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The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

[redacted]
ON 5/27/77
BY EL

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, October 9, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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COMMITTEE MEETING

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Thursday, October 9, 1975

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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to
Governmental Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:00 o'clock p.m. in Room 407, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

The Chairman. Would you please take the oath?

Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony that you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

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TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

The Chairman. Would you please state your name?

Mr. Tweedy. Bronson Tweedy.

The Chairman. Mr. Baron, are you going to commence the questioning?

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have the right to counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. You are appearing voluntarily today without counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have the right at any point to cease answering questions in order to consult with counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you finally aware that all of your Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, including your Fifth Amendment rights?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, the Committee has been informed that we have gone over your testimony on the Lumumba case in some detail in two sessions, one today when you reviewed some documents that we obtained since your first examination. And I would like to begin by reading a quotation from your first examination before you had seen these documents.

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At page 30 of the transcript of your examination on September 9th, I would like to ask you whether today's review of documents has changed your answer to this question. At that time I asked you: "Do you have any knowledge of a messenger from CIA Headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry out the assassination of Lumumba if possible, and also provide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination, namely poisons and medical equipment for administering them?"

You said, "No, I do not."

Later on in your testimony of that same session when you were asked your opinion as to the truth of testimony we had received from Dr. Gottlieb -- excuse me, from the Chief of Station, who was in Leopoldville at that time, about a visit that he received from Dr. Gottlieb, where the Chief of Station testified that he received poison and instructions from Dr. Gottlieb, when asked your opinion about the truth about the testimony of the Chief of Station, you responded that "There is nothing in my experience with the Agency that would really bear on that point whatsoever." And that was at page 19 in your transcript.

Have your answers to those two questions changed in light of your review of the documents today?

Mr. Tweedy. I have not had a chance to read the transcript of my first testimony. As you know, I started reading it this

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morning but did not get a chance to get through it. There seems to be something incomplete with that answer of mine, however, there is no question in reading the documents that I read this morning, which I had not seen in the better part of fifteen years, that a man did go out from Headquarters and was provided with material which you mentioned and had a discussion along these lines with the Chief of Station.

He did not, however, go out with instructions to the Chief of Station without further reference to Headquarters to set about assassinating Lumumba.

Mr. Baron. In your answers that we have just reviewed in your first examination, you indicated that you had no knowledge of a mission by Dr. Gottlieb to the Congo and that there was nothing in your experience in the Agency that would really bear on the question whether such a mission was undertaken or what the character of it was.

Has the review of the documents today refreshed your recollection to some substantial degree?

Mr. Tweedy. What I was certainly trying to say the first time, and I repeat it, I said I had no recollection of Dr. Gottlieb going to the Congo, but if the Chief of Station said he was there, I was perfectly prepared to believe the Chief of Station.

I have now reviewed these documents. I recall the circumstances in which these things occurred, and there's no question

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that Dr. Gottlieb went to the Congo.

I was merely telling you, at that time, what I could remember, and there was an awful lot that I did not and do not.

Mr. Baron. To move to the period when you were Chief of the Africa Division and Richard Bissell was DDP in the summer of 1960, did you have conversations with Richard Bissell where the subject of the assassination of Lumumba arose?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I did. In fact, the first conversation, as I recall it, that I ever had on the subject was one he initiated with me, and, as I think I told you, I do not recall exactly what was said, but there was no question about it but what Mr. Bissell was saying to me was that there was agreement, policy agreement in Washington, that Lumumba must be removed from the position of control and influence in the Congo or that the Congo was going to be in serious trouble and thus Africa, at that stage of its development; and that among the possibilities of that elimination was indeed assassination.

In terms of the detail of that conversation with Mr. Bissell, I really cannot go any further than that. This certainly was the gist of it.

Mr. Baron. Was Mr. Bissell any more specific at any point with you about the policy level where the consideration to assassinate Lumumba had been made?

Mr. Tweedy. No, sir. The most authoritative statement on that was a cable that went out to the field from the Director,

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Mr. Dulles, which implied to me there was policy agreement in Washington. When I say policy agreement in Washington, I cannot be more specific because I never knew any more specificity. However, it was perfectly clear that the Agency felt that it had some sort of policy consensus in Washington about the need for the removal of Lumumba. When I say removal, I mean by whatever means; this does not necessarily have to be confined to assassination, a political way of doing it, or anything else.

Mr. Baron. It did not exclude assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. No, indeed it did not.

Mr. Baron. You are referring to the cable of August 26th from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station in the Congo. Had you seen that cable shortly after it was sent?

Mr. Tweedy. I suspect, again I cannot be sure, I suspect that I saw it when it went out. At this point, I could not even tell you. On instructions, I might even have drafted it, this seems odd. I might have done, or had a hand in drafting it, I do not know. It was basically Mr. Dulles' cable expressing to the Station the type of authority that he had to pass such a message to the field. I certainly would have seen it on its way out.

Mr. Baron. When you spoke to Mr. Bissell, either in the first talk or in any subsequent talks --

The Chairman. Where is this cable?

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Mr. Baron. Tab 2 in the Senator's packet.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Baron. In your talks with Mr. Bissell, where the subject of the assassination of Lumumba was raised in any fashion, did Mr. Bissell move from this general information to you that the subject had been opened at very high levels to asking you to proceed to explore means to getting access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him?

