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R599

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

3/14/77

EG

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday, July 22, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Tuesday, July 22, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 o'clock a.m., Room 224, Russell Senate Office Building, the Honorable John Tower (Vice Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Hart of Colorado, Tower (presiding) and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Paul Wallach, Joseph diGenova, Patrick Shea, Charles Lombard, Rhett Dawson, John Bayly and Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. McManus, we will swear you in, and the testimony will begin, and we may be joined by other members of the Committee.

Would you raise your hand?

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McManus. I do.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You may be seated.

Mr. Schwarz, our Counsel, will begin the questioning.

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TESTIMONY OF GEORGE B. MC MANUS

Mr. Schwarz. Would you give your full name and address to the Reporter?

Mr. McManus. My name is George B. McManus, my address is P.O. Box 161, Barnstable, Massachusetts, 02630.

Mr. Schwarz. As I told you, we always go through a procedural matter with the witnesses at the outset, and ask you if you know you have the right to counsel?

Mr. McManus. Yes, I do know.

Mr Schwarz. And if you want to stop and obtain counsel you have that right.

Mr. McManus. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. And you have your Constitutional rights.

Mr. McManus. That's right. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. McManus, you were first employed by the CIA when?

Mr. McManus. In May of 1946 by Central Intelligence Group, the predecessor organization.

Mr. Schwarz. And you stayed with the Agency until when?

Mr. McManus. Until May 30th, 1970. That is, the predecessor organization after it was organized.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, prior to 1962, would you just give a brief, a very brief summary of the things you did for the CI Group and the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McManus. I entered the Agency as a Naval Officer.

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had been Naval attache in Capetown and was ordered to the Central Intelligence Group where I began organizing the thing that is known now as the Contact Division. It is an organization to develop intelligence from the American business community, set up a network so that we could see business people, university people, travellers and so forth, and I was engaged in that operation until 1951.

In 1951, I went to Germany and organized the Defector Reception Center, the idea being that we would process people who were defecting from the Soviet Union and satellite countries. And I then organized a group called the Returnee Exploitation Group dealing with German scientists who had been taken by the Soviets to the Soviet Union after World War II. We would induce these people back from East Germany, interrogate them for information on Soviet scientific and technical developments.

I left Germany in September of 1955, September or October, and I was sent to [redacted] as the Chief of Station and I remained there until October of 1960.

I returned to Headquarters and was assigned to duty in Headquarters until -- yes, I was on duty in Headquarters until -- well, for a long time, but in December of 1961 --

Mr. Schwarz. Then you got into Cuba matters?

Mr. McManus. This was when I was asked to make a survey.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to come back to that, but after you

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finished working on those Cuban matters and working generally for Mr. Helms, can you recount just briefly what you did in your remaining tour of the Agency?

Well, let me see if I can summarize it for you.

You became the Executive Assistant to Admiral Rayburn who was the DCI?

Mr. McManus. Right.

After I finished the Cuban show, I went over and took over the cover staff, and then I went on to Rayburn's office.

Mr. Schwarz. As his Executive Assistant?

Mr. McManus. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And after he left, what did you do before you retired?

Mr. McManus. Vice-Admiral Rufus Taylor came in as the new Deputy, because Helms moved up to Rayburn's position, and I broke him in and left for Germany, and retired in May, 1970 in Germany.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for questioning on the Cuban period.

You first came into that in December, 1961?

Mr. McManus. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And you lasted in that until after the MONGOOSE program terminated sometime in the fall of 1962, is that right?

Mr. McManus. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

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What were you asked to do in December, 1961?

Mr. McManus. I was asked to make a survey of what was going on in the intelligence collection field in Cuba, and I spent the Christmas week in Miami where we had our Cuban station, and I looked into all of our clandestine activities, the number of reports we received, and how many agents were dispatched, what was being done about the flow of refugees from Havana to Miami. I wrote this report and submitted it to the authorities when I returned.

As a result of this report, I had recommended a very intensive effort in the interrogation of this flow of refugees because I felt there were a very great number of intellectuals, well-informed people who were coming in.

Mr. Schwarz. And something called the Opa-Lacka Center was ultimately set up?

Mr. McManus. Well, this happened. Then I was told to implement that, so I set up the thing called Opa-Lacka, yes, the interrogation center.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now, did you attend, in January, on January 19, a meeting with a number of people, including the Attorney General of the United States concerning Cuba?

Mr. McManus. Yes, I did. In his office, in the Attorney General's office.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you put in front of the witness, and

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1 would you mark as McManus Exhibit 1, a memorandum dated
2 January 19, 1962 for the DCI, Subject: Meeting with the
3 Attorney General of the United States Concerning Cuba, and
4 consisting of three typed pages and then a group of five
5 handwritten pages attached.

6 (The documents referred
7 to were marked McManus
8 Exhibits No. 1 and 2
9 respectively for
10 identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. First, is that your handwriting, Mr. McManus?

Mr. McManus. It is indeed, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And the typescript is a typewritten version of your handwritten notes?

Mr. McManus. With some mistakes in it.

Mr. Schwarz. Some typographical mistakes.

Mr. McManus. For example, "not" instead of "now" changes the paragraph 2 in the beginning, changes the meaning completely.

Mr. Schwarz. Which word is that?

Mr. McManus. Paragraph 2 of the typed memo, third line 2, "would not attack the Cuban problem," "would now" --

Mr. Schwarz. Okay, yes.

In addition to the attendees who are shown on page 1, Mr. Helms attended, is that right?

Mr. McManus. Yes.

Actually, I wrote this memoranda for Helms' signature. Apparently the original is not here with his signature, so the I there is Richard Helms.

Mr. Schwarz. Now on the second page of the typed version at subparagraph e, there is a paragraph which reads as follows: "Accordingly, a solution to the Cuban problem today carried" and then you indent certain words, and you put them in quotations, "'The top priority in the US Gov't -- all else is secondary -- no time, money effort or manpower is to be spared.'"

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Now, who is that quoting? Whose words are those that you quoted?

Mr. McManus. Those are the words of Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you understand those words to include permission to assassinate Fidel Castro or have anything to do with assassination?

Mr. McManus. I did not. It never occurred to me.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you characterize Mr. Kennedy, if you were taking a sports analogy, would you characterize h what his demeanor was like in that meeting?

