student-related dissident activities.

- More information is needed.

NOTE: The FBI is opposed to the use of any military undercover agents to develop sources that may have information that would be in violation of the Limitations Agreement. The military services, joined by the FBI, oppose any modification of the Limitations Agreement which would extend it or its jurisdiction beyond matters of interest to the Department of Defense.

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II. BUDGET AND MANPOWER: RESTRICTIONS

The capability of member agencies, NSA, CIA, DIA, FBI, and the military counterintelligence services, to collect intelligence data is limited by available resources, particularly in terms of budget and/or qualified manpower. For some agencies fiscal limitations or recent cutbacks have been acute. Budgetary requirements for some agencies, other than the FBI, are reviewed and passed upon by officials who, in some instances, may not be fully informed concerning intelligence requirements.

CIA reported that recent and current manpower reductions (the Balance of Payments and Operation Reduction exercises) have lowered CIA's capabilities abroad with a corresponding decrease in its level of operational effectiveness. Lowered capabilities have occurred at a time when the communist services are expanding in Western Europe, Africa, the Near East, and Latin America. There has also been a serious loss in flexibility of deployment and some loss of cover positions.

The military services noted that cuts in budget requirements for counterintelligence activities have the effect of severely hampering the ability of these services to accomplish missions relating to coverage of threats to the national security. Budgetary deficiencies have occurred at a time when investigative work loads are increasing significantly.

Manpower limitations constitute a major restriction on the FBI's capabilities in the investigation of subversive activities. The problem is further complicated by the fact that, even if substantial numbers of agents could be recruited on a crash basis, the time required to conduct background investigations and to provide essential training would mean too great a need for personnel being available for use against the rapidly escalating subversive situation.

NSA, which has a potential to report on the activities of U.S. subversive elements, has neither the current nor near the budgetary mechanism for expanding its resources in this area. This is due to the absence of NSA's counterintelligence, which is blind to coverage of "core" counterintelligence, which is interpreted to mean U.S. systems who are under threat or invasion of such communications. If NSA
In the event, as a result of this report, additional collection requirements should be levied on the agencies involved, it would be necessary to provide for essential funding. For example, if the scope of NSA coverage is broadened to permit coverage of activities of U.S. subversive elements and/or the military services are called upon to provide counterintelligence functions or assistance not being furnished at present, adjustments will be necessary in their budgets to cover the increased costs.

**DECISION: Budget and Manpower Restrictions**

- Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs in the event the various investigative restraints herein are lifted.

- Each agency must operate within its current budgetary or manpower limitations, irrespective of action required as result of this report.

- More information is needed.

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**HANDLE VIA CLEARED CHANNLES ONLY**
PART THREE

EVALUATION OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

I. CURRENT PROCEDURES TO EFFECT COORDINATION

There is currently no operational body or mechanism specifically charged with the overall analysis, coordination, and continuing evaluation of practices and policies governing the acquisition and dissemination of intelligence, the pooling of resources, and the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field.

Although a substantial exchange of intelligence and research material between certain of the interested agencies already exists, much remains to be done in the following areas: (1) the preparation of coordinated intelligence estimates in a format useful for policy formulation; (2) the coordination of intelligence collection resources of the member agencies and the establishment of clear-cut priorities for the various agencies; and (3) the coordination of the operational activities of member agencies in developing the required intelligence.

II. SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

It is believed that an interagency group on domestic intelligence should be established to effect coordination between the various member agencies. This group would define the specific requirements of the various agencies, provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence, develop recommendations relative to policies governing operations in the field of domestic intelligence, and prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which would incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the entire intelligence community.

Membership in this group should consist of the principal officials responsible for domestic intelligence collection activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, an appropriate representative of the White House would have membership. The committee would report periodically to the White House, and a White House staff representative would coordinate intelligence originating with this committee in the same manner as Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President, coordinates foreign intelligence on behalf of the President. The chairman would be appointed by the President.

This interagency group would have authority to determine appropriate staff requirements and to implement these requirements, subject to the approval of the President, in order to meet the responsibilities and objectives described above.

**DECISION: Permanent Interagency Group**

An ad hoc group consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should be appointed and should serve as long as the President deems necessary, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry out the other objectives indicated above.

A permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should be appointed to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry out the other objectives indicated above.

No further action required.

More information is needed.

**NOTE:** The FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent committee for the purpose of providing evaluations of domestic intelligence.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD HEALEY, DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

The President has carefully studied the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and made the following decisions:

1. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence. National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 6 (NSC-ID-6) is to be interpreted to permit NSA to program for coverage the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities.

2. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations. The intelligence community is directed to intensity coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the national security. Also, coverage of foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community is to be intensified.

3. Mail Coverage. Restrictions on legal coverage are to be removed. Restrictions on covert coverage are to be relaxed to permit use of this technique on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest.

4. Subterfuges Entry. Restraints on the use of subterfuges entry are to be removed. The technique is to be used to permit procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material and against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.
5. Development of Campus Sources. Coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups is to be increased. All restrictions which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad is to be increased.

6. Use of Military Undercover Agents. Present restrictions are to be retained.

7. Budget and Manpower. Each agency is to submit a detailed estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs required to implement the above decisions.