Mr. Tweedy. The purpose of his conversation with me was to initiate correspondence with the Station for them to explore with Headquarters the possibility of this, that is assassination, or indeed any other means of removing Lumumba from power. In other words, the purpose of the exercise was to tell the Station what Headquarters had in mind, giving it some idea of the policy background of it, and then to have the Station start reviewing possibilities, assets, and discussing them with Headquarters in detail in the same way that we would with any operation, whether it was as sensitive as this, or less so.

It was, in other words, the initiation of quite normal operational dialogue between Headquarters and the field, apart from the fact that it was an unusual subject.

Mr. Baron. At some point after the series of conversations with Richard Bissell, did you have a conversation with Sidney Gottlieb about a mission that he was to undertake in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I was certainly reminded of that in this correspondence, as I think I told you in the first instance. If Gottlieb went to the Congo, there is no question that I would have seen him before he went. This traffic makes it perfectly clear that I did. The actual content of that conversation is no more clear to me now as is revealed in this cable traffic. On the other hand, I do think that is the gist of it.

Mr. Baron. You are referring to the cable that appears in Tab 3, a cable of September 19th that you signed and Richard Bissell signed and dispatched to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville telling him that Sid from Paris, a man who would announce himself as Sid from Paris, would be coming soon to Leopoldville to explain an assignment to the Chief of Station.

Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

The Chairman. Sid from Paris being Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. As we discussed earlier today, you do have a recollection of setting up a specially restricted channel of communication by this cable which would hold all communications on this operation to the eyes only of the Chief of Station, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. This was done immediately after my first discussion with Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember any instance where Mr. Bissell asked you to speak to Dr. Gottlieb and give him this assignment?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. My assumption would be that he would have had the first conversation with Dr. Gottlieb and quite routinely have said, now you talk to Mr. Tweedy, Chief of the Division, before you go out.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume in this normal course of operations in the DDP at that point you would have spoken to Bissell before you spoke to Gottlieb about this mission?

Mr. Tweedy. Inevitably, I think, I think Gottlieb was in effect sent by Mr. Bissell. He was not sent by me. Mr. Gottlieb, I think Dr. Gottlieb was, at that time, an assistant to Mr. Bissell. He was not my assistant. I would not have sent him.

Mr. Baron. As best you can recall, what instructions did you give to Dr. Gottlieb when you met with him?

Mr. Tweedy. This is very general, but I think it covers it: to assist the Chief of Station in his operational planning for this particular purpose.

Mr. Baron. Would that planning have included planning for the assassination of Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Specifically, I do not think Dr. Gottlieb would have been there to discuss Constitutional means of overthrow of Lumumba. He was there for one purpose only. He was a technician. He had this material with him. He was thus to act, as I think, a technical advisor on these matters to the Chief of Station. I do not think he was to be there as a general operational advisor. That was not within his competence.

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his training, or anything else. It would not have been his assignment.

Mr. Baron. What did you tell Dr. Gottlieb about the source of authority for this mission?

Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure I told him anything. I assumed that came through Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Baron. I will represent to you, as I did earlier today, that Dr. Gottlieb testified that in his conversation with you you indicated to him that you were giving him this mission on the authority of Richard Bissell.

Would that be consistent with the way you operated at that time?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. The only thing that is wrong there is the use of the verb -- I was not sending him to the Congo. He routinely checked, probably on Mr. Bissell's instructions, with me, Chief of the Africa Division. He had already been given his marching orders to go to the Congo by Mr. Bissell, not by me.

Mr. Baron. You would assume that Dr. Gottlieb had a separate conversation with Richard Bissell, where Richard Bissell told him, it is time for you to go to the Congo and deliver a lethal material and a certain set of instructions to the Chief of Station.

Mr. Tweedy. I cannot assume what was said in such a conversation, but that Dr. Gottlieb talked to Mr. Bissell before

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he went to the Congo is without question. I do not know what was said. I assume the general outlines of the purposes of him going to the Congo were discussed, and I would be discussing them with him in greater detail.

Mr. Baron. Turning to Tab 6 of the Senator's books, I'm referring to a cable we reviewed this morning issued on September 27th by the Chief of Station and sent to you, Eyes Only, at the CIA Headquarters where the Chief of Station indicates that he contacted Gottlieb on the 26th of September and they were on the same wavelength.

Mr. Tweedy. Which one is this?

Mr. Baron. This should be marked number 6.

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes, excuse me.

Mr. Baron. It begins, "Idea Ref contacted 26 September." In this cable, the Chief of Station indicates that he had had two talks with Dr. Gottlieb. He and Dr. Gottlieb had been considering a list of possibilities as follows.

In paragraph 3 at the bottom of the next page, the Chief of Station says, "Plan proceed on basis priority as listed above unless instructed to contrary."

And paragraph A on the first page was Chief of Station's top priority plan which related to recalling a certain agent from Stanleyville and having him take refuge with Big Brother. The cable continues, "would thus act as inside man to brush up details to razor edge."

1 Having reviewed this cable early this morning, is it your
2 understanding, Mr. Tweedy, that Big Brother refers to Lumumba?
3 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I do.
4 Mr. Baron. That this was a report from the Chief of
5 Station to yourself informing you that the top priority plan would
6 be to recall an agent from Stanleyville and ask that agent to
7 infiltrate the entourage of Lumumba where he could assess the
8 possibility for poisoning Lumumba, would that be your under-
9 standing?
10 Mr. Tweedy. Eventually, when a number of other steps had
11 taken place before and they would, for example, have included
12 a discussion between the Chief of Station and this agent which
13 would have made clear to the agent what this was all about.
14 At this stage, he had no idea of it, and our series of
15 exploratory cables between Leopoldville and Headquarters
16 outlining the degree -- [redacted] is his name -- [redacted]
17 access to the entourage, what he found out and whether any of
18 this basically bore on the feasibility of the operation.
19 Mr. Baron. This was one of a series of cables where the
20 Chief of Station was reporting on his attempt of finding means
21 of access to Lumumba for the purpose of poisoning him?
22 Mr. Tweedy. Throughout this whole period, the activity of
23 the Chief of Station in correspondence with Headquarters was
24 exploratory.
25 Mr. Baron. What was being explored was the means of access

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to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him?