Mr. McManus. Well, there was not any question that he had called this group together and he really wanted action. In other words, there was no question. He was very vehement in his speech. He said, we're going to get moving here, he said we have got to be underway. And he was really putting the pressure and heat on. And that came through to me very clearly and I am sure to everyone else in the room, and there wasn't any question that if there was any problem, all you had to do was give him a ring and he would see that you got results.

I think that is somewhere in the notes here that I did not put in the finished material, you know.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now, apart from the particular words that I quoted to you in focusing on the spirit of the meeting as a whole, did you

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understand the spirit of the meeting as a whole to contemplate or authorize assassination?

Mr. McManus. Absolutely not. I never thought of that. I had no idea that that was contemplated.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Now, following this meeting, did Mr. Helms ask you to play a role with respect to monitoring or following the progress of the task force and Mr. Harvey?

Mr. McManus. I was an assistant and dealt solely with Cuban matters.

Mr. Schwarz. Assistant to whom?

Mr. McManus. To Helms.

Mr. Schwarz. To Helms.

Mr. McManus. But I was primarily interested in intelligence. After we had the flow of information beginning to come in from the refugees, it became clear to me that there was a great Soviet threat, and I followed that very carefully. I could see the build-up developing in Cuba, and I thought that was the heart of the matter. That interested me more than any other aspect of the show.

I did write a weekly report --

Mr. Schwarz. For Mr. Helms?

Mr. McManus. For Mr. Helms.

It was printed up, perhaps the DCI signed it. I don't know what the name of it was, but it was a special report, it

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was sent to several people in government. It was sent to the White House, SECDEF, State, Attorney General, the Bureau, I guess, in which I would summarize the highlights of intelligence gathered during the past week, and then I had an operational summary of what had been done operationally during that week.

Mr. Schwarz. And that you obtained from Mr. Harvey, did you?

Mr. McManus. The operational?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. McManus. I would ask Harvey to supply that information to me. Harvey would give me the information, I would edit it and out it would go.

Mr. Schwarz. So was Mr. Helms looking to you as his principal staff assistant on Cuba to keep generally on top of what was going on in the Cuban operations for him?

Mr. McManus. Partially, yes. I would say I was assisting him, particularly in the intelligence field and keeping the community aware of what progress we were making in intelligence gathering and operations, and I followed all of the traffic on Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. You were spending, in a sense, your full time on Cuba, weren't you?

Mr. McManus. I was indeed, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Harvey was spending his full time on Cuba?

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Mr. McManus. He was the operational head of the task force who was responsible to General Lansdale.

Mr. Schwarz. Your understanding was that Harvey's boss, Harvey's reporting channel, was to Lansdale to get tasks from Lansdale?

Mr. McManus. Yes, Lansdale gave him tasks, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he gave him constantly changing and new and different and confusing tasks?

Mr. McManus. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. You are smiling. The record ought to show what your smile is intended to convey.

Mr. McManus. Well, Ed Lansdale had been picked by the Attorney General as the man in charge, you see. I am sure Lansdale assumed as soon as a task force had been set up in the Central Intelligence Agency that this was his private sort of Army, that he could task his battalion commander to do this, and he would send him another task, and he'd retreat, advance, go sideways, and as time went on, there were fantastic things that came in, do this, do that, write a paper on this, what about the possibility of balloons, and all sorts of propoganda ideas, papers would have to be written, just dozens of people working flat out to meet these requirements.

And so therefore, you see, these tasks were coming from an individual outside directly into a small task force within the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Mr. Schwarz. By the individual, you mean Lansdale?

Mr. McManus. From Lansdale to a task force that was set up under Bill Harvey, and Bill Harvey wasn't really even part of the clandestine service. In other words, here was Helms, the Deputy Director of Plans, Clandestine, and here is Mr. John McCone up here as the Director. So all of this was going right down into an organization, back and forth, couriers going, meetings being held. It was odd organizationally.

Mr. Schwarz. It was odd organizationally?

Mr. McManus. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And perhaps odd from the point of view of the personalities involved as well?

Mr. McManus. Rather, yes, rather.

Mr. Schwarz. We have seen some of that.

Now you were spending full time on Cuba and Mr. Harvey was spending full time on Cuba. What proportion of Mr. Helms' time went into Cuba?

Mr. McManus. I would say very little, as a matter of fact, except for responding to questions from around town and what the progress was, and what do you think the future holds. Otherwise, he was rather removed from it. I mean, he had the whole world to supervise from the clandestine point of view.

Mr. Schwarz. And you said something interesting that I hadn't understood before or heard before. You said Mr. Harvey was not really a part of the clandestine services. What did you

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mean by that?

Mr. McManus. Well, organizationally, if you look at the clandestine service, you have divisions and you have staffs, and he was not in a division and he was not in a staff. A special force, a task force, had been set up, so that organizationally he was the man nominally over them, and he was receiving his orders, not from someone in the hierarchy, but he was receiving them from a man outside of the organization who had been picked by the Attorney General to be the commander of this effort.

Mr. Schwarz. In other words, Lansdale.

Mr. McManus. Ed Lansdale, General Lansdale.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Now, did you, after the Cuban Missile Crisis had been dealt with and MONGOOSE was coming to an end, did you write a memorandum about MONGOOSE, looking back over it and saying what lessons we can learn, and so forth?

Mr. McManus. Yes, I did.

Mr. Schwarz. And who asked you to write that memo?

Mr. McManus. I don't think I was asked to write this piece of paper. I was talking to Helms about problems that I could foresee in the future, and we were discussing this, and I said, you know, I ought to sit down and put this on a piece of paper. It would be much better if I would put it on a piece of paper. So I just wrote a think piece. I didn't address it

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to anyone, I just wrote a piece of paper.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay. Let's put in front of you as McManus Exhibit 3, a three-page memorandum with your signature at the end dated November 5, 1962, with some handwriting on the front page, and stamped at the bottom 01110 to 01112.

Is that the memorandum we were just talking about, Mr. McManus?

Mr. McManus. Yes, that is the paper. That is the little think piece I wrote.

(The document referred to was marked McManus Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. And you gave that after you wrote it, and you have recounted the conversation you had with Mr. Helms. Did you give it to Mr. Helms?