8. Domestic Intelligence Operations. A committee consisting of the Directors or other appropriate representatives appointed by the Directors of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counter-intelligence agencies is to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, carry out the other objectives specified in the report, and perform such other duties as the President shall, from time to time, assign. The Director of the FBI shall serve as chairman of the committee. Further details on the organization and operations of this committee are set forth in an attached memorandum.

The President has directed that each addressee submit a detailed report, due on September 1, 1970, or the steps taken to implement these decisions. Further such periodic reports will be requested as circumstances merit.

The President is aware that procedural problems may arise in the course of implementing these decisions. However, he is anxious that such problems be resolved with maximum speed and minimum misunderstanding. Any difficulties which may arise should be brought to my immediate attention in order that an appropriate solution may be found and the President's directives implemented in a manner consistent with his objectives.

TOM CHARLES HUNTSTON

Attachment
cc: The President
    H.R. Haldeman
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IAG)

1. Membership. The membership shall consist of representatives of the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, and the counter-intelligence agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. To assure the high level consideration of issues and problems which the President expects to be before the group, the Directors of the respective agencies should serve personally. However, if necessary and appropriate, the Director of a member agency may designate another individual to serve in his place.

2. Chairman. The Director of the FBI shall serve as chairman. He may designate another individual from his agency to serve as the FBI representative on the group.

3. Observers. The purpose of the group is to effectuate community-wide coordination and secure the benefits of community-wide analysis and estimating. When problems arise which involve areas of interest to agencies or departments not members of the group, they shall be invited, at the discretion of the group, to join the group as observers and participants in those discussions of interest to them. Such agencies and departments include the Departments of State (I & R, Passport); Treasury (IRS, Customs); Justice (FBI, Community Relations Service), and such other agencies which may have investigative or law enforcement responsibilities touching on domestic intelligence or internal security matters.

4. White House Liaison. The President has assigned to Tom Charles Huston staff responsibility for domestic intelligence and internal security affairs. He will participate in all activities of the group as the personal representative of the President.

5. Staffing. The group will establish such sub-committees or working groups as it deems appropriate. It will also determine and implement such staffing requirements as it may deem necessary to enable it to carry out its responsibilities, subject to the approval of the President.
6. Duties. The group will have the following duties:

(a) Define the specific requirements of member agencies of the Intelligence Community.

(b) Effect close, direct coordination between member agencies.

(c) Provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence.

(d) Review policies governing operations in the field of domestic intelligence and develop recommendations.

(e) Prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the Intelligence Community.

(f) Perform such other duties as the President may from time to time assign.

7. Meetings. The group shall meet at the call of the Chairman, a member agency, or the White House representative.

8. Security. Knowledge of the existence and purpose of the group shall be limited on a strict "need to know" basis. Operations of, and papers originating with, the group shall be classified "Top Secret-Handles Via Comint Channels Only."

9. Other Procedures. The group shall establish such other procedures as it believes appropriate to the implementation of the duties set forth above.

Retyped from indistinct original
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McNamara

Per your telephone request, I am returning herewith Mr. Huston's memorandum to me, Subject: Domestic Intelligence, dated July 23, 1970.

Richard Helms

23 July 1970
(DATE)
SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Attorney General Mitchell on Domestic Intelligence

1. During a private meeting with the Attorney General on 27 July 1970, it became clear, to my great surprise, that he had heard nothing whatever about the President’s instructions on “Domestic Intelligence” until that very morning. In other words, the Attorney General had not been told of the meeting at the White House on 6 June 1970 or of the ad hoc committee meetings chaired by the FBI which had followed or about the report which was sent to the President around 1 July, setting forth in it, the Attorney General first heard about these matters when the Director of the FBI complained to him about a memorandum from Mr. Sam Ervin’s staff which must be essentially the same text as the one I received under date of 23 July 1970 (FRC 05515-10).

2. I told the Attorney General that we had put our backs into this exercise, because we had thought that he knew all about it and was behind it. The Attorney General was frank with me. In addition, he said that he had told Mr. Hoover to “sit tight” until he (the Attorney General) had an opportunity to discuss this whole matter with the President upon his return to Washington from San Clemente next week.

3. In connection with the problems involved in domestic intelligence collection, I again suggested to the Attorney General that he have a talk with Mr. John Mitchell, who, I pointed out, had now fully retired from the FBI. The Attorney General again wrote to Mr. Mitchell.

Richard Helms
Director

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SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

On March 25, 1971, I attended a meeting with the Attorney General, Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Admiral Noel A. Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency.

This meeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the purpose of discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very confidential type in covering intelligence both domestic and foreign. Admiral Gaylor stated that he was most desirous of the FBI resuming the so-called "black bag" job operations. There was some discussion upon the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail.

I stated to the Attorney General, Mr. Helms, and Admiral Gaylor that I was not at all enthusiastic about such an extension of operations insofar as the FBI was concerned in view of the hazards involved. The Attorney General stated that he thought before he could make any final decision in this matter, Mr. Helms should make an in-depth examination of exactly what he and Admiral Gaylor desired and then submit to the Attorney General and myself the results of this examination, and he, the Attorney General, would call another meeting of this particular group and make the decision as to what could or could not be done.

Mr. Helms said he would take care of this very promptly.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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