Mr. Tweedy. That was one of the things that was being explored. The other thing explored and constantly under review was the whole situation of Lumumba and were there other alternatives. That does not appear in this particular cable; it appears in others.

Mr. Baron. Turning now to Tab 9 of the Senator's books, this is the cable of October 7 which you received in the Eyes Only channel from the Chief of Station which indicated that Gottlieb had departed from Leopoldville for America on the 5th of October, and it says: "View expiration date his materials. However left certain items of continuing usefulness. Guthman" -- which is a pseudonym for the Chief of Station whom we have been calling [redacted] -- "Guthman plans continued try implement op."

Does that indicate that you received a report from the Chief of Station that he would continue to try to implement this operation against Lumumba even after Gottlieb had left the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. He would continue to explore the possibilities of this operation and continue to report to Headquarters. That is all that this means.

It does not mean with the disappearance of Gottlieb he would try to pull off the operation without further reference to Headquarters. It just means a continuation despite the

disappearance of Gottlieb and his materials that the Chief of Station would continue to examine the possibilities of carrying this out.

Mr. Baron. He was to continue, in your mind, at least up until the point where he had determined there was a feasible means of assassinating Lumumba?

Would that be correct?

Mr. Tweedy. I would put it more broadly than that. I would say that he was to continue to explore it to determine whether or not there was a feasible means. He perfectly well could come to the conclusion that with the hardest work in the world that he could see no way to do it. That would have been a perfectly acceptable conclusion to Headquarters, because a decision would have to be made professionally.

Mr. Baron. Turning to Tab 12 of the Senator's books, there is a cable that you sent in this Eyes Only channel to the Chief of Station on October 15th, which is the week after Dr. Gottlieb had left the Congo. In this cable, you are saying, you are referring first of all to another cable sent on the same day that was not sent through the Eyes Only channel, and then reassuring this Chief of Station that [redacted]ROAK, which is a pseudonym for Lumumba, is it not?

Mr. Tweedy. It is.

Mr. Baron. That [redacted]ROAK was still a stumbling block and that it was increasingly apparent that all studying Congo

1 situation closely and his disposition spontaneously becomes
2 number one consideration."
3 In the second paragraph, you told the Chief of Station:
4 "Raise above so you are not confused by any apparent duplication,"
5 referring to the other cable. "This channel remains for
6 specific purpose you discuss with colleague also remains highest
7 priority."
8 Was the colleague that you were referring to Dr. Gottlieb?
9 Mr. Tweedy. Without doubt.
10 Mr. Baron. What did you mean by disposition spontaneously?
11 Mr. Tweedy. The English of that cable, as I mentioned
12 this morning, is absolutely appalling.
13 What I am actually saying is, wherever you talk to people
14 like we did with the French, as I mentioned in the next sentence
15 or anyone is studying the situation in Africa, they all came
16 up with the same conclusion, that there was to be no solution
17 to the Congo with Lumumba still in power, or in a position of
18 overcoming it.
19 Mr. Baron. To summarize what we discussed this morning,
20 despite the series of cables and the indication here that
21 Lumumba's disposition spontaneously was the number one consider-
22 ation and highest priority. You are still maintaining that
23 the Chief of Station was not empowered to go through with
24 assassination without checking back with Headquarters?
25 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

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1 Mr. Baron. I have no further questions at this point.

2 (Whereupon, Senator Church left the hearing room.)

3 Senator Goldwater. Mr. Tweedy, how long did you serve

4 with the CIA?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I started with CIG on the 1st of May, 1947 and

6 served until March, 1973.

7 Senator Goldwater. You have had experience with intelli-

8 gence gathering agencies all around the world, I assume, or

9 most of them?

10 Mr. Tweedy. A considerable number, yes, sir.

11 Senator Goldwater. Is it common practice in intelligence

12 agencies such as the CIA for a lot of people to know about

13 everything that is going on, or am I right in assuming that

14 there are many things that you do in the intelligence field,

15 particularly the covert field, that the man sitting next to you

16 may know nothing about. Is that correct?

17 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct, sir. Compartmentation was

18 very heavy in CIA. There were a great many things going on that

19 I never knew anything about and do not know to this day.

20 Senator Goldwater. Is that not in your experience the

21 most successful form of intelligence gathering? Is that the

22 British practice?

23 Mr. Tweedy. The only way that you can run an intelligence

24 organization, in my view, is internally.

25 Senator Goldwater. You have been with the CIA actually

since before its conception. I want to ask you, and of your experience, what you think as a professional of the men in the CIA, men and women?

Mr. Tweedy. I came away from a career in intelligence in March of '73 with rather strong convictions. I might preface my remarks here in answer to your question, Senator, by saying I was in intelligence during the War, I was in Naval Intelligence. This was not OSS, but I was in intelligence. It also determined me, if the circumstances permitted, to make a career of intelligence after the War, and after the difficulty of making the right contacts and so on and so forth, eventually it worked and I spent a career in CIA.