Mr. McManus. I gave it to him. This is what I think, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And is it your understanding he then sent it forth, sent it out to Mr. McCone, the DCI?

Mr. McManus. I think he either took it up to Marshall Carter or perhaps he took it to John McCone. I think that is what he intended to do after he read it.

Mr. Schwarz. But you don't know that one way or the other, that is just your impression?

Mr. McManus. I don't think Mr. McCone was there on the 5th of November, and it is my recollection he gave it to Marshall Carter.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Did Mr. Helms make any comments to you about the substance of the memo?

Mr. McManus. No, he did not. He just thought I had some interesting ideas in here, and there are some fairly sharp comments, but I said that was my honest opinion, and I was also making recommendations here about organization, which I felt was very important.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now, part of the memorandum deals with your understanding

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1 of what happened, or what had been done during the MONGOOSE
2 program?
3 Mr. McManus. Right.
4 Mr. Schwarz. Let me read to you the first sentence of
5 paragraph 4, "During the past year while one of the options of
6 the project was to create internal dissension and resistance
7 leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that
8 policy makers not only shied away from the military intervention
9 aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals."
10 First question. Who did you mean by policy makers there?
11 Mr. McManus. I think when some aspects of MONGOOSE began
12 to be reviewed at a higher level, you know, all the way to
13 Bundy and across that level --
14 Mr. Schwarz. Maxwell Taylor?
15 Mr. McManus. Yeah, that's right.
16 Mr. Schwarz. Robert Kennedy?
17 Mr. McManus. They felt that MONGOOSE, you know, the
18 internal dissension and all is fine, but we're not going to
19 commit any forces to invade Cuba, and the other aspect was
20 that they didn't even like the idea of a lot of sabotage,
21 because there were so many Cubans, for example, even in Florida
22 and here we had a big Strategic Air Command base down south of
23 Miami, I mean, there could be all sorts of retaliation problems.
24 So generally the feeling was, we are going to go short of any
25 serious consideration of military intervention, and they were

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not very keen on sabotage operations.

Mr. Schwarz. I interrupted your answer to try to see who you meant by the policy makers. You said persons on the level, I think, of Bundy.

Mr. McManus. Well, I've got to be careful in saying, I'm not -- it is difficult for me to name, but I would say certainly people who were concerned with these matters, the senior people in government.

Mr. Schwarz. The senior people in government who were concerned with these matters, who included Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Robert Kennedy, McNamara --

Mr. McManus. All of those people, but I go on to say here, it was only Taylor -- if you could read the next sentence --

Mr. Schwarz. WYes. Will you read the next sentence into the record and explain what you meant by that?

Mr. McManus. Yes. I say, "The only senior official involved outside of the Agency who thought in terms of military action was Maxwell Taylor."

Mr. Schwarz. I guess that speaks in terms sufficiently for itself.

Mr. McManus. That's right.

Mr. Schwarz. What did you mean by the sentence that follows that? Maybe you could read that into the record and explain what you meant by it.

Mr. McManus. It is difficult for me to put myself back that

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1 many years, but I think at the time I had reached the conclusion,
2 you know, after the Missile Crisis was all over and I looked back
3 on it, I felt that a tremendous amount of the activity that had
4 been carried on, intensive activity of all kinds, was really
5 almost game-playing, you know, it really wasn't that serious.
6 I mean, if you look back in the period, you will find that
7 a lot of people were criticizing the government for inaction in
8 Cuba, not doing something, not sending the Army in there, not
9 doing all these kinds of things. So Lansdale and his group
10 were active as hell in getting, you know, keeping a frothy
11 operation going all the time. You know, there were things in
12 the paper about Cubans doing this, and we were trying to do that
13 about Cuba. Actually, not very much was accomplished.
14 What I was worried about, on the intelligence side, was
15 the Soviet build-up which was coming to me through intelligence
16 which is clear as a bell that this build-up was gradually
17 getting more intense, the Soviet presence was increasing, and
18 this was what -- you see, it wasn't this flaw. It was those
19 Ruskies who were coming in there and solidifying their
20 position while we were carrying on all these balloon operations
21 and Lord knows what.
22 Mr. Schwarz. And the froth, as you described, that is
23 your characterization of the MONGOOSE proram?
24 Mr. McManus. I would say that is what I thought at the
25 time I wrote this. I think that was what was going through my

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head. This was my honest opinion.

Mr. Schwarz. Based upon your review of the project over the months you were associated with it?

Mr. McManus. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

Senator Tower (presiding). Are you through?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Senator Tower. Mr. McManus, in this think piece that you did that we have been referring to.--

Mr. McManus. Yes, Senator.

Senator Tower. On page 3, the top of the page, "Practically everyone at the operating level agrees that Lansdale has lost his value. Bundy and Taylor are not impressed with him. Bill Quinn and company obviously have his number, as do we."

What was General Quinn's job? This is the only document I've seen or looked at closely in which Bill Quinn's name surfaces.

Mr. McManus. I believe General Quinn at the time, to the best of my recollection, was then running the Defense Intelligence Agency. Bill Quinn had been in OSS and had been with the CIG many years ago and SSU. I know Bill Quinn quite well, and I think he was in the Defense Intelligence Agency, or G-2. I cannot remember what the organization was at that time, but he was the boss, Senator.

Senator Tower. I see. So he was not necessarily directly

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1 involved in this Lansdale operation?

2 Mr. McManus. Oh, no, sir, not at all, no. But I felt

3 that over there in the Defense Department there were other

4 people who shared the view that we had, I mean there were some

5 other senior people in the Department of Defense, Bill Quinn

6 being a man I had greatly respected and had worked for at one

7 time when I was a younger man.

8 Senator Tower. So actually what was happening was that

9 Lansdale was, in effect, through back channels, tasking Harvey

10 directly, is that right, but no reference to this paper.

11 Mr. McManus. What was that, sir? Excuse me?

12 Senator Tower. Was Lansdale, through back channels, or

13 at least without going through the normal chain of command,

14 was directly tasking Harvey, is that correct?