I have two very strong impressions of that experience. One of them has to do with my colleagues, the personnel of the Agency, who I found to be a remarkably talented group. The second was, and it was something that I think all of us were basically proud of, the esprit de corps was at a very high level and resulting from esprit de corps, as it usually does, discipline was equally of a very high level, and it came quite naturally, this was not a matter that had to be inculcated and beaten into junior officers, it came quite naturally because this was quite clearly the way the organization was run, and basically, we were proud of it.

I have never regretted for a second my career, and I am very proud of it and my associations.

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1 Senator Goldwater. Are you still close to the members of
2 the CIA, your old friends?
3 Mr. Tweedy. Obviously I have a great many friends who are
4 still serving. This is increasingly not the case as retirements
5 are catching up with my colleagues, but I do keep abreast of
6 Agency affairs to the extent I can. I do not attempt to inter-
7 fere with them. At their request, I did a consultation job in
8 the Agency this summer. It's the first time I was asked to do
9 it. I was very glad to do it. I found it interesting,
10 stimulating, I was glad to be back. I do not necessarily
11 expect to do it again. However, if they asked me, I would if
12 I thought I could be of any help.
13 Senator Goldwater. Have you ever known of any actions
14 or activities to be taken in a precipitous manner in the CIA?
15 Mr. Tweedy. That is a very broad question, Senator. I am
16 not quite sure how to answer it.
17 As in every organization, I have certainly seen decisions
18 taken and actions implemented that might have been better
19 considered. This includes me, and there are a number of things
20 that professionally I would have done different if I had been
21 gifted with the hindsight I have now.
22 But on the whole, I would say the mark of the Agency was
23 not irresponsibility.
24 Senator Goldwater. I asked that, because the attack on
25 the CIA is probably the strongest I have seen in my life in

1 politics, and I cannot follow the idea that such a serious
2 undertaking as an assassination, regardless of who the target
3 might be, would be a subject that would be dreamed up in the
4 locker room at some lower level. Those decisions and other
5 covert decisions, in my opinion, have to start someplace, and
6 they do not start at the bottom.

7 Mr. Tweedy. I would agree with you, sir. My experience
8 in this particular case -- the only one of its kind that I have
9 ever had any experience with -- indicate exactly what you say.
10 I never felt at any time that I was operating in a policy
11 vacuum. I never had the impression that any of my seniors
12 felt that they were either.

13 Senator Goldwater. That is all the questions I have.

14 Senator Huddleston. I just have a few questions.

15 What is your concept of the term higher or highest author-
16 ity?

17 Mr. Tweedy. Highest authority was a term that we used in
18 the Agency and it was generally recognized as meaning the
19 President, and I would like to make myself quite clear on this,
20 in this context, that although, as I said a minute ago I
21 never felt that I was in a policy vacuum or that the Agency was,
22 I have no idea of the context in which policy was passed to the
23 Agency on this. I do not know whether the President
24 personally played a role, whether he played a role and passed
25 the message to the National Security advisors or the Secretary

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of State or whoever. I have no idea.

I merely felt that the concensus at the policy levels of government were that Lumumba must go and that discussion of the feasibility of assassination was at least part of this. I cannot to any further than that.

Senator Huddleston. Do you recall being told specifically that this operation had the approval, or was, in fact, the policy of the highest authority?

Mr. Tweedy. No, sir, I do not recall that. Highest authority was normally used in cable traffic, so we did not have to say the President. I do not recall that the word "highest authority" in connection with this particular operation was used.

Senator Huddleston. It is not an unfamiliar term? It was used during your experience in the Agency?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, certainly it was. It was sometimes necessary for examole, that Headquarters would come to the field and say, you will understand, I'm not talking about this operation, but just generally, you will understand, that in a matter of this kind, it will require the approval of highest authority. And normally this meant in my mind, overseas, the 40 Committee or its several equivalents, most of which decisions were referred to the President. That is basically what it meant.

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Senator Huddleston. What types of action come to your mind when the instructions come down that a certain individual must be removed or possibly eliminated, or whatever form of instructions may come?

Mr. Tweedy. This is the only case that I personally was ever involved with. What we were talking about was the removal, by any means, of an individual, and, as I have tried to make clear in my previous testimony, this involved the launching of the idea with the field so they in turn could make the proper operational explorations into the feasibility of this, reporting in all detail back to Headquarters for guidance. At no point was the field given carte blanche if they thought they had found a way to do the job, just to carry it out with no further reference. So it never occurred to me or anybody else in the position of the Chief of Station in Leopoldville to feel that he had that kind of delegated authority.

Senator Huddleston. Removal would include all the way up to assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. We are now talking about in this specific case, yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. You had no lack of understanding?

Mr. Tweedy. We had no lack of understanding that Headquarters wanted this explored. At no point did Headquarters ever say to the field, he is to be assassinated at all costs. It said, it is important he be removed. Among the tools of

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1 removal is assassination, you will explore it and report.

2 Senator Huddleston. Is it common within the Agency, that

3 instructions of this nature be handed down in oral fashion from

4 the Director to the Deputy Director for Plans to the Station

5 Chief?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Not the Station Chief unless you actually ask

7 the Station Chief to come back.

8 Senator Huddleston. A cable would have to be used?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Or send a messenger personally out.

10 Normally on something like this, as it happened in this

11 case, Mr. Bissell talked to Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell talked

12 to me and he did not sit down and write a memorandum to me.

13 I am virtually a hundred percent sure.

14 Senator Huddleston. Is it your belief that participants

15 in these kinds of discussions had very explicit understandings

16 about what each was talking about? No possibility, virtually

17 no possibility that there would be a misunderstanding as to

18 what the instructions were and what the limits were?

19 Mr. Tweedy. Really the only people that were seriously

20 involved with this were in the field, the Chief of Station;

21 if you are talking about operational detail, myself and my

22 deputy, with Mr. Bissell included, to the extent that he needed

23 to get into the operational detail.

24 On that score, I would say no misunderstanding whatsoever.

25 Senator Huddleston. Mr. Bissell's communication with the

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1 Director of the CIA would be such that they would have no
2 misunderstanding?
3 Mr. Tweedy. I always assumed so, sir. Obviously, again,
4 I cannot comment specifically.
5 Senator Huddleston. Given their experience and their
6 knowledge of each other and the knowledge of the operation --
7 Mr. Tweedy. They were very close personally, Mr. Bissell
8 and Mr. Dulles, and Mr. Dulles had personal affection for him
9 and enormous respect for him, intellectually and professionally.
10 Senator Huddleston. Even the communication between the
11 National Security Council and the Director of the CIA who was
12 a member of the Council, it was not likely that there would be
13 a great deal of misunderstanding there between what you really
14 are talking about, although there is no written order?
15 Mr. Tweedy. That would have been my assumption, Senator.
16 Senator Huddleston. Senator Schweiker?
17 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
18 Mr. Tweedy, in the August cable that Allen Dulles sent to
19 Chief of Station, he started out with the words "In high
20 quarters here." What does that mean to you, "in high quarters
21 here"?
22 Mr. Tweedy. The policy level. As I say, I cannot necessarily
23 say it included a specific conversation with the President. It
24 certainly, in my view, would have involved the National Security
25 Council, the advisor to the President, Secretary of State.

I mention the Secretary of State, because later on in the cable, Mr. Dulles says to the extent that the Ambassador desires to be consulted, you may seek his concurrence. Mr. Dulles was perfectly content to have this discussed with the State Department in the field, i.e., the Embassy, if this should prove to be necessary.

Senator Schweiker. Mr. Bissell testified before this Committee that "in high quarters here" meant the President to him. I assume that you are not as convinced of that as Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not think it a question of conviction. He was closer to the policy level than I was; he would have a better feel for this than I would. He never explained to me what the specific policy level decision was. He was the one Executive Director who would talk directly with the Director. Conceivably -- I do not say he did not, and I do not say he did. He may even have talked to the senior members of the government; I did not.

Senator Schweiker. He also testified that the further part of the paragraph, consequently we conclude that his removal, that removal meant assassination.

Does that or does that not concur with you?

Mr. Tweedy. It does not concur; it would refer to assassination but not exclusively.

Senator Schweiker. It goes on to say "We further authorize

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1 expenditures of up to $100,000 to carry out any programs in
2 which you do not have the opportunity to consult. Please
3 advise."
4 Does that not mean to you, here is $100,000, do with it as
5 you want, you do not have to consult if you do not have the
6 opportunity?
7 Mr. Tweedy. This is certainly the way it would read. I
8 read it, and I think I read it at the time, when you are talking
9 about that kind of money and crash programs, what you are talking
10 basically are political action type programs, not assassination
11 type programs.
12 Senator Schweiker. Of course--
13 Mr. Tweedy. The beginning of that paragraph says, "Hence
14 we wish to give you wider authority," et cetera, et cetera,
15 "including more aggressive action, if it can remain covert."
16 Senator Schweiker. What does the term mean, "more
17 aggressive action? How aggressive can you get, even more
18 aggressive, "including even more accressive action, if it can
19 remain covert" meaning if you can get away with it.
20 Mr. Tweedy. Correct.
21 My own belief is, because quite frankly I cannot recall
22 what this had specific reference to -- my belief is that this
23 had reference to general political action along the lines of
24 mounting successful political operations against Lumumba, which
25 is the sort of thing that would cost a lot of money.

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1 Senator Schweiker. Of course, we know now that at the time,
2 or very shortly about the same time we were sending poison down
3 there, certainly it was not political action. In light of what
4 we know now, would it not mean fairly clearly that this was an
5 authorization for an assassination?

6 Mr. Tweedy. No, sir, I do not believe so, for the simple
7 reason that although we sent Dr. Gottlieb and his materials
8 down to the Congo, the Chief of Station was always exploring,
9 as many of these cables indicate, other means of getting rid of
10 Lumumba besides assassination. It was always, certainly in my
11 mind, and I think in Mr. Bissell's mind, a clear realization --
12 and certainly the Chief of Station's mind -- that when every-
13 thing had been examined, a successful way of doing assassination
14 was not necessarily to be expected. Maybe it would, but it
15 was not necessarily to be expected.

16 Thus, it was incumbent upon the Chief of Station to keep
17 his eye on the whole spectrum of possibilities of getting rid
18 of Lumumba, politically or any other way.

19 Senator Schweiker. We know two things now in light of
20 this. One is he asked an agent to kill Lumumba, one agent
21 declined. He asked another agent to go down and do that, and
22 he assented. Since he specifically mentioned the two separate
23 agents, one in which the agent testified, sitting where you are,
24 that he declined to kill him, the other saying that he would
25 take the poison, it seems to me very likely that this language

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has to refer to that kind of authority, or I cannot see how Mr. Bissell would have respected -- you say you respect Mr. Bissell and he operates within the CIA system. Is it not inconceivable to you that he could be doing this without this kind of authority?