15 Mr. McManus. This was the way it was set up and it was

16 authorized. I mean, he wasn't cutting through any hierarchy

17 that he wasn't supposed to. This was set up that way. It was

18 a most unusual organizational set up, but that was because the

19 Attorney General was running the thing, and this was the way

20 he wanted it. He wanted Lansdale as his man to be in charge, to

21 run herd over this group, and that is what he did. He ran herd

22 over the group.

23 Senator Tower. Well, that, of course, I dont think there's

24 anything terribly unusual about that. I deal directly with

25 subordinates in my office.

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I yield to counsel.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. McManus --

Senator Tower. Excuse me.

Senator Hart?

Senator Hart of Colorado. I have some questions, but go ahead.

Senator Tower. I'm sorry, Gary.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Not at all.

How large was Task Force W?

Mr. McManus. I can't give you the figures right offhand.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Roughly?

Mr. McManus. My recollection is that there must have been between four and five hundred men in it. That is my recollection.

Senator Hart of Colorado. All under Harvey's direction, immediate direction?

Mr. McManus. I can't remember when Harvey left.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But when he was there.

Mr. McManus. Huh?

Senator Hart of Colorado. When Harvey was there, were the four or five hundred men under his direction?

Mr. McManus. Yes, yes, sure they were.

Senator Hart of Colorado. How many of those were in Wshhington as opposed to South Florida?

Mr. McManus. Well, you've got me there. This is only a

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1 guess, and I may be wrong. Let's split it fifty-fifty, two
2 hundred and two hundred, maybe, or it might be a little higher
3 in the Miami area.
4 Senator Hart of Colorado. Since you were involved, at
5 least to some degree, on Mr. Helms' behalf in this whole
6 Cuban operation --
7 Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
8 Senator Hart of Colorado. Were there ever Washington
9 meetings of Task Force W where these 200, roughly 200 people
10 would get together and Harvey would lecture them, or anything
11 like that?
12 Mr. McManus. I know that Harvey would hold staff meetings
13 of the senior people.
14 Senator Hart of Colorado. And that would be about how
15 many people?
16 Mr. McManus. I would say five or six, probably.
17 Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you attend any of those
18 meetings?
19 Mr. McManus. I never attended any of those meetings, no.
20 Senator Hart of Colorado. To your knowledge, did the
21 Attorney General ever pick up the phone and call directly into
22 Mr. Harvey or any of the senior people in Task Force W?
23 Mr. McManus. I really have no knowledge as to whether he
24 did or not.
25 Senator Hart of Colorado. But you don't recollect Harvey

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1 ever saying to you, I just talked with the Attorney General,
2 or anything like that?
3 Mr. McManus. No, I don't. No, I do not.
4 Senator Hart of Colorado. Would Mr. Helms ever have
5 attended any of these senior staff meetings?
6 Mr. McManus. No, no sir.
7 Senator Hart of Colorado. But to pursue Senator Tower's
8 question, the link between General Lansdale and Mr. Harvey was
9 an institutional one? It was established that way?
10 Mr. McManus. Correct, that's correct.
11 Senator Hart of Colorado. It was Taylor to Lansdale to
12 Harvey?
13 Mr. McManus. That's right, that's right.
14 Senator Hart of Colorado. In MONGOOSE.
15 And what role did Mr. Helms play in that link?
16 Mr. McManus. He really wasn't involved in that link
17 directly. He was much off to the side, because was really an
18 employee of Mr. Helms. Mr. Helms was his senior officer, but
19 again, on the other hand, he was taking his direction from
20 someone outside the organization.
21 Now I think you spoke, Senator, about Taylor, Lansdale,
22 et cetera, as I remember it, it was more the Attorney General,
23 Lansdale. I think Lansdale had a very sort of close relation-
24 ship with the Attorney General, and I think -- I sort of bring
25 that out somewhere here.

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Mr. Schwarz. At the bottom of page 2 --

Mr. McManus. Yes, I see.

Some people sort of thought he was a mystic, you know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. How did you gather this relationship between Lansdale and the Attorney General?

Was this representations that Lansdale made to you?

Mr. McManus. Well, my first impression I had in this meeting in the Attorney General's office, you know, you just sense people, that there's sort of a relationship, you know, there's a special relationship of some kind.

And I could feel that, Jeez, almost in the air, as far as the Attorney General and Lansdale, and I knew that Lansdale after hours and all, I knew from him, he would spend quite a bit of time with the Attorney General, so I knew there was more just a relationship of a general officer in the Pentagon and the Attorney General. There was a close personal relationship in which Lansdale had, I would say, a lot of influence, some sort of influence.

That's why I say when some of these -- that's why I say when some of these people thought he was a mystic, perhaps I don't get my point over to you, you know, but that is what I thought. That is why I put it in there. I just wrote down what I thought, as I was writing it up for my organization, and I wouldn't put anything down but what I thought was the truth.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you ever hear of the

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Special Group (Augmented)?

Mr. McManus. Sure, yes, sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you ever attend any of those meetings?

Mr. McManus. No, I never attended any of those, Senator.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you ever hear any discussions whatsoever concerning the assassination of Fidel Castro?

Mr. McManus. Senator, I never heard any discussion of it at all, never. I never heard any discussion of assassination, at any time, any plans, discussion or thinking of assassination. Never.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Based upon your experience in the CIA, could such planning or discussions have been conducted at the Harvey level without your knowledge?

Mr. McManus. I'm not quite sure I understand that question, Senator.

Could he have discussed it?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Could he and his senior Task Force W people have been planning this or discussing it without you finding out?

Mr. McManus. Oh, I think that was -- yes, he could, if that was what he wished to do, but knowing Harvey, I don't think he would have discussed it with very many people. I mean, he's not an articulate individual as far as revealing what he has in the back of his mind.

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(General laughter)

Mr. McManus. I do not think he would discuss it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You said five or six people.

Mr. McManus. I don't think he would discuss it with one of them. No, I don't think he would discuss it with them. This is what I would call a need to know, a one man need to no.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you saying it's impossible for five or six people in the Agency to plan assassinations without it getting out?

Mr. McManus. No, what I'm driving at, Senator, is that I don't think that if he was planning assassinatnion, he would not have that many people involved in his staff. He might have a special little inside group who probably wouldn't know why they were doing certain things. You know, he could give them orders to do something, and they would carry out the order. They wouldn't know what the end result would be.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that could be done among those few special people without others finding it out?