Mr. Tweedy. No, it is not.

Senator Schweiker. He would be doing it without authority?

Mr. Tweedy. No, it is not within my belief of Mr. Bissell that he would be doing it without authority.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

One other point. It says, consult the Ambassador if he desires or you may seek his concurrence if he desires it, and in any particular case he does not wish to be consulted, you can act on your own authority where time does not permit referral here.

I cannot imagine a more blank check wording, saying, first consult the Ambassador if he wants to be consulted. It also says in that particular case where he does not wish to be consulted, you have your own authority without conferring back here. I think that this is at variance with the point you were speculating on earlier, that we had to have the final go decision, when in fact it seems to me that that line says, here is authority if time does not permit referral here.

Mr. Tweedy. I can only assure you, Senator, that this was always my understanding, not even understanding, it was quite

1 routine, that in any kind of an operation as sensitive as was
2 involved in the United States that there would be no blanket
3 delegation of authority to the field. Although I quite under-
4 stand your point here, I can only assure you that that is the
5 way I felt about it then, feel about it now, and believe this
6 opinion was shared by the Chief of Station.
7 Senator Schweiker. That you can act on your own authority
8 does not mean that to you?
9 Mr. Tweedy. Not to pulling a trigger or administering
10 poison or what have you.
11 In other words, we do not want to hear anything about it.
12 If you find a chance to do it, do it and report later, no.
13 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Tweedy, have you ever heard of the
14 words Health Alteration Operation?
15 Mr. Tweedy. What was that?
16 Senator Schweiker. Have you ever heard the words Health
17 Alteration Operation?
18 Mr. Tweedy. Never.
19 Senator Schweiker. Have you ever heard of a Health Alter-
20 ation Committee chaired by a Mr. Herman Horton?
21 Mr. Tweedy. No.
22 Senator Schwiker. Are you familar that an effort ever
23 was made to send a biological agent to incapacitate Iraqi
24 Colonel Fahil Mahdawi?
25 Mr. Tweedy. No.

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Senator Schweiker. Do you know Mr. Herman Horton, or did you know him?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed, very well.

Senator Schweiker. Did you know a [redacted] Acting Chief of the Near Eastern, South Asian Division?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I did, sir.

Senator Schweiker. The Committee has a record of a memo there sent from [redacted] recommending a Health Alteration Operation Against the Colonel.

Mr. Tweedy. I have never heard of the phrase Health Alteration.

Senator Schweiker. None of this is familiar to you.

Mr. Tweedy. It is the first time I have ever heard of it.

Senator Schweiker. That is all I have.

Mr. Dawson. You described this operation against Lumumba at various times in your testimony as exploratory. To the best of your knowledge, or your knowledge now having been refreshed, having seen a variety of documents, was anybody ever asked by the CIA to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. No third party, no agent.

For instance, [redacted] who appears in this traffic, he was never asked to assassinate Lumumba. When you say that I characterized it as exploratory, may I just expatiate on that for a moment?

Whenever, under our system and in our profession, you go out

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1 to the field asking that something be accomplished which clearly
2 is not the sort of thing that you just do off the top of your
3 head, like having lunch with Mr. Smith tomorrow, but achieving
4 the difficult result, the task of the field is to explore the
5 feasibility of such a request by Headquarters.
6 This might be done quite quickly. It might take an
7 infinite amount of time. Headquarters would expect the field
8 to report regularly on its progress, giving Headquarters a chance
9 to comment, as we have done in this traffic. This particular
10 modus operandi was no different in this case than the cases of
11 infinitely less sensitivity or importance. That aspect of it
12 was quite routine. There was no way in the world that the Chief
13 of Station was going to come back, sir, I understand what you
14 want, I will have it down in twenty-four hours. He had no
15 inkling that this was going to occur. It took him obviously,
16 totally by surprise. He had to sit down and examine the
17 feasibility of it. In the end, he could not come up with an
18 answer.
19 I think the exploratory nature is in the innate nature of
20 our business on something of that kind.
21 Mr. Dawson. Thank you.
22 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Tweedy, assuming that the Chief of
23 Station out there had the impression at the time that the
24 messenger, or any other reason, that this was authorized by the
25 President of the United States, this whole operation, knowing

what you know about the business, would he have conducted himself any differently than what you now see as this case?

Mr. Tweedy. Not the slightest. He would consider himself in a disciplined organization, a servant of his chain of command as a member of the organization and not receiving some direct word from the President which, in effect, would have made him feel to go out and do anything he pleased.

Mr. Kirbow. Is it not the paramount situation, the non-attribution type situation, was the only thing that he could undertake, that it could not be attributed to the United States?

Mr. Tweedy. That was inherent in all of the correspondence on the subject, our intercourse in the field on this. I think this makes it amply clear in something like this, on attribution obviously would be very important. The other was just plain feasible access.

Mr. Kirbow. Thank you.

Mr. Smothers. As I listen to the testimony here, we may not be terribly clear on what would have happened had our Chief of Station come up with what he considered to be a feasible plan.

How would he have communicated a feasible plan back to you?

Mr. Tweedy. Through this channel.

Mr. Smothers. What would have happened if you had received, for example, the message from him that we now have a feasible

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1 plan for the removal or the killing?

2 Mr. Tweedy. I would immediately have shared it with Mr.

3 Bissell. After that, I can only speculate what would happen

4 and I know Mr. Bissell would have talked to Mr. Dulles. Where

5 it would have gone from there, I just cannot do anything more

6 than speculate. I do not think that would be very helpful.

7 My duty was quite clear. I was charged up the chain

8 of command. I would probably comment on it operationally to

9 Mr. Bissell. I would say, professionally this seems sound or

10 professionally I do not agree with it.

11 Mr. Smothers. It is your assumption that it would have

12 gone up even beyond Mr. Dulles, your assumption from your years

13 of work with the Agency?

14 Mr. Tweedy. I think that would be fair to say, but that

15 would depend so much on the understanding between Mr. Dulles

16 and the policy levels of government to which I was not privy,

17 I really cannot comment substantively on that.

18 Mr. Smothers. I have some problem in looking back at the

19 testimony, your previous testimony -- which I realize you have

20 not had a chance to review. The gist of what you say on page

21 34 of the transcript is that this operation against Lumumba

22 was certainly something that was so extraordinary that you would

23 have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba -- I use

24 your words here -- yet at that time your recollection was

25 certainly not as clear as it was from a review of the documents.

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In your experience, are we talking about this activity being an extraordinary situation?

Mr. Tweedy. The only one to which I was ever exposed of its kind.

Mr. Smothers. In terms -- the only one of its kind, you mean the only one involving an assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. Let us be quite clear; exactly. I was never personally involved in any conversations about a specific assassination at any other time in my career in the Agency, nor was I aware of any other, so this was the only one that I personally had any experience with.

Mr. Smothers. After looking at the documented evidence, your memory is now much better concerning your own involvement in the cable traffic.

Mr. Tweedy. In the specificities of it, Mr. Smothers, yes. In terms of the general role I played as Chief of the Africa Division, there was never any doubt about that, but the specificities of this, really -- I had forgotten, as I told Mr. Baron the other day, for example, that there was a period when Lumumba was actually in the hands of the U.N. I had just forgotten.

I had not remembered that Mr. [redacted] had been asked by Mr. Bissell to assist the Chief of Station in this operation until I was reminded of it. I'm afraid that's my frailty. But that is -- my conscience, however, is quite clear, but

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my memory is not quite as clear.

Mr. Smothers. I do not want to belabor the documents we have gone over today. As you have reviewed them and as you recall this timeframe, and giving us some assistance in interpreting what the documents say, is there any other matter that bears on the question of the discussions surrounding the Lumumba case that we have not gone into that have come to mind as you think about the circumstances of this case that you think will be helpful to this Committee in understanding, if you will, both the question of the flow of authority and indeed the scope of what was intended?

Mr. Tweedy. From the time that this was first broached to me by Mr. Bissell, I do not believe I discussed this matter with anybody else but Mr. Bissell; certainly Mr. Gottlieb when he went out on this trip; certainly now that I've been reminded of his tasking by Mr. Bissell, [redacted] obviously, the Chief of Station; and my Deputy.

I never discussed it ever with Mr. Helms. I suppose I did discuss it with Mr. Dulles. I think it was much more that I knew perfectly well that Mr. Dulles was familiar with it rather than I actually had any conversation with Mr. Dulles on it. I think those were all conducted by Mr. Bissell and passed down to me. I do not think I probably had any.

Mr. Smothers. Let me understand the reference to Mr. [redacted] Are you saying you probably discussed it with him?

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Mr. Tweedy. No, I think probably I did not directly. I was perfectly aware of his knowledge of it, but at this point I cannot recall having discussed it with him.

To put it differently, there was no reason for me to, because I would have had nothing to say to him that I was not saying to Mr. Bissell, who in turn would have passed it to Mr. Dulles, as he saw fit. And in any event, that unless invited by Mr. Dulles, I would not have jumped the chain of command.

Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Schwarz?

Mr. Schwarz. This is the only killing incident you know of?

Mr. Tweedy. The only killing incident I know of. It is the only question of assassination which (a) I knew of, or (b) I have ever played any role in.

Mr. Schwarz. You refer to the special channel of cable, the YQBROP.

Did you ever use the YQBROP in any other operation?

Mr. Tweedy. YQBROP was a one-time thing for this operation. We could have attempted to assassinate 500,000 people and there would always have been an additional channel set up.

Mr. Baron. We were told by the YQBROP channel, by the review staff of the CIA that the channel was set up for eyes

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only use for the Chief of the Africa Division, primarily for personnel matters; that it was just taken advantage of for this operation because it already existed.

Mr. Tweedy. I will not gainsay them, but I think they are wrong. I think this was set up purposefully for this. This cryptonym was only used for this particular operation. I do not think it had anything to do --

Mr. Kirbow. You were Chief of the Africa Division?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not think it had anything to do whatsoever with other sensitive matters in the Division, not at all.

Mr. Schwarz. Both in the sense that this is the only assassination matter that you were ever connected with and the special treatment of the cables, it was a matter of signifant importance at the time, was it not?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, it was a matter of significant importance, as I made clear to Mr. Baron this morning and Mr. Dawson. The setting up of special channels and special indicators for sensitive operations was and is a completely common occurrence in the Agency. It has nothing to do specifically with assassination; a very common occurrence.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know any other incident in which poisons were used in your experience?

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Scwharz. When did you first recall -- Mr. Tweedy, you have appeared before us this summer formally and in this occasion.

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formally this morning. You were examined under oath on September 9th and you appeared before us informally on one or two occasions.

Mr. Tweedy. No, just once, whenever that was; this must have been back in June or July.