Mr. McManus. I suppose so. I'm just thinking in my ordinary life, I ask people to do things without their knowing why or what my motive is, you know?

You could utilize individuals.

Senator Tower. Let me pursue Senator Hart's question just a step further.

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Was it standard operating procedure within the Agency to compartmentalize to the extent that very often people did not specifically why they were doing certain things? Perhaps one person knew or four different people were doing something, but those four had no knowledge of how it all fit together?

Mr. McManus. I think that could be said on a need to know basis, Senator Tower, that very often that something very sensitive was going on, that people would have to carry out certain orders without really knowing the honest reason for it, you see, what the objective was.

Senator Tower. During the course of your career in the CIA were you ever tasked to do things without fully understanding why you were doing it?

Mr. McManus. Personally I don't think that I ever was. I happened to enter the Agency in a fairly senior position as a young man, and stayed there.

Senator Tower. Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothers. If we might, Mr. McManus, can we go back for a minute to General Lansdale and your characterization of him as a mystic along with a discussion of the organizational anomaly here of Lansdale's direct tasking of the Agency.

Would it be a fair statement of the situation to say that apparently, based on a close relationship that Lansdale had either with the Attorney General or the Attorney General President, that he had been put in charge of a working group,

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working group which Mr. Harvey represented CIA, and that it was the view of the Agency that Lansdale's charter allowed him to task Harvey direct?

Mr. McManus. Well, there wasn't any question in my mind that Lansdale was able to charge the task force with whatever he wanted them to do. In other words, Lansdale was a General without an Army, if you took Task Force W away. When you put in Task Force W, that was his Army, and Harvey happened to be, if you call him a battalion commander or whatever he was, that was it. And Lansdale gave the orders.

Mr. Smothers. Okay.

In the normal --

Mr. McManus. Excuse me. I must -- except insofar as the organization and the task force would be running in a normal way a lot of clandestine operations, putting people ashore in boats and so forth, you know, a continuing standard clandestine infiltration.

Mr. Smothers. Then in order to task Harvey, it would not have been necessary for Lansdale to go through the DCI or through Helms?

Mr. McManus. No. He -- as I remember it, sir, there were couriers running back and forth between Lansdale's office and Harvey's office continuously. I think the correspondence I have seen, you have correspondence in the file which shows they were writing to one another back and forth.

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1 Mr. Smothers. Let me then draw on your general experience,
2 years of experience with the Agency and your familiarity with
3 both the method of operation of Helms, DCI and the other
4 principals at this time, to raise a few hypothetical questions
5 with you, if I might.
6 One, let us assume that Mr. Harvey had, in fact, been
7 tasked by General Lansdale to develop assassination plans.
8 Is it your opinion that this information would have been shared
9 with Mr. Helms by Harvey, and he would have gone to Helms and
10 said, this is what they've asked me to do, should I do it?
11 Mr. McManus. Well, I really cannot answer that.
12 Mr. Smothers. Based on the operating procedure at this
13 time, as you knew it?
14 Mr. McManus. That would be difficult for me to answer
15 that question, really. I really don't think I can answer that
16 or give you a reasonable answer.
17 Mr. Smothers. Let's try it this way, then.
18 Do you believe that Mr. Harvey would take steps to carry
19 out an assassination without informing Mr. Helms?
20 Mr. McManus. I really cannot answer for Harvey, but I
21 think he would be a damned fool if he didn't.
22 Mr. Smothers. Okay.
23 Let me focus, then, on the relationship between Mr. Helms
24 and the Director, Mr. McCone, as you knew it.
25 Is it your opinion that Mr. Helms kept Mr. McCone fully

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informed of the DDP activities?

Mr. McManus. I always assumed so when I was --

Mr. Smothers. Well, you noted here that your presence at the January 19th meeting was for the purpose of making notes so that the Director could be kept informed by Mr. Helms.

Was that the normal course of activity?

Mr. McManus. The reason I went along with Helms was that I had already written a report about our current activities, what had to be done to improve the intelligence gathering, and the Attorney General apparently was aware that this was done, so I went along to represent this new idea of intelligence gathering. On the way over, Helms said, you'd better take some notes. I said, fine, I'll take the notes. So I wrote up this memo of the meeting, and as soon as we got back, I had it drawn up --

Mr. Smothers. You wrote the memo for Helms' signature, didn't you?

Mr. McManus. That's right, so he could take it to Mr. McCone immediately.

Mr. Smothers. Was this consistent with Helms' normal method of operation?

Mr. McManus. As I remember it, yes. I always thought that he informed the Director. I always tried to keep the Director informed.

Mr. Smothers. Realizing again that we are in a hypothetical

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1 situation, and assume that there is, as there has been some
2 testimony to indicate, a conversation between Mr. Harvey and
3 Mr. Helms regarding the question of assassination, and the
4 implementation of assassination schemes, would it be your
5 opinion that after determining an assassination scheme should
6 be implemented, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. Helms would agree not
7 to inform Mr. McCone?
8 Mr. McManus. As I said, I always assumed that Mr. Helms
9 would keep the Director fully informed of any activity that
10 he thought was sensitive or should be brought to his attention,
11 you know, any sensitive activity, any information that was
12 developed that was important, as you would in any good organiza-
13 tion, disciplined organization. I mean, I just assumed that
14 any man in that position would keep the Director, who has
15 the responsibilities that he does in this government, fully
16 informed. I mean, I would just assume that.
17 There is only one reason that I think he might not that I
18 can think of, and that would be if someone told him not to tell
19 him.
20 Mr. Smothers. If someone told him not to tell the
21 Director?
22 Mr. McManus. If someone told him, now look, I don't want
23 you to bring John McCone into that. Who that someone is, I
24 don't know, but it occurred to me that this could happen.
25 Mr. Smothers. In your opinion, is that the only circumstance

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1 in which Mr. Helms would not inform the Director?

2 Mr. McManus. In my opinion, yes. Yes, sir, that is my

3 opinion.

4 Mr. Smothers. All right.

5 As you knew the Operation MONGOOSE Cuba situation, who

6 would be in a position to advise Mr. Helms not to inform Mr.

7 McCone?

8 Mr. McManus. I don't know. I really honestly don't know,

9 but --

10 Mr. Schwarz. I thought he was going to finish his

11 answer.

12 Mr. McManus. I was searching my mind for why he wouldn't

13 inform Mr. McCone. I can't think of any reason for not inform-

14 ing Mr. McCone unless someone whom he thought was higher

15 authority told him not to. Now, Mr. McCone is one of the

16 finest Directors I ever knew. He was a broad-gauged, sincere,

17 morally strong individual, and I think that if a matter of

18 that kind had been brought to his attention, he would have

19 reacted violently immediately, and Mr. McCone had a great

20 love for the President of the United States, and he sort of

21 looked at him in a way as an older son or a brother, a very

22 protective sense he had about the President, President Kennedy,

23 and McCone would have immediately said, Jesus, this is a no-w-

24 ballgame, number 1. Secondly, as an individual, he would have

25 found it morally reprehensible, see. So I think that that

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about summarizes my thinking on this.

Mr. Smothers. Let me understand this, then.

Under most circumstances, and indeed, under all circumstances you can imagine, Helms would have told McCone, with the exception of a situation in which Helms had been told by higher authority not to tell him.

Are we correct that far? Is that a correct statement, or a correct summary of what you have said?

Mr. McManus. Let me just repeat, if I may, what I said. I said the only reason I could think of that he would not inform him is that someone instructed him not to. Obviously, it would be someone more senior in government, someone whom he felt he ought to obey his orders, and who that is, I don't know.

Mr. Smothers. Well, understanding General Lansdale's position now as coordinator, his ability to task the CIA, and understand Mr. Harvey's position and his relationship to Mr. Helms, is it your opinion, even if Mr. Helms had received a very clear directive with regard to assassination from General Lansdale or anyone on that level, anyone on the level below higher authority, or below the Cabinet level, that Mr. Helms would have considered that sufficient basis to proceed with the execution of an assassination scheme?

Mr. McManus. I really can't answer that, sir. I really don't --

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Mr. Smothers. Well, didn't Mr. Helms have access, regular access, substantially higher than General Lansdale?

Mr. McManus. Well, I mean, Mr. Helms used to go over to all the time, you know. He was always in and around the White House.

Mr. Smothers. Well, do you think he would have taken General Lansdale's order to assassinate Fidel Castro without checking it out, without seeing if Lansdale was correct?

Mr. McManus. Do I think that he would take Lansdale's order? No, I don't think he would take Lansdale's order to assassinate Castro, no. That's my opinion. No, I definitely don't think he would have.

Mr. Smothers. Understand now, we are going on your understanding of the way things operated at this time, as well as the operation of the Agency.

All right, let's look at Mr. Helms' contacts, then.

Did he meet regularly with the President?

Mr. McManus. Did he meet with the President? Yes, he met with the President a lot. I've been in the office when the President would call him on the phone and say, Dick, what the hell's the story on this, I'm getting some boilerplate from some other Departments. And we would look into it and report to him precisely, immediately.

Mr. Smothers. These reportings to the President, did they sometimes occur on Mr. Helms' initiative, or did he wait for

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the President to call him?

Mr. McManus. I think he usually waited for the President to call him. I remember one amusing incident when we had picked up some machine guns and I think it was the coast of Venezuela, when Castro had landed there, when he was interested in stirring up trouble in the southern Hemisphere, and someone sent one of these guns up to Headquarters and Helms was going over to see the Attorney General that day and he put the gun in a little box he had there and took it over and showed the Attorney General, and I think the Attorney General called the President and said I'm going to take Helms over to see you, he's got a piece of equipment he wants to show you. I think you'd like to see it.

So they all knew Helms there, the Secret Service and all, you know, and, Christ, he walks right into the White House with this thing and into the President's office, and the President took him and put it up, you know, aimed around in the office and said, Jesus, he said, Dick, you know, it's a good thing you're a loyal subject.

So, this is the relationship. I'm just trying to give you the relationship there. It was a close relationship between the President and Richard Helms.

Mr. Smothers. Would you describe the relationship between Mr. Helms and Robert Kennedy?

Mr. McManus. I really can't. I tell you, I really don't

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that much about it. I was never present at any other meetings. I don't know what the relationship was.

Mr. Smothers. All right.

Let's raise a question regarding some other actors involved here.

You have indicated in your memo that the opinion of General Lansdale was not terribly high in the Agency, and you seem to infer that he was simply tolerated by other persons based on the fact that the President, or the President and the Attorney General, had laid the mantle on General Lansdale for the purpose of heading up the working group on Cuba operations.

Mr. McManus. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. You mentioned as one of the persons who was trying going along, Mr. Gilpatric who was then the Deputy Secretary of Defense. What was your understanding of Mr. Gilpatric's involvement in the Cuba opeations?

Mr. McManus. I cannot answer that, but I just -- at the time -- it is hard for me to recollect, but somehow or other I gathered a lot of this information in the Pentagon and over at the White House and around, and I had a pretty good idea of what people, how people had sized up Lansdale, and if I put it in a phrase I would say they thought he was a wild man, you see, and they had to go along with him because the Attorney General over there was pressuring them, you see? You damn well have to cooperate with Lansdale. So he was tolerated. It wasn't

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1 just within the Agency. Excuse me. You see, it wasn't just
2 within the Agency, and the reason I was making these recommenda-
3 tions is that I wanted to protect our own organization.
4 Mr. Smothers. How well did you come to know the wild man,
5 General Lansdale?
6 Mr. McManus. Well, I met him on the day I went over to that
7 meeting, and I used to see him from time to time, and people
8 from the task force would come up to me and say we have this
9 paper from Lansdale. I don't know what the hell to do. And
10 I'll say, well, I'll give you a hand, I'll help you write it,
11 write a report for him.
12 Mr. Smothers. In your opinion, was General Lansdale doing
13 things inconsistent with the desires of the Attorney General?
14 Mr. McManus. I cannot answer that question. I do not
15 know.
16 Mr. Smothers. Well, you mentioned your observation of
17 the relationship between them, and you mentioned the fact that
18 the Attorney General was apparently pleased with General Lans-
19 dale.
20 Mr. McManus. I don't know how pleased he was later on,
21 but I think he was enamored of him in the sense that he thought
22 he was a man capable of a lot of terrific activity that I
23 suppose embarrassed Castro. I really don't know what he thought
24 at the end of MONGOOSE, I really don't know. But Lansdale
25 certainly had his backing. As I say, Bobby Kennedy was fighting

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his battle. Then I say in here, as recently as two weeks ago.