Mr. Schwarz. When did you first recall that poisons were used to attempt or prepare to assassinate Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. By having my memory jogged, I guess. I remember the first time it was mentioned when somebody said, would it have been possible that poison had been sent to the Station? I said, yes, indeed, it would have been possible. Did I know that the Chief of Station had sent poison there, that he had kept it in his refrigerator? I said no, I did not recall it, but that I would not gainsay it, that if someone testified that it was there -- this has all come back as a result of my memory being jogged.

I was not -- certainly the poison was considered; that I remember quite clearly.

Mr. Schwarz. From the beginning?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. That was obviously one of the ways that it might have been carried out.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to explore for a moment, of all the methods that you used to jog your memory, we showed you documents. Did you see any documents at the Agency?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I have seen none, nor have I talked to

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anybody, because there is nobody to talk to who, you know, participated in this experience with me.

Mr. Schwarz. You did not talk to Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. I have not talked to Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Fields?

Mr. Tweedy. I have not seen Mr. Fields; I have not talked to him by phone or any other way, nor have I seen any files.

Mr. Schwarz. The totality of your effort to refresh yourself has been efforts in the course of working with people on the staff of this Committee, is that right?

Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. You have not talked to any current, or have not talked to any current or former Agency employee?

Mr. Tweedy. No, sir, not on the subject of this field. The only thing I have discussed with them, as I told you, I was working on a job with the Agency this summer. I guess I told Mr. Elder I was going to be going up to testify primarily to find out whether I could get a car or something. No point in discussing it with him, because he would not have told me anything about it.

Mr. Schwarz. When you were told to take steps to move towards the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, did you consider declining to do that? If not, why not?

Mr. Tweedy. I will try to be as honest with you as I can. I certainly did not attempt to decline it, and I felt, in view

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of the position of the government on the thing, that at least the exploration of this, or possibility of removing Lumumba from power in the Congo was an objective worth pursuing.

Mr. Schwarz. Including killing him?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. I suspect I was ready to consider this.

Mr. Schwarz. That was an objective worth pursuing, right?

Mr. Tweedy. Getting rid of him was an objective worth pursuing, and if the government and my betters wished to pursue it, professionally, I was perfectly willing to play my role in it, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Looking back now from the perspective of 1975, do you think the United States should continue to entertain assassinations of foreign political leaders?

Mr. Tweedy. I have never thought that assassination in most cases was anything more than a mugs game, for the simple reason that I do not think in most cases, because I think an excellent case could have been made that the early elimination of Hitler would have saved us all a hell of a lot of trouble. But that was an almost unique case. Most people do not control situations totally within themselves. I think Hitler did, and I know something about that.

In other words, I don't think anybody else would have continued if Hitler had either had a heart attack or disappeared. I think the thing would have folded.

In most cases, I think we kid ourselves that getting rid

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of -- Henry II said, "this turbulent priest is in effect, take care of the issue.

Having to do it all over again, it would be my strong recommendation that we not get into it. I was never in any doubt whatsoever about it on a professional basis, because there always was a possibility that the Soviets might try this kind of thing on what I would call a professional basis.

Mr. Schwarz. What do you mean, professional basis?

Mr. Tweedy. Get at our sources, or conceivably even getting to staff officers, this type of thing. I was never in any doubt whatsoever that to engage in anything like this, if the Soviets should show inclination to do so would be totally non-productive.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean having a war back and forth between the two intelligence services?

Mr. Tweedy. The only reason I mention it, services have done this. The Soviets certainly have done it with some of their own operational agents, and other services have done it. We had a couple of conversations in the Agency, I remember quite informal, if the Soviets ever started a game like this whether it would be worth retaliating. I think we all agreed that the answer would be no. Two can play at this game, and there would be no end to it. In fact, of course, it never has happened, to my knowledge.

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Mr. Schwarz. What was so special about Lumumba that justified killing him?

Mr. Tweedy. There was nothing special about Lumumba as a person.

Mr. Schwarz. In that sense, you would distinguish him from Hitler, whom you did say was special as a person?

Mr. Tweedy. No, let me try to answer your question, which has to be answered more fully than just discussing Lumumba.

The concern with Lumumba was not really the concern with Lumumba as a person. It was concerned at this very pregnant point in the new African development of the effect on the balance of the Continent of a disintegration of the Congo, and it was the general feeling that Lumumba had it within his power to bring about this dissolution, and this was the fear that it would merely be the start -- the Congo, after all, was the largest geographical expression. Contained in it were enormously important mineral resources. Africa as a whole, the Congo itself, is adjacent to Nigeria, which at that point was considered to be one of the main hopes of the future stability of Africa, and if the Congo had fallen, then the chances were Nigeria would be seized with the same infection.

This was why Washington, after the point the Western world was so concerned about Lumumba, not because there was something unique about Lumumba, but it was the Congo.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever consider in your discussion of

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this subject what effect it would have on the United States' position in Africa if it were to be known. the policy makers in Africa sat around thinking about killing Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Policy makers in America?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed we did, which was one of the reasons, one of the sine qua nons of this operation was that the American hand would be totally hidden, which was, amongst others, a criteria that we were never able to achieve.

Mr. Schwarz. In fact, it is probably something that is not possible to achieve, is it not?

Mr. Tweedy. It is never possible to achieve anything with 100 percent assurance, no. Certainly you can achieve professional results with a high degree of assurance, but you can never go further than that.

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further.

Senator Huddleston. I have nothing further, and a vote is on.

Am I to understand that Senator Church is coming back or not?

Mr. Schwarz. I did not have that impression.

Senator Huddleston. We will recess at this time.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 o'clock p.m. the hearing concluded.)

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