Mr. Smothers. To the best of your knowledge, were any of Lansdale's wild schemes or pokey schemes, as you described them, ever specifically called off and pulled back by the Attorney General?

Mr. McManus. You see, I would not know about that.

Mr. Smothers. Well, you apparently formed some opinion, though, about the amount of backing Lansdale enjoyed at the time of this memo, at the time of your think piece, and if we could go back to that time, is it your recollection at the time of this think piece that General Lansdale still enjoyed the confidence of the Attorney General?

Mr. McManus. Well, I think I say in paragraph 9 on the bottom of page 2, "Absolutely no attempt on our part should be made to unseat Lansdale. Remember that the Attorney General was fighting Lansdale's battle as recently as two weeks ago." So that, I mean, obviously I felt that there wasn't a thing we could do about Lansdale, but organizationally, we could protect a lot of our people from his depredations.

Mr. Smothers. Now this think piece is in November. Your first exposure to Lansdale is in January of 1962.

Mr. McManus. That's right, yes, sir

Mr. Smothers. Based on your recollection of the times, and the state of mind or the conclusions that you apparently drew at the time of the November memorandum, would it be your

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1 opinion that in August of 1962, General Lansdale did, in fact,
2 enjoy the confidence of the Attorney General?
3 Mr. McManus. Well, I would assume so. You see, I really
4 can't tell you that. I don't know. I would assume so, yes.
5 He was fighting his battles in November.
6 Mr. Smothers. Thank you. Nothing further.
7 Senator Tower. Do you have any more, Fritz?
8 Mr. Schwarz. I do not.
9 Senator Tower. Thank you very much, Mr. McManus. We
10 appreciate your appearance.
11 (Whereupon, at 11:18 o'clock a.m., the hearing recessed.)
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B-11

January 19, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The D C I

SUBJECT : Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States concerning Cuba

1. I attended a meeting at 11 AM today in the Office of the Attorney General which was chaired by him. Others present were:

Brigadier Gen. E. S. Lansdale (OSD)
Major Patchell (OSD)
Brig. General Craig (JCS)
Mr. D. Wilson (USIB
Mr. Frank Hand (CIA) and,
Mr. George McManus CIA.

(The Dept of State was not represented although invited)

2. The Attorney General outlined to us "How it all started", findings as they developed and the general framework in which the U.S. Government would ~~not~~ now attack the Cuban problem.

Briefly, these were the main points

(a) After failure of invasion, the U.S. Govt relaxed and became less active on the basis "be the to lay low".

(b) ~~However over the~~ months the complexion of the refugee flow changed (ie upper classes out first then middle classes dropping to lower middle class etc which, he stated, indicated a strong feeling of opposition to Castro within Cuba.

(c) Progress in Cuba toward a police state and Communist state was more rapid during this period than that made by any country in Eastern Europe in

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an equivalent period of time. Hence, because of the rapidity of advance, immediate action was necessary.

(d) With these factors in mind Attorney General had discussion at White House with President, SECDEF (Taylor?) and Lansdale. SECDEF assigned Lansdale to survey problem and he' Lansdale reported to Pres, SECDEF and Attorney General in late November concluding

I Overthrow of Castro regime was possible

II. Sugar crop should be attacked at once

III Action to be taken to keep Castro so busy with internal problems (economic, political and social) that he would have no time for meddling abroad (in Latin America

detail U.S. Govt was precluded from destroying the current sugar crop (1) we were late and overly optimistic and (b) "the assets of U.S. Government were not as great as we were led to believe"

(e) Accordingly a solution to the Cuban problem today carried

"The top priority in the US Gov't
-- all else is secondary --
no time, money effort or manpower is to be spared"

(f) Yesterday (January 18, 1962) the President had indicated to him "that the final chapter on Cuba had not been written" -- its got to be done and will be done.

(g) Therefore the Attorney General directed those in attendance at the meeting to address themselves to the "32 Tasks" (See program review The Cuba Project dated 18 Jan 1962) unfallingly he said "It is not only General Lansdale's job to put the tasks but your's to carry out with every resource at your command.

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3. The Attorney General inquired about the progress in establishing a refugee interrogation center at Miami and was informed that this would be ready to start functioning initially by 15 Feb 1962 -- the target date. With respect to interrogating the back log of Cubans we agreed that we would attack this problem by getting at the more recent arrivals first and work toward those who have been here longer. It was made clear to the Attorney General that one could not relate in time the establishment of an interrogation facility with placing agents to live in Cuba -- in other words a body of information would have to be developed over a period of intensive interrogation of many sources.

4. It was General Lansdales view that there were several tasks amongst the #32 outlined upon which action could be taken without awaiting this detailed intelligence information. He noted for example -- the defection of top Cubans as being within the capabilities of the CIA.

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January 19 1962

Memorandum for: File D-C-1-

Subject: Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States concerning ~~the~~ Cuban ~~problem~~.

(1) I attended a meeting ~~[illegible]~~ at 11 AM today in the Office of the Attorney General which was chaired by him, ~~and~~ Others present were:

Brigadier Gen E.S. Lansdale (OSD)
Major Patchell
Brig General Craig (JCS)
Mr. D. Wilson USIB
Mr Frank Hand (CIA) and,
Mr George McManus CIA.

~~Not present or invited~~
(The Dept of State was not represented although invited.)

(2) ~~The Attorne~~ The Attorney General continued to us "How it all started", findings as they developed and the general feeling within the U.S. Government ~~[illegible]~~ with the ~~[illegible]~~ policy of the U.S. Government ~~[illegible]~~ with the ~~[illegible]~~.

Briefly, these were the main points

(a) after failure of invasion, the U.S Govt retrenched and became less active on the basis "better to lay low".

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(b) However, over the months the complexion of the refugee flow changed (upper classes first out first then middle classes dropping to lower middle classes, etc) which, he stated, indicated a strong feeling of opposition to Castro within Cuba.

(c) Progress in Cuba toward a police state and Communist state was more rapid during this period than that made by any country in Eastern Europe in an equivalent period of time. Hence, because of the rapidity of advance, immediate action was necessary.

(c) With these factors in mind Attorney General had discussion at White House with President, Sec Def (Taylor?) and Lansdale. Sec Def assigned Lansdale to survey problem and he immediately reported to President, Sec Def and Attorney General in late November concluding

I Overthrow of Castro Regime was possible

II Sugar crop should be

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attacked at once

III action to be taken to keep Castro so busy with internal problems (economic, political and social) that he would have no time for meddling abroad (in Latin America

detail ... U.S. Govt was precluded from destroying the current sugar crop ~~because~~ (a) we were late and (b) overly optimistic and (b) "the assets of U.S. Government were not as great as we were led to believe"

(e) Accordingly, a solution to the Cuban problem today carried

"The top priority in the US Govt — all else is secondary, — no time, money effort or manpower is to be spared"

(f) Yesterday (January 18 1962) the President had indicated to him "that the final chapter on Cuba had not been written" — this got to be done

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and will be done.

(g) Therefore the Attorney General directed ~~that~~ those in attendance at the meeting ~~were~~ to address themselves to the "32 Tasks" (see program review The Cuba Project dated 18 Jan 1962) unfailingly knowing it is not only General Lansdale's job to put the tasks but yours to carry out with every resource at your command.

(3) The Attorney General inquired about the status of progress in establishing a refugee interrogation center and was informed that this would be ready to start functioning initially by 15 Feb 1962 — the target date. With respect to interrogations, the back log of Cuban refugees, we agreed that we would attack this problem by getting at the most recent arrivals first and work toward those who have been here longer. It was made clear to the Attorney General that we could not refer the establishment of an interrogation facility with placing

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agents to live in Cuba — in other words a body of information would have to be developed over a period of intensive interrogation of many sources

(4) It was General Lansdale's view that there were several tasks amongst the "32 outlined upon which action could be taken without ~~delay~~ awaiting this detailed intelligence information. He noted for example — the defection of top Cubans as being within the capabilities of the CIA.

00829

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1. When the President, in his letter to Khrushchev of 27 October, gave "assurances against invasion of Cuba" in consideration of the Soviet removal of offensive weapons in Cuba under UN supervision, Operation Mongoose was on its death bed. When the President stated in his letter of 28 October to Khrushchev, "I consider my letter to you of 27 October and your reply of today as a firm undertaking on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out" Operation Mongoose died.

2. If these agreements are carried out it seems clear that Cuba will be dealt with as another denied area in a manner differing not greatly from that in which CIA handles other denied areas. If the agreements are not carried out, military action cannot long be delayed. In either event the Mongoose structure as it has existed in Government is through.

3. Looking back to the origins of Mongoose one finds the Attorney General and Mr. McNamara seeking primarily to remove the political stain left on the President by the Bay of Pigs failure. Both the A. G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for political reasons that some action be taken with respect to Cuba to insure the President's future. In a nutshell, they were out to dump Castro or to make him cooperate.

4. During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official involved, outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was Maxwell Taylor. Others like the Attorney General, McNamara, Gilpatric, Johnson and later Bundy viewed the project in a strictly political light. Hindsight must now reveal to others, as well as it has to us, that a Chief of Operations (i.e. Lansdale) was never actually needed.

5. At present no senior U.S. Government official around town is interested in a future "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Bundy has already suggested the creation in State of an "Office of Cuban Exile Affairs" or "Free Cuban Affairs" which in itself is a move outside of the Mongoose structure. All clandestine activities on the part of

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TFW continue at a stand down. Significant steps have been taken by the Agency together with the military for contingency planning. USIA has moved into the propaganda field under State guidance without relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoose can only live again through "resurrection."

6. Given these circumstances and in the light of great pressures elsewhere in the world CIA, internally, should move with great rapidity to distance Task Force W from any external access. This would involve regularizing or institutionalizing TFW in order that this unique group which has been available to Lansdale as a "whipping boy" becomes a normal part of our monolithic Agency structure. By such a move, neither Lansdale nor anyone else could get at these resources without going through regular channels. Within CIA we would return Cuba to the Western Hemisphere and treat Cuba as a denied area and relate it to over-all WH problems. (Throughout Project Mongoose, this is precisely the manner in which State has handled the problem. As a result Lansdale never felt that he had troops in State as he did in CIA.)

7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of is a corporate one. We should not go through bankruptcy which would have to be announced, but rather pass TFW through an unpublicized receivership and reorganization. The need to realign manpower and assets for demands in other areas would be sufficient reason in itself. The current stand down is a perfect setting for such a change in structure.

8. Concurrently, the DCI should endorse Bundy's suggestion and he should encourage the immediate establishment of an Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve CIA of one of the most annoying and insoluble problems we have faced. This would place problems of proposed Cuban Government structures, provisional governments, platforms, exile politics, and the like, right where they belong - in the Department of State.

9. Absolutely no attempt on our part should be made to unseat Lansdale. Remember that the Attorney General was fighting Lansdale's battle as recently as two weeks ago. Secondly, McNamara and Gilpatric still look upon Lansdale as something of a mystic and are

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on the defensive by virture of his relationship with the Attorney General. Practically everyone at the operating level agrees that Lansdale has lost his value. Bundy and Taylor are not impressed with him. Bill Quinn and company obviously have his number as do we. With a political solution to the Cuban problem in hand reflecting great credit on the part of the President, the A.G. will drop Lansdale like a hot brick. Therefore, while awaiting the outcome of the Cuban talks, we must at once deny Lansdale direct access to TFW. Lansdale can have access as to all other CIA components through the DCI during the stand down period.

10. Lansdale's reaction to any reassignment is apt to be a violent one. He undoubtedly realizes that he never again will be in the position of a special advisor to the two most powerful men in the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within CIA and put TFW beyond his reach without delay (except through the DCI) he might be able to inflict serious damage to CIA's standing before his eventual demise.

11. To summarize, the following action is required:

a. Internally, institutionalize TFW. Grate it into WH. (Defense will then look to DIA for intelligence and DIA to us.)

b. Push (through the DCI and Bundy) for the immediate establishment of the Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in the Department of State.

Gordon McLeod
Nov 5 1962

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